Aspirational Journeys: Alienation, Authenticity and the Future of Japanese Tourism

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Introduction: We live in a post-modern world - the fruition of a long evolution of human society from the ancient to the pre-modern, and with the invention of the machine, the astonishing mechanical age we call the modern. It unleashed social and cultural forces around the world that eventually collided in the mid-century catastrophe we refer to as World War II, and in its passing gave birth to its child, the post-modern era. Man’s ability to control and conquer nature from the atomic bomb to chemical processes making plastics, semiconductors and gene-splicing, super-computers and smartphones is the hallmark of this era - we increasingly replace nature with the surreal, the synthetic and the virtual experience. Alienation is the price mankind - human society - has paid, and it exacts an ever rising price tag on convenience, speed, and virtual wonder. Alienation is the atrophy of the soul and the natural condition of man in a fabricated society.

Yet the rewards of this post-modern world are - for now - also abundant. Spreading global prosperity, rising longevity, productivity, and immense growth in personal choice. Almost anyone can apply for a passport, buy a suitcase and some suntan oil then hop on a jumbo-jet for almost any destination on the planet. Tourism today is a barometer of this prosperity but it is also a mirror of alienation, millions of anonymous inbound visitors from other cultures descending for a few hours of gawking at attractions - increasingly man-made ones. Mass tourism, with its ubiquitous buses, its selfie-sticks obscuring the very attractions that sightseeing requires, its bad manners and tawdry souvenirs, and its near-total emotional detachment are the dark side of the coin.

Japan is a stark example of a post-modern society, one that fell into disarray and decline from self-inflicted problems in the “bubble economy” of the late 1980s. In an increasingly alienated society, the dramatic surge in inbound tourism that began in 2013 and broke all records in 2015, provides a possibility of positive and constructive change. In this paper we will look at the roots of this alienation and the potentially transformative power of tourism, which we learn to our surprise became Japan’s fifth largest export industry in 2015, after autos, electronics, steel and auto parts.

We also introduce the notion of “aspirational journeys” to characterise this potential for growth. Humans travel for many reasons - for business, for family, for adventure, for migration, and we like to note, for aspirational reasons. Tourism has its roots in pilgrimages, across
I The Meaning of the Lost Decades

History may not repeat, but it echoes, someone has said and that is true today in Japan as well. I am going to make a few points about historical antecedents, the major eras of the past 400 or so years and the way that Japanese culture and society have adapted to abrupt changes in their environment - often successfully. But I will also introduce the notion of “alienation” over the course of economic development in these past 400 years, and what I regard as the source of the severe social malaise which gripped Japan for at least two decades, a period in which alienation intensified. I posit that this malaise and intense alienation arose in the rubble of the “bubble economy” in that short intense
period from 1989 to 1992 when expectations (and asset prices) were raised to unnaturally high levels and then shattered with great speed and severity.

The period that followed, from 1992 to 2012 were indeed the “Lost Decades” in which the plague of “hikikomori” recluses spread, the twisted Aum Shinrikyo cult arose, the “zombie companies” and the “broken convoy” of the financial system festered, with little courage in Japan’s leadership to tackle root problems. In a tragic way, that two-decade period was capped by the Great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster of March 11, 2011, and most traumatically the mind-boggling meltdown of three adjacent nuclear reactors at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi power plant.

It was a period in which Japan’s collective leadership - in government, business and finance - went through a protracted phase of denial about the terrible judgments they had made in the bubble and its aftermath. There was further a sense of dismay at the incompetence shown by Tokyo at the time of the Great Kobe Earthquake in January 1995, and the chaotic search for culprits in what turned out to be the Aum Shinrikyo cult and its malevolent terror attack on civil society with home-brewed sarin nerve gas.

Also a mark of the deepening alienation in Japanese society was the betrayal of the labor movement in the early years of the new millennium, following the collapse of the so-called Internet Bubble. Japan’s global electronics industry found itself in its first ever severe contraction, and captains of industry collaborated to initiate a series of measures to undermine the status of industrial labor unions by allowing labor-recruitment firms to take over large swaths of factory workers. This betrayal has since widened the wealth-gap among privileged employees able to retain traditional lifetime employment status, and the many more thrust into the low-pay, low-security contract labor pool, which today is regarded by many observers as one reason young Japanese are unable or unwilling to start families for lack of sufficient lifetime earnings.

One might add the questionable judgment of a succession of Bank of Japan executives who have obstinately stuck with a near-zero interest-rate policy since 2001 despite no evidence it is effective in reversing deflation. Perhaps the greatest dismay for the people of Japan in this period, however, was the signal failure of the liberal opposition parties to show effective national leadership and unity - despite being given several opportunities to do so by voters, first with the election of Morihiro Hosokawa in 1993 and later with the election of Yukio Hatoyama in 2009. Despite a yearning for alternative leadership to the clumsy LDP political machine that had ruled since 1955, on neither occasion was the opposition able to form the stable two-party system that many had hoped would emerge. On top of all this one could also add the growing aversion of global investors to take long-term positions in Japanese assets, notably equities - with the result that share prices dipped to a low of just ¥7,200 on the Nikkei 225 index during the post-Lehman crisis recession of 2009.

But alienation is not a new phenomenon, but rather represents the psychological price mankind has paid for its historical progress over the past several hundred years. For simplicity and broad explanatory use, I outline those centuries as a historical evolution from the ancients to the pre-modern era, the modern era, and the period we are now in, the post-modern era. (I sense that we are already transitioning beyond the post-modern to something new, but am not quite sure how to define or delineate what that might be.)

Ancient civilisations emerged from neolithic societies in many parts of the world, but as the great English historian, Edward Gibbon shrewdly observed, they were inevitably compromised by their human frailties, and hence were doomed to rise and fall as fate and fortune would have it. Some of these civilisations may have developed recognisable pre-modern aspects - Roman laws, roads, aqueducts, public sanitation, sophisticated urban life - but they did not survive without the disruptions caused by wars, invasion, break-up and decline. In any case, to set out my timeline for students, I note that in the European context, the heart of what I call the pre-modern era is the Renaissance, the flowering of knowledge and the opening of the human mind. Alienation in this time may have been more of a liberation from hard village life, illiteracy and superstition that
had taken root in the Dark Ages, but it was nonetheless a break with tradition. The modern era is the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the machine and the factory, and here alienation takes firm root as people leave handicraft and farming - direct manufacturing of food and practical objects - to something new, an era of inventions one after the other harnessing science and technology to the production of things - in vast quantity. While it is an age of affluence and the emergence of a new middle class, it is a time also of dislocation and loss of tradition, loss of what might be called “home.”

Harnessing coal-fired engines to ships and trains (and of course in the early 20th century, to automobiles and airplanes) also created a dislocation of time and space. Speed was no longer that of the race horse or the darting swifts and sparrows, but something everyman could experience. Acceleration of time, history, social movements was the new reality but so was the sense of runaway forces, collisions and passions. The modern era of course came to its fateful climax in the first truly global war, fought by humans but with inhumane scale, power and devastation. The modern period without doubt ended abruptly in early August 1945 at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whose mushroom clouds as abruptly gave birth to the post-modern era.

The atomic weapons dropped with military precision and planning by the US Air Force on Japan with the goal of bringing hostilities to an end also proved just how fast and far Mankind had traveled in the previous hundred years since the machine age began. Man had tapped the hidden principles embedded in nature - magnetism, chemical reaction, aerodynamics, cracking of buried petroleum reserves for fuel, and finally the atom itself. The post-modern era is therefore the age of the surreal, the synthetic, and as we accelerate into the world of ubiquitous electronics and digital technology, the virtual. It leaves nature behind to stagnate and to shrivel as man’s assertive demand on its resources grows almost without limit or hesitation.

The year 1945 is as clear a historical dividing line between now and then - with Japan as its ground zero - as the way lower Manhattan becomes the dividing line on September 11th, 2001. What we call our current era, which follows from 9/11, is unclear. Perhaps another Dark Age is ahead as climate change fundamentally breaks the underlying natural stability of climate and weather we have taken for granted for the past 5,000 years. Climate changes break up the basis of civilised life, as we know it. A new but eerily old age like that when great civilisations like Rome were overtaken and vandalised by barbarians. Look no further than the ruins of Aleppo for evidence.

Alienation in a world of the surreal, synthetic and virtual is not just a loss of connection, a growing existential angst about the evidence man has truly lost the mythical Garden of Eden, but evidence that humans have lost solidarity and responsibility for themselves and the world around them. Alienation is real and finds many new and often bizarre ways of expression. Despite the ubiquity of knowledge and information, wisdom, patience and understanding are abandoned for fanaticism, fundamentalism, and bestiality.

Few people in Japan today like to admit that a mere 20 years ago saw the emergence of an entirely home-grown made-in-Japan terrorist cult that researched and developed crude but deadly weapons of mass destruction and unleashed them on unsuspecting and ordinary civilians, not just in the Tokyo underground nerve gas attacks, but also in a previous attack conducted in the provincial city of Matsumoto with the hope, it appears, of killing residents of a judicial residence compound. The fact that a near-blind former masseuse could attract highly-educated members and transform their alienation into a sinister and eventually homicidal cult demanding absolute loyalty is an icon of that alienation most Japanese would rather forget, as they would rather forget the Red Army Faction and other home-grown political radicals of an earlier era.

II Modernism Arrives in Japan

But let’s go back and look at older historical antecedents in Japan. In my view, the pre-modern phase is quite different from that experienced in Europe, namely the consolidation of near dictatorial powers in the hands of the Tokugawa clan - which built its command and control apparatus with such care it maintained its continuity.
for nearly 250 years, handing power from father to son.

Commoners across much of then settled Japan enjoyed a long stretch of stability and freedom from violence under the firm, sometimes harsh hand of the samurai administrators who were the visible hand of the Shogunal state in their lives. But it is not necessary in this essay to provide the innumerable details but rather to show how the transitions came, and how they were managed. The shift to modernity in Japan was in fact a dramatic and rapid one, a coalescing of anti-Tokugawa opposition among other clans bristling with frustration and ambition, struck by the advances made by Western naval ships that had suddenly appeared in Japanese waters.

The Meiji Restoration transformed Japan with astonishing rapidity as the newly installed rulers went about erasing the samurai class and replacing with a more utilitarian - and only haltingly egalitarian social compact. In my view the abruptness of the transition, and the replacement of one set of aristocratic executives with another more modern one left the great mass of Japanese largely untouched. It was only later as they were drafted into the military and into the industrial system that they too began to feel the painful price of change - alienation from traditional life replaced with an unsure but more regimented one in industrial cities. The Meiji government did have some trump cards it played to manage the upheaval, namely the newly introduced notion of Japan as a single united country under a newly created Imperial system, one of many clever mechanisms for social control invented by these impatient and ambitious Meiji leaders.

But as in Europe, the acceleration that took Japan from isolated and marginal in world affairs, to an exporter of increasingly advanced industrially made products and a builder of increasingly advanced armaments, rose in the same arc of military adventurism cloaked by a fascist rationale for the rigid ways in which life was regimented. It too ended in collision and a level of national destruction almost without comprehension, not only the atomic weapons but the harrowing fire-bombing of nearly all Japanese cities. Post-modern Japan had to be forged out of the ashes and ruins - but that too was accomplished with similar determination and vision as the Meiji. Once again Japan had a slogan to motivate its people - the call to create a strong Japan on par with the western victors. This time it was the call to “catch up and surpass” the rivals in the West (追い付け追い越せ) and while alienation did tear at the emotional fabric of post-war life among intellectuals and artists, it was also smothered in a prolonged banquet of mass consumerism that raised living standards and created the appearance of a happy and motivated middle class with its picture perfect notions of salaryman, dutiful wife and energetic children. Japan was again on an ascending arc and prosperity burst forth with affluence both material and emotional once television and other electric conveniences entered the home.

Alienation was more profound among intellectuals and artists, after all this was the era of plastics too as in the other prosperous western countries, a plasticity of science and engineering bred into a constant flow of goods to feed the mass consumer hunger that affluence and advertising created. Some artists felt a loss of a simpler, more authentic Japanese lifestyle, less Americanised with its gaucherie and vulgarity, Elvis, Coca-Cola and hamburgers. Others were haunted by the detonation of nuclear weapons in the Pacific atolls to the south, a similar sense of the violation of Nature that gave rise to the famous monsters of Japanese cinema and graphic art. With the US intervention in the Vietnam War, a younger generation felt shame and anger at their country supporting a brutal and lop-sided war in another, nearby Asian country. As in Germany, some took the path of political extremism and terror aimed, they hoped, at softening the contours of corrupt post-modern capitalism. And yet these radical movements subsided and rising prosperity became for a time an antidote to alienation, but that too was to come to an abrupt end, a collision once again of runaway expectations with the hard surfaces of economic reality.

From 1989 to 1992, Japan enjoyed a surreal suspension of the normal rules of economic life, an abandonment of caution and common sense that for a short three years infected nearly the entire business community along with a good swath of the normally cautious gov-
ernment agencies. Surging real estate prices and a highly accommodative monetary policy, coupled with rising notional wealth based on the Plaza Accord dollar-yen realignment led many to draw the flawed but flirtatious conclusion that at last Japan had won in peace what it could not in war, a wealth unimaginable and the ability to command global industry, investment and prestige.

Perhaps Japan’s post-modern era came to its sudden end as the Bubble Economy collapsed in 1992 for the simple reason that this time, there was no feel-good slogan to harness national pride and effort to start again and accomplish something better. The end of the bubble dragged Japan into an astonishing void of alienation from top to bottom in what has since been called the Lost Decades, lasting from 1992 to 2012. Japan was gutted, its elite companies and institutions reeling from the massive debt they took on chasing the illusion of ever-rising asset prices, and it was at this time that denial took root in more corrosive ways than in the Meiji and MacArthur transitions. There wasn’t really anyone to blame, the lunacy of the bubble was collective, which robbed the system of the means with which to assign blame and allocate costs. Instead, the costs were socialised but slowly, and the ordinary householders (who later came to be known as Mr. and Mrs. Watanabe) ended up footing the bill with the result that affluence and well-being were diminished. As the yen surged in most of this period, corporate appetite for investment and employment in Japan declined, and greater numbers of college graduates sought lower-paying “freeter” jobs in the emerging service economy, joined by more housewives and older retirees needing to supplement declining disposable incomes. Middle-aged men who had expected lifetime employment to continue, found themselves abruptly “restructured” with the result that economic suicides surged to more than 33,000 per year.

III An Inspirational Destination: The Inbound Tourism Boom

But frankly it is now time to switch focus from this long litany of Japan’s past woes - which you Japanese readers of this Bulletin know only too well, but which my foreign exchange students know hardly at all. Most are in their early 20s, born around the same time as the Internet (Yahoo was launched in 1994) and history to them is generally something found buried in textbooks or embodied in historical monuments. My teaching career here at Rikkyo coincides with a dramatic sea-change in the way Japan regards the notion of tourism, especially in light of what has just in the past 2 years emerged as a bona fide and widely celebrated macroeconomic phenomenon - the “Inbound Tourism Boom.”

I will now focus now on the many changes that this boom will engender, and I mention two additional themes that I use to help my students (of any nationality) to understand the deeper origins and drivers of what we know universally as “tourism.” For most engaged one way or another in the industry, it generally it refers to the notion of “leisure travel by families and small groups to other countries for shopping and sightseeing.”

We all know the stereotypes: A visit to Tokyo Disneyland perhaps, gawking at the neon lights along the Ginza, shopping for traditional souvenirs in Kyoto, perhaps even putting on a “genuine” kimono and enjoying a rickshaw ride in our nearby “Deep Japan” destination called “Koedo” Kawagoe.

The two themes that I use to connect this conventional (and for daily purposes practical) definition of tourism with its older, spiritual and hedonistic origins in pilgrimages is the notion of “aspirational journeys” and “inspirational destinations.” They are inter-related but by separating them, I can highlight the dual “yin-yang” aspects that define tourism but also fuel a persistent tension, what I call the “tourism dilemma” between visitor and host, between the pilgrims and the keepers of the shrines.

If tourism has its roots in pilgrimage, it is easy to see how these two aspects of spiritual and hedonistic are always in an embrace, though not always admitted. Tourism is enjoyable - the companionship, the adventure, the novelty, the learning, and the sense of renewal, and the evenings spent in lodgings with other travellers are simply put hedonistic pleasure. But it is perhaps the just reward for the spiritual quest, the hardships, the separation from home, the arduous and sometimes haz-
ardous travel to distant places to see what may be mere dusty ruins, relics from a holier time. In that sense, tourism today is not just a leisure activity, a crass display of bourgeois achievements as some critics would argue, bragging rights acquired by tan lines and branded luxury goods purchased at those ubiquitous “Duty-Free” shops in airports and tourist meccas.

Perhaps I am old-fashioned. But I regard a trip to Waikiki as not all that different from older trips to tour ancient ruins of Athens and Rome, the Alhambra and the Louvre, or the natural grandeur of Niagara Falls or Mt. Fuji. To gaze at the legacy of the past via cultural tourism or the grandeur of “God’s creations” in nature, or to return to the baptism of the ocean (even for surfing and snorkelling) have antecedents in the spiritual quest that takes peasants from their humble lives on once-in-a-lifetime spiritual journeys. Such trips, we know, are uplifting in intent and often in result. (I am indebted to the late John Urry for his many penetrating insights in The Tourist Gaze 3.0, with Jonas Larssen, SAGE Publications, 2011).

They are what I call “aspirational journeys”. After all we know from industry and trade data that modern tourism is an accurate barometer for the health of the global economy, and we note the the word “aspirational” might most closely be associated with the rapid expansion of a prosperous middle class in the world’s “emerging” economies who “aspire” (hope, work and reach for those icons of achievement which of course include trips abroad) to have more than what their parents - often rising out of poverty, post-colonial stresses, and newfound engagement via globalism - could conjure in their most earnest dreams.

But I don’t want to merely equate the notion of “aspirational journeys” with rising middle-class consumer “mobilities” (as Urry would have put it.) In my view the notion of “aspirational” is as old and as new as society itself, by which I mean that regardless of location, avocation, economic status and religious beliefs, there is in civilised humans a need and an urge for re-affirmation, for re-connection, and what I strongly believe, for “re-creation” via a pilgrimage undertaken in adulthood to seek meaning in life and perhaps to touch on God’s work by going to places where it can be found.

I routinely tell my Rikkyo students at the beginning of each term how lucky they are, but how poorly they understand their own good fortune. Why, I ask them rhetorically, would 19.7 million foreign visitors have made the costly and often challenging trip to Japan during 2015, setting new records and for the first time in 45 years spending more on travel to Japan than the Japanese spent on travel overseas? They do not quite perceive what are the emotional drivers that have brought so many people - 80% of them from other countries in Asia - to come to this remote and unique island country. One might say the animals on the Galapagos Islands do not experience a sense of uniqueness, even as the adventure tourists with their expensive cameras (and selfie-sticks) crowd around them.

Japan is a “Makunouchi-bento” of cultural, historical, and natural attractions and destinations - and my students typically don’t know how different their cultural context and environment are from the places where those inbound tourists were born and raised. As an inbounder myself, I have cherished the sheer uniqueness, diversity, and accomplishment of even the most humble aspects of life in Japan - the promptness of its trains, the cleanliness of its public toilets, the ubiquitous availability of its vending machines and convenience stores. And much more. With my students we are creating a “Bunkapedia” open-sourced online guide to the “most Japanese” aspects of the culture.

So in this sense, my students have the opportunity to make aspirational journeys in their careers - more ambitious than some of their more cautious “senpai” or seniors who graduated and entered the work force in more difficult times. With my colleagues at Rikkyo, I hope they will be willing to take risks in new ventures because the opportunities created by inbound tourism are so many and so diversified. They may realise that failure is just a learning phase on the way to success, which I would call their inspirational destination. Not just another cog in the corporate machinery of some colossal brand-name company but perhaps as an innovator, risk-taker, entrepreneur who not just takes on a job, but creates new jobs for others, including his or her
kohai from Rikkyo and other like-minded schools.

I would add that I have high hopes and take much satisfaction from the policy shift in Tokyo’s governing circles, a move begun by still popular former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and ardently supported by his own LDP kohai, Shinzo Abe, current prime minister, a man with the rare opportunity granted by voters to be prime minister twice. Koizumi and his staff recognised what economic analysts and government planners now see as reality: namely that inbound tourism is the same as export of other goods and services. Though it does not “leave the country” the income and revenues come in from abroad, the same way as overseas sales of Japan-made cars, computer chips, and Aomori apples are counted as exports. It was an important discovery.

In a recent research note by Shumpei Fujita at MUFT Research and Consulting it is apparent just how big these “export earnings” from inbound tourism really are. They rank 5th in size (value) after automobiles, electronic components, steel and automotive components. (Fujita, MUFT, April 2016.)

I would like to close by saying this investment by official and corporate Japan has another potentially huge payback. Tourism, like many consumer oriented export industries, has a surprisingly large psychological component. After all in many countries buying a “made-in Japan” product - a car, a TV, a manga, or an Aomori apple - has an aspirational aspect all of its own. Consumers around the world study, search and investigate their consumption options and often choose the intangible cultural values they associate with made-in-Japan.

But beyond shaping and maintaining an appetite for made-in-Japan products (think of Uniqlo apparel and Mujirushi household goods), the inbound tourism boom has another intangible impact: Person-to-person, first-hand grass-roots engagement in cross-border diplomacy.

For the 80% of 2015 inbound visitors who came from other countries in Asia, the Japan they discovered and experienced likely changed their image and evaluation of Japan in a positive way, and their many postings and messages on their home-country social networks likely help disseminate a positive view of Japan to millions of fellow natives in those countries. (I am working on supporting this theory with evidence from visitor surveys).

Frankly, I cannot imagine a more cost-effective form of diplomatic interaction than supporting inbound tourism with incentives to all the stakeholders in the process - including the incentives to those visitors via tax-free stores and VAT-refunds to visitors. The bottom line is that luck and smart policy innovations have created an export boom that occurs daily across Japan, and spreads the revenues and income to new and diversified participants who never had a chance in the old hardware-based export industry of Japan.

Blue skies, clean water, safe streets, fast and prompt train connections, great food at accessible prices, little discrimination, an egalitarian society, a trustworthy police and political class. I may exaggerate but - as my Professor Ezra Vogel wrote many years ago, in his 1979 book Japan As Number One (Harvard University Press, 1979) Japan still has many valuable, in fact enviable, social innovations that enhance stability, public morality, and as the outpouring of volunteer assistance after the Kobe and Tohoku earthquakes show, a genuine post-modern solidarity. It is my hope that the Inbound Tourism boom will help reinforce these characteristics and that our Rikkyo students will take up the challenge.

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