How Do We Define Wilderness Beyond Designated Wilderness Areas?
いかにウィルダネス指定区を越えてウィルダネスを定義するか

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Abstract: In this paper, I deliberate on how we can define wilderness beyond designated wilderness areas. Although pristine condition is a primal requirement for designated wilderness areas established by the Wilderness Act of 1964, it is questionable whether pristine nature is real or nostalgia. In addition, designated wilderness areas could be “the incarceration of wildness” (Birch, 1990), while wildness complements us in the premise of wildness as otherness: uncontrollable and unpredictable. If wilderness is the other, it should have autonomy independent from human beings. To think of wilderness as the subject, intrinsic value is a key, which is that “wilderness is valuable just because it exists, just because it is” (Nelson, 1998, p. 191). Following this, Rolston’s “systemic value” is “held within the historic system that carries value to and through individuals” (1993[1991b], p. 144). If ecosystems work in a certain place, we could call that place “wilderness” on the assumption that wilderness has systemic value. When the value is confirmed, it is not necessary to exclude human activity from wilderness. Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wildness is everywhere across the boundary separating nature from society. Liberated wildness from designated wilderness areas is the essential quality for wilderness. On the other hand, Elliot (1999 [1982]) and Katz (2012) don’t allow human intervention in nature. They argue authenticity of nature based on the arguments of the intrinsic value. Two keywords of wilderness: intrinsic value and wildness don’t compromise because the wilderness idea has a contradiction between permanence and novelty.
1. Introduction

Since the Wilderness Act of 1964, the National Wilderness Preservation System (WPS) has designated 762 areas encompassing 109 million acres of federally owned land in the U.S. These areas are called designated wilderness areas to distinguish them from the wilderness idea. In the Wilderness Act, the definition of wilderness is that “[a] wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” It continues, “[a]n area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this Act an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions...”.

According to the Act, designated wilderness areas are positioned as the opposite of areas where human activities take place. Designated wilderness areas should have no or little human influence. However, this principle has been criticized in terms of historical science. Long-term influence by Native Americans and middle-term influence by early European settlers altered the American landscape even before the intense industrial development of modern times. This paper, therefore, aims at elucidating how we can define wilderness beyond designated wilderness areas. Let me briefly describe the contents of the following sections.

In section two, I discuss the wilderness idea that underlies the Wilderness Act. Cronon (1998[1995]) identifies two main sources of the wilderness idea: “the sublime and the frontier” (p. 474). If the wilderness idea is a product of Romanticism and nostalgia, it is not an actual place, but an abstraction.

In section three, I discuss how designated wilderness areas are controversial, referring to Birch’s argument of “imperium” (1990, p. 462). He argues that these areas are an “asylum” (p. 449) that incarcerates wildness for the sake of society. Turner (1996) defines that “wilderness is a place, wildness a quality” (pp. 83–84). If wildness is a primal condition for wilderness, incarcerated wildness cannot make a place wilderness. Birch argues wildness can reside everywhere, not only in designated wilderness areas. When we regard wildness as otherness, wilderness complements us as others.

To redefine wilderness away from designated wilderness areas, in section four, I discuss Nelson’s (1998) arguments about the “concept of wilderness,” referring to the arguments over “morality” and objectivism/subjectivism between Rolston (1998[1991a], 1993[1991b]) and Callicott (1991a, 1998[1991b]). To identify the substance of wilderness, I consider intrinsic value and systemic value. According to Nelson (1998), intrinsic value means that “wilderness is valuable just because it exists, just because it is” (p. 191). Following this idea, Rolston argues that the systemic value (1993[1991b], p. 143) is in ecosystems based on the historical continuity of nature without human evaluators. I argue that the systemic value does not fix the boundary of ecosystems to designated wilderness areas; rather, it allows ecosystems to expand beyond the boundary. If we regard ecosystems as wildness, wilderness
can exist beyond designated wilderness areas.

Lastly, I discuss the authenticity of nature with intrinsic value, and wildness in order to rethink what wilderness is. Both McShane (2007) and Minteer (2001) adopt pluralism in order to overcome the dualism between nature and society. Elliot (1999 [1982]) and Katz (2012) do not recognize ecological restoration because it is “faked nature” (Elliot, 1999 [1982], p. 388). Human interference in natural continuity is unacceptable to them. On the other hand, Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wilderness is everywhere regardless of human activities.

2. The Sublime and the Frontier: Two Main Sources of the Wilderness Idea

First, I discuss Cronon’s (1998[1995]) wilderness idea because it underlies the Wilderness Act of 1964. In thinking about designated wilderness areas, the wilderness idea is necessary. Cronon (1998[1995]) argues that the two main sources of the wilderness idea are “the sublime and the frontier” (p. 474) in a historical context. If the wilderness idea is a product of Romanticism and nostalgia, wilderness is not an actual place, but an abstraction.

Cronon (1998[1995]) argues that “there is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness” (p. 483), but instead there is “the cultural invention of wilderness” (p. 483). He lists the main sources of the wilderness idea as “the sublime and the frontier” (p. 474). First, Romanticism changed the view toward the American wilderness from “deserted, savage, desolate, barren” (p. 473) and other negative images derived from the King James Version (p. 473) of the Bible, to “Eden itself” (p. 473). Sublime nature became a shrine outside of a dark cave. Referring to John Muir’s opposition (Muir, 1912, p. 715) to the construction of a dam in Hetch Hetchy Valley within the boundaries of Yellowstone National Park, Cronon (1998[1995]) claims “[f]or Muir and the growing number of Americans who shared his views, Satan’s home had become God’s own temple” (p. 474). Untamed land is not worthless anymore but is rather an invaluable place to be protected by humans before it is spoiled by development or exploitation. Once, wilderness was seen as an agent that exerted pressure on society, especially in areas surrounding villages, but now, humans are seen as agents affecting wilderness, while wilderness is a passive object. Wilderness has been deprived of subjectivity and put on an altar far away from society. “As more and more tourists sought out the wilderness as a spectacle to be looked at and enjoyed for its great beauty, the sublime in effect became domesticated” (p. 478). Sacred places attracted people and, as a result, were trampled down by tourists.

The second source of the wilderness idea is the notion of the frontier, which supported the legislation of designated wilderness areas. Since F. J. Turner (1920, pp. 37-38) declared “the frontier has gone,” Americans have lamented the lost landscape that represented American identity. Americans have tried to preserve wilderness for their frontier experience. They wish the frontier offered them a “free Spirit” and “individualism” (Cronon, 1998[1995], p. 480).
That world and all of its attractions, Turner said, depended on free land-on wilderness. Thus, in the myth of the vanishing frontier lay the seeds of wilderness preservation in the United States, for if wild land had been so crucial in the making of the nation, then surely one must save its last remnants as monuments to the American past—and as an insurance policy to protect its future. (Cronon, 1998 [1995], p. 479)

This notion would contribute to the establishment of national park systems and the Wilderness Act, and, in a sense, wilderness works as a “recreation” (Wilderness Act) area for urban dwellers. Cronon (1998 [1995]) writes, “wilderness offers us the illusion that we can escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared us” (p. 483). Pristine wilderness is a free zone away from constrained urban life. Urban inhabitants visit no-man’s lands, release their wildness, and then return to the restricted city. Cronon (1998 [1995]) raises opposition to “[t]he wilderness dualism” (p. 490), saying, “[i]dealizing a distant wilderness too often means not idealizing the environment in which we actually live, the landscape that for better or worse we call home” (p. 490). In terms of democracy, in other words, for equality between urban and rural people, or between consumers and producers, Cronon (1998 [1995]) advocates the concept of “[t]he middle ground… where we actually live” (p. 490). There are no frontiers but one common ground for both including “human” and “nonhuman.” He appropriates wildness even outside of designated wilderness areas.

This will only happen, however, if we abandon the dualism that sees the tree in the garden as artificial—completely fallen and unnatural—and the tree in the wilderness as natural—completely pristine and wild. Both trees in some ultimate sense are wild; both in a practical sense now depend on our management and care. We are responsible for both, even though we can claim credit for neither. (Cronon, 1998 [1995], p. 494)

Since human’ influences are everywhere, wildness is also everywhere. Cronon (1998 [1995]) emphasizes our responsibility for all of nature, in other words, management and care. If we value wilderness historically, nature includes a human history, and not only Native Americans’ culture but also frontiersmen’s trading posts, European settlers’ agricultural fields, and modern tourists may be valued. Quoting Thoreau’s saying, “in wildness is the preservation of the World” (1862), Cronon argues that “for wildness (as opposed to wilderness) can be found anywhere: in the seemingly tame fields and woodlots of Massachusetts, in the cracks of a Manhattan sidewalk, even in the cells of our own bodies” (p. 495). He values wildness instead of wilderness. However, if wildness makes a place wilderness, wilderness can be appropriated regardless of criticism of the wilderness idea.

3. Incarcerated Wildness to Comprehend Otherness

In the last section, I discuss criticism of the wilderness idea that underlies the Wilderness Act. In this section, I focus on the problem of designated wilderness area created by the Wilderness Act, using Birch’s (1990) argument that wilderness is “the
incarceration of wilderness” in a social context. Birch argues “imperium” (p. 462), referring to Euro-American history, to be: “a wilderness reservation can still give the lie to the imperial story of Western civilization” (p. 462). This argument can be explained using the example of the treatment of Jews in Europe. Germany incarcerated Jews in wall-encircled areas called Ghettos, while Spain, Portugal, and England expelled them. The Third Reich endeavored to exile them; however, since it kept pushing its boundaries, Jewish people stayed in the empire. The Nazis’ final resolution was extermination and the destruction of every Jewish cultural trace, except the architecture and cemetery in the Prague Ghetto, which was preserved as a “Museum of the Extinct Race” (The Jerusalem Post, 2008). Ironically, the physical artifacts of Jewish heritage that are in the best condition in Europe nowadays are the ones preserved by the Nazis, who were the most destructive force against the Jews. On the other hand, Nazis reused victims’ belongings, including not only possessions such as glasses, clothes, and jewelry, but also body parts such as hair, skin, teeth, and bones. The Nazis captured Jews and used them as resources but did not grant them rights.

“Western culture was a cluster of tenuously connected islands surrounded by a sea of wilderness, civilization now surrounds… the last islands of wilderness, and puts everything to use, wasting nothing” (Birch, 1990, pp. 461–462). To eliminate threats, Western society expanded and conquered otherness, and then the proportion reversed. Society preserved the threat “to give humans control over otherness…. [T]he imperium must therefore attempt to keep its game” (p. 458). Key to Birch’s argument is the idea that we cannot completely remove our nemesis, in order to maintain our own identity. Before Thoreau argued the necessity of preserving wilderness for our society in Walking (1861), he wrote Civil Disobedience (1849) in opposition to the Mexican-American War (1846–1848), which could be seen as American expansionism. To consider Birch’s (1990) “imperium” (p. 462), it is necessary to think about Native Americans.

In the colonial era, newcomers encountered Native Americans in the U.S. White settlers lived next to the tribes, whom they regarded as belonging to the dark wilderness. However, as the frontier was conquered and the white settlers became Americans and began to surround the wilderness, Native Americans were forced to become remnants. Nabokov and Loendorf (2004) researched Yellowstone National Park and its local tribes and showed how these tribes were alienated from American society.

Across the nation these “Last of…” Indians continued to function as protagonists of novels, or the stuff of local legends, as still today one hears about or sees evocative photographs depicting the “last” Indian full-blood, the “last” speaker of an Indian language, the “last” Indian medicine man.

These images offered a psychological mechanism for outsiders to symbolically justify the physical removal or elimination of Indians that had occurred or that appeared imminent. With such sentimental requiems for the “passing of the Redman”, by offering praiseworthy laments for their nobility and indulging in nostalgia for their heyday as Noble Savages and poignance at their extinction, non-Indians at the same time paved the way for their physical
elimination and freed themselves of any guilt for it. (Nabokov & Loendorf, 2004, p. 289)

This argument reminds us of Cronon’s source of the wilderness idea, “post-frontier ideology” (1998 [1995], p. 475). Cronon insists that “[t]he movement to set aside national parks and wilderness areas followed hard on the heels of the final Indian wars, in which the prior human inhabitants of these areas were rounded up and moved onto reservations” (1998 [1995], p. 482). Americans lamented the loss of the frontier, which they had conquered under the belief of their manifest destiny. American society compelled Native Americans to enter the American myth. The tribes were not subjective but objective in narrative. Native Americans were incarcerated in reservations. Part of their lands became national parks and then designated wilderness areas. Imperium never granted any rights to the tribes. They were managed in the remote reservations by the U.S. government.

The wilderness idea and “imperium” (Birch, 1990, p. 462) is seen in Disneyland as well, as argued by Davis below.

One of the images we have of our past frontier is a place of new beginnings. It was also, unfortunately, a place of endings, especially for the native American population, for it was on the frontier where the native tribes began to view their own demise. It was a place where conflicts were played out: white settlers and native tribes...It was a place where even rural interests and urban influences met in ways that began to change the political and economic picture of America forever. Genocide of the native American tribes is not a part of the Frontier Land we can view at Disneyland. Disney’s frontier is a much happier and joyful place, the illusion of which we tend to enjoy seeing and thinking about as a culture. (Davis, 2011, p. 166)

Similar to this view of Disneyland, designated wilderness areas work for American recreation in the Wilderness Act of 1964. The bill mentions “wilderness areas” that shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people... Designated wilderness areas should not be dangerous or filled with “savage” Indian hostility. The places for tribes’ hunting and gathering or worship were altered into safe playgrounds for American families. Native Americans would appear only in the folk tales that a father tells his son around their portable stove and dinner. Birch (1990) argues that “[the] finalization of the identification of the other is a (self-deceived) absorption or ingestion of the other into the subjectivity of the self, or on the social level, into the “system” (p. 451). Wilderness was incarcerated in designated wilderness areas so that we could bring law wildness, in other words, comprehend otherness, which is seen as unpredictable or uncontrollable.

“The otherness of wildland is objectified into human resource, or value, categories and allocated by law to specific uses (thus bringing law to the land)” (Birch, 1990, p. 448). Although bringing law into wilderness represents an old attitude toward wilderness before Romanticism, according to Birch, this view continues until now. He also states that we can feel wildness everywhere, referring to Gary Snyder. Finally, mentioning Leopold’s Land Ethic, Birch concludes, “cooperates with others as complementary to us” (1990, p. 464-65). If wildness is a primal condition for wilderness, incarcerated wildness cannot make a place wilderness. Birch argues that wildness can reside everywhere, not only in designated
wilderness areas. Is it possible to define wilderness beyond designated wilderness area? With this in mind, I discuss two values of wilderness in terms of otherness in the next section.

4. Beyond Designated Wilderness Areas: Arguments over Intrinsic Value


Nelson organizes the arguments about the “concept of wilderness” (p. 154) into thirty sections in his paper, “An Amalgamation of Wilderness Preservation Arguments” (1998). Challenging to the concept of wilderness shared commonly in the U.S., he encourages his readers to consider whether or not designated wilderness areas legitimated by the Wilderness Act of 1964 are necessity. He demonstrates how people have raised problems with the values of wilderness. Among these arguments, I pick up two critical arguments regarding self-realization and intrinsic value:

…a sort of asylum of reorientation where this relational self ideal can take form. We must, therefore, maintain areas of “wilderness” in order to achieve a complete and appropriate view of self. Designated wilderness areas are crucial, according to this argument, for individual development and continued existence. (Nelson, 1995, p. 178)

This argument reminds us of the recreation value of wilderness in the Wilderness Act of 1964. First of all, wilderness required preservation for the sake of American citizens, not for wilderness itself. We enter the asylum to form the ideal. The problem of “imperium” is shelved in the self-realization argument. Nelson considers that the self-realization argument is raised by Deep ecology derived from “Muir, Thoreau, Leopold, and the Romantic and American Transcendental traditions” (p. 178). The notion that “in wildness is the preservation of the World,” set forth in Walking (Thoreau, 1862, p. 185), was interpreted by J. Turner (1996), Cronon (1998[1995]), and other environmental thinkers in the 1990s in order to challenge Cartesian dualism.

Although pre-Socratic philosophers employed a holistic view in seeing nature as a unified substance with district properties: Thales’ water, Anaximander’s air, Heraclitus’ fire, and so on, Socrates’ student Plato set up a foundation for the modern philosophy. “Plato developed the dualistic view of the world, celebrating the superiority of the mind over the body, reason over emotion, the ‘real’ world of ideas and forms over the ‘illusory’ world of the senses” (Marshall, 1996, p. 73). Plato made a clear distinction between soul and body; the body can be seen as the “prisoner” of the soul, which is the true person. After death, the
souls are separated while the body decomposes into its original elements. Because the soul is not composed of material substance, it cannot decompose. This is the logic of dualistic hierarchy: mind over matter, mental over physical, reason over emotion.

Turner (1996) explains Deep ecologists’ view, saying, “[A] wild order in complete interdependence comes freedom, a freedom unlike our civil freedoms but, I think, close to what Thoreau imagined” (p. 92). As Deep ecologists focus on holism and try to decentralize anthropocentrism harder, they sometimes undervalue humanity and society, which Thoreau placed weight on, unlike in Turner’s argument. One does not have to go to a remote place such as a designated wilderness area in order to encounter a sense of wonder. Self-realization occurs not only in recreational experiences but also in daily life. Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wildness is everywhere, across the boundary between nature and society. I discuss this in section five.

Turner (1996) continues, “Deep ecologists are desperately attempting to replace the philosophical foundations of a mechanical model of the world with those an organic model of the world…. Reason has not compelled us to respect and care for wild nature…” (p. 88). Turner presumes that in an ecological continuity between human beings and non-human beings, holistic Deep ecologists would abandon dualism, and this is good for wild nature. However, the notions of “wild” and “care” seem to be quite contrary to each other. If we care for wild nature, wildness might be gone because of the domestication referred to in Birch’s “imperium” (1990, p. 462). In relation to this, although wilderness is defined as “undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence” in the Wilderness Act of 1964, managements for retaining the wild would be controversial. Turner (1996) defines that “wilderness is a place, wildness a quality” (pp. 83–84). If wildness is a primal condition for wilderness, incarcerated wildness cannot make a place wilderness. Domesticated others are not others anymore. Away from designated wilderness areas, if wilderness works independently from humans, we might say wilderness is the other. To think of this, I focus on the intrinsic value.

Deep ecologists are opposed to the idea that humans are distinct from other species. On the other hand, Rolston (1991b) argues, “[n]ature is amoral; the moral community is interhuman” and “[o]nly the human species contains moral agents” (p. 126). Then, he argues for “interspecific ethics” rather than enhancing human morals to include nature, adopting Leopold’s “land ethics.” His assumption for developing a proper relationship between nature and society is the appropriation of the difference between humans and nature: “animals have freedom within ecosystems, but humans have freedom from ecosystems. Animals are adapted to their niches; humans adapt their ecosystems to their needs” (1998 [1991a], p. 368). In a sense, for Rolston, humans affect nature negatively, even if we try to protect nature with benevolence: “Worse, cultural protection can work to their detriment; with too much human or humane care their wildness is made over into a human artifact…. Culture is a good thing for humans, often a bad thing for animals” (Rolston, 1993 [1991b], p. 129). He argues that wildness is an ecosystem functioning on its own rules, independently of society (1998 [1991a], p. 368 and 1993 [1991b], p. 129).

Rolston (1993 [1991b]) argues “systemic value” (p. 143), saying, “some value is held
within the historic system that carries value to and through individuals” (p. 144). Because of genetic continuity, ecosystems have value. The value is not in each animal or plant unlike moral human individuals.

On the other hand, Norton (1992) shows us deep ecologists’ concept related to the self-realization, “we must first dismiss the assumed but inaccurate bifurcation between self and nature” (p. 178). They emphasize that there is no difference between human and nature. Coherentists argued the coherence theory of truth and justification. Their truth is that one belief is sustained by other believes, in which the web-like messy structure is not like Cartesian fundamental structure. Norton (1992) considers that Callicott (1991a, 1998 [1991b]) is beyond Cartesian: subject-object distinction like Rolston (1993 [1991b])’s human and nature.

Quoting Fritjof Capra, ‘A basic oneness in the universe’ is also implied which include[s] the observer [the ‘I’] in an essential way”…Adopting Alan Watt’s view that ‘the world is your body’, this approach denies ‘the conventional separation between self and world’ and implies that harms to the rainforest are harms to our extended selves. In this sense the rainforest is intrinsically valuable if the self is. Deep ecology therefore provides, according Callicott, one simple and direct solution to ‘the central axiological problem of environmental ethics, the problem of intrinsic in value (Norton, 1992, p. 222).

Norton opposes the notion of intrinsic value, adopting ideas put forth by Watt and Callicott (2010), who stand on Leopold’s land ethics: enhancing human’s morality to include nature (Callicott, 2010). If an individual expands beyond his or her skin, and becomes the environment itself, nature is rendered valuable as an extension of the self. According to Nelson (1998), the definition of intrinsic value is that “wilderness’ is valuable just because it exists, just because it is” (p. 191). If we can appreciate the intrinsic value in nature, nature might have otherness. However, Nelson argues as follows:

[T]hey would have to demonstrate that something of great social value would be lost if a wilderness area stood in its way; they would have the difficult task of showing that something possessing intrinsic value should be sacrificed for the sake of something of merely instrumental value. (Nelson, 1998, pp. 192–193)

Why do we prefer their intrinsic value to our social value? Intrinsic value needs humans as evaluators, and humans preserve nature. Callicott (1991a) focuses on locals’ benefit and insists on sustainable development in terms of democracy rather than the conservation of wilderness for itself (p. 346). We cannot think of wilderness separated from society and history. In the next section, I discuss wilderness as an idea in the American context.

Affirming the intrinsic value, Rolston (1993 [1991b]) considers that “[t]he system is value-able, able to produce value. Human evaluators are among its products…. Here we do not want a subjective morality but an objective one, even though we find that subjectivity
is the most valuable output of the objective system” (pp. 144–145). As the value is in DNA, and ecosystems generate species, he presumes that the value is in the creative, prolific-able systems. He argues that the value of nature doesn’t need human evaluators.

Unlike Rolston (1993[1991b]), Callicott (2010) tries to adopt morality to the land. Adopting Aldo Leopold’s (1948 [1887]) land ethics in his essay “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethics” (2010), he states, “we must become ethical before we become rational” (p. 226). His argument is a challenge to Aristotle’s teleological hierarchy: “Only creatures with the same degree of rationality can be considered equal” (Marshall, 1996, p. 75). Only rational beings, humans, are higher than irrational beings; the purpose of those lower beings is to serve the higher ones. Aristotle’s theory was dominant related to “the great chain of being” (Lovejoy, 2001 [1933]) until Darwin’s “Tree of Life” (1837) and “Food Chain” (1927) were published. Callicott (2010) introduces moral-based relationships instead of reason:

[R]ationality or sentiency are the most commonly posited -he, she, or it is entitled to equal moral standing with others who possess the same qualification in equal degree. Hence, reasoning in this philosophically orthodox way, and forcing Leopold’s theory to conform: If human beings are, with other animals, plants, soils, and waters, equally members of the biotic community…” (Callicott, 2010, p. 233)

Wolves value deer as their prey and value their children as their diffused gene, but those values are limited, while only humans have “consciousness” (Rolston, 1993 [1991b], p. 144). However, if we project value on nature, human’s moral community expands to the natural world. Callicott (2010) challenges the Cartesian view that when the thinking subject expands into the object, the inside of the subject corresponds to the outside of it. “The biosocial development of morality does not grow like an expanding balloon, leaving no trace of its previous boundaries, so much as like the circumference of a tree” (Callicott, 2010, p. 234). So, Leopold’s land ethics is both deontological and prudential, Callicott concludes. He tries to overcome the bipolar argument between anthropocentricism and decentralization, saying that value is not in nature itself but for itself, and it is inherent, not reflected in us, as in the Cartesian view.

Rolston (1998 [1991a]) criticizes Callicott’s (2010) stance of the subjectivist, saying, “Callicott has made it clear that all so-called intrinsic value in nature is “grounded in human feelings” and “projected” onto the natural object that “excites” the value” (p. 382). Rolston (1993 [1991b]) does not need “consciousness” or humans as “evaluators” because “[t]he possibility of valuation is carried to us by evolutionary and ecological natural history, and such nature is already valuable before humans arrive to evaluate what is taking place” (p. 144). According to him, nature has a value regardless of humans. “What is ‘right’ includes exosystemic patterns, organisms in their generating, sustaining environments” (Rolston, 1993 [1991b], p. 145). He argues that the value is not in each animal but in the whole ecosystems, called “systemic value” (p. 143). This value is not “for itself” but “in itself” (p. 143). In a sense, he affirms the intrinsic value.
...it preserves primeval nature, as much as it can. But it is morally advanced in another sense: it see the intrinsic value of nature, apart from humans...When we designate wilderness, we are not lapsing into some romantic atavism, reactionary and nostalgic to escape culture...We realize that ecosystems sometimes can be so respected that humans only visit and do not remain (an idea that the Indians did not need or achieve) (Rolston, 1998 [1991a], p. 379).

Based on the intrinsic value, he reaffirms the wilderness idea as well as designated wilderness areas. Ecosystems might have a right intrinsically to survive. My question is why he confines ecosystems to designated wilderness areas when he mentions wilderness.

Birch (1990) casts doubt on designated wilderness areas, saying, “the preservation of wilderness is essentially only a next step in the evolution of our liberal tradition, which now would allow even the freedom of self-determination for wild nature... and this is still a (homocentric) system of hierarchy and domination (p. 445). The former part is similar to Callicott (2010) in terms of projecting our value on nature, but the latter part suggests the relic of Christendom consisted of subjugation and the great chain of being. Wilderness designation means the assimilation of otherness or domestication of wildness to Birch (1990); he likens designated wilderness areas to an “asylum” (p. 449).

5. Authenticity of Nature: Ecological Restoration and Continuity

What kind of indicators identify wilderness, if wilderness does not have a legal boundary? To identify wilderness beyond designated wilderness areas, I have discussed wildness, intrinsic value, Birch’s (1990) otherness, and Rolston’s (1993 [1991b]) systemic value. In this section I discuss pluralism and the authenticity of nature with intrinsic value, and wildness in order to rethink what wilderness is.

I begin this section with a pluralistic approach to intrinsic value as opposed to instrumental value. Both McShane (2007) and Minteer (2001) try to overcome dualism as a means of developing a better relationship with nature. Then, I introduce the concept of “faking nature” (Elliot, 1982) and consider whether the environment holds value regardless of human intervention. Lastly, I discuss a new angle on wildness brought by Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011).

McShane (2007) acknowledges an intrinsic value based on feeling, and an extrinsic value based on reason, saying “intrinsic value does not mean absolute value” (p. 58). Therefore, there is room to accept another value, extrinsic value:

An example of an attitude is that I think, at least in many of its forms, is an intrinsically valuing attitude is the attitude of love. Part of what it is to love something is to value it as a good in itself....reverence and awe also seem to have a similar structure (McShane, 2007, pp. 52–53).
Her intent is to emphasize feeling, which was undervalued by Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes. Intuition or sensibility was always put under reason until Romanticism. Callicott (2010) argues for expanding the moral community, inspired by Leopold’s land ethics, while McShane (2007) argues for expanding “friendship” (p. 55), quoting Leopold: “land is to be loved and respected as an extension of ethics” (p. 55). When you love something, it has value. This is not projective value. As McShane’s value depends on a relationship, it could be pluralistic. She challenges Cartesian’s foundationalism in terms of pluralism.

While McShane (2007) emphasizes feeling, the Dewey inspired contextualist Minteer (2001) develops the argument with political issues. His concern is not only nature but also people. Mentioning conflicts between national parks and local dwellers, he calls for a “sustainable nature-culture relationship” (p. 74). Callicott (2010) expresses support for sustainable development. Minteer (2001) argues instrumental value for the sake of local dwellers in terms of democracy, saying, “protect the area’s biodiversity while also providing for viable human communities” (p. 74). He focuses on the local economic demands besides biodiversity. He advocates “this sort of pragmatic attempt to balance the various human and ecological needs” (ibid). Instrumental value and non-instrumental value are complementary, and they may offer a solution for the conflict between anthropocentrism and decentralization. Hence, Minteer’s value is pluralistic.

Minteer (2001) discusses strong and weak anthropocentrism. The former exploits the environment, while the latter preserves it but does so in anticipation of reward. Then, the latter is anthropogenic: preserving the environment for our descendants. Minteer (2001) does not regard the latter negatively. We are able to accept the anthropocentric view positively and manage the environment with consciousness.

When it comes to management, Elliot (1982) describes “faking nature”: environment restored by humans. Although Cronon (1998[1995]) values historic wilderness with human activity, Elliot (1982) argues that only pristine wilderness has value:

... nature is not replaceable without depreciation in one aspect of its value which has to do with its genesis, its history.... we are turning the wilderness into an artifact that in some negative or indirect way we are creating an environment.... What is significant about wilderness is its causal continuity with the past (Elliot, 1982, pp. 384–385).

He indicates wilderness as pristine nature, which Nelson (1998) and Cronon (1998[1995]) criticizes and which Rolston (1998 [1991a]) affirms. Elliot would regard wilderness as a reference to the natural condition. He argues that humans’ creativity interrupts wilderness’ continuity and deprives it of its value. Even if we try to restore ecosystems for their sake, wilderness loses its value. Elliot compares “faking nature” with “faking art,” describing the “esthetic object as an intentional object, as an artifact, as something that is shaped by the purposes and designs of its author” (p. 386). Whenever we try to fix ecological functions and compositions following the natural order, the original status is gone, resulting in a counterfeit one.

The value that Elliot (1982) mentions is similar to Rolston’s (1993[1991b]) “systemic
value” (p. 143) in terms of continuity. Rolston notes that DNA is “a linguistic molecule” (p. 132). Every species emerges from natural dynamic processes including natural disasters, which bring nourishment based on the view of the long-term geological process.

As Katz (2012) is an upholder of Elliot (1982), he opposes ecological restoration, calling it “ecocultural restoration” (p. 74). The features of his argument are the affirmation of dualism and use of the term of “artifact” (p. 71), in a way used by Aristotelians. An “artifact” comes from outside of itself, while “nature” (p. 67) is independent and self-created in his definition. For example, a sculpture is carved by hand with a chisel and a hammer. As an outside force affects it, the sculpture is an artifact. Likewise, “a project of ecological restoration is not really the restoration of a natural system; it is the creation of an artifact, an artefactual system” (p. 72). Katz continues, “the normative problem of ecological restoration [is] based on the presence of human intentionality and design” (p. 69). Therefore, restored nature is not nature any more, just a human creation. The theme of Katz’s paper is “authenticity” (p. 70). His ideal is that “the restoration is accomplished by nature working to restore itself, rather than a massive human management of natural processes…” (p. 69). Katz (2012) argues if nature can restore itself, so be it.

He considers restored nature as an expansion of the human dominion; restoration is human control over nature. This argument is relevant to Birch’s (1990) “imperium.” “[T] he restoration of nature is… a ‘big lie’” (p. 72) because it breaks the historical continuity of nature, Katz states. “Unlike artifacts, a large part of what makes natural entities valuable is their freedom from human control” (p. 71). Katz argues that nature is the wild separated from humans’ intention. In a sense, he stands on dualism between nature and society, defending the wilderness idea that Cronon (1998 [1995], p. 483) criticizes. Katz (2012) says, “A garden is not a natural area” (p. 74). Unlike Birch (1990) and Cronon (1998 [1995]), he does not recognize wildness in restored nature. According to him, Restored nature is a “copy” (p. 79) of the original, and it does not have intrinsic value because the copy-creator is not an original creator.

Vogel (2002) shows us a different way of understanding wildness. Katz (2012) laments that nature disappears because of human influence being everywhere. In contrast, Vogel considers that humans are also part of nature and artifacts also have wildness. The traits of wildness are unpredictable and uncontrollable. For example, the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was destroyed by an outside force, a tsunami. In other words, the power plant collapsed from inside entering into resonance with a tsunami. However, Katz (2012) defends his dualistic view, saying, “This new use of the term wild makes no sense within our established grammar. We cannot dismiss the dualism of nature and humanly created artifacts by linguistic fiat” (p. 92).

Following Vogel, Marris (2011) states, “Nature is almost everywhere” (p. 2), “We can see the sublime in our own backyards, if we try” (p. 3), and “where the wild is always better than the tame. But it wasn’t always so. The cult of pristine wilderness is a cultural construction, and a relatively new one” (p. 15). She uses “cult” instead of Cronon’s “illusion” (1998[1995], p. 482). She is skeptical about the existence of pristine nature. Instead, she
values nature with humans like Cronon values “middle ground” (1998[1995], p. 490). Since “ecosystems are always changing, whether humans are involved or not” (Marris, 2011, p. 4), even if humans intervene in nature’s continuity, nature doesn’t end according to her.

Marris’ new environmentalism consists of humble management, looking forward, and creating a new environment. These are opposite to the existent environmentalism, which is anti-transformation for both preservationists and conservationists. However, she does not eliminate exotic species; rather, she accepts them as new members of the ecosystems. Alien generalists are often superior to local specialists, whom environmentalists usually try to protect. She focuses on “managing landscapes with an eye to the future, rather than past” (p.14). Marris (2011) mentions, “[r]ambunctious gardening is proactive and optimistic; it creates more and more nature as it goes, rather than just building walls around the nature we have left” (pp.2–3). Does she seem to regard nature as environment or the object, rather than the other or the subject that has intrinsic value? Surely, her argument is opposite to continuity, but “[r]ambunctious gardening” implies wildness: uncontrollable and unpredictable. Although both wildness and intrinsic value are keywords to define wilderness, they contradict each other. Because, on the hand, wildness tends to be changeable, on the other hand, intrinsic value is related to unchangeable.

6. Conclusion

How do we affirm wilderness in light of criticism that wilderness idea and designated wilderness areas have sustained? Cronon (1998 [1995]) brought “middle ground” (p.490) instead of wilderness. The wilderness idea derived from Romanticism and nostalgia is an “illusion” (p.483). Currently, Wilderness as pristine nature is questionable. Birch (1990) criticizes designated wilderness areas in terms of “imperium” (p.462), referring to “the incarceration of wildness.” He argues that wildness complements us in the premise of wildness as otherness. The other brings us self-realization with a sense of wonder.

If wilderness is the other, it should have autonomy independent of human beings. I focus on the intrinsic value and its kind, Rolston’s “systemic value” which “held within the historic system that carries value to and through individuals” (1993 [1991b], p.144).

Because of genetic continuity, ecosystems have value. If ecosystems work in a certain place, we could call that place “wilderness” on the assumption that wilderness has systemic value.

Intrinsic value can be seen in the argument over the authenticity of nature brought by Elliot (1982) and Katz (2012). According to them, the historical continuity of nature is severed by human interference, including ecological restoration. Since this argument seems to reflect the wilderness idea, human influence works negatively. However, if systemic value is confirmed, it is not necessary to exclude human activity from wilderness. When we regard some places as wilderness based on systemic value, wilderness could be already the other independent of human beings.

Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wildness is everywhere, across the
boundary between nature and society. Liberated wilderness from designated wilderness areas is the essential quality for wilderness. However, their arguments lack of continuity or authenticity to be pristine wilderness. Continuity is quite opposite to unpredictable wildness. In conclusion, the wilderness idea embraces a contradiction between permanence and novelty.

Notes
2 “Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure” (Thoreau, 1849, p.1).
3 “(2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation”; Definition of wilderness in The Wilderness Act of 1964.
5 Ibid. 3
6 Definition of wilderness taken from the text of The Wilderness Act of 1964.

References


