Uri Haggyeo (our school) a Postcolonial Third Space in Japan: A Hundred Year Zainichi Korean Education Struggle (100 Nyeon Gyoyug Tujaeng)

日本におけるポストコロニアル第三空間: ウリハッキョ（私たちの学校）

在日朝鮮人の100年教育闘争

by

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ABSTRACT

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(Under the direction of Professor Mark E. Caprio)

The purpose of this dissertation is to present an alternative perspective to existing political and social interpretations of the Joseon schools in Japan. Writing against existing stereotypes and using Homi Bhabha’s hybrid Third Space theory, this study proposes against the common perspective that the Joseon schools are microcosms of the DPRK, but unique postcolonial hybrid spaces that empower articulation of Korean identity and culture. The existing literature generally critiques the curricula and describes oppression during certain periods. However, other studies fail to chronicle the 100-year history of Joseon schools in the context of hybridity, geopolitical displacement, cultural transformation, political negotiation, and transnational bureaucratic oppression.

This research inquires how, contrary to geopolitical postwar and Cold War sanctioned representations, the Joseon schools have created interpreted history, culture, and power to create a Third Space. Through a Postcolonial lens, illustrating the Joseon schools as a Third Space, assists in reinterpreting power dynamics between Japan, the DPRK, the United States, and the ROK and mediates Japan’s social responsibility
towards the schools. Permeated by the transnational histories of Korea and Japan, this study analyzes cultural transformation against a milieu of oppression and misrepresentation over four periods. Chapter one looks at the creation of a hybrid Korean community in prewar Naichi Japan against cultural suppression of ethnic education. In chapter two, against a background of SCAP-provoked Cold War discourses and colonial racism, the analysis focuses on the early ethnic schools in response to post-colonial and geopolitical displacement. The third chapter, against a background of ROK- and Japan-provoked DPRK Cold War discourses, focuses on political negotiation in Chongryun’s hybrid education system. The fourth chapter focusses on ongoing cultural translation and a move away from DPRK influences against the background of current anti-DPRK discourses. The results of this research demonstrate that politically constructed labels of the Joseon schools have been fossilized in government policies to deny Zainichi Koreans their right to ethnic education. This study is significant because it builds on the Third Space theory to deconstruct Postcolonial and Cold War discourses. Furthermore, from transnational, cultural transformational, and displacement discourses it offers a pragmatic approach for Japan to interpret the Joseon schools and reinstate Zainichi Koreans’ civil rights to ethnic education.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 25th, 2018, a group of Joseon school (Joseon Haggyeol/조선 학교/Chōsen Gakkō/朝鮮學校 or Korean schools)\(^1\) supporters congregated in front of the “Liberation Movement Nameless Warrior Tomb” in the Aoyama Cemetery in Tokyo. The gathering was organized to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the April 24, 1948, Hanshin Education Struggle when Japanese authorities, acting under the directions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) forcefully closed the Joseon schools. The meeting began with a song: \textit{April 24 has come again, the bloody day we resent. Our freedom to learn our ethnic language was stolen. Hear our voices.} Next, Japanese teachers, the Republic of Korea (ROK) activists, and researchers offered statements of support for the Joseon schools, and elderly Koreans shared personal testimonies. A moment of silence for the victims was held and the participants reiterated a commitment to the struggle for ethnic education rights. In conclusion, in a speech of unity, the highly respected Chongryun (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan /재일본조선인총련합회 or Chōsen Sōren)\(^2\)

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\(^1\) The term Joseon designates the original term for the Korean peninsula (Joseon Bando) and not the DPRK.

\(^2\) In Japanese Chongryun Koreans are referred to as Zainichi Chōsenjin.
historian Mr. Oh Hyeong-cheon defined the oppression against Korean ethnic education in Japan as a “One Hundred Year Education Struggle.” Mr. Oh mentioned the 36 years under colonial rule and the 73 years that followed liberation. The four specific periods he referred to were the prewar binary policies of assimilation and exclusion (Ito 1983; Kim 2006); SCAP and the Japanese government’s forced closures of the Joseon schools between 1948 and 1950 (Wagner 1951; Kim 1997; Inokuchi 2000; Caprio and Yu 2009); the 1968-1972 Foreigners’ Schools System Bill (Pak 1966; Kurusu 1967; Ozawa 1973; Kim 2004) and the 2009 exclusion of Joseon schools from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program (Pak 2011; Ishii 2018; Nakagawa 2018; Ri 2018) (reported by Kiroku suru kai 2018, 258-265).

Photo was taken on April 25th, 2018, at Aoyama Cemetery, Tokyo.
The Chongryun community fondly refers to the Joseon schools as “uri haggyeo” (our school) because the Joseon schools are an inclusive community venture. However, existing political and social interpretations of the Joseon schools recurrently emphasize the schools’ links with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology’s (MEXT) English website officially refers to the Joseon schools as “North Korean Schools” (MEXT 2012). In Japan’s National Diet, the schools are often called Kita Chōsen no Gakkō (North Korean schools) that teach hannichi (anti-Japanese) dogma. The Japanese media generally focusses on the DPRK and Chongryun’s domineering authority over the schools. The western press on occasion refers to the schools as Korean ethnic schools that generally follows a “socially constructed demonization of North Korea” (Dalton, Bell and Jung 2013: 27), and, to sensationalize, refers to the schools as “Pro-Pyongyang,” “North Korean,” or uses headlines like “North Korean Schools in Japan Build Loyalty, Even Love, Abroad” (CBS 2018). Furthermore, Japanese ultra-right groups accuse the Joseon schools of operating as “spy training schools,” illegally occupying Japanese land and conducting hannichi (anti-Japanese) education (see Nakamura 2014). Due to the overemphasis on the DPRK link, the schools often
receive death threats\(^3\) and some have been terrorized. Homi Bhabha (1994, 95) refers to such a condition as a “dependence on the concept of ‘fixity’ in the ideological construction of other[-]ness.” Accordingly, the lack of positive representation has fueled misrepresentations and many people in Japan unconsciously believe the Joseon schools teach an anti-imperialistic hannichi dogma in a pro-DPRK curriculum, thereby educating children to be Japan-haters loyal to the DPRK. Furthermore, in 2002 the Joseon schools became a peculiar focus of international attention as Chongryun Koreans were linked to what is perceived as a dangerous regime. This status quo was a result of the inclusion of the DPRK in George W. Bush's 2002 "axis of evil" speech and Kim Jong-il’s confession to kidnapping Japanese citizens.

This study submits that in order to serve national interests, the ethnic education in Joseon schools has been invalidated and facts regarding the Joseon schools have been reconstructed by a “web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, and dehumanizing ideology” (Said 1978, 27). Writing against existing DPRK stereotypes, this dissertation proposes that the Joseon schools are not microcosms of the DPRK, but are unique cultural hybrid spaces of ethnic education that empower articulation of

\(^3\) The most recent threat was on August 8, 2019, when a 21-year-old Japanese male threatened to detonate bombs at four Joseon schools in Aichi Prefecture.
Korean identity and culture. In Rutherford’s (1990, 211) interview with Homi Bhabha titled “The Third Space,” Bhabha describes cultural hybridity as the “Third Space” because it “gives rise to something new and unrecognizable, [in] a new era of negotiation of meaning and representation.” In this dissertation, in the context of Bhabha’s cultural hybrid theory, the Joseon schools will be debated in terms of a Third Space. This study over four curricula outlines the ongoing cultural transformation and break from the DPRK. The question central to this research inquires how, contrary to geopolitical postwar- and cold-war-sanctioned representations, have the Joseon schools interpreted history, culture, and power to create a Third Space?

4 The current Joseon schools were established in postwar Japan to accommodate cultural dislocation due to Japan’s colonization of Korea and differ from other ethnic or foreign schools in Japan that were not affected by Japanese colonialism. For example, the first “international” school- the Saint Maur International School, was established in 1872 in Yokohama by the Catholic French order the Sister of Holy Infant Jesus as an English speaking school and currently operates as multi-faith and multinational school for foreigners in the Tokyo and Yokohama areas. The school was closed during World War II but reestablished in 1947. The first ethnic school - the Kobe Chinese School was established in 1899 to accommodate Cantonese Chinese living in the Kobe area; and with local assistance it managed to operate in the pre-war and postwar periods. The Kobe Chinese School now identifies with the People's Republic of China.” Moreover, the American School in Japan was established in 1902 in Tokyo to cater for the broader foreign community. The school was closed during the World War II and reopened in 1946 (Kōrai Hakubutsukan, 2014,44).
Theoretical discussion – the Joseon schools in postcolonial discourse

John Lie (2008, x) defines the transient term Zainichi (to reside in Japan) as a postcolonial, ambivalent diasporic identity. Against a background of imperial policies, under colonial rule by 1945, some 2 million Koreans were living in Naichi Japan. A legacy of colonialism, according to Bhabha (Rutherford 1990, 218), is the change in the postcolonial individual. In the post-colonial metropolis, the “colonial cultural experience” compels the post-colonial to question the authority of previous narratives creating changes in politics, cultural ideologies, and intellectual discourses. In the same sense, Cumings (2005, 183) who was referring to Koreans on the peninsula writes that colonialism changed the Korean people forever:

They were no longer the same people: they had grievances against those who remained secure at home, they had suffered material and status losses, they had often come into contact with new ideologies, they had all seen a broader world beyond the villages.

For Koreans everywhere, Japan’s defeat and the loss of its colonies meant haebang (liberation) from colonial rule. However, in postwar Japan Zainichi Koreans were challenged with a new form of exclusion. They were no longer considered imperial subjects who shared the same ancestry as Japanese under the colonial slogan isshidōjin; instead, Japan’s official postwar discourse rejected the “ethnic other” and homogeneity became “the defining quality of Japaneseness” (Lie 2008, 15). Koreans were now

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5 Mainland Japan
referred to as non-Japanese and/or criminally bent *Sangokujin* (third-country nationals) and held responsible for the decay of Japan’s social order (Kim 1997, 276).

Forced to assimilate to new social patterns Ashcroft (1995, 183-184) claims that hybrid communities develop most strongly when members can no longer identify with their own history. Hence, due to colonial cultural suppression, a strengthening of Japanese political and economic hegemony, poverty, and discrimination, Koreans were forced into ghettos termed *Chōsen buraku* where they created a hybrid culture. The growth of a hybrid culture in the *Chōsen buraku* will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1; however, within the context of prewar hybridization, it should be noted here that in the *Chōsen buraku* homeland regional hometown (*gohyang*) differences disappeared as dwellers simply became “Korean” (Lie, 2008, 5-8). In the *Chōsen buraku*, there were spaces where intellectuals and sojourners mingled to study Marxist theories and ethnic nationalism, and in breaking with Confucian tradition many families migrated to Japan for their daughters’ education. In the context of postcolonial hybridity, this discussion aims to construct a logical argument of how the *Joseon* schools have created a hybrid Third Space for ethnic identification and empowerment. However, before the discussion on the schools, it should be noted that in postcolonial discourse,

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6 Korean towns.
the elements of racial stereotyping and cultural hybridity are integral components of Bhabha’s Third Space hypothesis.

Postcolonial Koreans as racial stereotypes

Stereotypes generalize a particular group or minority, are rarely contested and are often accepted as a legitimate discourse. According to Bhabha (Rutherford 1990, 219), postcolonial discourse forces mainstream society to reconsider who is worthy of inclusion and, through the cultural and political construction of the migrant metaphor, leads to a process of “othering.” Hook (2005, 701-702) explains that to be effective the stereotyping discourse must be incessantly repeated to inflate the difference of the “other” as it recreates the “other” with “usable facts” into a stable plausible object to rationalize the use of dehumanizing terms.

Under colonial rule, Koreans, as imperial subjects, were designated to a lower class “caste” status (Lee 1981, 33). Koreans in *Naichi* Japan were often considered subversive and frequently called *futei Senjin* (insolent Koreans); they were also vulnerable, regularly harassed, blamed, penalized, or punished (Ryang 2016). A pertinent example is the genocide of thousands of Koreans following the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 over rumors that they had poisoned the drinking water. In postwar Japan xenophobic attitudes towards Koreans endured, but, in contrast to prewar
multiethnic dogma, the postwar “othering” of Zainichi Koreans developed according to new ethnic and cultural homogeneous ideologies. Hence, in the milieu of Japanese homogeneity, poverty-stricken Koreans lived in Chōsen buraku, were rarely seen, and generally forgotten. Moreover, the presence of the Chōsen buraku itself manifested derogatory stereotypes.

In official postwar discourse, Koreans were often labeled as smugglers or public security risks. For example, on August 17, 1946, the Minshutō member Shiikuma Saburo stated in the Diet:

We refuse to stand by in silence watching Formosans and Koreans, who have resided in Japan as Japanese up to the time of surrender, swaggering about as if they were nationals of victorious nations. We admit we are a defeated nation but it is most deplorable that those who lived under our law and order until the last moment of the surrender should suddenly alter their attitude to act like conquerors, pasting on railway carriages ‘Reserved’ without any authorization, insulting and oppressing Japanese passengers and otherwise committing unspeakable violence everywhere. The actions of these Koreans and Formosans make the blood in our veins, in our misery of defeat, boil (Conde, 1947, 43).

Here, the “useable facts” recognize Japan’s defeat; however, the statement kindles an image of unruly and violent Koreans who were responsible for destroying Japan’s social order for “committing unspeakable violence everywhere.” Or in the 1947 “anti-crime week” campaign, the Ueno Police Crime Prevention Association distributed a poster in downtown Tokyo to warn citizens of the dangers of robbers. The image of the Korean Taegukgi flag (below) undoubtedly created the impression that all Koreans were
criminals (Lee & DeVos 1981, 76).

Furthermore, in 1965 Ikegami Tsutomu (1965, 96-97), a bureaucrat in Japan’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Immigration Bureau writes on the Joseon schools:

The case of the Joseon schools is a delicate and serious issue. With the exception of communist countries, there is no country that would allow the establishment of communist schools that teach intense communist ideologies designed to turn students into revolutionaries. The problem is, Japan has been over-democratized, and with bureaucracies divided the schools fall between reasonable jurisdictions. We would assume that school education falls under the Ministry of Education (MOE); however, the MOE is powerless in controlling these illegitimate schools. The schools are the same as private abacus schools, and legally there is no means to close them. While it may seem trivial, the schools are violent and a security concern.

Here the “usable facts,” recognize the Joseon schools are not legitimate and are linked to the DPRK. However, the statement heightens anxiety by stating that the schools are uncontrollable, violent and a security concern. The discussion in the following chapters on national policies against the Joseon schools will confirm how stereotypes have been inflated and fossilized in national policies.
Zainichi Koreans and cultural hybridity

Tiffin (1995, 95) states that post-colonial cultures are inevitably hybridized due to a dialectical relationship between the colonizer’s ideologies and the colonized who “create or recreate local identity.” In Homi Bhabha’s words:

Hybridity is the sign of the productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal. Hybridity is the reevaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects (Bhabha 1995, 34-35).

In postwar Japan, against a backdrop of social exclusion and ambiguous legal status, a highly political hybrid culture of empowerment developed. Immediately after Japan’s surrender, to advocate civil rights the diverse community of forced laborers, collaborators, socialists, communists, nationalists, released prisoners, returned soldiers, conscription evaders, students, and Koreans who were expediting liberation created organizations all over Japan (Oh 2009, 3). Moreover, to prepare Koreans for repatriation the community established grass-root nonpartisan language schools called Gugeo Gangseupso. After 35 years of pervasive colonial rule, many adults were illiterate, and most children could not speak Korean. In turn, in the Gugeo Gangseupso, these disenfranchised Koreans were exposed to the printed Korean language and this raised national consciousness (Anderson 1983 44-45). Furthermore, the Gugeo Gangseupso texts, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, were hybrid texts that were often translations from Japanese textbooks.
According to Bhabha, in a hybrid culture, members are obliged to politically negotiate, and when circumstances change, they are required to translate their values and broaden their perspectives (Rutherford 1990, 216). Beyond the sovereign ideologies of the Korean homeland, the postwar Zainichi diaspora residing in the metropole recreated their colonial hybrid culture. In the pursuit of ethnic education, the creation of the *Gugeo Gangseupso* (and later *Joseon schools*) provided a Third Space for ongoing cultural translation and political negotiation.

**The *Joseon schools* – a Third Space**

In postcolonial discourse, the “Third Space” is defined as a place where the oppressed can congregate and shelter from discrimination: a place where they share common ground. In terms of people and spaces Lefebvre (1991, 116), explains the “first space” as “spatial practice” which includes members of society, family or working class. The “second space” is a “representation of space” and may include experts, scientists, architects, technocrats, and social engineers. The “third space” is a representational space where inhabitants and consumers passively encounter space. Pertinent to this study are the *Joseon schools* as a Third Space. However, in a broader context, the two ethnic organizations, the *Chongryun* and the ROK affiliated *Mindan* (Korean Residents
Union in Japan/ 재일본대한민국민단 or 在日本大韓民國民團), are other examples of Third Spaces for Zainichi Koreans where, in Bhabha’s (1994, 2) words:

the intersubjective and collective experiences of nation-ness, community interest or cultural values are negotiated in the emergence of the interstices, the overlap, and displacement of domains of difference.

On a smaller scale, Korean ethnic interest, and religious groups where people can meet and negotiate and reproduce cultural identity are also Third Spaces.

To Bhabha, the concept of hybridization is the Third Space where people are empowered with different perspectives as new structures of authority and political initiatives arise (Rutherford 1990, 211). The Third Space is not based on foreign concepts or multiculturalism but founded on colonial and post-colonial concepts of an “inter-national culture” created through the “inscription and articulation of the hybridity” (Bhabha 1995, 209). Furthermore, the Third Space does not represent an identity but establishes a way to identify with and through another. Hall (1990, 223) describes a cultural identity “in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective ‘one true self’… which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common.”

The Joseon schools as a Third Space were first founded by Zainichi Koreans as a survival strategy. Based on Bhabha’s Third Space hypothesis (1994, 247), this hybrid space was founded from cultural displacement and cultural transformation permeated by

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7 In Japanese, Mindan Koreans are referred to as Zainichi Kankokujin.
the transnational histories of Korea and Japan. Furthermore, the cultural identities of people in the Joseon schools identify as “Korean” (*Chōsenjin*) but they are constantly undergoing a transformation. The Joseon schools explained in Stuart Hall’s terms are:

> Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture, and power. Far from being grounded in a mere ‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past (Hall 1990, 225).

The transformation mentioned here is a consequence of cultural translation. Cultural translation, according to Pym (2009, 139), happens when colonial and postcolonial processes have “displaced and mixed languages.” Cultural translation is also a consequence of the movement of people rather than the movement of texts. As an example, Michaelsen and Johnson (2001 ix) write:

> [that] the language of the Americas is translation, and that therefore questions of translation, dialogue, and border crossings (linguistic, cultural, national, and the like) are necessary for rethinking the foundations and limits of the Americas.

Subsequently, in this study on the Joseon schools, it will become evident how the precolonial movement of Koreans generally from the southern areas on the Korean peninsula and a postcolonial identification with the north pushed the boundaries of translation and interjected hybrid identities in the Joseon school community.

Against a shared history of colonial policies responsible for a loss of Korean identity, cultural dispossession, displacement, and oppression over the last 70 years
(since liberation) the *Joseon* schools have created a shared cultural identity, by connecting the dots of the forgotten past. For cultural identities are created in “the unstable points of identification, which are made, within the discourses of history and culture” (Hall 1990, 226).

In the chapters that follow, this dissertation will apply the Third Space theory against officially endorsed static stereotypes to emphasize the importance of how concepts such as migration, nationalism, cultural translation, and negotiation have factored into the evolution of the *Joseon* schools as a unique Third Space.

**Literature Review**

This study contests the common narrative that *Joseon* schools are steadfastly *hannichi* and loyal only to the DPRK and focuses on the *Joseon* schools as a Third Space hybrid culture. David Chapman’s (2008) study *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity* contends that contemporary *Zainichi* Korean identity is a “third-way” hybrid identity because of a generational change and politics. This study agrees with Chapman’s hypothesis of *Zainichi* Korean hybrid identities and expands on his hypothesis in arguing that the *Joseon* schools are a Third Space hybrid culture created from cultural displacement and cultural transformation.
For general studies in English focusing on other Zainichi fields, Wagner (1951) provides the earliest well-informed accounts on Zainichi Koreans in Japan from 1904-1950 against a postwar background of Korean, Japanese, and SCAP hostilities. To foster a deeper understanding of the Korean minority in Japan Wagner uses SCAP and Japanese documents and gives circumstantial evidence on the postwar geopolitical situation in North-East Asia. For other studies see Richard Mitchel’s (1967) *The Korean Minority in Japan*—an analysis of how the presence of Koreans in Japan have influenced Japan-Korean relations. Yukiko Koshiro’s (1999) *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* on race and culture including a study on the Korean minority. Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s (2006) *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War* on the 1959 and onward repatriation of some 90,000 Zainichi Koreans from Japan to the DPRK. According to this study the repatriation program was carried out under the auspice of the Red Cross the governments of Japan, the DPRK, the USSR, and the U.S. to relieve Japan of its “Korean problem.”

Current political and social interpretations of the Joseon schools disregard how and why the Joseon schools were established and a lack of Chongryun literature until the 1980s has further fueled misconceptions in context with links to the DPRK. Changsoo Lee and George DeVos’s (1981) *Koreans in Japan Ethnic Conflict and*
Accommodation- a post-WWII chronological analysis of challenges faced by the Korean minority in Japan. In the context of political policies of exclusion, Lee Changsoo (1981) writes an objective analysis on Chōren and Chongryun “ethnic education and national policies” in the post-war era until 1968. Moreover, Yasunori Fukuoka’s (2000 57-58) analysis on the diversity within young Zainichi Koreans, typecasts them as “Nationalist,” “Naturalizing,” “Individualist,” and “Pluralists.” However, Fukuoka’s typology groups all Joseon school students in the “Nationalist” category and reinforces a rigid stereotype as he asserts that the students “feel little sense of attachment in the country of their birth and upbringing.” Or they “live their lives upon the principles of Kim Il Sung to the extent possible in their very different environment” (Fukuoka 2000, 52-53).

Moreover, English language commentaries on the Joseon schools by Lie (2008), Hicks (1997), Rholen (1981), Ryang (1997), and Okano (2011) emphasize the political connection with the DPRK. An example of political bias against the Joseon schools is Rholen (1981, 206) who writes, “the content of the Ch’ongnyŏn education is patterned closely on North Korean educational practice. The textbooks come from

8 Strong sense of ethnic awareness
9 Korea being a country where ancestors originate.
10 Someone who rejects belonging to any ethnic group for preferring meritocracy.
11 Someone who wants to operate somewhere within ethnicity and nationality constructs.
North Korea,” or Hicks’ (1997, 136) assertion that the standardized curriculum of 1963 until 1993 was “completely dominated by a North Korean perspective [and] focused on quasi-deification of the Great Leader.”

From this point, the literature review will follow a chronological approach corresponding with the chapters in this study. In prewar Japan, the government evaded formulating policies on education for Koreans, and consequently resources are limited as most records at private *Joseon* schools were destroyed due to intense police surveillance. For Koreans in *Naichī* Japan, Tanaka (1967), Kawamukai (1973), Ito (1983), Weiner (1994), Park (2000), Tonomura (2004), Kim (2006), and Kashani (2006) assess the fluctuations in colonial immigration and community growth against colonial capitalist policies. First, students and sojourners formed the foundations for a community via social infrastructure in mutual aid and pro-independence ideologically focused organizations (Ozawa 1973; Ko 1977; Pak 1979) and, after 1930, a stronger Korean community was established when women and children began to migrate (Kashani 2006). Against a background of economic migration Naito (1989) points out that in a break away from patriarchal norms some Korean families chose to migrate to educate their daughters because education in *Naichī* Japan was more accessible than on the peninsula.
In *Naichi* Japan Koreans attended night schools because Japanese language skills were necessary for employment and Korean literacy for corresponding with family in Korea. The research of Ito Etsuko (1983), Nakajima (2005), and Tanaka (1967) is significant in illuminating how illiterate sojourners and some children in the 1920s attended Japanese day and night schools where Korean instruction was sometimes offered. On the other hand, to expedite assimilation in the 1920s the *Sōaikai* as a pro-Japanese Korean association offered classes to Koreans (Ringhoffer 1981; Kawashima 2009). Kawamukai (1973), notes that night schools became the mainstay for Japan’s capitalist ventures, and a substantial number of Korean students were enrolled in Tokyo-based schools and studied alongside impoverished *Burakumin* students. Moreover, in his analysis, Kawamukai (1973) argues that the national government reinforced poverty when it delegated education to the regional governments. As for *Joseon* schools established by Koreans, they were considered subversive because many taught pro-independence ideologies, and from the early 1930s were forcefully closed and, barring personal testimonies such as the Osaka *Jinken Hakubutsukan* (1999), documentation is scant.

As Japan mobilized for war, from 1938 Korean parents were obliged to enroll

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12 Japan’s outcaste minority.
their children in Japanese schools under the jurisdiction of the Kyōwakai (Ito 1983; Naito 1989; Higuchi 2002). Again, beyond the assimilation dogma, there was no consistent Kyōwakai national policy on how Koreans should be educated, and similar to Japan’s policy on night schools, Korean education was left to prefectural Kyōwakai branches. Moreover, education under the Kyōwakai did not focus on academics, rather it indoctrinated the powerful Kōminka ideology to eradicate Korean identities (Ozawa 1973).

In postwar Japan, SCAP was ill-equipped to supervise Koreans. Wagner (1951), Kim (1997), Inokuchi (2000), and Caprio and Yu (2009) refer to the American intelligence reports Civil Affairs Handbook: Japan (1944) and Aliens in Japan (1945) in substantiating that in preparation for an occupation, the United States did carry out some investigations on the livelihood of Koreans in Japan. However, despite anthropological studies on the Japanese, such as Benedict’s (1947) Chrysanthemum and the Sword, Passin’s The Occupation: Some Reflections (1990, 118) points out that most SCAP personnel were ignorant towards Japanese people, and more so towards the Koreans. Within SCAP, Wagner (1951, 56) points out that there was no special division to supervise Korean affairs and according to Braibanti (1948, 215), the occupation

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13 Subjects of the Emperor
relied on an impractical system of dependence on the Japanese bureaucracies for translations and administration. The research for this paper suggests that SCAP and the Japanese Government initially shared similar views on Korean repatriation because a homogenous Japan was preferable for efficient administration (Koshiro 1999; Lie 2008).

SCAP was originally sympathetic towards the plight of Koreans; however, when Koreans, as designated “liberated nationals,” began to demand special treatment and “adopted an unreasonable and highly emotional attitude towards the occupation and or Japanese authority” (Wagner 1951, 41), SCAP’s approach towards the Koreans hardened. Furthermore, the status of Koreans became more precarious when the official expatriation ended in December 1946 and some 600,000 Koreans who stayed were informed that they would hence be considered as “Japanese” until a country of Korea was created. Conde (1948) and Wagner’s (1951) literature on SCAP and Japanese treatment of Koreans and the ensuing “anti-Korean campaigns” is noteworthy. Both writers provide a succinct narrative report on the events that had direct and immediate implications on the lives of Koreans. Moreover, concerning SCAP’s contribution to the “anti-Korean hysteria” Conde (1948, 42) quotes a SCAP press release that stated that Koreans were a menace to the health of the Occupation and the Japanese nation as a whole. Conde (1948, 41) writes:
The Koreans find themselves being blamed for Japan’s black market and the increase in crime and accused of being the carriers of disease, of paying no taxes, of having secured a financial stranglehold on Japan, and of “being brave” today and having cowered in fright during the war.

Moreover, Wagner (1951, 59) writes of how SCAP promoted the “anti-Korean campaign” as it manipulated the media to influence the Japanese public.

(League of Koreans in Japan 재일조선인련맹/재일조선인연맹 or 在日本朝鮮人聯合) failed to protect the Joseon schools due to poor political tactics as it became embroiled in SCAP and Japanese provocations.

Moving on to Cold War politics and the division of the Zainichi Korean community, Mitchel (1967, 134-164) emphasizes that the ROK and the DPRK involved Zainichi Koreans like pawns in negotiations with the Japanese Government. In Lie’s (2008, 67) words, “the Zainichi population [became] a convenient object of North-South struggles for influence, legitimacy, and primacy.” Similarly, Suzuki (2016, 69) describes the division in the Zainichi community and allegiance to North or South Korea as a reflection of Japanese hegemony.

On the Foreigners’ School System Bill, Chongryun writers and Japanese supporters agree that Chongryun’s affiliation with the DPRK provided the Japanese Government a reason to control the Joseon schools (Fujishima 1966; Fujishima and Ozawa 1966; Kim 1967; Ozawa 1971; Inamoto 1968; Ozawa 1973; Pak 1966; Pak 1982 Kim 2004; Mc Kee 2013). Likewise, Chongryun critics, such as Pak (1966), Han (1967), Kim (1967), Ko (1969), Pak (1982), Kim (2004) and Oh (2015), denounced the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea as a pretext to regulate and close the Joseon schools. Furthermore, Japanese scholars like Yōnosuke
Inamoto (1968, 101-105) questioned how the *Joseon* schools could be detrimental to Japan’s “national interest,” and Ozawa’s (1971, 38-54) analysis from 1963 to 1965 of Diet and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) committee proceedings and LDP journals notes that the *Joseon* schools were the focus of unreasonable criticism well before the June 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, from a human rights perspective, Fujishima Udai (1966) criticized the Japanese Government for failing to protect the rights of Korean children despite ratifying the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959. In English literature, annotations on the Foreigners’ School System Bill are documented only by Lee Changsoo (1981, 174-181), but despite providing a full analysis on the accreditation of the Tokyo based Korea University in 1968 his inquiry into the Foreigners’ Schools System Bill is somewhat incorrect. While Lee states that the bill was submitted once and shelved in 1966, it was submitted to the Diet seven times between 1966 and 1972 (Ōsaka Minzoku Kyōiku 60-Nen Shi Henshū Iinkai 2005).

In stride with generational and social changes, following the 1980s the *Joseon* schools began to construct a shared identity around the suppressive events of the 1948 *Hanshin* school closures and published more literature focusing on ethnic education rights. *Chongryun* academics Pak (1980; 1982), Ko (1996), Pak (1997; 2003; 2011;
2012), Kim (2004), Han (2006), Oh (2009; 2015), Oh (2019), and Kim (2011) have published subjective studies on various periods that are useful for understanding a Chongryun perspective. For example, Pak Sang-deok’s (1980) Zainichi Chōsenjin no Minzoku Kyōiku pens a chronology on Chongryun’s commitment to ethnic education beginning with pre-war Japanese suppression and DPRK assistance. Chongryun members Byeon Hi-jae and Chon Hyonchol’s (1988) “Ima Chōsen Gakkō de-naze Minzoku Kyōiku ka” focuses on the Joseon school system in the 1980s, asking why Korean parents preferred Joseon schools over Japanese schools and emphasizing ethnic education as a civil right. The literature gives a detailed analysis of the second curriculum (1974-1977) and highlights the teaching of Korean (Gugeo) and, to demonstrate integration in Japanese society, explains the degree of Japanese literary works in the Japanese language texts. Pak Sam-sok’s (1992) manuscript “Towareru Chōsen Gakkō Shogū: Nihon no Kokusai-ka no Mōten” is the first comprehensive and candid account of the Joseon schools under Chongryun. Pak, an academic at Tokyo’s Korea University, writes on different attitudes per generation and the Chongryun community’s commitment to the Joseon schools. He analyzes aspects related to civil rights and integration in Japanese society, the careers of graduates, school management, safeguarding ethnic education, history of oppression, and the Joseon schools from an
international perspective, Japan-DPRK goodwill, the future of Joseon schools, and the curriculum. Using Chongryun archives Kim Dong-Ryong (2004), a former member of Chongryun’s textbook committee and an academic at the Tokyo based Korea University, chronicles a 1945-1972 school history. Furthermore, from a contemporary and global perspective in Kokusaika Jidai no Minzoku Kyōiku, Ko Chan-yu (1996) gives an account of the historic oppression against the Joseon schools and chronicles the importance of evaluating the schools in a foreign school framework. Han Tong-hyon (2006) highlights the uniqueness of the Chongryun schools in her ethnology on the origins of the Chima Chogori school uniform. Also, Oh, Yong-Ho’s (2019) pioneering literature clarifies how the DPRK and Chongryun collaborated in the 1950s to compile unique texts to accommodate Zainichi Koreans.

The period following the shelving of the Foreigners’ Schools System Bill in 1972 to the present (2019) includes three curricula revisions. The new curricula were launched against a background of turbulent social challenges such as the resumption of the repatriation program between 1971-1985, DPRK education funds, accreditation, civic gains, the fall of the Iron Curtain, Chongryun’s declining profile, DPRK acts of terrorism, the Pyongyang Declaration, Kim Jong-il’s confession to kidnapping Japanese, and the Joseon schools’ exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program.
While the current curriculum (2003-2005) is mentioned briefly in summaries of *Joseon* school education (Pak 2003; 2011; 2012), currently there are no comprehensive analyses on the overall curriculum. However, on the current history (*yeogs*a) syllabus former senior academic at the Korea University Kang Seong-eun (2010) writes that democratic movements in the ROK have influenced the present history textbooks. Furthermore, with a focus on ethnic education and civil rights, Muraguchi (2004), Pak (1997, 2011, 2012), the committee *Urihakkyo o Tsuzu Kurai* (2007), Kim (2014), Fujii (2014) write on changes in the *Joseon* schools. *Chongryun* is now more tolerant of outside researchers, an early example being Cary’s (2003, 98-132) general account on the *Joseon* school history and her analysis of “parental attitudes about language and ethnic identity,” in her fieldwork at the Shikoku *Joseon* school in the 1990s.

Aside from reports in the media, the literature on the exclusion of the Tuition Waiver Program is still limited. However, Pak (2011), in the context of multiculturalism, writes on the contradiction of excluding the *Joseon* schools from the Tuition Waiver Program. Moreover, the *Chongryun* publication *Gekkan IO* (2015, 2017) has published two books – *Kōkō Mushō-ka Saiban. 249 Nin no Chōsen Kōkōsei Tatakai no Kiroku* (2015) and *Kōkō Mushō-Ka Saiban. Ōsaka de Rekishi-Teki ni Shōso* (2017) – to document how the Japanese government has attempted to exclude the
Joseon schools. Furthermore, from an academic and legal standpoint, Chongryun member and lawyer Ri Jun-hui (2018), and Japanese academics Ishii Takuji (2018) and Nakagawa Ritsu (2018) have correspondingly argued that the Joseon schools’ government exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program is prejudicial and unconstitutional.

To date, the two main analytical studies on the Joseon schools are Sonia Ryang’s (1997) inquiry – North Koreans in Japan and Song Kichan’s (2012) Katararenai mono to shite Chōsen gakkō. Zainichi Minzoku Kyōiku to Aidentiti Poritikusu (Things that cannot be articulated in the Joseon schools. Zainichi ethnic education and identity politics). Ryang, a former Chongryun member published her study in 1997 before Chongryun experienced major internal turmoil and subsequent reform in the curriculum following the DPRK’s 2002 confession of kidnapping Japanese citizens (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 4). In context with Chongryun links with the DPRK, Ryang’s title North Koreans in Japan implies that loyal DPRK citizens reside in Japan when Chongryun Koreans are in fact stateless citizens denoted as Chōsen-seki\textsuperscript{14} because Japan does not formally recognize the DPRK. The main focus of Ryang’s (1997, 18) study is on the Chongryun organization as a “displaced social

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\textsuperscript{14} Chōsen-seki - is a Japanese term that differentiates stateless Zainichi Koreans who are affiliated with the Chongryun organization.
space that pretended, albeit temporarily, to be North Korean although it existed in Japan.” In the discussion on the Joseon schools, Ryang does acknowledge change in the curricula, but emphasizes how it affects social relations within Chongryun; and within the constraint of the organization’s politically constructed DPRK Overseas Citizen identity. Fundamentally Ryang focuses on Chongryun’s top-down clumsy attempts to reproduce Chongryun identities in the Joseon schools (to be discussed in Chapter 3). However, in magnifying the reproduction of a North Korean identity through enforcing DPRK education; she disregards that the central focus in Joseon school education is a community commitment to ethnic education. Moreover, this community engagement has been the catalyst for changes in the curricula revisions, social inclusion, and civic activism.

On the other hand, Song (2012), a ROK scholar published his work following the release of the current (2003) curriculum. Song writes against Ryang’s analysis and emphasizes the importance of ethnic education in the Joseon schools and DPRK support as an auxiliary factor. Contrary to Ryang’s focus on reproducing DPRK education, the benchmark for Song’s (2012, 25) research is based on his fieldwork observations of teacher/student interactions in the classroom and community participation as a new interpretation of the schools. Primarily his study focuses on how the students navigate
“identity politics” in context with ethnic education and how the Joseon school community has recurrently redefined the link with the DPRK. Song describes how students adapt between their Joseon school ethnic identity and personal identities. He argues that rather than focusing exclusively on DPRK political ideologies the schools facilitate “identity management” to help students separate and negotiate their ethnic education experiences in the classroom and their lives in Japan. Song (2012, 22) is critical of Ryang’s inflated image of the Joseon schools’ reproduction of “North Korean education” and the emphasis on Chongryun politics. He argues her inquiry fails to acknowledge how the schools have translated DPRK concepts to accommodate Korean identities inside and outside school. For example, in her analysis, Ryang (1997, 61) often refers to the Young Pioneers in the Joseon schools in context with teaching DPRK revolutionary concepts to “be loyal to the Fatherland Marshal Kim Il Sung and Dear Leader Kim Jong Il.” However, Song (2012, 170) contends that joining the Young Pioneers in the fourth year of Elementary school is simply an act of initiation into the Chongryun community and celebrated by the local branch, PTA, headmaster, teaching staff and the entire school. Moreover, he notes that the ceremony, where mothers tie the red scarves on their children, is a formality and not a political commitment to the DPRK based Young Pioneers.
The existing literature on the Joseon schools generally critiques changes in the curricula, ethnic identity, Chongryun politics, connection with the Korean homeland, integration in Japan, and civil rights. However, studies review only particular periods and fail to acknowledge that issues related to certain times are only part of a bigger picture of cultural transformation and oppression against the Joseon schools. Historical events are a consequence of combined incidents, the movements of people, and determinations made by people in authority. For this reason, this dissertation spans over 100 years to gain a broader understanding of how colonial cultural suppression, postwar geopolitical displacement, Cold War discourses, and cultural translation have shaped the Joseon schools into a Third Space. Grounded on Bhabha’s Third Space theory, this dissertation fills the gap in the literature and is a unique endeavor to re-define the Joseon schools. This research differs from Song’s focus on “identity management” by within the construct of the Third Space, it examines how Zainichi Koreans “identify” with the Joseon schools rather than just “identity” per se. Findlay (1984, 58) writes that identification “goes hand in hand with [a] setting [of] others at a distance, an alienation of ourselves from them and their ways.” In context with the Third Space, the “alienation” discussed here is due to post-colonial marginalization of Zainichi Koreans who strongly identify with the Joseon schools.
Hence, this study contests the socially constructed sociopolitical DPRK stereotypes linked to the schools and focuses on the overall Joseon school education system as a hybrid Third Space for ethnic identification and empowerment. The Joseon school as a Third Space is an effect of colonial subjugation and now functions as a social space “in-between” Japanese and Korean (ROK and DPRK) cultural, political, economic systems and geographical boundaries. Or in other words, it is the space where Japanese and Korean cultures overlap, and hybridity comes into being, and through cultural translation and political negotiation, the Third Space initiates change. For this study, as a Third Space, the Joseon school system encompasses transnational government policies, regulations, funding, administration, facilities, teaching, administrative staff, curricula, teaching resources such as textbooks and community involvement.

In the prewar period, 97% (Morita 1996, 40) of Koreans migrated to Japan from the southern areas of the Korean peninsula, and in the postwar period displaced Chongryun Koreans identified with the DPRK in the north. The Joseon schools, to some extent, still lean towards the DPRK. For example, in context with how the Korean War started, the curricula briefly teaches a modified DPRK account. Over the twelve-year curricula, the year 8 social studies (sahoe) (Chongryun Jungang Sangim Wiwonhoe
text mentions in a few words that the Korean War was started by the Americans. Furthermore, in the year 10 modern history text (hyeondae Joseon yeogsa) (Chongryun Jungang Sangim Wiwonhoe 2004, 79), in one paragraph it explains the war began following the ROK’s bombarding of the DPRK Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on June 23, 1950; and because the Rhee Syngman government failed to heed the DPRK’s appeals to cease hostilities the Korean war commenced on June 25, 1950.

However, it is important to note that in context with shifting identities, identification with the DPRK has fluctuated due to generational change, domestic politics in Japan, and political events on the peninsula. A pertinent example of wavering loyalty to the DPRK is evident in the current curriculum (2003) that bases some lessons on ROK material and the dual acknowledgment of the ROK as an ancestral homeland (gohyang) and the DPRK as the fatherland (jogug). Beyond this ambiguous identification with the DPRK, the schools have forged a shared cultural identity due to colonial cultural dispossession, postcolonial displacement, and hegemonic Japanese national policies against the schools. In fact, in context with the expression “home is where the heart is,” people in the Joseon school community refer to Uri Haggyeo (our school) as their “home” (gohyang). Furthermore, in testament to the schools as a Third Space, against a background of diversity within the Zainichi Korean community and an
ability to accommodate sociopolitical change in Japan, the original curriculum and school system were established to facilitate moving students between the Japanese and Joseon school system. Moreover, due to a myriad of personal and political reasons Zainichi Korean students have frequently transferred within the Joseon, Japanese, and Mindan school systems. Consequently, the Joseon schools are prepared to accept new students at any stage of their schooling and put no restrictions on their language abilities.

Hence, this study contends that as a hybrid Third Space, rather than identifying with the DPRK Zainichi Koreans have interpreted DPRK ideologies as a source of empowerment to unify the Chongyrun community. To identify how collective experiences have given rise to the Third Space, this analysis will focus on: colonial independence ideologies, post-colonial and Cold-war displacement, ethnicity and the curricula, community involvement, social inclusion, social activism, and bureaucratic hegemony.

Over 100 years via cultural translation and political negotiation the catalyst for change in the Joseon schools has been an emphasis on regaining a Korean ethnic identity through ethnic education. However, against this backdrop of hybridity, to
discourage Korean ethnic education, the Japanese government, SCAP, and the ROK have negated the value of ethnic education and instead inflated and fossilized discriminatory stereotypes linked to national security. To ascertain this is an ongoing issue, this study will focus on the unique ethnic curriculum against bureaucratic hegemony over four periods of prewar binary policies of assimilation and exclusion; postwar displacement and SCAP and the Japanese government’s forced closures of the Joseon schools; ROK involvement in Cold-War politics and the Foreigner’ Schools System Bill; and application of DPRK stereotypes and the exclusion of Joseon schools from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program.

**Historical background**

Before this discussion moves on to chronicling a brief Zainichi Korean background, it should be pointed out that post-colonials residing in the colonial metropolis is not unique. Like the Joseon schools that were created in response to cultural displacement, Algerian youth in France have created a Third Space in Islam due to ongoing social discrimination, and assimilation policies that deny them their Algerian cultural identity. Consequently, despite being educated in French schools many young
Algerians now identify as “Algerian with French nationality” (Alsaafin, 2019). Algeria regained its independence in 1962 and by 1965 some 500,000 Algerians were living in France (House 2006). Initially, the French government saw the Algerian presence as temporary (see Babicz 2013); however, due to previous family settlement, many decided to stay. Furthermore, the migration of Algerians to France follows a similar trajectory to Koreans in prewar Japan: first, a wave of economic migrants, postwar migration to rebuild infrastructure, and second a wave of family reunion in the 1970s.

Comparable to Zainichi Koreans in Japan, biased migrant images of Algerians in France have reinforced colonial stereotypes. For example, Parisians call Algerian ghettos banlieues and the word has come to denote crime, unemployment, and precarious Muslims. Moreover, the banlieues are generally reported in the media only when there are “car bombings and drug shootings” (Packer 2015). Gender-based stereotypes, also portray Algerian youths as a “problem,” for males are often referred to as criminal-bent and women as “submissive” Muslims (House 2006). French Algerians have also been scapegoated following acts of terrorism. The most recent example came following the January 7, 2015, killings of twelve people at Charlie Hebdo by two

15 In 1947 the Statute of Algeria granted Algerian men full French citizenship, and their descendants have attained French citizenship as a birthright (jus soli).
French citizens with Algerian names. In the aftermath, mosques in France were vandalized and women and girls wearing hijabs were harassed (Packer 2015). Likewise, in Japan following DPRK missile launches, media reports of DPRK spy ships, and following Kim Jong-il’s confession to kidnapping Japanese citizens, threats against the Joseon schools escalated and female chima chogori uniforms were slashed.

In 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea, and Korea became part of the Empire of Japan. The Imperial Nationality Law differentiated Gaichi and Naichi family registration and created a separate subjectivity for Koreans on the peninsula and in Naichi Japan. In Morris-Suzuki’s (2010, 42) words “the boundaries of nationality that [the Japanese government] established were elastic, susceptible both to expansion and contraction.” Koreans were told they were “Japanese” however in the two-tier structure of nationality, Japanese people were deemed imperial citizens (teikoku kōkumin), and Koreans were imperial subjects (teikoku shinmin) with Korean (Chōsen-seki) nationality (Takahashi 2014, 15).

Immigration policies to Naichi Japan were strictly controlled by colonial policies and demands in Japan’s labor market. The four significant policies behind the mass exodus of Koreans to Naichi Japan were the 1910-1919 Land Survey, the Rice

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16 External territories
Expansion Project from the 1920s, the intensified assimilation drive in the 1930s known as the Köminka movement, and the conscription of Korean laborers from 1942 and Korean soldiers from 1944 (Zai Nihon 2006, 11). Ozawa (1973, 32) points out that Japan’s “brutal” colonization of Korea uprooted Koreans from their land and occupations and transformed them from a conservative agrarian people into itinerants, and “just like Korean rice (that was exported to Japan), Koreans too became export commodities.” Predominantly, Koreans who migrated to Japan came from the southern provinces: 37.5% from Gyeongsangnam-do, 23.1% from Gyeongsangbuk-do, 20.6% from Jeollanam-do and only 3.4% from the northern provinces that are now DPRK territories such as Pyongyang, North Hamgyong, and North and South Hywanghae (Morita 1996, 147).

When Japanese rule ended on August 15, 1945, the Korean peninsula was provisionally separated at the 38th parallel under Soviet administration in the north and United States of America in the south. Furthermore, there were over 2 million17 displaced Koreans (approximately 10% of Korea’s population) living in Naichi Japan, and in other Japanese territories (Morita, 1996, 33). The postwar crisis18 in Japan had

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17 These statistics are not exact because the Japanese government and corporations were unable to determine just how many Koreans came to Japan as forced laborers and how many Koreans had evacuated to Korea during the war (Kim 1997, 77).
18 The return of demilitarized soldiers and repatriates caused gross unemployment, serious food, and housing shortages and crippling inflation produced a collapse of Japan’s political and socio-economic
serious consequences for the displaced Koreans. With insufficient means to survive some 800,000 Koreans left between August 15, 1945, and November 30, 1945, in what Wagner (1951, 43) describes as a “spontaneous exodus” as they rushed to ports of Hakata, Moji, Sasebo, Senzaki, Sakai-minato, Maizuru, and Hakodate and departed by any available boat headed back to Korea or China (Kim 2010, 33). By March 1946, over 1.4 million Koreans had repatriated. However, following January 1946, some 600,000 Koreans opted not to accept repatriation because SCAP’s policy prohibited them from taking more than 1000 yen and set a baggage allowance of 250 pounds per/person. In 1945, the amount of 1000 yen (which was also difficult to exchange in Korea) would have lasted for only a few days (Caprio, 2009).

Therewith many politically minded Koreans simply refused to repatriate because they could not accept a divided peninsula and decided to wait until an official united Korean government was established (Kim 2010, 34). Other reasons for remaining were a lack of Korean language skills, insufficient repatriation assistance in Korea, rumors of livelihood insecurity, political unrest, food shortages, an outbreak of cholera, limited educational opportunities for women, floods in Seoul, and rumors of repatriation order in the immediate period after surrender (Lee & DeVos 1981, 57).

19 This figure is derived from the number of Koreans who registered for the 1947 Alien Registration Order, so it is possible there were more Koreans still residing in Japan (Zai Nihon 2006, 68).
vessels sinking\(^{20}\) (Zai Nihon 2013, 69; Eo 1998, 104).

By way of illustration, in his memoir, *Shinde Tamaruka (I’m not gonna die)*, Takahashi Akira (Korean name Seong Seong-deok) records he was born in Japan and until August 15, 1945, he thought he was “Japanese.” During the war, his father owned a factory that supplied weapons to the Japanese army and for this reason, he delayed his repatriation. However, in November 1946, eight-year-old Akira and his mother returned to Hwayang-myeon in South Jeolla Province Korea where they discovered their land was now listed in someone else’s name. Hence, with nowhere to live they relied on the charity of distant relatives. In Japan, Takahashi had attended school, but in Korea, he waited three years to enroll because he could not speak Korean (Takahashi 2014, 15-27).

The precarious legal status of Koreans became “the common denominator of most of the Korean troubles in Japan” (SCAP 1990, 63). For, until December 1946, when the official repatriation program ended, Koreans were regarded as “liberated nationals,” or sometimes “enemy nationals.” After 35 years of colonial rule, Koreans in Japan believed the Americans would liberate them and treat them on par with other

\(^{20}\) The *Ukijima maru* sank transporting 2838 Korean laborers and 897 civilians from Ōminato-kō Aomori to Pusan. On route it was ordered to berth in the Maizuru Port and on approach it collided with a naval mine and exploded. In the explosion 549 people were killed immediately and among the 175 people rescued eight people died. The remains of the remaining victims were recovered in 1950 and 1955 when the ship was salvaged. No one has been held accountable for the sinking (Caprio 2019, 81-104; Eo 1998, 104; Naito 2014, 97).
foreign nationals; however, this never materialized and a series of inconsistent policies against Koreans were enforced. Beginning in December 1945, Korean men in Japan lost their voting rights (Tanaka 1992, 60), and in November 1946, for the smooth running of the occupation, MacArthur declared that Koreans who forfeited their right to repatriate would no longer be treated as “liberated nationals” but “Japanese” nationals. However, during this time frame in the Tokyo Trials (May 1946 to November 1948) Koreans were treated as Japanese citizens for Class B & C war crimes (Fitzpatrick 2016, 758).

However, on May 2, 1947, (the day before Japan’s new constitution came into effect) the Showa Emperor issued his last Imperial Order 207 the Alien Registration Ordinance declaring that Koreans would henceforth be considered Aliens. In Takemae's (2002, 450) words, the last Meiji Constitution Imperial Ordinance became “an irony that was not lost on Koreans.” The Alien Registration Ordinance required Koreans to register and carry an Alien Registration booklet, and, in essence, the registry provided SCAP and the Japanese police with a list of “troublesome aliens” (Takemae 2002, 450). Furthermore, the Alien Registration booklet identified Koreans as Joseon which was not an official nationality because the ROK and DPRK were not established until 1948. Subsequently, anticipating mass repatriation, the 1951 Immigration Control Law was formulated to

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21 Fingerprinting “aliens” was not legislated until 1955 (Tsukajima 2017, 137).
establish the legal status of Koreans, control illegal immigration from Korea, and monitor Koreans who presented as a security threat (Chung 2010, 76).

The occupation ended on September 8, 1951, when Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, renouncing its title and claim over Korea. Subsequently, on April 28, 1952, without any formal consultations with the ROK or DPRK, Koreans were instantaneously divested of their “Japanese nationality.” Hence, without a country to advocate for them, it further transformed the Korean community of predominantly unskilled workers into a “highly politicized and ideologically divided foreign community” (Suzuki 2016, 51).

After Japan’s surrender, to advocate civil rights the Korean community created organizations all over Japan. Some of the earlier organizations were the Ōsaka Chōsenjin Kyōkai (August 28, 1945), the steering committee for the Zai Nihon Chōsenjin Renmei (September 10, 1945), the Seiji-han Shakuhō Undō Renmei (September 24, 1945) for the release of political prisoners, and on October 5, 1945, the Korean miners in Yubari Hokkaido formed a labor union with 7000 members to prepare for repatriation, and to push for improvement in meals and a raise in salaries (Satō, 1986, 90). The Korean League, called Chōren, was established in October 1945 and soon emerged as the most dominant Korean organization. Chōren began as a nonpartisan
ethnic organization to advocate for the welfare of Koreans in Japan but soon identified with Japanese communist factions and Marxist ideologies in Soviet-occupied northern Korea. Due to this association, under SCAP the Japanese government disbanded the organization on September 8, 1949, as part of the government’s crusade against “terrorists, and organizations of … confirmed gamblers who … are caus[ing] great disorder in the democratization of Japan and the reconstruction of a peaceful country” (Wagner 1951, 85).

The Zai Nihon Chōsen Kyoryū Mindan\(^\text{22}\) abbreviated as Mindan (Youth Organization for the Reconstruction of Korea; YORK) was established on October 3, 1946, by anti-communists expelled from Chōren. It was a center-right organization with Pak Yol as honoree chairman and supported President Syngman Rhee in the United States occupied southern Korea (Wagner 1951, 55). However, barring Mindan’s anti-communist stance, its ideologies had little persuasion over impoverished Zainichi Koreans who were more attracted to proletariat ideologies (Suzuki 2016, 51). The formal division of the homeland became a defining moment for Zainichi Koreans when the Republic of Korea was formally established on August 15, 1948, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established on September 8, 1948. Hence,

\(^{22}\) Forerunner to the current Mindan (Korean Residents Union).
on October 4, 1948, the organization changed its name to *Zai Nihon Daikanminoku Kyoryū Mindan*.

*Minsen* (United Democratic Front in Japan for Unification in Korea/민주주의민족전선 or *Minjeon*) as an arm of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) was established in 1951 to replace *Chōren* as an ethnic organization. However, it was disbanded in May 1955 and members were integrated into *Chongryun* on May 25, 1955. *Chongryun* was a highly ideological organization and it vowed to protect the rights of *Zainichi* Koreans, pledged allegiance to the DPRK, and promoted friendly relations between Japan and the DPRK. *Chongryun* severed ties with the JCP and as an independent ethnic organization affirmed it would not interfere in Japanese politics (Lee 1981, 112). *Chongryun* as a representative of the DPRK was destined to become the stronger ethnic organization because, in 1953, 77% (415,340) of *Zainichi* Koreans identified with the DPRK and only 23% (124,878) identified with the ROK (Higuchi 2002, 170).

Following the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3), many *Zainichi* Koreans transferred membership to the *Mindan* in exchange for a ROK passport and permanent residence (*kyōtei eijū*) in Japan. As of 2016, the Ministry of Justice (2016) resources
estimated that there were 338,950 Special Permanent Residents (tokubetsu eijū) and 32,461 of Chōsen-seki status. Demographically speaking this demonstrates that the Mindan is now the prominent ethnic organization. However, this statistic is misleading because many members of the Joseon school community (the mainstay of Chongryun) are de-facto members of Chongryun with ROK nationality.

**Current status of the Joseon schools**

As of 2019, there are 65 Joseon schools, including ten senior high-schools, one university (General Association of Korean Residents 2019), and 40 kindergartens (Gekkan IO 2019), run by Chongryun. The current overall student cohort is around 8000. This includes students who are stateless Koreans with Chōsen-seki, status or ROK, and Japanese nationals. Furthermore, due to multicultural marriages, there are some other nationalities (KIN 2015, 24).

Under Article 134 of the School Education Act and Article 64 of the Private Schools Act, as quasi-incorporated educational institutions, Korean schools are accredited as “miscellaneous” schools by the prefectural governments (MEXT 2016). The “miscellaneous” school category incorporates all foreign schools and the likes of

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23 Introduced in 1991 for all Korean and Taiwanese residents who were descendants of former Japanese subjects who had formerly lived in the metropolis.
cooking, sewing, knitting, and driving schools. On the other hand, Japanese schools are accredited as “regular” schools because they satisfy the curricular requirements of the 1947 School Education Law. As “miscellaneous” schools, the Joseon schools receive around 10% of subsidies compared to “regular” schools. However, the “miscellaneous” accreditation provides the schools with the autonomy to pursue ethnic education without Japanese government interference (see Appendix A for “miscellaneous” school regulations).

Fieldwork for this study has found that in context with empowerment in the Third Space Joseon schools now aim to prepare third- to fifth-generation students for life in Japan by nurturing strong Korean identities, and also to be instrumental in building a cultural bridge between Japan and the Korean peninsula. Beyond changes in the curriculum (to be discussed in detail throughout this study), the most prominent example of transformation was the mid-September 2002 removal of the DPRK leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il images from the first- to ninth-year classrooms following long negotiations with parents who campaigned against excessive ideological education.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the issue of DPRK...

\textsuperscript{24} Subsequently, the pictures were displayed in the staff rooms or headmaster’s offices at the schools’ discretion. Later, as a concession to the elderly in the community, it was agreed that a small picture of Kim Il-sung playing with children would be displayed on the side wall in the classrooms. These continue to be hung in senior classrooms out of respect for young adult students considered old enough to judge for
abductions of Japanese citizens stunned the Chongryun community. Now, at open days for Japanese people, the school communities regularly condemn the DPRK for abducting Japanese citizens, and on a case, by case basis, the schools hold lessons on the issue.


To establish how, in contrast to geopolitical postwar- and cold-war-sanctioned representations, the Joseon schools have interpreted history, culture, and power to create a Third Space; as a site of cultural hybridity and regeneration, this dissertation will analyze the hybrid education system against conflicting officially endorsed static racial and political stereotypes of Koreans.

Henceforth, to present a comprehensive overview of the Joseon schools over 100 years, this dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 – “Creation of the
Zainichi Subaltern: Colonial Cultural Suppression of Korean Education in Japan (1910-1945)” – reviews colonial displacement of Koreans and the creation of a hybrid culture in Naichi Japan between 1910-1945. The chapter documents how migration policies and demands for Korean labor in Japan influenced the development of the Chōsen buraku. For the Japanese government, the downside of Korean migration was a demand for education as Korean workers required Japanese language skills for work and Korean literacy for corresponding with family in Korea. Furthermore theoretically, children as Japanese subjects were required to attend school. However, the Japanese government prioritized the demands in the labor market and a lack of education further subjugated Koreans, but these circumstances also generated different educational opportunities for Koreans. The study will analyze the options for Korean education concluding with education under the jurisdiction of the police-operated Kyōwakai in Japanese schools. This chapter, in the context of the creation of a hybrid community, provides a basis for future chapters in correlation with the Korean community’s role in education and the Japanese government’s invalidation of Korean ethnic education.

Chapter 2 – “Post-colonial and Geopolitical Displacement: Under SCAP the Joseon School Closures under SCAP (1945-1952),” – analyzes the first five years of the Joseon schools under SCAP as it expands first on the precarious postwar legal status of
Zainichi Koreans and outlines post-colonial and geopolitical displacement in the construction of the postcolonial “other” between 1945-1952. The chapter emphasizes SCAP and the Japanese government’s failure to address decolonization beyond repatriation and the effect it had on Koreans in context with ethnic education. Tracing the development of the hybrid Gugeo Gangseupso schools the study focuses on how the Joseon school system developed under Chōren. This is followed by an analysis of the differences and similarities between SCAP and Japanese government oppression on the Joseon schools and how the issue of ethnic education was twisted into a security issue.

Chapter 3 – “Political Negotiation: the Joseon schools in pro-DPRK Cold-War Discourse and the Foreigners’ Schools System Bill (1955-1972),” – analyzes the development of the Joseon school system following the establishment of Chongryun against a background of repatriation to the DPRK, Japanese bureaucratic oppression and ROK intervention. First, the study documents how the Joseon school system expanded and developed under Chongryun between 1955 and 1972 with DPRK assistance. Furthermore, how political negotiation created a unique autonomous school system and how Chongryun Koreans as displaced diaspora identified with and relied on the DPRK for financial and curricula assistance. Second, in the context of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the study looks at how the ROK
and the Japanese government mutually suppressed the Joseon schools on the grounds of public security, to control and feasibly close the schools via the legislation of the Foreigners’ Schools System Bill.

Chapter 4 – “Cultural Translation: the Joseon schools, a Break from the DPRK amid Lingering Cold War Images: Exclusion from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program (1972-2019),” – analyzes the Joseon schools for third- and fifth-generation students against anti-DPRK debates. Spanning over three curricula this study summarizes an ongoing cultural transformation and break from the DPRK. Documenting generational change, the advocation of citizenship rights in Japan and geopolitical issues mainly concerning the DPRK the chapter explores how the schools have further metamorphosed into Third Spaces. Second, the analysis examines the Japanese government’s indifference to Korean ethnic education and how the DPRK connection has embroiled the schools into a public security debate to exclude the Joseon schools from the supposedly non-partisan High-school Tuition Waiver Program.

This original qualitative study builds on Homi Bhabha’s cultural hybrid theory of the Third Space to interpret the unique disposition of the Joseon schools. The inquiry is a mixed-method using English, Japanese, and Korean language primary and secondary sources. Through this synthesis of data, this dissertation, based on the Third
Space hypothesis, presents an alternative interpretation to the socially constructed geopolitical postwar and cold-war sanctioned representations and explores how the Joseon schools have interpreted and translated transnational history, culture, and power dynamics to create a distinct hybrid education system.
CHAPTER I

Creation of the Zainichi Subaltern: Colonial Cultural Suppression of Korean Education in Japan (1910-1945)

Introduction

In 1890, the Meiji government promulgated the Elementary School Order aiming for universal enrolment in compulsory education to equip Japanese children with life skills and a moral education befitting of members of the Japanese nation (MEXT 2009). Compulsory education began with a three-year course, followed by a four-year course in 1900 and six years in 1907. The enrollment rate gradually increased from 69% in 1898 (JICA 2004, 20), to 96% in 1905 (MEXT 2009) and 99% in 1917 (JICA 2004, 21).

The facts here verify the provisions made in education for Japanese Imperial citizens (teikoku kōkumin); however, education for Koreans in Naichi Japan, who were Imperial subjects (teikoku shinmin), followed a different trajectory as subalterns in the metropolis. Theoretically, as Japanese Imperial subjects, Koreans living in Naichi Japan should have had equal access to free and compulsory education like their Japanese
counterparts.

“Subaltern” is a term that identifies excluded and displaced people whose political voices are denied through their subordination in society. Antonio Gramsci used the term when referring to “groups who do not have a class consciousness but whose agency is still a historical force.” Or Ranajit Guha described a subaltern as anyone who has been subordinated (Childs and Williams 1997, 234).

Broadly speaking Koreans in Naichi Japan were basically pushed through the cracks because they were caught between the policies of the Governor-General in Korea (GGK) and a lack of policies in Japan. Or in the words of Wagner (1951, 20) “Koreans in Japan were Japanese nationals with a legal status somewhere between the level of Koreans in Korea and that of [the] Japanese population.” In hindsight, the Japanese government failed to foresee a large number of Koreans permanently settling in Naichi Japan and the matter of education was further complicated because many Korean adults were illiterate and required education in Japanese literacy. Moreover, as will become evident in this study, the Japanese government seemed unwilling to integrate Korean children into the Japanese school system. In 1922 the central government did make some concessions on Korean welfare and education and allocated jurisdiction to the prefectural governments. Furthermore, when families began migrating to Naichi Japan,
in 1930 the Ministry of Education issued the 32nd Education Ordinance informing Korean parents that as Imperial subjects they were obliged to enroll their children in Japanese schools. However, the Ordinance was not enforced until 1938 when Koreans came under the supervision of Kyōwakai (Concordia Association) jurisdiction.

Resources for this study are limited for two reasons: the government’s evasion in Naichi Japan of formulating political policies on education for Koreans, and most records at private Joseon schools being destroyed due to intense police surveillance.

This chapter, in the context of the creation of a hybrid Chōsen buraku (Korea town), is a starting point for future chapters in correlation with the creation of Joseon schools as a Third Space and the Korean community’s role in education. Against a background of impoverishment and immigration policies, it first reviews how the early students and sojourners laid the foundations for the Korean community through the creation of organizations, followed by community settlements when families began migrating to Naichi Japan. Second, it then analyzes how the community responded to the education needs of Koreans in the face of poverty and contradictory national policies. This study asks how, against sustaining a labor market, the Japanese government used the contradictory binary of exclusion and assimilation to create a subaltern identity for Koreans in Naichi Japan. How did the subjugation of Koreans in education instigate
insurrection in the Korean community and a strong desire for ethnic education?

Table 1.1 is a timeline of events that affected the trajectory of Korean immigration to Japan between 1905 and 1945.

Table 1.1 Prewar Japan and Korea 1905-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Eulsa Treaty</td>
<td>Korea becomes a protectorate of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Japan annexes Korea</td>
<td>Land survey begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td></td>
<td>1st March Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
<td>Campaign to Increase Rice Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td>32nd Education Ordinance for Koreans in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>National Mobilization Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>National Mobilization Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Enforcement of Soshi Kaimei Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Japan attacks Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>Forced conscription of Korean laborers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conscription of Koreans into the Japanese armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japan’s defeat in WW II</td>
<td>Liberation of Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Kōrai Hakubutsukan 2014, 44-45; Zai Nihon 2006, 7).*

The Creation of the Korean community

The trajectory of migration to *Naichi* Japan and the formation of a Korean community was influenced by colonial and national policies. To protect the domestic economy and restrict migration, from 1906 the Governor-General Police Affairs Division began issuing Japanese travel certificates\(^1\) to Koreans. Then, when Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, the government removed Koreans from its ban on hiring foreign laborers and a steady flow of Korean workers began migrating to *Naichi* Japan (Naito 1989, 6).

\(^1\) Standard Japanese passports were issued exclusively to elite Koreans whereas the Governor-General of Korea Police Affairs Division issued travel certificates for ordinary Koreans.
Migration trends changed again when Japan tightened immigration laws to safeguard Japanese jobs after the Shōwa Financial Crisis in 1927 and the 1929 Great Depression. For example, in 1928, the Governor-General introduced a directive requiring migrating Koreans to carry more than 60 yen (approximately 102119 yen by today’s economy)\(^2\) on their person and be referred through a labor broker (Kim 2006, 152). This directive changed the migration trajectory because impoverished Koreans could no longer migrate to Naichi Japan in search of work. Subsequently, in 1930, the government introduced two new immigration laws enabling families to migrate: the Ichiji Kisen Shōmei Seido which allowed Koreans to briefly return to Korea if they were carrying a re-entry certificate and the Tokō Shōkaijō Hakkyū Seido permitting Koreans to enter Japan if they carried a letter of introduction (Kim 2006, 153). In sum, the changing migration flows to Naichi Japan, influenced how collective settlement began.

\(^2\) To calculate the 1928 value of yen to the 2017 Consumer Price Index (CPI) the Yaruzou.net. 2020 will be used for future calculations.
The beginning of the *Chōsen buraku*

Until 1930 the *Chōsen buraku* settlements were undeveloped due to a gender ratio disparity,\(^3\) and because Japanese landlords refused to lease their properties to Koreans. Consequently, itinerant Korean sojourners lived and worked in company accommodation called *Hamba*. Moreover, the establishment of a community of collective households may have been temporarily delayed due to the violence against Koreans following the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake when thousands of Koreans were massacred by Japanese vigilantes (Kim 1997, 56).

Before 1930 predominantly Korean sojourners and elite students settled in *Naichi* Japan. In 1911,\(^4\) Japan recruited 2,527 Korean laborers and by 1917 when labor importation was crucial during World War I, 14,502 Korean laborers were working in the metropolis (Morita 1996, 35). The student population also increased and by 1919 there were 770 students in Japanese schools and universities studying literature, medicine, economics, and law (Higuchi 2002, 90). The 1920 National Census records that there were 36,026 Korean males and 4,711 females (Morita 1996, 41). Most of the women aged between 15 and 29 were recruited by Japanese brokers to work in textile factories, and most males were illiterate and unskilled sojourners called *dekasegi*, who worked for

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\(^3\) In 1917 the ratio of men to women was 8 to 1 (Nakajima 2005 143).

\(^4\) Before 1910, there were some 229 Korean students and political asylum seekers living in Japan (Ozawa 1973, 32).
cheaper wages than Japanese workers.

Ken Kawashima (2009, 93) points out that Koreans were “free workers in the day labor market” and not protected by unions. There was no safeguard from discrimination, and they worked for lower wages to their Japanese counterparts. Hence, destitution was common among Korean sojourners, and most struggled with a “double life” as they supported a family back in Korea. Kim (1997, 60) notes that 78% of construction workers, 86% of craftsmen, and 65% of day laborers remitted funds back to Korea. For example, in 1924, the Osaka City Social Affairs Division (Kim 1997, 60) documented a 27-year-old Korean laborer who earned 35 yen per month (2017 conversion - 55,651 yen). From his earnings, he paid 19 yen 50 sen (2017 conversion - 30211 yen) for boarding and two meals per day, remitted five yen (2017 conversion - 7950 yen) to family in Korea, and was left with only ten yen (2017 conversion - 15900 yen) for expenses.

In lieu of collective settlements, students and sojourners created mutual aid associations that provided financial assistance, employment, and education. The organizations created by students played an important role in educating the Korean community, spreading pro-independence, and Korean ethnic nationalist ideologies (Pak, 1979, 34). Between 1910 and 1920 Korean students, Christians, and intellectuals were
regarded as dissidents, and to avoid police scrutiny, the students created societies where they could legitimately congregate. For example, societies held meetings to foster friendship through year-end and New-Year parties, speech contests, sports events, graduations, and welcome events for new members. Also, religious services, publications, and schools conveyed ideologies of pro-independence, resisting assimilation, and cooperation with fellow Koreans in America, China, and Russia. These early avant-garde societies were decisive in the Zainichi Korean anti-imperial struggles to follow (Pak 1979, 68). However, Pak (1979, 44) also points out that the early student intellectual and ideological organizations, such as the Kokutōkai, the Hokuseikai, Ichigetsukai, the Tōkyō Chōsen Musan Seinen Dōmeikai, the Sangetsukai, and the Shinkō Kagaku Kenkyūkai, were weak in nationalistic, socialist and ideological stances until they aligned with the Korean workers (Pak 1979, 44).

A pertinent example of early student leadership in the pro-independence movement was the February 8, 1919 rally for Korean independence at the Tokyo Korean YMCA Tokyo, where Baek Gwan-su read the declaration of Korean independence to 600 Korean students. This rally paved the way for the March First, 1919, Independence Movement in Korea, and the establishment of Korea's provisional government in Shanghai (Zai Nihon 2006, 25). Following the Tokyo assembly, Korean
student delegates were dispatched to Korea. Encouraged by the students, Korean nationalists including Christians, Buddhists, and Cheondogyo\textsuperscript{5} members planned a national petition for independence. Subsequently, on March 1, 1919, 29 (of 33) nationalists signed a Declaration of Independence and submitted it to the Governor-General. Then, over the following months over a million Koreans participated in Independence Movement demonstrations. The movement stunned the Japanese authorities and the police response was violent. The March First, Independence Movement failed to liberate Korea from Japanese rule, but it did motivate the Korean nationalist movement (Eckert 1990, 276-279; Kang 2001,15-23).

Another example of the political role Korean students played in the Empire was the Gwangju Student Independence Movement that began after an October 30, 1929, incident at Naju Station in Gwangju. At the station, female student Pak Ki-ok was harassed by two Japanese junior-high-school males. Her brother Pak Chun-chae came to her defense and became embroiled in a skirmish after the Japanese males called him the derogatory epithet “\textit{senjin}.” Consequently, some 30 Korean students and 50 Japanese students tussled, and Pak Chun-chae was severely beaten by a Japanese policeman for throwing the first punch (Solomon 2009). The indiscriminate beating of Pak resulted in

\textsuperscript{5} Religion of the Heavenly Way
nationwide civil disobedience until March 1930 with some 54,000 students from 300 schools nationwide participating in what is described as the second-most important independence movement (after the March First, Independence Movement) in occupied Korea (Yonhap News Agency, 2019).

In Naichi Japan, after 1920, following the March First Independence demonstrations on the peninsula, encouraged by the pro-independence movement in Korea and focusing on class struggles, the fraternity unions evolved into ideological associations and worker organizations. As an example, in 1922 the Tokyo Korean Labor Association and the Osaka Korean Labor Association were founded followed by Rōsō (the Zainichi Korean Worker's Union in Japan) in 1925. Rōsō administered over eleven prefectural branches and by 1926 founded 250 affiliated organizations with a national membership of 9,900 (Pak 1979, 44). Rōsō’s main objective focused on ethnic, political, social, and economic issues. However, when Rōsō became a member of the Japan National Union Council of Trade Unions it abandoned ethnic issues and joined with Japanese unionists to focus on universal class struggles (Kadoki 1978, 12).

Organizations established by Korean workers (excluding the government-sponsored Sōaikai organization) were also closely shadowed by Japanese

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6 Organizations established by Korean workers from 1910-1920 were short-lived and scant evidence on their activities remain (Weiner 1989, 100-103) likely due to police harassment (Pak 1979, 144), the Korean laborers’ itinerant lifestyle, and a general disinterest in labor activism.
authorities. Hence, small organizations did not register with authorities, were clandestine, and destroyed records. However, a 1929 report published by Osaka City (Social Division Research Section Osaka City Social Division Research Section 1929, 29) notes that in the 1920s there were at least 12 organizations registered by Koreans. The report documents the names of organizations, their objectives, the year of inauguration, and office addresses. For example, in 1923 the Naisen Kyōwakai was established to promote harmony between Korea and Japan, followed by the Osaka branch of the Sōaikai to provide mutual support for Koreans. Other organizations listed in the report were the (1926) Korean Labor Union in the Japan-Osaka Korea Labor Branch to provide support for the struggles of Korean workers and better pay, the (1927) Airin-kai to promote harmony between Korea and Japan, the (1928) Korean Christian Church Youth League to promote cultural activities for Koreans, the (1927) Osaka Korean Student Association for social support, and the (1928) Osaka branch of the Korean Youth League to support labor struggles. Additional organizations such as the (1927) Ōwada Branch of the Naisen Doaikai, the (1928) Kyōshin-kai, the (1928) Osaka Eishin-kai, the (1927) Naisen Dōshikai, and the (1926) Chōsenjin Shinshin-kai are listed for providing social support and mutual aid to Koreans.

In comparison to the autonomous student and worker organizations mentioned
here, the Japanese sponsored *Sōaikai* was founded in 1921 following the 1919 March First Independence Movement to accelerate assimilation and facilitate control over the *Zainichi* Korean population. The *Sōaikai* was the forerunner to the *Kyōwakai* (to be discussed later) and aimed to foster “harmonization” and assimilation among Koreans in *Naichi* Japan. Theoretically, Koreans I Gi-dong and Bak Jun-gun founded the organization and gave it a Korean semblance (Ringhoffer 1981, 49). However, the organization was subsidized by the Governor-General of Korea (GGK), the metropolitan police in Tokyo, the Bank of Chōsen, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui. Maruyama Tsurukichi, who arranged the financial patronage, believed that welfare organizations should be supervised by the police because welfare recipients tended to commit criminal offenses (Kawashima 2009, 137). The main activities of the organization involved running night schools, assigning jobs to Korean laborers, establishing worker dormitories, mediating in labor struggles, and collaborating with the police (Higuchi 2010, 247). As employment and travel documentation between *Naichi* Japan and the peninsula were controlled by the *Sōaikai*, membership became essentially compulsory for Koreans (Wagner 1951, 22). Hypothetically the *Sōaikai* was a private welfare organization run by Koreans; however, in reality, Kawashima (2009, 141) describes it as a “preventative police organization” focused on Koreans going “beyond the binary
opposition of state and civil society.” In terms of the Third Space, the Sōaikai did represent a hybrid social space somewhere between Japan and Korea. However, in context with the Third Space in this study, the Japanese sponsored Sōaikai was nowhere near the empowering Third Space created by Koreans to share collective experiences of culture and history.

The Chōsen buraku and family settlement

After 1930, due to the intensified Kōminka assimilation drive, a labor shortage, and relaxation in travel restrictions, more Koreans began settling to Naichi Japan. Then, following the 1938 Manpower Mobilization Ordinance, another wave of migration occurred when Japan began drafting civilians into the war industries. Hence, it could be said that the Korean communities across Japan were founded on the previous mutual aid association, publication, and night school infrastructure created by the sojourners and students.

The main Chōsen buraku were built in Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Fukuoka, and Aichi, areas where there was a high demand for Korean labor. Settlements were generally located close to rivers, construction sites, and in the cities next to Japan’s

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7 Kōminka was the national “Japanization” campaign to assimilate Koreans.
outcaste groups, the *Burakumin* and the Okinawan community. Lacking fresh water, sewerage, and electricity the *Chōsen buraku* was regarded by the Japanese as unclean. However, the *Chōsen buraku* were safe havens away from Japanese control and surveillance (Higuchi 2002, 76). The Koreans, as a transnational community, brought with them regional customs, regional dialects, culture, ethnic ties, and as they culturally translated and adjusted, as they developed a new hybrid culture in Japan. For example, in the *Chōsen buraku* Korean and Japanese were spoken, some dwellings used Korean floor heating (ondol), shops sold Korean spices, illegal liquor *doburok*, was easily available and dwellers wore a mixture of Japanese and Korean clothing. The community organized social gatherings, established informal schools for children, founded clan and hometown associations, and formed labor and nationalist movements. Moreover, in the settlements, Korean children were naturally exposed to Korean culture from traveling Korean singers and actors, and salesmen who sold Korean novels and classics (Kim 2006, 155). As for religion, Koreans were at liberty to choose, some were Buddhists, and in some areas, Christian churches were established with Korean pastors. However, most people maintained Confucian customs and abided by ancestral rituals (*jesa*) and traditional wedding customs (Higuchi 2002, 84).

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8 The Korean equivalent to Japanese “sake.”
Due to the isolation from mainstream Japanese society, even during the Second World War (WWII), the Koreans did have some degree of freedom. For example, Higuchi (2002, 117) writes that escaped conscripted laborers often found places to hide, and many workers drank *doburoku* to relieve their stress, ate garlic and chili pickles, and roamed the streets singing sad subversive Korean folk songs. In this hybrid community in Hall’s (1990, 228) words they “[e]ach negotiated [his] economic, political, and cultural dependency differently. And this ‘difference’…. [was] inscribed on [their] cultural identities.” However, despite some interludes of freedom, following Japan’s invasion of China in 1931 in context with Japan’s intense assimilation (Kōminka) movement the Japanese government tightened control over the Japanese population and intensified Korean integration through the *Kyōwakai* (Higuchi 2002, 105).

**The *Kyōwakai* and the Korean community**

The establishment of the *Kyōwakai* (the Concordia Society) in 1936 foreshadowed crucial changes for Koreans and it infiltrated every aspect of Korean life (Wager 1951, 37). Previously, in October 1934, the Cabinet released a memorandum titled “Procedures for Korean Immigration,” as it mulled the creation of a unified Korean collective body to safeguard the livelihood of Koreans, oversee living standards, and expand access to education (Naito, 2004 16). Consequently, in August 1936 the
Kyōwakai was inaugurated as “an official arm of the Japanese government” (Wagner 1951, 37). The Kyōwakai was supervised by the Korean division of the Special High-ranking Police Agency and like the Sōaikai it was essentially a police-operated exercise. Authority within the association was evenly divided between the Governor-General of Korea, the Central Kyōwakai administrative offices, the Ministries of Education, and the Colonial Affairs and Welfare division (established in 1938) (Weiner 1994, 160-162). In 1936, the Kyōwakai established offices in Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa, Aichi, Hyogo, Yamaguchi, and Fukuoka. Furthermore, in 1939, as Japan began conscripting laborers from the Korean peninsula, the Kyōwakai established branches in all national police agencies (Zai Nihon 2006, 45). Hypothetically, the Kyōwakai “safeguarded Korean livelihood.” However, its main objective was to exercise control, suppress, and impose Kōminka assimilation policies on Koreans via the promotion of the “Japanese spirit,” culturalization,9 welfare,10 protection,11 and investigation of Korean conditions and “publicity”12 (Wagner 1951, 37).

To bolster Japan’s Kōminka movement, the Kyōwakai attempted to control

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9 Etiquette, cleanliness, public morality, compulsory education, group training, payment of taxes and rent.
10 Livelihood, housing, community centers, cooperatives, vocational education, savings, clinics, and recreation.
11 Close liaison with Korean affairs regarding employment of students, personal guidance, vaccinations, and periodic leaves.
12 Propaganda through every medium to explain Japan to Koreans on the mainland and the peninsula.
most aspects of Korean lives. For example, under the pretext of improving Korean livelihood (seikatsu kaizen) in the Chōsen buraku women were targeted for “Japanization” because, compared to Korean men, they were more isolated from mainstream Japanese society and maintained Korean traditions at home (Higuchi 2002, 111). For example, Kyōwa classes for women were held in the Chōsen buraku where they were taught Japanese language, etiquette, Japanese cooking, and to discourage them from wearing the Korean chogori, they were taught how to wear a Japanese kimono. Courses on Japanese customs also included how to celebrate Japanese festivals such as Girls’ Day and Boys’ Day and to display the national flag on public holidays (Higuchi 2002, 111). Koreans were also obliged to worship at Shinto shrines and in some areas the Kyōwakai gave small Shinto shrines (kamidana) to be displayed in Korean homes (Higuchi 2002, 112).

From 1940, the Kyōwakai issued compulsory photo identification booklets called Kyōwakai techō. Except for Korean students, doctors, teachers, intellectuals, and company workers, 450,000 Korean household heads were expected to carry identification (Higuchi 1984). The booklets became a symbol of patriotism, and those who failed to carry them were subject to arrest. The identification was required for work,

13 However, the practice was not successful because Koreans did not understand the significance of the kamidana. After accusations of disrespect, the Kyōwakai halted distribution (Higuchi 2002, 112).
taking trains, returning to Korea and to receive rations. Higuchi (2002, 115) points out that the booklet was intended to distinguish Koreans from Japanese because the holder was immediately identified as Korean. Hence, the identification booklets provided Japanese authorities with information regarding the movements of Koreans, life in the Chōsen buraku, and information for conscription. It also prevented Koreans with subversive ideologies from re-entering Naichi Japan, because for “higher police” surveillance on the passage of Koreans between the Gaichi (peninsula) and Naichi areas was deemed essential to preserve public peace (Higuchi 2002, 116). For police purposes, the booklets verified the holder’s identity and pending confirmation police then issued travel certificates to Koreans. Furthermore, when Japan initiated the name-change policy (sōshi-kaimei) in 1940 the booklets gave the Japanese police a database to enforce name changes.

Briefly, the booklets were 30 pages and identified the holder as a member of the Kyōwakai, recording a home address in Korea, address in Japan, and place of employment. Kimigayo was considered Japan’s National Anthem at the time and inscribed on the cover page. Included within were details of family members, the Imperial Oath, expectations of Kyōwakai members, Japan’s 16 national holidays (when

14 Japanese citizens were also subject to rations.
all citizens were expected to display the national flag), and notes recording monetary donations towards Japan’s war effort. For example, in Kim Ryong-deuk’s *Kyōwakai* booklet, he is also recorded as Kaneda Saburo, born in 1915 in Gyeongsangbuk-do, and living in Toyama City. His details note that he entered Japan in 1936 and worked as a construction worker. Other particulars refer to transferring membership to another branch (*Kyōwa-kai Membership Card*, 1940). There is also the case of Ju Rak-uk: his booklet was issued in 1942 and, also records him as Kato Rakuei, born in 1927 in Chungcheong and living in Hoi-gun in Aichi Prefecture. He first landed in Japan in March 1941 and was a textile worker. In 1944 he donated five yen to the war effort (*Kyōwa-kai Membership Card*, 1942).

So far, this discussion has established that Korean settlement in the colonial metropolis was a consequence of colonial politico-economic policies. The hybrid *Chōsen buraku* was shaped by two waves of immigration: first intellectuals and sojourners, and then family migration and conscripted laborers. Boittin (2015, xiv), documents interactions in the French metropolis between politically active working-class black men and white feminists in the 1930s. She argues that interwar Paris was a colonial space, where opposites mingled and the threat of empire channeled people’s self-identification and socio-political relations. In the same manner, in the
space of Japan’s metropole and hidden away in the ghetto-like Chōsen buraku, illiterate sojourners and nationalist orientated students intersected and came to terms with where they stood in the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer. Here the overlapping of disparate individuals and groups facilitated mutual identification and the creation of a hybrid Korean community and the organization of the Chōsen buraku as a Third Space. However, against social and political exchanges in the Chōsen buraku, the community was beleaguered by bureaucratic indifference, police scrutiny, and militarization. From this perspective, the following analysis will look at the education options for Koreans.

Korean education in pre-war Japan

Due to a lack of government policies and a significantly small population of Korean minors, before 1930 there are no reliable statistics regarding school enrollment. As mentioned previously the Governor-General of Korea’s 1922 Korean Education Ordinance was enforced and issues of Korean education were delegated to prefectoral governments. Then in 1930, the Ministry of Education announced the 32nd Education Ordinance in Naichi Japan. Ozawa (1973, 71) points out that the Ordinance

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15 The 1920 National Census indicates that 40,755 Koreans consisting of only 2,450 children between the ages of 5-14 years old were living in Naichi Japan (Morita 1996, 41).

16 内地在住朝鮮人ハ学齢中ハ小学校令第32二依リソノ保護者ニ対スル就学ノ義務ヲ負ハセル
vaguely feigned an impression of public fairness (*tatemae*) to appease Koreans but focused on the parents’ responsibilities rather than the children. Furthermore, to enroll in Japanese schools Koreans were required to file a separate application, have some proficiency in the Japanese language. Even still, Japanese children were given priority for places (Ozawa 1973, 71). However, a lack of infrastructure too may have prevented the government from enforcing the Ordinance until 1938 under *Kyōwaki* (Nakajima 2005, 146). Hence, rather than enforcing the Ordinance, the government delegated the issue to regional jurisdiction reasoning that prefectures were qualified to manage Korean education under the conditions of the existing Elementary School Ordinance (Ozawa 1973, 70).

**Child poverty and education**

Without a national policy on education, Koreans were caught in a vicious cycle, as their lack of education created poverty which in turn prevented them from receiving an education. The situation was exacerbated by Japan’s Factory Law,\(^\text{17}\) which prohibited child labor under the age of 14 years, but did not apply to Korean children.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) The Factory Law was first introduced in 1911 and put into effect in 1916 to protect the rights of workers. The law prevented employing children under the age of 12 years and in 1922 it raised the age to 14 years.

\(^{18}\) There are no public documents stating that Korean children were exempt from this law; however, Ito (1983, 19) is unable to present any evidence, contending that Japanese ignored the law when employing...
Furthermore, the Japanese public was indifferent to the plight of Korean children who were marginalized, and this further disempowered them in Japanese factories (Ito 1983, 4). However, the welfare of Koreans came to the attention of Osaka authorities and in 1923, the Osaka prefecture requested that the Ministry of Education (MOE) formulate a comprehensive national policy on education for Koreans. Despite this, the ministry was unresponsive, and Osaka was pressed to formulate an independent policy for accommodating laborers, job placement agencies, and enrolment of Korean children in Japanese schools (Ito 1983, 5-6). Despite Osaka’s measures, on a national scale, the Korean community was beset by low school enrollment. For example, a 1935 survey conducted by the city of Kyoto found that poor Korean school enrollment was due to poverty (60%), a lack of support for women’s education (30%), and a lack of proficiency in Japanese (10%). An additional survey by the Social Division in the Social Welfare Division discovered that out of those who had enrolled in school at some time, over 90% had dropped out (Ozawa 1973, 72-3). In 1937, the circumstances were similar, and a survey report by the Kyoto Community Affairs Division (1937) found that 63% of survey respondents were born in Japan, and out of a sample of 4756 respondents between the ages of 7 to 17, only 5.4% had completed their education; 47.6% were Koreans (Ito 1983, 19).
enrolled; 2.6% had dropped out; and 44.3% had never attended school. Moreover, the survey also found that 70.9% of six-year-olds had never enrolled in school at all. Again, the main reasons given for non-enrollment were poverty, parents not supporting their daughter’s education, and a lack of Japanese proficiency.

As a case in point, the experiences of 15-year old Ko Jun-seok corroborate how young Koreans were marginalized and disempowered in Japanese factories. In his memoirs, Ko Jun-seok (1973, 76-90) a 15-year-old sojourner from Chejudo recounts how he balanced working in a factory and going to school. In 1925, Ko traveled from Chejudo to Osaka and boarded in his uncle’s overcrowded, bedbug- and lice-infested workers’ dormitory. Eventually, he found work as a blacksmith apprentice, with work conditions that included board and free education in night school. His boss changed Ko’s name to “Masakichi,” and Ko tolerated the lower wages and took on extra jobs such as coming to work earlier than other Japanese apprentices because his boss had promised to send him to school.

However, after three years he tendered his resignation because he realized the owners had no intention of allowing him to go to school. The announcement stunned them and to keep Ko in service they reluctantly agreed to keep their promise. However,

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19 No response from 0.1% of the sample.
despite the conditions of freeboard and education, enrolling in school was considered a private issue and he had to pay his tuition. Ko borrowed 10 yen from a fellow Korean and enrolled in the vocational night classes at the Ōe Elementary school in Higashi-ku Osaka. Following enrollment, Ko was harassed by fellow workers for going to school and called a futeisenjin (insolent Korean); also, the boss’ wife was cantankerous over his late dinners and demanded he put in extra hours because of his privileged situation. The pressure became intolerable and after a month he dropped out. Moreover, to keep him in employment he did receive a pay raise, but his remuneration was still less than that of his Japanese counterparts.

Ko’s one month at school is one experience in the complex education dilemma for Koreans in Naichi Japan. Due to the government’s indifference, Koreans were constrained by poverty and obliged to resolve their educational issues without support. For those who did have access to education, many attended night schools, privately run Joseon schools or Japanese public schools.

Public night schools (Yakkan Gakkō)

After 1918, many Koreans studied in public night schools under a nationally accredited truncated curriculum and approved textbooks in Japanese, mathematics,
history, geography, and science. Due to the high number of Korean enrollment records, studies on pre-war Korean education in Naichi Japan have generally focused on these schools\(^\text{20}\) (Kawamukai 1973; Kuwamura 1983, 74; Nakajima 2005; Tanaka 1967). In 1921, night schools were established in Kobe, and a large cohort of Korean students registered. By 1922, 80% of the student population in Osaka night schools were Korean (Tanaka 1967, 167). Moreover, in the 1930s there were over 200-night schools located in Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya with some schools reporting up to 75% of the student cohort as Korean (Kuwamura 1983, 74). By 1941, across the nine elementary level night schools in Kobe out of 184 students, 129 were Koreans (Nakajima 2005, 150).

All night schools offered the national curriculum; however, schools varied according to local conditions. For example, at the Kobe elementary night schools, students were required to be over nine years old at the time of enrollment and expected to attend two hours per day for six years to graduate. The truncated curriculum included morals, Japanese, mathematics, geography, history, and science; girls also studied

\(^{20}\) Night schools in Japan were established under the January 12, 1894, First Directive from the Ministry of Education Order as a means to provide education for the impoverished. This order was an extension of the 1985 Elementary School Order. The schools were considered Charity Schools and offered a truncated curriculum to boost Japan’s compulsory school attendance rate. In the early planning stages night schools were to be subsidized by the national government, however the Diet failed to support the order and administration was handed down to regional government jurisdiction, and management was turned over to religious groups and regional public organizations (Kawamukai 1973, 39).
home-science (Nakajima 2005, 150). In Osaka and Kobe, following the 1920-1931 “cultural rule” policy (Bunka Seiji) in Korea, the schools customized education programs and included Korean because educators believed that immersing Koreans in their native language and culture would serve as a shortcut to their assimilation. For instance, in 1922, the Osaka Saibi Elementary school held night classes and, together with the local council and the Osaka Education Board made special allowances for Koreans who were considered under pressure from work and study. Fundamentally, the headmaster Takahashi Kihachirō believed that Koreans should study with Japanese students; however, to ease them into the system he established two separate classes. Each class was divided into three sub-groups according to the students’ Japanese ability. Subsequently, Korean students were transferred into the mainstream when their Japanese reached a level of competency (Ito 1983, 11-12). The Saibi Elementary school also employed Korean teachers to teach the Korean language and facilitate communication between the school and parents. Due to these special considerations, Korean attendance was likely higher than in other night schools (Nakajima 2005, 152). In addition to the Saibi Elementary school, in 1922, the Mikura Elementary school and the Yakumo Elementary School in Kobe established a vocational branch for Koreans, and Korean teachers were paid by the city (Tanaka 1967, 163-164).
As previously discussed, the *Sōaikai* schools were run by the organization and, in return for financial support, accepted police authority, and endorsed assimilation. How many night schools were established by *Sōaikai* is uncertain due to a lack of records (Ringhoffer 1981, 62). However, it is known that *Sōaikai* schools were established to teach illiterate laborers and children Japanese language skills necessary for work and in some places basic Korean language for corresponding with family in Korea. For example, in 1922 the *Sōaikai* started a school at its headquarters in Tokyo for Korean workers who lived in the *Sōaikai*-operated dormitories. More than once a week it offered classes in morals, Japanese, Korean language, and mathematics. The morals classes endeavored to reinforce the *Sōaikai* ideologies of assimilation to prepare Koreans for a “Japanese lifestyle” by “cultivat[ing] common sense, spiritual discipline, and an ethical character” (Kawashima 2009, 148).

From a Korean perspective, the *Sōaikai* was regarded more as a labor broker than a “harmony” group and most Koreans did not agree with the group’s principles (Higuchi 2002, 148). For, if anything, the classes reinforced a subaltern status. The basic education taught in the schools was designed to expedite communication with Japanese employers in the workplace to prevent problems on work sites. For example, at the Izumi night school in Osaka, basic Korean and Japanese were taught to illiterate
laborers. Using only katakana and hangul they learned to write from sentences like, “throwing rubbish on the road is a nuisance to others” (Ringhoffer 1981, 62). Sōaikai schools generally operated according to labor demand and were closed according to the government policies. By way of illustration, the Tokyo Sōaikai Sunday school for workers’ children closed in 1929 because the authorities reconsidered that the fastest track to assimilation was to integrate Korean children into Japanese schools (Ringhoffer 1981, 62).

_Joseon night schools_

From the 1920s, in Naichi Japan, to cater to the diverse intellectual needs in the Korean community, Koreans launched a pro-active education campaign to educate working illiterate Korean adults and children. The founders of the schools were Korean Labor Unionists (Rōsō and later Kyōsō), Communists, Korean nationalist educators, Christians, and Koreans who cooperated with the Japanese authorities in Yūwa (harmony) societies including the Sōaikai. There were no formal schoolhouses for Joseon schools, and students generally studied in people’s homes, factories, churches, or anywhere they could be accommodated.

Between 1920 and 1941, including the Sōaikai and other Yūwa groups, records
indicate 68 Joseon schools were operating in major cities in Naichi Japan. Student numbers are unaccounted, and the period of operation for most schools ranged from a few months to one year, except for the Osaka Buddhist school Seishin Yagakkō that is said to have operated from 1934 to 1943 (Ito 1985, 55-58).

Joseon schools established by the Rōsō union in the early 1920s in Osaka, Aichi, and Tokyo, taught Japanese and Korean literacy to sojourners and children and were generally operated by Korean students who were attending Japanese universities. However, as Rōsō evolved into a political labor union, it became more radical and the curriculum incorporated Marxist class ideologies with the Korean language, Japanese language, mathematics, social studies, politics, law, history, and geography (Ito 1985, 36).

In some areas, the community and workplaces created schools in the Chōsen buraku to address the severe communication gap in families and the focus of instruction varied from basic Korean language to pro-independence philosophies. Examples of schools include the 1924 Osaka Bengakuin created to teach glass factory workers Korean, classics, Japanese, and mathematics, the 1928 Osaka Rōka Gakuin, the 1928 Tokyo Takada Gakuin, and, later in 1930, the Fusei Gakuin in Nagoya, and the Osaka

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21 When Rōsō was absorbed by the Japanese Labor Union Zenkyo.
Policies on *Joseon* schools and the length of operation varied according to the prefecture. Schools operated by Korean students and intellectuals generally promoted nationalist principles and were regarded by the Japanese police as subversive. Hence, to stay open, some schools included subjects like Japanese morals to disguise the nationalist-based curriculum (Ito 1985, 44). The Osaka *Kansai Kyōmei Gakuin* taught proletariat and pro-independence philosophies to some 100 Koreans. However, following the arrest of the school head Kim Sang-gu and nine students for handing out anti-war flyers, it was closed by the Osaka Prefecture Special High Police on August 25, 1932. In the same period another such school, the *Minohara Gakuin* in Sakai City was closed for teaching nationalist and communist ideologies (Ito 1985, 39-40). Consequently, in 1932, the Osaka Prefectural government closed all Korean-operated schools except for one school operated in two locations by the Osaka Christian Church. In this case, Pastor O Seok-gwan was summoned by the police and permitted to continue Korean classes on condition he discontinue the class he held in the church (Ito, 1985, 40). Subsequently, Osaka banned all *Joseon* schools in 1933 following the Social Division in the Ministry of Home investigation to strengthen policies regarding *Zainichi* Koreans (Ito 1985, 40). However, in Nagoya, the *Fusei Gakuin* managed to stay in
operation for five years due to the Korean community's financial support (Ito, 1985, 42).

Evidence on so-called dissident schools is scant; however, the testimony of 19-year old Kim Chang-ok in Osaka alludes to police oppression against ethnic education. In 1931 when Kim arrived in Osaka, she was 18 and illiterate. To find a job she needed some skills in Japanese and in 1932, enrolled in a private Joseon night school. The school was located in rented rooms on the second floor of a large house. The classroom was fitted with desks and staffed by five Korean teachers including Kim’s brother. The students’ ages ranged from 15 to 20 years. At the school, many women indulged in education as a protest against the strict Confucian moral codes on the peninsula. Classes started at seven pm and finished at ten pm, and the curriculum included Korean, Japanese, and mathematics. A “Korean language only” policy was enforced, and they also learned Korean independence songs. Kim does not recall the date but says the police raided and closed the school arresting and detaining all teachers for five days.

Again, to improve her Japanese, Kim enrolled in another Joseon school in a home close to the Osaka Korean Market where the same brother was a teacher. She contends that someone must have informed the police because the school was raided again. This time her brother managed to escape but she and the other teachers were
arrested. Kim was held for four days during which time she recalled police treatment was brutal; one teacher died in custody and three died soon after release (Osaka Human Rights Museum 1999, 88-92). By 1936, all Joseon schools were closed by authorities in preparation for enforcing Kōminka education and controlling Koreans under Kyōwakai.

The last schools to close were the night schools run by the Hyogo Prefecture, Kinka Seinen-kai, and the Bankaku Yagako in Shimogyō-ku, Kyoto (Higuchi 2002, 83).

Japanese elementary schools

Documentation on Koreans in Japanese schools up through 1938 (when Korean education came under Kyōwakai jurisdiction) is limited due to little bureaucratic effort to enforce Korean enrollment. On a national basis, Korean children may have been kept out of school due to parents’ itinerant lifestyles, poverty, lack of parents’ Japanese language skills for enrollment, or the reluctance of Japanese school authorities to integrate Korean children. In comparison to universal enrollment for Japanese children, in 1932 the national records indicate the enrollment ratio for Koreans in Osaka, was 58% but on a national basis just 25%. The higher enrollment in Osaka may have been due to Korean parents’ appeals to enroll their children in schools (Higuchi 2002, 82). In a 1935 national census, the Korean population was 625,678 and some 45,332 children were enrolled in elementary school and 7,292 in junior-high-school and above (Higuchi
While most Koreans were economic laborers, some families did migrate for their children’s education because tuition costs for schooling in Korea limited access to universal education (Naito 1989, 147). Some Korean students in Japanese schools had positive experiences, for example, Lee Chans-Su thrived in his six years at a Japanese school in Wakayama and became the president of the student council (Kashani 2006, 181). However, due to marginalization in the Imperial system of education and because Korean education was not enforced, many students just dropped out and were unaccounted for.

By way of illustration, the testimony of Kon Huino at the Shimizu City school demonstrates how many Koreans were treated in Japanese schools. Kon Huino (Okamura 1968, 141-142) attended a Shimizu City school from 1936 to 1937. At school, Koreans were encouraged to assume Japanese names, hence Kon went by the Japanese name Kondo Yasuhiro, but his teacher nicknamed him “Konki” which was, in fact, a discerning derivative of his Korean name (Okamura 1968, 141-142). He recalls that some students found the 1890 Oath of Imperial Rescript on Education amusing because no one understood the meaning. On one occasion at morning assembly, two Japanese students began to laugh, Kon was standing next to them and fearing as a
Korean he would be scapegoated he pretended to cry. Afterward, Kon was summoned to the staff room, and to spare himself he told the teacher the Oath made him feel emotional. His teacher was pleased.

Kon’s family was extremely poor and could afford only a lunch box with wheat and a salted plum. One day at lunch, a “rich boy” threw the lunch on the floor saying: “Konki, this is a filthy lunch box.” In retaliation, Kon bit him and when the teacher saw the “rich boy” crying, he indiscriminately beat Kon. The abuse was so painful, he soiled himself, but even then, Kon was ignored as the “rich boy” was comforted. Kon went home clutching his stomach and gave up school (Okamura 1968, 151-153). Like many other Koreans in Japanese schools prior to Kyōwakai education where they were theoretically eligible to enroll Kon’s withdrawal from school was considered a personal issue. Records of Koreans in Japanese day schools are limited to Kyōwakai publications, and the literature like Kon’s experience does suggest that Korean students in Japanese schools were regarded as hindrances and Japanese educators resented the responsibility of educating Koreans.

**Education under Kyōwakai**

To inculcate the Kōminaka policy and compel Koreans to cooperate in Japan’s war effort after 1938 the Japanese government determined to integrate Korean students
into Japanese public schools under Kyōwakai jurisdiction. This venture differed from the previously discussed voluntary attendance at Japanese schools. Hence, to integrate Koreans into Japanese schools the government enforced the (1930) 32nd Education Ordinance for Koreans in Japan and ordered Korean parents to enroll their children in Japanese schools. In the Kokumin Gakkō (National People’s School), the Kyōwakai imposed moral education on Korean children to indoctrinate patriotism, spread the “national language” (kokugo) and foster spiritual development. Furthermore, in Japanese schools, Koreans were forced to use Japanese names and the Korean language was forbidden. Consequently, for a long time, Kyōwakai education created a cultural and linguistic divide in the Korean community and left unhealed psychological scars in young Japan-born Koreans who were programmed to believe they were “Japanese” and that “their country” would win the war (Higuchi 2002, 118).

Despite the Kyōwakai’s efforts to force Korean students to enroll in Japanese schools, like before, priority for school places was still given to Japanese children, and the keenness of the local school authorities to integrate Korean students is dubious. Records show that under Kyōwakai in 1942, out of 276,000 Korean children only 64.7% were enrolled in Japanese schools (Ozawa 1973, 72). This statistic also includes night

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22 Elementary schools were renamed Kokumin Gakkō in 1941.
schools where there was a considerable dropout rate. For example, Ju Rak-uk’s student card alludes to how Korean students may have attended school on an irregular basis. In his student card, his attendance records verify that he finished *Kokumin Gakkō* in March 1942, began Youth School (*Seinen Gakkō*) in July 1942,²³ finished his first year in March 1943, withdrew in December 1943, and, in March 1944, at the age of 17 years, re-enrolled and finished school in the same month (*Seinen Gakkō Techō* 1942).

Higuchi (2002, 111-119) notes that most Japanese have no memory of the *Kyōwakai* because it was exclusively administered by the Korea Division in the Special Police High Police for the sole purpose of controlling Koreans. Hence, under the *Kyōwakai*, Koreans were controlled rather than educated. The records of Koreans in Japanese day schools are limited to *Kyōwakai* publications, but the literature does suggest that Korean students in Japanese schools were regarded as hindrances and Japanese educators resented being held accountable for their education. Moreover, rather than education, the writings reveal a racist preoccupation with etiquette, hygiene, and public morality. For example, in a 1943 national *Kyōwakai* publication (Chūō Kyōwakai 1943), the Hokkaido, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Toyama, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka *Kokumin Gakkō* principals emphasize the importance of assimilating

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²³ The Japanese school year runs from April to March.
Koreans and make brief references to their physical attributes, the academic superiority of some, and an admiration for their observance of Confucian values. On the other hand, some principals refer to the Korean students as unclean, cliquish, loud, and unruly. Furthermore, concerning Kyōwakai welfare, they remark that the assimilation of Koreans is problematic due to their strong sense of individualism, parents’ illiteracy, adults wearing Korean clothes, and overcrowded living conditions (Chūō Kyōwa-kai, 1943, 261-342).

In the same publication, the principal of the Mikasa Yamanaka Chūō Kokumin Gakko in Hokkaido, Namekawa Shintarō, wrote about his special Kyōwa class (Kyōwa Gakkyū) for first and second-year Korean students. According to the principal, the class was created in cooperation with a mining company (where Koreans were employed) to manage their poor standard of Japanese proficiency. Namekawa promised to integrate the Korean students into the mainstream Japanese classes at a later date but advocated that segregating them would reduce distractions for Japanese students from “Korean jabbering” and Korean parents who stared through the windows (Chūō Kyōwakai, 1943, 328-329). To manage the Kyōwa class efficiently he advocated that the mining company was responsible for formulating a teaching method and finding a teacher. In return, his school would offer moral and financial assistance. Namekawa concluded that Kyōwa
classes improved communication with parents and indeed communicated Kyōwakai values (Chūō Kyōwakai, 1943, 330-332).

In a Kagoshima report on assimilation by the Kyōwa-kaï division at the Onaga Kokumin Gakkō (Chūō Kyōwa-kaï 1943, 46-48), the school advocated that Koreans would be expected to arouse their “national spirit” through their reciting the Imperial Rescript; to lessen discrimination Koreans should participate in local student groups and volunteer with Naichi students. In return, the school and Japanese students would promote the essential aspects of the Kōminka policy. Furthermore, for the benefit of the Korean students, the school would introduce regular checks to ensure hygiene and install a mirror in the school hallway to promote neatness.

Beyond Kyōwakai’s grand plans to transform Koreans into Imperial subjects, as these documents suggest at the school level authorities were reluctant to integrate Koreans. Consequently, Koreans were marginalized in the schools and many simply dropped out and were not accounted for. Kokumin Gakkō graduation statistics are not available, and to reiterate, in 1942, 64.7% of Korean children were supposedly enrolled in Japanese schools (Pak 1982, 153). However, this statistic is doubtful because it includes night school enrollment where the drop-out rate was significant. However, logically, this enrollment statistic was considerably higher than on the Korean peninsula.
whereby 1945, Eckert quotes that only 5% of Koreans had studied beyond elementary school and only 20% of the total population had ever attended school (Eckert 1990, 263). This statistic correlates with a May 1944 census by the Governor-General of Korea that found only 20% of Koreans over the age of 15 years had ever attended school (Governor-General of Korea Census 1944). Then again, 64.7% was considerably lower than the 100% enrollment rate for Japanese enrolled in Naichi Japan and on the peninsula.

Conclusion

This chapter has established that Koreans in Naichi Japan were caught between the Governor-General of Korea’s policies and laws for Japanese citizens on the mainland. The hybrid Chōsen buraku was created in two stages as Koreans migrated to the metropolis. First, it developed out of an alliance between students and the sojourners who created the social infrastructure for community-building through worker organizations and schools that taught proletariat and independence ideologies. Using Simon During’s (1995, 125-126) hypothesis, using print language nationalism emerged in the Chōsen buraku and Koreans identified themselves as members of the community inferred to in the print. Second, after 1930, immigrants with families established
collective settlements and founded the hybrid *Chōsen buraku* where a diverse group of Koreans interreacted daily. In Bhabha’s (1995, 34) words hybridity “displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination.” Hence, it is in this ambivalent space against a background of poverty and oppression, the Korean community developed as disparate individuals, groups and ideologies intersected “in-between” Japan and Korea, diversified and through cultural translation developed into a Third Space.

Furthermore, this study has identified that a lack of government policies on welfare for *Zainichi* Koreans created a vicious cycle of poverty that invariably kept them out of school, and this lack of agency created a subaltern status for impoverished Koreans. However, due to a lack of education policies for Koreans, until 1938 options in education were more diversified. Moreover, and in the *Joseon* schools, where nationalist ideologies were taught, different backgrounds and ideologies overlapped and this shared culture created a hybrid “cultural identity” (Hall 1990, 223). The binary of education for Koreans entailed a Japanese resistance to integrating them into the Japanese system, but on the other hand, the police kept a close watch on ethnic education and regarded it as subversive.

From 1938, education under the *Kyōwakai* created a new binary of exclusion
and assimilation as Koreans were both included and marginalized within the Japanese school system. Furthermore, Kyōwakai’s education had serious consequences for Koreans as it created a cultural, ideological, and language divide in families and communities. Pak (1982, 152) refers to Japan’s attempts to “Japanize” and subordinate Koreans as a “policy to obliterate a barbarian Korean identity.” As documented in this chapter, Korean children in the Kokumin Gakkō were expected to adopt Japanese names and were forbidden to speak their language and to learn Korean customs and history. For this reason, following liberation in 1945 most young Koreans needed to learn to become Korean again. For example, Higuchi (2002, 118) points out that even the famous Zainichi literary Kim Tal-su and historian Pak Kyŏng Sik, who were educated in Japanese schools, learned to speak and read Korean after the war. Japan was unwilling to accept Koreans as equal subjects of the Empire and the Kyōwakai education racist ideologies only festered resentment among Koreans. Subsequently, over time for Koreans, education in Naichi Japan, created what Hardt and Negri (2006, 106) describe, as “a weapon for change and revolution in the hands of the subordinated.” Hence, immediately after liberation in 1945, the predominantly illiterate community mobilized on the ethnic organizations established in the Chōsen buraku to create their schools. Building on the colonial experience of exclusion and assimilation, how did Koreans
translate their geopolitical displacement to reproduce subaltern nationalism and cultural identity in ethnic education?
CHAPTER II

Post-colonial and Geopolitical Displacement: Under SCAP the Joseon School

Closures 1945-1952

In the context of Bae Yeong-ae’s experience, this chapter will trace the development of the hybrid Joseon school system in postwar Japan and the perplexing trajectory of SCAP and the Japanese government’s hegemony over Korean ethnic education between 1945-1952. To begin this discussion, an image of SCAP and Japanese violence against Korean ethnic education.

This is Bae Yeong-ae’s story:

Eight-year-old Bae Yeong-ae was walking to the Moriyama Joseon school in Nagoya city on May 20, 1950, when her friend’s mother grabbed her arm and warned her to stay away. From the distant embankment, she could see three trucks and armed police with batons pursuing students. On the first call, the police boarded up the doors and windows and used barbed wire to prevent access to the school. Yeong-ae arrived and found parents and teachers trying to retrieve the desks and blackboards so students could study outside. The police returned a second time, screaming “baka yarō (stupid bastard),” attacked students with batons, and dumped the younger ones outside. In the disturbance 50 Koreans were arrested including Yeong-ae’s mother, two sisters, and teachers. Yeong-ae’s mother, who had been sleeping at the school every night to guard the school against the police was severely beaten and hospitalized for six months. The teachers were detained, so lessons were taught by older students on the grounds of a local shrine near the Yada-River. About two months later the school reopened as an autonomous Joseon school (Jinken to
The picture (Figure 2.1), taken by a Chunichi Newspaper journalist, shows eight-year-old Bae Yeong-ae being dumped outside the classroom.

Introduction

On August 15, 1945, Koreans in Naichi Japan were liberated from colonial rule. First, many tried to repatriate to Korea, but for those who stayed Japan’s postwar official narrative of homogeneity created a different form of exclusion for these geopolitically displaced Koreans. In this milieu, to accommodate cultural dislocation and prepare for repatriation, Koreans hastily mobilized and founded ethnic schools. With assistance from a small number of Korean intellectuals the schools were built on
the prewar Chōsen buraku infrastructure of organizations, and publications. Subsequently, as an inclusive community venture, within four years the Joseon school system developed and diversified into a comprehensive hybrid education system.

SCAP believed that Korean ethnic education would create ethnic tensions and problems for the occupation. Furthermore, after 1947, SCAP linked Korean independence ideologies to communism and clamped down on the Korean community, using vulnerable children and education as its “political weapon” (Koshiro 1999, 114). On the other hand, Japanese colonial racism against Koreans was reinvigorated as Japan reinvented itself into a homogenous society and favored segregation over integrating Koreans in Japanese schools.

SCAP and the Japanese Government’s formula for decolonization was repatriation. Therefore, there were no coherent policies on Korean education, in the early days, the Gugeo Gangseubso (language schools) were tolerated to expedite repatriation. However, after 1947, SCAP’s plans for Japanese demilitarization changed as Japan became a US base for its Cold War offensive against communism. SCAP’s “Red Purge,” in Japan was a backlash against leftist movements; it focused on weakening Japanese labor movements and repressing left-wing ideological activity, both among Japanese and Koreans (Takema 2002, 480). The Koreans were subjected
because the Korean League called Chōren, maintained allegiance to the DPRK, and kept affiliation with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Hence, the Joseon schools, which were run by Chōren were targeted by SCAP. However, the schools were oppressed and closed without sufficient knowledge of the education being given to the students.

**Background**

SCAP’s administrative model for governing Japan differed to the postwar occupations of Germany, Austria, and Korea where military governments had full control. In Japan SCAP retained the Emperor system and administered through the pre-war model of Japanese government and organizations, yet MacArthur retained full authority and reserved almost unlimited power. To a limited extent, a military government under the Eighth Army command was established to supervise the 46 prefectures and report back to SCAP (Passin 1990, 109). SCAP was dependent on the Japanese executory and law enforcement causing discrepancies and a delay in communication with the prefectural field offices (Braibanti 1948, 215). Furthermore, SCAP’s general lack of understanding of Japan and the over-reliance on Japanese administration for translation assistance had dire consequences for Koreans because it fostered misunderstandings, and in time SCAP began to embrace the Japanese racism
against Koreans. For example, Wagner (1951, 62) argues that “Japanese interpreters, through whom Koreans had to go to approach American officials, sometimes distorted the reason for a visit so as to place the Koreans in a bad light.”

As for the Koreans, immediately after Japan’s surrender, to advocate civil rights, the Korean community created ethnic organizations, and the Chōren (established in October 1945) soon emerged as the most dominant organization quickly establishing nationwide branches. Initially, as an agent for all Koreans, Chōren coordinated with the Japanese, and later SCAP, authorities to reduce ethnic hostilities and launch a systematic repatriation program (Lee & De Vos 1981, 61). Furthermore, in February 1946 it established an office in Seoul and in October 1948 it became the DPRK’s umbrella organization. Other pursuits of the organization were welfare, cultural activities, and education (Wagner 1951, 51). The paradox of Chōren’s nonpartisan stance was its political activities with Japanese communist factions because its founding members were generally communists and ethnic nationalists like Chongryun’s founding member, Han Deok-su, who surely fit this mold.

This chapter, in the context of postwar geopolitical displacement and oppression, is a starting point for understanding how, as a consequence of cultural dispossession Zainichi Koreans created a shared cultural identity through ethnic
education which was yet another Third Space. Against a background of ambiguous legal status, this chapter first reviews how between 1945 and 1952, with limited resources and some help from Japanese, intellectuals from the Korean community built a comprehensive school system. Second, it analyzes SCAP and the Japanese Government’s different stances towards Korean ethnic education and then the twofold oppression as they joined forces in the 4-24 Hanshin Kyōiku Tōsō (April 24, 1948, Kobe and Osaka riots) to transform the issue of ethnic education into one of public security. This chapter asks the following questions: how was ethnic education disregarded by Japanese authorities and politicized by SCAP, and, despite these different stances, were both parties complicit in oppressing Korean ethnic education?

Table 2.1. is a timeline of events that affected the trajectory of Korean education in the postwar period between 1945 and 1952.
Table 2.1 Korean education in postwar Japan 1945-1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japan surrenders (August 15)</td>
<td>* Gageo Gangseupso established nationwide (August) * Chōren established (October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Basic Act on Education and the School Education Act enacted</td>
<td>Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) established (October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>* MOE notification on “handling of Korean schools (January 24) * Osaka, Hyogo and Okayama issue closure orders to Joseon schools (April)</td>
<td>* Yamaguchi: first demonstration against closure orders (March) * Hanshin Education Struggle (Hyogo Governor rescinds closure order/ SCAP declares martial law in Kobe and Koreans are arrested (April 24) * Large demonstration in Osaka and Kim Tae-il shot by Japanese police (April 26) * The establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) (August 15) * The establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (September 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>* Japanese Govt. issues Chōren a dissolution order and confiscates all property (September) * Japanese Govt. Orders 92 Joseon schools to close (October) * Japanese Govt. Orders 245 Joseon schools to restructure and declares all Joseon schools illegal (November).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>Korean War begins on June 25, 1950, and ends on July 27, 1953, with an armistice agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>The signing of the Treaty of San Francisco (September)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Kōrai Hakubutsukan 2014, 44-45; Zai Nihon 2006, 61)

The foundation of a hybrid ethnic education system

After “liberation,” Koreans in Japan no longer needed to fight against imperialism. However, harsh colonial policies of assimilation and Kyōwakai education had created acute language and cultural barriers in families. Many young Koreans like Takahashi Akira who was described in the introduction were born in Japan and educated

---

24 When the war ended there were some 200,000 Korean children attending Japanese schools in 1945 (Higuchi 2002, 81).
under Kyōwakai’s austere dogma as “militaristic youth” (gunkoku shōnen). Few could speak Korean and believed they were Japanese. In short, young Koreans needed to be “de-Japanized,” and all Koreans needed to learn how to become “Korean” again (Ozawa 1973, 173). As “liberated people” in postwar Japan, Koreans believed that they were entitled to autonomous ethnic education to “recover their lost language and cultural identity” (Lee 1981, 79). Hence in preparation for repatriation, Koreans established numerous types of non-partisan grass-root schools to teach the Korean language, history, and culture. Infrastructure and teacher training was inadequate, and finances were limited; however, the school community valued their newly found independence away from Japanese government interference (Kim 2004, 21; Fuji 2014, 13). With the hope of returning to Korea, ethnic education began as an inclusive and empowering community venture, under the slogan:

If you have money – dedicate your money
If you can work – dedicate your labor
If you are educated – dedicate yourself to teaching
As a community let us build schools! (Lee 1956, 67).

Due to a lack of formal education before migration to Japan, illiteracy was widespread in the Korean community. Thus priority was given to teaching adults. The schools began

---

25 金のある者は金で・ある者は労働力で・ちえのある者はちえで・われわれは学校を建てよ！
26 A 1931 survey by the Director of the Interior Ministry of Security (quoted in Lee 1956, 60) found
in private homes, Christian churches, vacant weapon factories, warehouses, outdoors, and, in some cases, vacant classrooms in Japanese schools (Lee 1956, 64). The Gugeo Gangseupso schools were the most popular, but there were also Kaihō Shinbun (Liberation Newspaper) newspaper reading groups, book groups, and chorus groups where Korean literacy and mathematics were taught from available literature (Hirabayashi 1978, 12). Subsequently, by the end of 1945, there were 200 Gugeo Gangseupso schools nationwide teaching approximately 20,000 adults and children to prepare for repatriation (Eo 1998, 108).

Chōren was the main contributor to ethnic education, and its schools prospered due to Chōren’s strength as an ethnic organization, ethnic ideologies, and community support. This analysis will concentrate on the expansion of the Joseon schools under Chōren administration from October 1945 until Chōren’s forced dissolution in September 1949. However, it should be noted that there were also some independent Christian and Mindan Joseon schools. In 1947, the Mindan administered 56 schools with a student cohort of 6,828. The Mindan school system was not as successful as the Chōren system because Mindan was a smaller, less ideological organization and lacked intellectual resources. For example, the Mindan schools used Korean texts issued by

57.5% of adults were illiterate because they were unable to attend school in Korea. After crossing to Japan due to poverty, many adults were unable to even attend night schools.
USAMGIK (The United States Army Military Government in Korea) and *Chōren* texts for mathematics. Table 2.2 compares the size of the *Mindan* and *Chōren* school systems in 1947 (Ozawa, 1973, 200).

Table 2.2 1947 *Mindan* and *Chōren* schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><em>Mindan</em></th>
<th></th>
<th><em>Chōren</em></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6,297</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>1,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior HS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>Youth Schools</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *Gugeo Gangseupso* schools

In preparation for repatriation, the first *Gugeo Gangseupso*, the *Kanda Chōsen YMCA*, was founded in September 1945 (Lee 1956, 64). Other schools were the *Totsuka Hangul Gakuin* in October under the intellectual Ri Jin-gyu, a school in Arakawa under Kim Chang-hyeon, *Itabashi Hangul Kōshūkai* under Jeong Gu-il. Eo Dang also established a school in the Toshima *Chōren* office (Eo 1998, 108). In the early days, the main difficulty for the schools was finding adequately trained teachers and appropriate texts, and to resolve the shortage of resources. To rectify this situation, *Chōren* launched a nationwide search to locate educated Koreans to teach the classes and Korean language resources from which students could study.

---

27 This school later became the Arakawa *Jeil Joseon* school where Kim was headmaster.
28 Jeong Gu-il later taught at the Tokyo *Chōren Jesam Joseon* school.
Subsequently, in December 1945 a teacher’s league was established, and the first training course under Ri Jin-gyu in Tokyo certified teachers for *Gugeo Gangseupso* schools after only a seven-day intensive course (Kim 2004, 54). Until basic texts could be compiled the schools were limited to using the colonial language text for Korean, the *Chōsen-go Dokuhon* (Fujii 2014, 14), and Ri Jin-gyu’s Totsuka Hangul Gakuin text, titled the *Hangul Kyōhon* (Eo, 1998, 108). All texts used in the *Gugeo Gangseupso* schools were screened by SCAP to eliminate writings that promoted Japanese imperialism. By April 1946, there were 7,183 handwritten Korean language texts and 4,000 Korean history texts printed on offset printers in circulation at the *Gugeo Gangseupso* schools. Table 2.3 lists the texts used in the *Gugeo Gangseupso* schools (Fujii 1987, 85).

### Table 2.3 1946 *Gugeo Gangseupso* school texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textbook Subject</th>
<th>Copies-First Publication</th>
<th>Copies-Second Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beginners Hangul Textbook (初等ハングル教本)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher’s textbook (教師用子供教本)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s textbook （子供教本）</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean spelling (ハングル綴字法)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangul Textbook （ハングル教本）</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft for Beginners, Intermediate and Advanced Level Korean history textbook (朝鮮歴史教材草案)</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
School infrastructure

In March 1946, some 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan with no immediate plans for repatriation. Therefore, to productively meet the needs of the Korean community, between February 1946 and January 1947, building on the Gugeo Gangseupso school infrastructure Chōren formulated a comprehensive school system.

The new system incorporated two political youth colleges, teacher’s colleges, and junior high schools. Furthermore, to sustain a larger school system Chōren formulated a five-point education policy:

- On a national scale establish a semi-permanent education policy
- Expand the school facilities and introduce a democratic curriculum
- Establish a systematic education organization
- Organize a base for financial support in education
- Earnestly collaborate with Japanese democratic educators (Fushima and Ozawa 1966, 46)

The majority of Zainichi Koreans only had functional literacy in Korean and there was a shortage of Korean intellectuals to sustain the school system. Hence, to build a more sophisticated education system on the Japanese education prototype, Chōren determined to invest in the support of experienced Japanese educators. In February 1946 Chōren convened a second national convention and established a fifteen-member editorial committee to work in cooperation with Japanese educators and intellectuals such as child psychologist Hatano Kanji, children’s literature writer Kokubun Ichitaro and artist Goto Teiji (Lee & DeVos 1981, 1963). The Korean members in the editorial committee
were:

- Korean language (Gugeo) – Ri Jin-gyu and Bak I-sang
- Science – Im Yeong-sun
- History – Bak Sun-yeong and Im Gwang-cheol
- Geography – Eo Dang and Ri Eun-chik
- Music – Yun Gi-Seon and Han Jun-u
- Art – Bak Seong-ho and Ri In-su Ri Sang-yo

(Tōkyō Chōsen Chū Kōkyū Gakkō 2009)

Furthermore, Ri Eun-chik was appointed to supervise the publication of children’s educational magazines[^29] and Cheon Jong-gyu was placed in charge of calligraphy (Eo, 1998, 109).

The new school system was divided into elementary beginner (1st and 2nd year), intermediate (3rd and 4th year) and advanced level (5th and 6th year), and in October 1946, the first Joseon junior-high-school opened in Tokyo in a former weapons factory leased from the Japanese government with a student cohort of 329 students and two teachers (Kim 2004, 56-57). Moreover, to accommodate politically orientated youths, two political youth colleges were established: the Tokyo-based 3・1 Seiji Gakuin in March 1946, and the Osaka 8・15 Seiji Gakuin in August 1946. The students at the college were generally young adult Chōren members who attended on a volunteer basis and studied

[^29]: Between July and October 15, 1946, a children’s magazine titled Eolini Tongsin published 20,000 copies. The third issue was compiled by nine authors, it included a poem titled “our national hero – Marshall Kim Il-Song” songs, guidelines to follow, fables, lessons on trade unions and farmer’s organizations, simplified versions of Korean classics, and cartoons (Eo 1998, 111).
communism with a focus on Marx and Lenin's ideologies under Japanese and Korean teachers (Kim 1997, 289).

To further expand the system Chōren organized a second, two-week teacher training course in July 1946 for 84 teachers from 36 areas in Japan, followed by a third course in September 1946 for 35 teachers. The trainee teachers studied elementary level subjects in Korean, mathematics, science, history, geography, civic education, art, music, and physical education (Kim 2004, 54-55). In a seven-month course, the class of 1946 certified 40 teachers, followed by the class of 1947 certifying 150 teachers including 20 females. Moreover, the first teachers' college to accommodate student teachers nationwide the- Osaka Choseon Sabeom Hakkyo, was established in September 1946. By October 1946, the Chōren school system comprised of elementary, junior-high schools, political youth colleges, and teachers’ colleges, with 540 schools, 44,112 students and 1,128 teachers (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 43; Lee & DeVos 1981:163). Chōren had full jurisdiction over education policies, decisions regarding teacher certification, and legal status; however, issues of autonomy were entrusted to local Korean school administrative authorities (Kim 2004, 33).

After repatriation slowed down, in 1947 the ethnic content of the Korean

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30 The teachers' college remained open until the forced closures in 1948 (Kim 2004, 56-57).
language and culture content decreased and the curricula expanded to focus on Korean independence and nation-building principles (Kim 2011, 19; Kim 1997, 403). The history syllabus included topics such as the 1894 Donghak Peasant Revolution, and global democratic themes like the post-war American and Russian agreements on world peace, the Polish Ludwik Lejzer Zamenhof’s creation of the Esperanto language, and his peace philosophy “humanitism” (Fujii 1987, 104). Table 2.4 refers to the textbooks published as of September 1946 (Eo 1998, 108-109).

Table 2.4 Textbooks published as of September 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textbook Subject</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean Language Reader 1 (初等国語読本) 68 pages</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Language Reader 2 (初等国語読本) 84 pages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Language Reader 3 (初等国語読本) 100 pages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Arithmetic 1 (初等算術) 82 pages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Science 1 (初等理科) 68 pages</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Science 2 (初等理科) 150 pages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s National History Elementary Level 1 (子供国史(初等歴史) 150 pages)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s National History Elementary Level 2 (子供国史(初等歴史) 150 pages)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Citizen’s Reader 1 (初等公民読本) 52 pages</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginners Korean (ハングル初歩)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginner’s Korean Geography (初等朝鮮地理) 150 pages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of Elementary School Songs (初等唱歌集) 36 pages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing 1 (図画)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing 2 (図画)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean History (朝鮮歴史)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Grammar Reader (初等文法読本) 54 pages</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Level Social Studies – Our lives and our culture (上級用社会科–我等の生活と文化)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional texts
Korean Dictionary (朝鮮語辞典), New Encyclopedia on Manchuria, Korea, China, and Japan (満鮮日華新辞典) authored by Mun Se-yeong. Sentence Reader (文章の読本) authored by Ri Ji-sun, and A Collection of Korean Folk Tales (Mulupan’ā suisha ムルパンー水車) authored by Eo Dang.
In April 1947, in testimony to continued innovation, in compliance with the Japanese 1947 Fundamental Law of Education, Chōren introduced a “six-three year” school system to correspond with the Japanese system and conform to conditions required for accreditation in the Japanese system. See Table 2.5 for the 1947 Elementary level curriculum (Ozawa 1973, 198).

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31 The Fundamental Law of Education was enacted in March 1947, based on pacifism and respect for the individual; it became the foundation for Japan’s post-war education system. New rules stipulated nine years of compulsory education in a 6-3-3-4-year system. In addition, it recommended co-education and stipulated the creation of education boards at municipal and prefectural levels and a university-based teacher training system (Saito 2011, 6).
### Table 2.5 1947 Elementary level curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean (Gug-eo)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics (including abacus)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Science</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School hours per week</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School hours per year</td>
<td></td>
<td>805</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1,190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1947, when SCAP began its purge against the Joseon schools the Chōren education bureau continued to upgrade texts and introduced practical Korean vocabulary texts for all school levels. Moreover, rather than socialist or communist ideologies, the curriculum conveyed universal themes. For example, children’s stories such as Aesop’s Fables and Sleeping Beauty by Hans Christian Andersen were
translated into Korean and included in the curriculum. Refer to Table 2.6 for texts published before October 1947 (Fujii 1987:87).

Table 2.6 Texts published before October 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Copies</th>
<th>Date released-1947</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Korean</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Year</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Year</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Year</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Year</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Mathematics</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Year</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Music</td>
<td>1-2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Years</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Years</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer Homework Workbook</td>
<td>1-3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Years</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Years</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and High school Readers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Collection of Elementary Compositions</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Aesop’s Fables</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*High School Grammar</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Children’s Science Stories</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Mun Seok-sun- Korean History</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Elementary and high school level basic science</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Sang Heo-man – Reader</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Hangul Grammar</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Romanization Symbols</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Korean Liberation Songs</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Standard Korean Language</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the context of the ongoing consolidation of the school system in 1947, in addition to the Osaka Choseon Sabeom Hakkyo teachers’ college, a national teachers’ college, a teachers’ union, and a union for school administration were created. In July 1947 a national teachers’ college Jungang Choryeon Sabeom Hakkyo was founded in Tokyo under principal Ri Jin-gyu. At the teachers' college, in a 1,350-hour program, student teachers studied Korean, mathematics, history, geography, social science, education, philosophy, economics, general science, and Korean issues (Chōsen mondai).

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32 The founder of the Totsuka Hangul Gakuin.
The first cohort of 46, including ten females, graduated in May 1948 (Kim 2004, 59). Furthermore, the Teachers League was established with 1,400 teachers to improve Korean education, guarantee livelihoods for teachers, improve teaching skills, and build connections with Japanese educators (Lee 1956, 69-70). Moreover, in the context of community involvement, the national union for school administration was created to empower the Korean community with autonomous school management and from September 1947, all school expenses were funded solely on local community donations rather than parents' fees (Inokuchi 2000, 48). By October 1947, the Chōren school system had further expanded to 578 schools (elementary, junior high, and youth schools), 51,845 students, and 1,505 teachers (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 43).

Details regarding SCAP and the Japanese government's oppression of the Joseon schools from January 1947 through 1949 will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. However, it is important to note here that despite external interference, through 1949 the Chōren Education Bureau continued to formulate policies, standardize national texts, and strengthen local school administration (Kim 2004, 48). Moreover, a five-member editorial committee headed by Ri Jin-gyu– Im Gwang-cheol, Heo Nam-gi, Ri Eun-chik, and Eo Dang – consulted with Japanese educators to compile new texts and to organize the distribution of texts to regional schools. By October 1948, the
*Chōren* Education Bureau produced 93 different texts with 1,200,000 copies, and until September 1949 when *Chōren* was dissolved, it continued to publish texts for Korean and mathematics, subtexts for science, art, and calligraphy, and maps of liberated Korea. Also, picture story shows (*Kamishibai*) included topics such as the March First Independent Movement, May Day, and the promotion of global connections for Koreans in Japan (Kim 2004, 51). By 1948 there were 606 schools, 57,900 students, and 1,460 teachers (Lee 1956, 70). See the following Table 2.7 for texts printed by October 1948 (Kim 2004, 51).

Table 2.7 Texts printed by October 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Korean</td>
<td>1st Year</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Year</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Year</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th Year</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th Year</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Mathematics</td>
<td>1st Year</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Music</td>
<td>1st-2nd Years</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd-4th Years</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Calligraphy</td>
<td>(All years)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean History</td>
<td>Beginners</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life classes for boys and girls</td>
<td>4th, 5th, and 6th Years</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Korean Language Vocabulary</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science stories</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesop’s Fables</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior-high school grammar</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanization Symbols</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangul Grammar</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Science</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948 Collection of Elementary Compositions</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-text Stories of Korean Cows in Japanese</td>
<td>5th and 6th Years</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Liberation Songs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 朝鮮牛物語
SCAP and the Japanese government precisely perceived that the rapid growth of the Chōren school system based on language and nationalist teachings was a testimony to a strong ethnic community. Against a background of ambiguous legal status, illiteracy, and poverty, and “anti-Korean campaigns,” in less than four years Chōren created a unique and extensive school system. To appreciate the hybrid school system, it is important to note that first, for the curriculum Chōren solicited external assistance from Japanese intellectuals. Furthermore, many of the original texts were often based on Japanese material, but culturally translated across borders and politically negotiated within the space of “liberated national” and later “displacement” for those who chose not to repatriate to a divided peninsula. Second, the schools were located within Japan and the following analysis will demonstrate that to stay in operation school facilities were also dependent on Japanese assistance.

However, the flourishing hybrid ethnic school system challenged the narrative of a homogeneous Japan. Therefore, intimidated by Chōren’s affiliation with the DPRK and communist leanings, on January 24, 1948, on SCAP’s orders the Ministry of Education (MOE) began forcing the Joseon schools to comply with the Japanese government education standards or face closure. From now our analysis will look at
how SCAP and the Japanese Government bent Korean ethnic education into a security issue.

Twofold Oppression

On November 12, 1946, in an official press release, SCAP announced that “Koreans who refused to return to their homeland under the SCAP repatriation program will be considered as retaining their Japanese nationality….” (Wager 1951, 58-59). It seems that SCAP was keen to avoid a minority problem and assumed that, as in the United States, education would serve as the institution for assimilating the Korean population (Takemae 2002, 463). From October 13, 1947, SCAP granted the Ministry of Education (MOE) the power to administer the Joseon schools. Furthermore, as Korean children were now regarded as “Japanese” SCAP ordered that they be integrated into the Japanese school system (Koshiro 1999, 115). However, before SCAP’s order, Japanese documentation in 1946, suggests that regional authorities and central government were willing to cooperate with the Koreans and endorse segregated schooling.

In some sections of Japanese society, there was support for the Koreans, and the Joseon schools were portrayed positively. For instance, in 1946 Fuse Tatsuji, a prominent human rights lawyer commented that if Koreans were deemed “aliens” under
international law, they had a right to pursue an ethnic education. Fuse praised the Korean Textbook Committee texts as being far superior to Japanese texts and went as far as recommending that Korean texts be used in Japanese schools. Furthermore, he advocated that schools should be permitted autonomous management, and, if Koreans agreed, they could include the Japanese language as a regular subject (*Kaihō Shinbun* May 5, 1946, quoted in Pak 1989, 202-203). In another instance, possibly to keep the Japanese and Korean systems separate, on April 20, 1948, the MOE Minister Morito Tatsuo visited a *Joseon* school in Yamaguchi, and after inspecting the facilities and observing classes the minister stated he was “amazed” at the high standard of teaching and the quality of the textbooks used in the curriculum and promised his assistance (*Kaihō Shinbun* April 25, 1948, quoted in Segami 2000, 42). However, Segami (2000, 42) points out that there is no consistent evidence to prove the MOE assisted following Morito’s visit.

**Communiqués to the MOE**

*Chōren* argument for ethnic education was founded on Japan’s responsibility for the loss of Korean ethnic identity. Hence, after meeting with *Chōren* officials as a conciliatory measure, Japanese school principals in many regions, granted classroom
space to Koreans. Separate classrooms did alleviate the “burden” of Koreans in Japanese classrooms. However, the echoes of Korean ethnic teachings in the next-door classrooms concerned Japanese educators who, until recently, had taught Japanese national polity (kokutai) tenets to Koreans. Furthermore, Kim (2011, 21) points out that many Japanese educators and parents still embraced racist feelings and found “arrogant Koreans” in the schools intolerable. Thus, concerning Chōren connections, Koreans occupying classroom space in Japanese schools and for advice on the accreditation of Joseon schools the Gifu, Yamaguchi, and the Tōkai-Hokuriku regions authorities dispatched three communiqués to the MOE.

The first communiqué from the Gifu Prefecture Education Division Head to the MOE was sent on July 1, 1946, regarding procedures for operating foreigners’ schools in Gifu Prefecture. Specifically, the communiqué queried first the legal status of Koreans who were now considered as foreigners and second how this would concern the establishment of ethnic schools (Kim 1997, 383). In reply, the MOE director Hidaka Daishiro conveyed his sympathy to the Koreans and informed Gifu Prefecture that foreign schools would receive MOE approval if the schools could provide legitimate reasons for operation (CIE (C)-04145, 1946). Furthermore, the MOE stated that foreigners would be expected to comply with Japan’s law, apply for private school
permits, and operate as a school foundation. In subsequent correspondence, Gifu inquired into the legal status of Koreans, but the MOE’s reply was inexplicit, citing that it was “in consultation on the issue” (Untitled- July 1, 1946, Yamaguchi Prefecture Archives quoted in McKee 2014, 62).

The Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) within SCAP was monitoring communications between the MOE and Gifu and in reference to the Gifu communiqué, in an August 28, 1946 correspondence, the CIE Universities Officer Edwin F. Wigglesworth warned the chief of the CIE’s Education Division, Lt. Colonel Mark T. Orr, that encouraging separate schools for minority groups would cause significant social discord. Furthermore, Wigglesworth stated that repatriation was ongoing and separate Joseon schools were not congruent with “national independence and reconstruction of the Korean homeland” (CIE (C) 04145, 1946).

Consequently, in response to the Gifu communiqué on September 12, 1946, the MOE issued a notification to all prefectural education departments titled, “Regarding the Establishment of Joseon Schools.” The MOE did not recognize the Joseon schools as foreign schools. However, it specified that Koreans would be permitted to establish their schools as “miscellaneous” schools if they followed Japanese laws (Untitled –

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34 Accredited “miscellaneous” schools include driving schools and vocational schools such as beauty, sewing, cooking and language schools. Miscellaneous schools are accredited by prefectural governments
Following the Gifu communiqué on September 27, 1946, the Yamaguchi Governor Aoyagi Ichirō sent a detailed report titled, “Regarding the Establishment of Joseon Schools” to the Home Minister, the MOE Minister, the Kyushu Prefectural Governors, and respective police branches. The report assessed Korean children living in Yamaguchi Prefecture, the Joseon school administration, the incentives behind school establishment, developments within Chōren, and the general Korean population. It also noted the demographics of Korean children in Joseon schools, Japanese schools, and those not attending school. Aoyagi’s report warned the authorities that Chōren and the Korean Youth league were exploiting the Joseon school system and teaching “dangerous concepts” such as raising ethnic awareness and Korean independence.

Moreover, he referred to the curriculum and the school buildings as primitive, using terms such as “poor” or “weak” (Yamaguchi Police Report 1070, quoted in McKee 2014, 30).

if the schools fulfill the requirements of teaching hours, number of teachers and facilities. Miscellaneous schools receive smaller subsidies than Japanese “regular” schools.

35 Prior to 1945, Aoyagi had a distinguished career as a division head in the “special higher police”, in Kumamoto and Fukuoka, as a Consulate in Shanghai, and posts in the Health and Welfare Ministry. After April 1946, he served as the Deputy Governor under Governor Tanaka Tatsuō and played an important role in the 1948 Korean School Closure negotiations.

36 The report implied that in postwar Yamaguchi Koreans had remained under considerable police surveillance.
Next, on April 12, 1947, the Tōkai-Hokuriku Region Administration Bureau sent the MOE a communiqué titled, “An Issue Relating to Compulsory School Attendance for Korean Children.” In turn, the MOE consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on the nationality status of Koreans. In response to the Tōkai-Hokuriku query the MOE replied that Koreans would be expected to obey Japanese laws, and when possible attend Japanese schools. However, when circumstances prevented enrolment, regional authorities should be understanding and allow Koreans to establish their schools under “miscellaneous” accreditation (MOE, 1947). However, as will become apparent later in this analysis despite positive assessments of the Joseon schools and consideration for ethnic education in Japanese circles, SCAP’s agenda for the Joseon schools varied according to the prefecture.

**SCAP’s communist profile of the schools**

SCAP’s standpoint on the Joseon schools was complicated by the anti-Korean attitudes many SCAP personnel embraced. In the first six months of the occupation, SCAP was generally sympathetic towards Koreans because it expected that they would want to repatriate. However, following the conclusion of the formal repatriation in December 1946 SCAP intolerance towards Koreans began to escalate. For example, Conde (1947, 45), writes that SCAP failed to censor “anti-Korean” sentiments in the
Japanese media. Furthermore, Wagner (1951, 60) states:

expanding on the actual facts of ill-considered Korean depredations and illegal activities, Japanese officials, aided by the press, conducted a fierce propaganda campaign against Koreans. Emphasis was placed on principally upon Korean black-market activities, hooliganism, and the menace of the illegal entry of Koreans into Japan. Koreans were often referred to as criminally bent and criticized for their lack of respect for Japanese law.

Moreover, it should be noted that racism against all Asians was prevalent in the U.S. Armed forces, and, during WWII and the Korean War, Asians were often condescendingly referred to as “gooks.” Consequently, frustrated with the actions of Koreans who expected special treatment as “liberated nationals” and with encouragement from some Japanese, SCAP racism against Koreans was easily rekindled.

From 1947, SCAP policies under the umbrella of the Great Reversal changed from demilitarization as it transformed Japan into North-East Asia’s anti-communist base. SCAP’s “Red Purge” besieged the Japanese Communist Party, supporters, bureaucracy, and education institutions (Kumano 2010, 513). Consequently, the Korean community was targeted due to Chōren’s links with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and Chōren’s growing influence over the community.37 However, SCAP’s purge

37 From its inception Chōren was controlled by Korean communists who were also members of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and after the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established on August 15, 1948
of the Koreans was so fanatical that it irked non-American members of SCAP. For example, Patrick Shaw, the head of the Australian mission in Tokyo, criticized SCAP’s August 1948 Quarterly Report for disregarding three years of peaceful occupation and for failing to convey comprehensive coverage on political intelligence. Shaw believed the exclusive news of the 1948 Kobe and Osaka riots exaggerated the “Korean problem,” and declared “that it is certain that an incident in which Koreans are involved receives publicity out of proportion to its importance” and “that Japanese xenophobia often attribute[s] to the Korean crimes which they have not committed” (Davies 2001, 211).

SCAP’s democratic paradigm for Japanese education highlighted the protection of individual and minority rights, but it failed to understand Korean disenfranchisement under Japanese imperialism. SCAP fundamentally believed that Korean ethnic education would promote “a strong and distinctive national identity” that would worsen further Japanese and Korean animosities and hinder the smooth running of the occupation (Takemae 2002, 463). Hence, from 1947, SCAP attempted to create a communist profile on the Joseon schools by linking Chōren’s affiliation to the Soviet-backed northern Korean government, the JCP, and the ethnic nationalism taught in Joseon schools.

Chōren expressed its support for the DPRK.
Ironically, SCAP was already familiar with the Joseon school curricula because all texts were subject to CIE (Civil Information and Educational Section) screening. As of summer 1947, there had been no reports of communist teachings in the school curricula (Kim 1997, 403). However, following a 1947 commissioned report of the Osaka 8-15 Seiji Gakuin, SCAP linked the political education in Chōren’s Osaka and Tokyo political youth colleges to the overall school system. A report on the Osaka 8-15 Seiji Gakuin titled the “8.15 Political Institute,” noted that the school was located in Fuse City, Osaka Prefecture, supervised by Principal Kim Suk Song and staffed by seven teachers (three Japanese and four Korean), four of whom were JCP members. The curriculum included Economics, Historical Materialism, Philosophy, Korean Problems, Racial Problems, International Problems, Farmers’ Problems, Labor Problems, Theory of Political Parties Cultural Problems, Chinese Problems, History, and Korean Language. According to the commentary, the Osaka 8・15 Seiji Gakuin taught communist ideologies, had dubious financial support, and lacked accreditation. After this report, SCAP began to assert that all the Joseon schools were communist and anti-American. Hence, in September 1947 Captain Malcolm Craig of the First Army in

38 After June 1948, a twofold screening system was introduced. First, the Chōren Education Bureau was required to submit English translations of all texts to the CIE and then to the Eighth Army for further screening. The translation committee in the Chōren Education Bureau was headed by Eun Mu-am, and screening required 1) a signature to prove the textbooks had been authorized for publication, 2) text title, author, publisher, quantities, date of publication and price, and 3) number of pages and contents.
Kyoto commanded the Japanese Government to enforce Japanese law over all Joseon schools and have the MOE investigate the Osaka 8・15 Seiji Gakuin (CIE (C) 04144, 1947).

An example of SCAP’s allegation against the schools: on October 1948, a Tokyo based Captain Paul. T. Duppel of the CIE visited the Tokyo Joseon junior and senior high schools in Jūjō. The Joseon school records account that he failed to remove his shoes and entered the classrooms in muddy boots. When the students protested, he is reported to have declared “I am the most senior education supervisor, and you have no right to criticize me for entering in my boots. This school is teaching anti-American ideologies” (Kurusu 1968, 26).

Furthermore, to boost SCAP’s case that the Joseon schools taught communist ideology a February 1949 CIE report titled “Yamaguchi Korean Schools” claimed the curriculum violated Article 8 in the Fundamental Law of Education\(^{39}\) and the Japanese Press Code (see Appendix B for Press Code of Japan). SCAP reported on an “Elementary Korean Geography” (CIE (C) 04235, 1949) which described rivers and cities in Korea. However, the report claimed the text contained communist doctrine, disrespectful references to the Korean Government (ROK), and the American military

\(^{39}\) Article 8 in the Fundamental Law of Education prohibited political education in schools.
government in Korea. Furthermore, it stated that some school badges that resembled the North Korean flag were an “extreme fanatical approach to patriotism.” Additional evidence included a (conceivably) hidden North Korean flag, students’ artwork of North Korean flags, and the use of communist and North Korean textbooks.\(^\text{40}\) Also, SCAP claimed the Korean song “Independence Day Morning” was to “develop a hatred for the Japanese in retaliation of their 40-year rule of Korea” (CIE (C) 04235, 1949). By April 1949, SCAP reported on the Joseon schools as follows:

> The basic curriculum in the primary schools includes communism and North Korean propaganda of a jingoistic nature. Subject matter required by Japanese law is taught incidentally, if at all. Basic aims for Korean primary school teaching are 1) To develop attitudes of hate towards the Japanese; 2) To develop attitudes which revolt against legally constituted authority and democratic government; 3) To develop attitudes among children which will make them class-conscious and receptive to political communism; 4) To teach children to be fanatically patriotic to the North Korean government and to pledge sole allegiance to its flag; 5) To teach children that the legally constituted Korean government is a puppet government under the strict military control of the Americans (CIE (C) 04145, 1949).

In the same vein, in an April 16, 1949 report, SCAP declared that the Yamaguchi Joseon schools “violate[d] numerous Japanese laws, spread communism and incite[d] lawlessness.” However, it also acknowledged a lack of evidence concerning communist teachings, stating that “although sufficient cases do not yet exist in the opinion of the 24\(^\text{th}\) Division, it is apparent that evidence is obtainable which will justify the issuance of

\(^\text{40}\) In 1949, contact with North Korea would have been extremely limited.
an order by the prefectural governor closing all Korean schools” (CIE (C) 04235, 1949).

These documents suggest, that despite SCAP granting the MOE authorization over the Joseon schools, behind the scenes SCAP was not prepared to relinquish control. Furthermore, as reported by Takemae (2002, 463), those who did show sympathy for Koreans were “quickly silenced.” In sum, SCAP was not prepared to accept its own finding, that there was little or no concrete evidence demonstrating that the Joseon schools were teaching communism.

Enforcing Japanese law on the Joseon schools

Following SCAP’s orders, on January 13, 1947, the MOE issued a tsūchi (directive), informing all prefectural governors that from April 1947, Koreans were legally obliged to enroll in Japanese schools and study under a Japanese curriculum. However, in some cases, subjects such as the Korean language and history would be condoned as extra-curricular subjects. Alternatively, Joseon schools could register as private schools and teach Korean language and history as extra-curricular subjects (Takaemae 2002, 462). However, enforcing Japanese laws on the Joseon schools was problematic for numerous reasons: first, the Koreans refused to cooperate (Kim 2011,

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41 A tsūchi is a recommendation or practical advice from the Central Government issued with an expectation of compliance.
42 To be studied out of school hours.
Second, despite requests from the Japanese Government and regional bureaucracies, SCAP refused to issue written orders and held the Japanese government responsible for Korean education (Takemae (2002, 497-498)). Third, bureaucratic decisions were challenging, and a consensus was almost impossible due to the ambiguous legal status of Koreans and contrary opinions between the Japanese Government, SCAP, the MOE prefectures, and municipal education bureaus. Moreover, the MOE did not have a clear policy on education for Koreans as most Japanese still expected they would repatriate, the prefectures were still in the process of reforming the Japanese education system and the local levels were unequipped to supervise Joseon school issues. In all truth, it appears that the MOE considered that Korean education should be regulated, but some sectors recognized Korean people’s right for ethnic education. Furthermore, the government at the national and prefectural levels refrained from interfering in Korean education because they feared it might incite hostility and social unrest (Kim 1997, 388). Therefore, at prefectural levels, except for Yamaguchi Prefecture where

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43 Takemae (2002, 497-498) cites the United States Foreign Policy Advisor Program (POLAD Tokyo Dispatch 734 1949) in proving that SCAP refused to issue written orders and the Japanese Government was made responsible for the schools. Consequently, until the school closures were announced by the Japanese Government some high-ranking SCAP officials including MacArthur were unaware that the schools were to be forced to close.

44 Jacob Van Staarveren (1994, 184) worked as a CIE officer from 1946-1948. In his memoirs he recalls the Japanese Yamanashi prefectural education chief was very distressed over potential confrontation with the Koreans about and petitioned for SCAP to close the schools.
teacher screening was introduced in July 1947,\(^{45}\) because the *tsūchi* was not legally binding, most regional authorities opted to compromise and accredit the *Joseon* schools as “miscellaneous” (Kim 2011, 59).

However, due to the MOE’s failure to comply with SCAP’s instructions and enforce Japanese law over the *Joseon* schools, on recommendation from the Eighth Army in Yamaguchi, Tokyo, and Kanagawa, SCAP ordered the MOE to issue a top-down legally binding memorandum (*tsūtatsu*) to regional governments. Still, in the drafting process of the memorandum, the MOE’s reluctance to enforce Japanese laws over the *Joseon* schools was apparent. For example, the first two articles in the draft stipulated that all *Joseon* schools must fully comply with the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education. However, discussion in the drafting committee predicted that refuting ethnic education might cause problems from the Korean quarter. With this in mind, a third article was added to give the prefectures and local authorities jurisdiction to make “flexible” decisions when the *Joseon* schools were unable to comply with the first two articles. Subsequently, the CIE Lt. Colonel Mark T. Orr disagreed with article three and

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\(^{45}\) In July 1947, the Chugoku Area Military Government notified the region’s administrations that Korean schools were under the supervision of the MOE or local governments, and like Japanese teachers, Korean schoolteachers must be screened. In response, the Yamaguchi Prefecture Education Division ordered all Korean schools to register and Korean teachers screened. By September, the Korean schools had not complied. Accordingly, Yamaguchi municipal education divisions notified Korean schools to 1) register the address, name, founder and administrator and 2) provide names of teachers and subjects taught and students’ names and ages. Schools which did not meet the deadline were threatened with closure, arrest, and deportation. Despite these strong measures only 10 schools out 34 registered (Kim 1997, 392-393).
argued that personal opinions would interfere in the decision making at the prefectural level. Therefore, article three was modified to state that all parties must comply with the conditions in articles one and two (Kim 1997, 397-400).

Consequently, on January 24, 1948, the MOE issued the revised directive, titled the 1-24 Tsūtatsu, to all prefectural governors:

Koreans now living in Japan are obligated to obey the Japanese laws, as was announced by GHQ on 20 November 1946. Accordingly, the Korean children of school age must attend either public or private primary school, or public or private secondary school, according to their age as in the case of Japanese children (CIE (C) 04145, 1948).

The 1-24 Tsūtatsu was SCAP’s “get tough policy” on the Joseon schools, and schools were ordered to comply with the Fundamental Law of Education standards by March 31, 1948, or face closure. The CIE quoted that “the establishment of miscellaneous schools with a view to educate the children of school age [would] not be approved” (CIE (C) 04144, 1948). Hence, options for the Joseon schools were to either pursue private school accreditation and teach a Japanese curriculum, or Korean children would be integrated into the Japanese school system and ethnic studies would be offered only as extra-curricular subjects (Takemae 2002, 462).

Subsequently, on January 26, 1948, the MOE notified prefectural governors

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46 January 24, 1948, Memorandum “on how to handle schools established by Koreans” (CIE (C) 04145, 1948).
that in compliance with the 1-24 Tsūtatsu the Joseon schools must apply for private school accreditation. Furthermore, under Government Ordinance No. 68, 1947, all Joseon schoolteachers were subject to screening or would face a punishment of three years of imprisonment and/or a 155,000 yen fine if they did not comply (CIE(C) 04144, 1948). The questionnaires in the screenings for the Joseon schoolteachers were the same as those used before 1948 when SCAP screened 70,000 Japanese teachers to weed out nationalist sympathizers and anti-American dissidents (Matsushita 2010, 27).

Bureaucratic procedures varied according to the prefecture, and in the case of Shiga Prefecture, Korean teachers were subject to two screenings. The first screening, on July 21, 1948, for teacher accreditation was conducted on seventeen Joseon schoolteachers (half the teacher cohort) from just seven Chōren schools, with all the teachers passing. The second round of screenings (between October 31 and November 4, 1949) was held after the September 1949 dissolution of Chōren and used police intelligence to identify Chōren sympathizers. This time, 51 teachers from 14 Chōren schools in Shiga were vetted and ten were deemed to be Chōren sympathizers and disqualified (Matsushita, 2010, 38).

The objective of the 1-24 Tsūtatsu was to close all Joseon schools; however,

47 5,000 Japanese teachers were disqualified (Matsushita 2010, 27).
many of the Joseon schools were unregistered and could not be legitimately closed. Therefore, to legally enforce closures, the prefectural education bureaus modified the by-laws Education Law Articles 4\textsuperscript{48} and 84\textsuperscript{49} to encourage the Joseon schools to apply for “miscellaneous” accreditation. Conscious of this legal ambiguity most Joseon schools boycotted the applications. However, under Articles 83\textsuperscript{50} and 84 even without formal applications Joseon schools with two or more teachers and 20 students or more were automatically deemed “miscellaneous” and became candidates for closure. Furthermore, often the application alone gave authorities a case to enforce closure (Matsushita 2010, 29). Another realistic issue for the Joseon schools was the facility and building standards required for accreditation. For most schools occupied substandard buildings and thus, unable to meet accreditation standards to continue ethnic education, the schools simply ignored Japanese laws (Staaveren 1994, 185).

\textit{Chören’s response}

Predictably, due to the education experience under the Kyōwakai, the Chören was fiercely against sending Korean children to Japanese schools again. Moreover, the

\textsuperscript{48} Article 4 stipulated that a permit would be required by a government bureau to establish or close educational institutions.

\textsuperscript{49} Article 84 stipulated that when institutions of education, other than schools or “miscellaneous” schools retain two teachers and 20 students, the organization is deemed to be a school.

\textsuperscript{50} Under Article 83, Article 4 became applicable – if the schools did not apply directly, a government bureau could legitimately declare their miscellaneous status.
Koreans were very critical of the SCAP-approved history textbook *Kuni no Ayumi* \(^{51}\) (Our Nation’s Progress) used in Japanese schools, for the text carried information they considered incorrect, such as the colonization of Korea being based on mutual agreement between Japan and Korea. The text also failed to criticize the Emperor’s responsibility in the Pacific War and the colonization of Korea. Hence *Chōren* demanded that if Korean children were to attend Japanese schools, they be provided with a separate history syllabus (Koshiro 1993, 115).

On February 16, 1948, *Chōren* responded to the 1-24 Tsūtatsu by declaring that the postwar democracy of the Education Stipulations Fundamental Law, seriously disregarded Korean history and Japanese-Korean relations (Kang 2002, 262). *Chōren* argued that as Koreans were now legally classified as non-Japanese (and were forced to carry Alien Registration cards) they should have the right to manage their own schools. Likewise, if Koreans were expected to obey Japanese laws and succumb to Japanese education, the same regulation should apply to the children of Americans or members of the occupation forces (Lee, 1956, 72).

One month later, on March 6, 1948, *Chōren* submitted a six-page statement to the

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\(^{51}\) Until September 1947 history books were not included in the Japanese school curriculum. *Kuni no Ayumi* was the first SCAP-endorsed postwar textbook published in 1946. *Kuni no Ayumi* was criticized by left factions and by Marxist historians. They argued that despite deleting former *Tennōsei* (Emperor System) references, replacing mythological “history,” and introducing scientific anthropological interpretations to history, the textbook did not reflect democratic reforms in education as it glossed over Japan’s militarism (Thakur 1995, 268-271).
MOE Minister Morita Tatsuo demanding that the MOE accredit *Joseon* schools as special schools (Matsushita 2010, 29). Also, *Chōren* insisted that the Japanese Government grant autonomous status, acknowledge the special circumstances of Korean education, and fund *Joseon* schools (Lee 1955, 75). The MOE ignored *Chōren*’s appeals, and on March 23, 1948, the *Chōren* Korean Education Counteraction Committee submitted a second proposal to Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi and SCAP demanding that the Japanese Government permit *Joseon* schools to conduct classes in the Korean language under the supervision of the Korean School Management Union. *Chōren* also agreed to allow CIE to screen its textbooks and to include Japanese language instruction as a regular subject in the curriculum (Lee 1956, 75-76; Lee & De Vos 1981, 165).

Reiterating the conditions of the Fundamental Law of Education, both SCAP and the Japanese Government declined *Chōren*’s demands. Consequently, *Chōren* launched a petition campaign directed towards SCAP. Communication between the Headquarters of the Korean Educators League in Japan to the Ibaraki branch on April 21, 1948, reads:

- The education of Korean children residing in Japan should be the Japanese Government’s responsibility, but the Japanese Government has no right to manage all education. At present, it is obstructing the aims of our educational organs, after we established school buildings and trained teachers through our own efforts.
- The Japanese Government’s villainous interference with our education is aimed at eradicating our national culture. The bureaucratic control of education, despite our defraying of all expenses, is obviously a high-handed
suppression.

- Education in Korean letters and language is a natural requirement of civil liberty. The rejection of this national fundamental requirement is obviously against the Potsdam declaration.
- In order to achieve our purpose, we have to establish an organization to provide all facilities (CIE (C) 10140, 1948).

Further, Korean educators announced their “struggling plans” to:

- organize a Korean Education Policy Committee
- cooperate with Japanese democratic groups and combat the Japanese government
- organize Korean Boy Scouts
- organize Korean Girl Scouts
- convene a general meeting of Korean school authorities and to lodge protests with Japanese educators, with authorities or with the Education Ministry, and with the Allied Council of Japan
- object to the arbitrary government of South Korea
- cooperate with the Japanese laborers and jointly participate in their demonstrations (CIE (C) 10140, 1948)

Korean students from all over Japan sent letters to General MacArthur; one by an Osaka Joseon School student, Kang Yunjai, from April 1948 reads:

We are Korean children who have been educated in Japanese schools. However, Koreans were released from Japanese control through the victory of America and we wish to learn the Korean language and its history. It is our earnest desire that America would help us achieve our desire to be educated by Korean teachers, taking our peculiar circumstances into consideration (CIE(C) 10140, 1948).

Irrespective of the Chōren petitions, from April 1948 on instructions from the MOE, prefectural education bureaus began informing the Joseon schools of imminent closure due to their failure to comply with the conditions of the 1-24 Tsūtatsu (Kang 2002, 26).
Mass protests over *Joseon* school closures

By March 1948, the *Joseon* school issue triggered social unrest throughout Japan. Furthermore, contrary to the MOE’s general stance of compromise, when the Japanese police and SCAP became involved ethnic education transformed into one of national security and as Fujishima and Ozawa (1966, 62-63) point out, hostility escalated as SCAP sanctioned a renewal of Japanese colonial racisms and police violence toward this minority. The outcome and scale of the protests differed according to the area. For example, in Kyoto and Shiga, where the regional authorities had previously exchanged memorandums with the *Joseon* schools, the protests did not escalate (Matsushita 2010, 26). However, the main protests occurred where there was a higher density of Koreans – in Yamaguchi on March 31, in Okayama on April 8, in the *Hanshin* area of Kobe on April 11 and 24, and in Osaka on April 23 and 26.

Yamaguchi was the first prefecture to close the schools. On September 23, 1947, the 33 *Joseon* schools were notified to register by November 1, 1947, or face closure. Accordingly, 10 schools were allocated “miscellaneous” accreditation and the rest operated without permits. On November 20, the Yamaguchi prefectural education bureau issued the *Hatsugaku* 62 order declaring that all Korean teachers must gain

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52 *Hanshin* is a term used to refer to Osaka and Kobe together.
MOE certification. Chōren ignored the order and Korean principals boycotted the meetings the Yamaguchi authorities convened on September 23, December 1, and December 15 (Segami 2000, 38).

Subsequently, overriding the prefectural education bureau, on March 31, thirteen Chōren personnel accompanied by the Communist Party member Yamamoto Rihei demanded a meeting with the Governor Tanaka Tatsuo. Tanaka was sick, and instead, the delegation consulted with Deputy Governor Aoyagi Ichiro, and two Yamaguchi Prefectural education officials. At the meeting, Chōren’s argument focused on the injustice of forcing Japanese education on Koreans without citizenship rights. Aoyagi reiterated the conditions of the Fundamental Law of Education, refused Chōren’s demands, and ordered the Koreans to leave the building and grounds. In the late afternoon, water cannons were used to disperse the crowd of 10,000 Koreans as U.S. MPs with pistols searched for the protest organizers. On April 1, after midnight the Yamaguchi police issued a state-of-emergency declaration, and Yamamoto and the Chōren officials began around the clock negotiations with Aoyagi to extend the deadline for closures. Accordingly, at 11 am on April 1, the authorities announced the closure.

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53 Kim (2011, 70) claims that the first emergency declaration was issued in Kobe and not in Yamaguchi. He explains that the Eighth Army requested permission to issue an emergency declaration and the Yamaguchi police waited to be dispatched, but the Eighth Army did not consider the situation urgent and did not issue the order. However, Yamaguchi police records state that the Eighth Army issued an emergency declaration on the evening of March 31, 1948 (Yamaguchi Police 1982, 809).
order would be postponed if the schools could meet curriculum and teacher certification requirements.

After April, in follow up inspections, ten schools were closed (Segami 2000, 42). However, overriding the MOE’s instructions that schools for children would not be permitted to operate under the “miscellaneous” accreditation, the Yamaguchi Government permitted branch schools for Koreans to operate under “miscellaneous” accreditation. As of November 1948, there were four Joseon schools in Iwakuni, Ube, Onoda, and Shimonoseki, as well as 16 branch schools and five ethnic classes within Japanese schools (CIE (C) 04235, 1948).

In Okayama, the Joseon schools were ordered to close on April 8, and on April 15, the Okayama Chōren chairman was arrested for refusing to comply with authorities. On April 19, at a protest rally of 8,000 Koreans (Gwon 2008, 132) Chōren submitted four demands asserting that Japan must cover all costs of Korean education, recognize special ethnic education for Koreans, recognize the democratic right to autonomy in ethnic education, and settle the matter of Korean education directly with the Korean authorities (Gwon 2008, 138-139). The MOE refused the Koreans’ demands, but the

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54 On July 31, 1948, Yamaguchi Prefecture agreed to permit the four Chōren schools to operate providing they applied for authorization by August 31, 1948. However, an incomplete application was submitted, and an April 20, 1949 CIE record states that the schools had been operating without valid licenses (CIE(C) 04235, 1949).
Eighth Army in Okayama, agreed to release the detained Chōren official and Okayama authorities agreed to postpone the closing of the schools.

The protests in Yamaguchi and Okayama secured agreements to postpone the school closures. However, the Yamaguchi and Okayama mass protests marked a turning point in SCAP and Japanese authorities' attitudes towards the Koreans who they criticized for threatening public security. For example, frustrated with Korean resistance, a December 4, 1947, SCAP report from Yamaguchi recounted that “the actions and attitude of the Koreans in this matter [of education] was consistent with their actions and attitude in all relations with the Japanese Government and Military Government” (CIE (C) 04236, 1947). Or in the words of Elizabeth Ryan (a SCAP court reporter in Kobe), Korean attitudes were referred to as “a slap in the face for Uncle Sam” (Ryan 1948, quoted in Caprio 2008).

In the Hanshin area (Osaka and Kobe), tensions intensified between the Koreans and the authorities first, due to Chōren’s refusal to register its schools and comply with teacher screening regulations, second, the Osaka 8-15 Seiji Gakuin triggered the Osaka Eighth Army’s uncompromising attitude towards Koreans, and third, the emotional sight of Korean children being physically evicted from Joseon schools operated within Japanese public schools magnified the protests.
In Osaka on February 10, 1948, the Eighth Army and the Osaka Education Bureau demanded the Joseon schools apply for permits and undergo teacher screening. The Joseon schools refused to cooperate\(^{55}\) and on March 16, with instructions from the Eighth Army and the Osaka Education Bureau, Osaka regional offices ordered Koreans to vacate school properties and to cancel contracts by March 31. In the case of Kobe, following April 10, 1948, SCAP ordered the Hyogo Governor Kishida Sachio to instruct all Joseon schools without accreditation to close and prohibit further use of Japanese classroom space.

Following April 15, angry demonstrations by Koreans in Osaka and Kobe were marked by police violence, and arrests became more frequent. In Wagner’s words, “as tension mounted, charges and countercharges, Korean demonstrations and dispersals by police, riots and bloody restorations of order, marked the rapid worsening of the situation” (1951, 71). On April 23, to prevent school closures over 15,000 Koreans protested throughout Osaka and marched on the Osaka Prefectural Government Office with Japanese supporters (Pak 1989, 193). At 2:30 pm some 70 Chōren delegates

\(^{55}\) Then under instructions from the Eighth Army on February 26, a joint meeting with the Osaka authorities was arranged for Joseon school principals. However, out of 70 principals, only 12 attended and the meeting was canceled; on March 2, a second meeting was organized, but all principals boycotted; on March 12, at the third meeting the five principals in attendance expressed their dissatisfaction with the terms of 1-24 Tsūtatsu and left immediately
requested a meeting with Governor Akama Bunzo, and in the Governor’s absence, the delegates met with the Deputy Governor Ōtsuka. The delegation requested that the governor revoke the closure orders, recognize autonomous Korean education, and allow Koreans to use classrooms in Japanese schools. At the same time, several hundred aggravated Koreans, including members of a Korean youth group, stormed into the Governors’ office to fiercely advocate their case. However, the Governor refused to revoke the orders. At 4:30 pm, Ōtsuka and his colleagues suspected the situation had become dangerous and fled the office. At 5:00 pm, 3,000 Osaka police were mobilized to disperse the Koreans from the Osaka Prefectural Government building, and the grounds.

Koreans in Kobe petitioned Mayor Kodera Kenkichi for the right to autonomous education and the use of classrooms in Japanese schools. Kodera was a graduate in civil law from Columbia University and a former governor in Korea who “manifested an especially hostile attitude towards Koreans” (Wagner 1951, 71). Kodera refused their petition and told the Koreans they were “guests” without citizenship rights and if they didn’t like Japan, they should all return to their “magnificent” (rippa) country Korea (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 62-63)

Subsequently, on April 14, several thousand Koreans gathered in front of the
Hyogo Prefectural Government Office to hear the results of the scheduled interview between the governor and 30 Chōren delegates. However, as the governor boycotted the meeting, the Koreans had nothing to report (Wagner 1951, 71). On the following day, 73 Chōren delegates requested a meeting with Hyogo Prefectural Office authorities but were refused because the delegation arrived late and included too many people. A dispute followed and 70 Chōren delegates were arrested and detained in the Ikuta and Hyogo police stations (Gwon 2008, 117).

Tensions built further on April 23, when 2,000 police attempted to evict Korean children\(^\text{56}\) from the classrooms they occupied in the Nishi Kōbe Kagura, Higashi Kōbe Ninomiya, and Hieda Elementary schools (Lee 1956, 79: Gwon 2008, 121). Consequently, on April 24, 10,000 Koreans gathered in front of the Hyogo Prefectural Government to demonstrate against the closures (Lee 1956, 78). By coincidence, the Governor, Deputy Governor, the Head of Education, police, and other officials were holding a meeting (Lee 1956, 7). Therefore, to obtain a written agreement from the governor to withdraw the closure orders, postpone the return of classrooms in Japanese schools, and release arrested Koreans, an “overwrought Korean crowd” of 500

\(^{56}\) 200 Korean students were studying in East Kobe schools and 300 in West Kobe schools (Gwon 2008, 121).
Koreans stormed the building and cut the phone lines. Under duress, the Governor agreed to their demands and they left the building (Wagner, 1951, 71-72).

The massive protests and the written agreement secured in Kobe infuriated SCAP and on April 25, the Commanding General of the Eighth Army Lt. General Robert L. Eichelberger, flew into Kobe and declared an official state-of-emergency, mobilizing 4,663 Japanese police and MPs to indiscriminately hunt down Koreans (Chōsenjin gari) in Osaka and Kobe (Gwon 2008, 369).

Then, on April 26, at the Osaka Prefectural Government, 40,000 Koreans gathered to demonstrate (Lee, 1956, 78). SCAP personnel and 5,000 Japanese police dispersed the crowd with fire hoses and rifles killing a 16-year-old Korean youth, Kim Taeil, and seriously wounding a young Korean woman (Lee, 1956, 78). Over April 1948, unrelated to the closure of the Joseon schools over 4,000 Koreans and Japanese communists were arrested (Gwon 2008, 370), and eight Koreans and ten Japanese communists were prosecuted by the Osaka Eighth Army Military Commission receiving sentences as high as 15 years with hard labor for obstructing the occupation (Lee, 1956, 81).

Following the clampdown on the Koreans, in Osaka and Kobe, on April 24, 1948, the ROK affiliated Mindan formed a countermeasure committee on education and
issued a statement of protest over General Eichelberger’s treatment of Koreans (Kang 2002, 266). Ironically, Chōren schools were targeted by SCAP and the Japanese government for supposedly teaching communist ideologies; however, all Mindan schools (56 Mindan schools with 6,825 students) except the Baekdu Hagwon were closed indiscriminately (Ozawa 1973, 200).

However, in all truth, an image of unruly self-styled DPRK supporting Chōren Koreans may have been beneficial to SCAP and the United States Army Military Government in Korea’s (USAMGIK) reputation. For both authorities needed to suppress Korean communists, because, in southern Korea, communist ideologies based on nationalistic and anti-Japanese patriotism still appealed to many people (Cummings 2005, 202-203). Moreover, under the USAMGIK the economy in the south lagged, while the outcome from the DPRK’s economic strategies was remarkable. For example, in 1947 the industrial output grew to 54% and in 1948 it recorded 64%, with a rise in consumer goods and grain as well (Hoare 2012, 112).

To SCAP’s discontent, the January to May 1948 oppression of Korean education ended when the MOE Minister Morito Tatsuo and the Committee Member for Korean Education Choe Yong-gun agreed upon the May 5 Memorandum. The Memorandum stipulated that Joseon schools would conform to the Fundamental Law of
Education standards and apply for private school accreditation to operate independently (Lee, 1956, 82). Furthermore, following the Memorandum, the MOE agreed to give Joseon schools more time to upgrade facilities for accreditation; however, most prefectures adopted a passive approach and the remaining Joseon schools continued to operate (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 66). Moreover, as a substitute for the closed schools Koreans opened schools in Chōren offices, factories, storerooms, and some classes were held outside in open spaces (Ko 1996, 97). In May 1949 there were still 307 schools in operation with 1,170 teachers instructing 37,287 students (Lee, 1956, 95).

The dissolution of Chōren and the second school closures

The 1948 school closures did not affect Chōren’s influence over the community. In fact, Wagner (1951, 84) states that far from a setback, the 4-24 Hanshin Kyōiku Tōsō (4-24 Hanshin Education Struggle) gave Chōren a “heightened aura of martyrdom.” However, on September 8, 1949, as part of a campaign “to reconstruct a peaceful country,” Japan’s Attorney General,57 accusing Chōren of “creating great disorder,” without forewarning ordered Chōren and the Korean Democratic youth league to

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57 After August 15, 1948, SCAP relinquished control of Koreans to the Japanese government.
disband (Wagner 1951, 84). Other reasons for Chōren’s dissolution were the flying of the DPRK’s flag in violation of SCAP orders, its committing acts of violence against SCAP personnel, and its organizing mass protests (riots) over the school closures. In disbanding Chōren, national-level leaders were purged, and its property impounded (Wagner 1951, 87).

Following the dissolution of Chōren, the Japanese government had a legitimate case for closing the Chōren schools and executed the closures in two stages. First, after October 19, 1949, 92 Joseon schools (68 elementary schools, four junior high schools, and two senior-high schools) were forcefully closed by armed police who stormed into classrooms and pasted closure signs on the windows and doors. Next, after November 4, 1949, under a restructuring order, the Japanese government ordered the remaining 245 Joseon schools (223 elementary schools, 16 junior high schools, and six senior high schools) to apply for private school accreditation or face closure. However out of the 128 applications, only the Osaka Mindan-affiliated (elementary, junior- and senior-high school) Baekdu Hagwon gained accreditation (Ko 1996, 97). Bae Yeong-ae’s school the Moriyama Joseon school in Nagoya that was described in the introduction was closed in April 1949, with SCAP’s consent, the Japanese Government legislated the Organization Control Law to prohibit organizations which used violence as a course of action against government policies. Chōren soon became a candidate for dissolution after holding mass demonstrations with the JCP to overthrow the government and its support for the newly established Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) after September 9, 1948, and clashes over the display of the DPRK flag (Lee & De Vos 1981, 84).
this period.

Joseon schools following 1950

Following the school closures in Osaka, 10,000 Korean children enrolled in Japanese schools. However, some 40% are said to have dropped out or recorded extended periods of absence. According to Lee (1956, 93) due to a lack of mentoring some Korean students who did not attend school became juvenile delinquents. Furthermore, where there was a high ratio of Korean students, they are said to have obstructed classes (Lee 1956, 93).

When the San Francisco Treaty came into effect in April 1952, Japanese policies toward the Joseon schools changed again because Koreans were no longer “Japanese citizens” and mandatory education laws no longer applied. In Tokyo schools, extra-curricular Korean classes were scrapped, and places in Japanese schools were offered to Koreans on the condition that they pledged that they would not disturb classes (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 78). In Osaka, a Korean year 7 student was forced to sign the following agreement:

I apply to enroll in this school. I promise to obey Japanese laws and respect school rules and not cause a disruption. If I obstruct lessons, the headmaster has the right to

59 At the Miyuki Mori Elementary school in Osaka, 40% of the students were Korean.
60 The first branch schools to close were in Okayama in 1950, Yamaguchi in 1953, Osaka in 1961, Kanagawa in 1965, and Aichi in 1966. The Tokyo Metropolitan Joseon Schools closed in 1955 (McKee 2014, 60)
expel me and I relinquish my right to contest the headmaster’s decision (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 79).

No longer legally required to attend Japanese schools, Koreans were at liberty to once again establish their own schools, and as of April 1952, the options for ethnic education were unlicensed schools, Joseon Municipal Schools/Joseon Public Schools, and ethnic Korean classes in Japanese schools. In total there were 44 unlicensed schools, 17 in Hyogo, four in Hiroshima, and one or two schools each in Kanagawa, Chiba, Shizuoka, Okayama, Aichi, Kyoto, Mie, and Osaka (Ko 1996, 99). In Tokyo, the 15 Joseon Municipal Schools that were operated by Japanese and Korean teachers were absorbed into the Japanese system. In Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Hyogo prefectures, 19 Joseon schools became branch schools of Japanese schools. Furthermore, in response to a campaign by Korean parents, extra-curricular ethnic classes were established in Kyoto, Osaka, Saitama, Ibaraki, Shiga, and Hyogo public schools (Kurusu 1968, 27). As of April 1952, there were 174 Joseon schools under various classifications, 491 teachers, and 17,678 students (Pak 2000, 155). The system continued to develop under Minsen (The United Democratic in Japan for Unification of Korea) administration and by 1953, 21,096 Korean children were attending 191 Joseon schools (62 autonomous schools, 21 Municipal (Joseon) schools, 17 Municipal (Joseon) Branch schools, 79 ethnic classes (in Japanese public schools) and 12 Joseon night
schools (Oh 2019, 74-75).

Conclusion

This chapter has built on the discussion of prewar education issues for Koreans as subalterns and analyzed education and subsequent suppression in the turbulent postwar period from 1945 to 1952. In postwar Japan beyond repatriation, SCAP was unprepared to formulate policies for Koreans, and the Japanese Government’s homogeneous narrative excluded displaced Koreans. However, in this milieu, Chōren was successful in its educational endeavor; because Chōren’s mechanism involved rearticulating oppressive postcolonial discourses, and revealing fundamental contradictions, to create a new and unprecedented hybrid education system. Between 1945-1952 the Joseon schools became a Third Space where Zainichi Koreans could identify beyond a nation (as a unified Korean country no longer existed), but through a common language, culture, and history. In other words, as Simon During (1995, 125-126) states:

> the post-colonial desire is the desire of the decolonized communities for an identity. Obviously, it is closely connected to nationalism, for those communities are often, though not always, nations. In both literature and politics, the post-colonial drive towards identity centers around language partly because in postmodernity identity is barely available elsewhere.

This chapter has detailed the development of a hybrid school system that
focused on ethnic education and contested the sociopolitical interpretations that the Joseon schools were simply pro-communist. Moreover, it has established that except for the Chōren operated Osaka and Tokyo political youth colleges, the comprehensive curriculum in the Joseon schools focused on the teaching of the Korean language, history, culture, and later on Korean independence and global themes. However, SCAP opposed the Joseon schools fearing that national awareness would cause ethnic tension, and later as part of SCAP’s “Red Purge,” with limited evidence, unrelentingly targeted the Joseon schools. On the other hand, while discrimination towards Koreans continued and segregation was the preferred option by the Japanese authorities, documents suggest that in the MOE and regional education bureaus there was some degree of consideration for the Joseon schools.

The crux of the matter is that when SCAP involved the police and former colonial officials such as the Yamaguchi Governor Aoyagi Ichirō⁶¹ or Kobe mayor Kodaira Kenichi,⁶² who embraced racist attitudes towards Koreans, the issue of ethnic education was transformed into a question of public security (Wagner 1951, 71). In sum, oppression against Zainichi Koreans and ethnic education was far-reaching as they were suppressed by the transnational and internal polices of SCAP, the Eighth Army, the

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⁶¹ Colonial division head in the “special higher police.”
⁶² Former governor in southern Korea.
MOE, prefectural administrations, police, and the politics of a divided Korean peninsula (McKee 2014, 6).

SCAP and the Japanese authorities were ultimately complicit in oppressing Korean education. Hence, as the schools continue to evolve, in Joseon school collective memory, the 1948 April 24 Hanshin Education Struggles (4-24 Hanshin Kyōiku Tōsō) have become symbolic due to the scale, police participation, violence, and the degree of SCAP oppression. However, one might consider whether the trajectory for the Joseon schools might have been different if SCAP had not intervened.
CHAPTER III

Political Negotiation: the *Joseon* schools in pro-DPRK Cold-War Discourses

*Culminating in the Foreigners’ School System Bill (1955-1972)*

In September 1963, under a blue *Seto* Inland Sea sky and DPRK’s flag the *Ramhongsaek Konghwaguk*, on the grounds of the Iejima *Joseon* school, some 280 Japanese and Korean islanders prepared for Nishijima Island’s annual sports day. Flowerbeds cultivated from seeds sent from the DPRK were positioned in front of the school and elderly Japanese and Korean islanders sat inside the *Chongryun* branch’s tent for shelter.

Early in the morning, to participate in the sports day the students from Harima and Aboshi elementary *Joseon* schools on the mainland crossed over to the island in boats. From a distance, the students believed that the scene against the blue sky of the inland sea’s reflections on the stone quarries was so beautiful it must be an illusion. As the boats entered Nishijima’s harbor, the mainland students, wearing colorful Korean costumes, began their booming Korean *Nongak* percussion performance to announce
their arrival. Excited islanders hearing the drums and tambourines played to the Korean 
_Jangdan_ rhythm raced down to the shores to greet their guests from the mainland (Kim 
2004, 211-213). The introduction of _Nongak_ at the school sports day is significant 
because the performance of _Nongak_ is said to enrich community solidarity and support 
and epitomize a shared identity (UNESCO 2014).

The Iejima _Joseon_ school was the only school on Nishijima island and was the 
center of all community activities. Furthermore, between 1946 and 1968 the _Chongryun_ 
community allowed the children of disenfranchised Japanese quarry laborers to enroll 
(Kim 2004, 209). For the Japanese students, headmaster Jo Yeong-sang, a 
first-generation immigrant from Busan, created a syllabus based on MOE-approved 
textbooks, and on the same blackboard, he simultaneously taught the Japanese and 
Korean students. Also, to ensure the MOE requirements were fulfilled, Jo held special 
after-school classes for the Japanese students (Kurusu 1968, 45). After 1955, 
_Chongryun_ incorporated the school and following 1957 the school building was rebuilt 
by Japanese and Korean islanders with DPRK funds. Consequently, the Japanese 
students stayed and studied in a classroom displaying a Kim Il-sung image and the 
DPRK flag (Atarashī Sedai, 1963). The Iejima _Joseon_ school is an anomaly because it 
educated Japanese students. However, beyond a strong affiliation with the DPRK, it
indicates how local autonomy was respected and incorporated in the *Chongryun* education system to accommodate local conditions.

The Iejima *Joseon* school with some Japanese students in 1955. Photo provided by the first headmaster Yun Mu-sun’s son Yun Seong-ju. Teacher Ha Dae-yang stands on the left (Kim, 2001, 214).

**Introduction**

The previous chapter analyzed the early development of the *Joseon* schools in postwar Japan and how the precarious legal status of Koreans and SCAP’s Red Purge instigated two-fold oppression against the *Joseon* schools and transformed ethnic education into a public security issue. This chapter will analyze how under *Chongryun*, with assistance from the DPRK, the *Joseon* schools prospered and adjusted to create unique hybrid spaces from 1955 against a milieu of Cold-War security discourses, but were stereotyped again as public security risks between 1961 and 1972. Furthermore, in context with the Iejima *Joseon* school, this analysis will identify how *Chongryun*
restructured DPRK nationalistic ideologies via the teaching of the Korean language, history, and culture between 1955 and 1972 to suit local conditions. Anderson (1983, 12) states that nationalism must be understood by analyzing the large cultural systems that preceded it and not the perceived political ideologies. In this sense, this chapter will demonstrate how the primary focus of Chongryun education was not to mimic DPRK education but was structured against a backdrop of colonial displacement to accommodate the unique status of Zainichi Koreans.

Japan is a signatory of international conventions to protect the rights of children. For example, in the time frame of this analysis, on November 20, 1959, the Government of Japan ratified the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Article 7:

The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages. He shall be given an education which will promote his general culture, and enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abilities, his individual judgment, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to become a useful member of society. The best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those responsible for his education and guidance; that responsibility lies in the first place with his parents. The child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation, which should be directed to the same purposes as education; society and the public authorities shall endeavor to promote the enjoyment of this right (Declaration of the Rights of the Child 2019).

Furthermore, Japan’s Constitution includes provisions for education as a human right.

For example, Article 26 reads:
All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law.
All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2019).

However, irrespective of Japan’s promotion of child rights, and the provisions for equal education in the constitution, Japan’s government failed to recognize the promotion of a child’s “general culture” and the responsibility of parents in determining the best interests for the Korean child. Instead, by politicizing Chongryun’s connection to the DPRK the government with ROK support constructed a Cold War discourse against the Joseon schools, and formulated theForeigners’ School System Bill from 1968 to 1972.

Background

Following the dissolution of Chōren in September 1949, Minsen (The United Democratic in Japan for Unification of Korea) was established in January 1951 to support the DPRK during the Korean war. From the beginning, Minsen was weak on ethnic issues and as a political organization collaborated with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) following a “one country one-party principle” (Oh 2015, 31) to fight a guerrilla war for a unified Korea and a “democratic revolution” in Japan (Lee & De Vos 1981, 88).

The DPRK played a major role in the foundation of Chongryun in 1955. First,
to consolidate power in North-East Asia, the DPRK lobbied for a new ethnic organization and friendly relations with Japan. In view of a new organization, in December 1952, Kim Il-sung stated his ideas on ideology, principle, and leadership for an ethnic-centric organization. Subsequently, a group of disenchanted Minsen activists visited the DPRK and met with Kim on January 19, 1953. At the meeting, Kim suggested founding a new organization under DPRK guidance to safeguard the livelihood of Zainichi Koreans, guarantee the right to “democratic ethnic education,” and to support a unified Korea (Ko 1996, 108). Then, on August 30, 1954, the DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il released a statement that referred to Zainichi Koreans as DPRK Overseas Citizens and accorded them the same civil rights as citizens living in the DPRK. Nam also stated that the gravity of discrimination against Zainichi Koreans had developed beyond a domestic Japanese issue and was now of international concern (Ko, 1996, 108).

Before the May 1955 establishment of Chongryun, Japan, too, was eager to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK. For instance, in January 1955, Prime

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1 In 1953, Zainichi Koreans were able to apply for re-entry permits; however, most were refused (see Jeong 2011, 35).
2 Chongryun’s interpretation of “democratic education” is vague and without explanation. In 1956 Lee (1956 134-135) omits the word “democratic” in Chongryun’s “ethnic education” charter. However, after 1980, in Chongryun literature Pak (1989, 383), and Oh (2015, 40) include the term “democratic ethnic education” in the original charter.
3 The DPRK’s Nationality Law of October 9, 1963, formally declared Zainichi Koreans as DPRK Overseas Citizens. However, as early as 1954, the DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il informally used the term DPRK Overseas Citizens when referring to Chongryun Koreans.
Minister Hatoyama Ichirō expressed that Japan was ready to develop trade relations with the DPRK (Lee 2002, 8). In response, in February 1955, Nam Il declared that the DPRK was prepared to promote friendly relations with Japan based on cultural exchange and trade (Lee, 1984, 89). However, the ROK strongly opposed any form of normalization between Japan and the DPRK, and channels for future exchange were kept open through consultations on the repatriation of Zainichi Koreans (Lee 2010, 42).

With the DPRK offering an olive branch of friendship, Minsen’s strategy of guerilla warfare was no longer feasible. Moreover, from Han Deoku’s⁴ point of view, Minsen was too radical and violent and its ideologies were inconsistent with Zainichi Korean ethnic issues. Hence, at the March 2, 1955, Minsen national convention, a Chongryun preparatory committee was formed under Han and in his groundbreaking speech titled, “Transformation in the Zainichi Korean Ethnic Movement” he criticized both Chōren and Minsen for collaborating with Japanese democracy movements (Ko 1996, 108; Lee 1956, 130). Subsequently, Minsen was dissolved on May 24, 1955, and Chongryun was officially inaugurated on May 25, 1955, in Tokyo at the Akasaka Kōkaidō. At the gathering of 468 delegates with an audience of 600 Koreans, a formal

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⁴ Han Deoku-su immigrated to Japan from Gyeonsangbuku-do in 1927 at the age of 20 planning to study music. However, he failed the entrance exam and instead decided to study social sciences for a short time in a Japanese university. Later he joined the Esperanto Labor and the Zenkyō Labor movements as an advocate for Korean independence and labor issues for Koreans and was imprisoned for two years (Oh, 2009, 8).
affirmation, strategy, by-laws, and a general policy were declared. Under a collective leadership system with six chairpersons, Han was nominated as *Chongryun*’s founding chairman with Ri Sim-cheol, Sin Hong-sik, Yun Deok-hon, Kim Un-sun, and Kim Seong-ji (Oh 2015, 30).

As an ethnic orientated organization, *Chongryun* cut ties with the JCP and advocated that activism linked to civil, social, or political empowerment was against Korean nationalism and equivalent to assimilating into Japan (Chung 2010, 51). Thus, *Chongryun* was founded as DPRK’s delegated overseas organization and pledged to protect the rights of Zainichi Koreans, but also to obey and respect Japanese laws (Oh 2015, 30-31). New members were required to contribute to the prosperity of the DPRK, raise ethnic consciousness, and follow orders from the DPRK fatherland. The 500,000 DPRK Overseas Citizens⁵ agreed to adhere to the regime’s revolutionary ideologies, the Workers Party and DPRK government policies, and the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula (Oh 2015, 30-31). Furthermore, *Chongryun* flagged ethnic education as one of its highest priorities and, requesting DPRK guidance, it pledged to defend the right to ethnic education and to educate children loyal to the DPRK.

Analyzing *Chongryun* literature mainly published after the 1980s, this chapter,

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⁵ Alien Registration records in 1955 record 577,682 Koreans living in Japan (Morita 1996, 103) and Lee (1956, 138) claims that in 1955 there were some 500,000 Koreans who supported *Chongryun*.
in context with DPRK support for ethnic education, first reviews how Chongryun collaborated with the DPRK to create a unique autonomous education system for Zainichi Koreans. Second, using primary documents such as Diet and LDP committee transcriptions, it investigates how, under the pretext of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the ROK and Japan joined forces to politicize Chongryun and the schools to legislate the Foreigners’ School System Bill against the Joseon schools. This chapter asks: how did Chonryun and the DPRK collaborate to create a unique curriculum and texts? And, how did Japan and the ROK politicize and incriminate the Joseon schools between 1961 and 1972?

Table 3.1. is a timeline of events that affected the trajectory of Korean education in Japan between 1954 and 1972.
### Table 3.1 Timeline 1954 – 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>* Tokyo Education Committee notifies imminent closure of the Tokyo Municipal Joseon School (October).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1955 | * Tokyo Municipal Joseon School closed (March)  
* Tokyo Governor accredits closure of the Tokyo Municipal Joseon School (April) | Chongryun is established (May) |
| 1956 | Korea University is established (April) | |
| 1957 | | Remittance of the Korean Education Aid Funds begins (April). |
| 1959 | | * Korea University moves to a new campus in Kodaira, Tokyo (June)  
* Repatriation to DPRK begins (December) |
| 1965 | Japan-ROK Normalization Treaty and Legal Residency Agreement (June) | |
| 1966 | First submission of Foreigners’ Schools System Bill (April) | Registration for permanent residence for ROK citizens begins (January) |
| 1967 | MOE Tsutatsu “regarding the handling of Korea University” (September) | |
| 1968 | * Japanese Govt. submits Foreigners’ Schools System Bill, to Diet (March)  
* Governor Minobe accredits Korea University (April) | |
| 1972 | | Foreigners’ School System Bill shelved after being debated 7 times. |

(Kōrai Hakubutsukan 2014, 44-45; Zai Nihon 2006, 61)

The Chongryun education system and the DPRK

At Chongryun’s May 1955 inauguration, ethnic education was flagged as one of its highest priorities. In Article Four of Chongryun’s eight-point inaugural charter:

> We, Korean compatriots, pledge to enforce democratic education and teach our children to speak and write our mother language. For the adults in our community, who have been defeated by the shackles of slavery and feudalism, we will eradicate illiteracy and endeavor to develop our [uri] Korean culture (Pak 1989, 383).

Chongryun’s original education charter was promoted under the slogan of strengthening “democratic ethnic education” (*minshu minzoku kyōiku*). The interpretation of the
“democratic ethnic education” was mapped out as:

- Educate all school children to be loyal to the DPRK
- Build more schools
- Encourage Koreans in Japanese schools to transfer to these schools
- Encourage local autonomy and accreditation
- Establish an education administration system
- Offer scholarships and lobby for the right to matriculate to Japanese universities

(Lee 1956, 134-135).  

When Chongryun assumed responsibility for ethnic education it absorbed some 228 Joseon schools with 23,415 students and 759 teachers (Kim 2004, 155). Chongryun’s education strategies became more concrete following an August 28, 1955, visit to the DPRK by Chongryun members Rim Gwang-cheol, Ri Heun-yeol, Jeong Yeon-chang, and Bak Hyeon-nam. In Pyongyang, the members met with Kim Il-sung, who promised to send funds for Zainichi Korean education, welcome students to study in the DPRK, and offer scholarships to allow Zainichi students to study in Japanese universities (Lee 1956, 137-138).

To consolidate the school system, under Chongryun the Korean Education Association in Japan (KEA) was created and administered in conjunction with the Textbook Committee to supervise the curriculum, students, school rules, compilation of

---

6 Oh (2015, 40) interprets the original charter as follows: Educate all school children to be loyal to the DPRK/Improve education standards/Improve school standards/Offer education to youths and women/Establish an education administration system/Offer scholarships and lobby for the right to matriculate to Japanese universities.

7 Including seven municipal and prefectural branch schools.
texts, and publishing of textbooks through *Hagu Seobang*\(^8\) (Kim 2004, 155). Also, the KEA coordinated with umbrella organizations – the Korean Teacher’s League, the Korean Student League in Japan, and the Korean School PTA Federation (Kim 2004, 154). Furthermore, *Chongryun* expected the community to participate in the educational endeavor and in a July 1955 statement it stipulated that the PTA Federation must include all Koreans living within school districts:

> For fellow compatriots to implement “democratic education” to teach language and literacy we bear collective responsibility for school infrastructure, assistance in administration, and academic and career counseling (Pak 1982, 206).

Hence, raising funds to build new schools and finance teachers’ salaries fell on the community. As of 1955, out of approximately 120,000 Korean children in Japan, less than 30,000 were studying in Joseon schools, and, subsequently, *Chongryun* launched a massive community-based project to build more schools to encourage these children to enroll (Lee 1956 134). The community mobilized under the same slogan as the *Gugeo Gangseupso* venture – to dedicate money, labor, or “intellect” (Lee 1956, 67). Again, *Zainichi* Koreans were passionate about ethnic education, and, as an inclusive community venture, donations from all levels of the community were significant. For example, at the Hiroshima school, a wealthy merchant donated a whole classroom; a

\(^8\) *Chongryun*’s publishing house.
woman in Sendai with limited means donated 300 handmade dust cloths; for the Tohoku Junior High school some people donated wooden beams, and many gave up smoking and alcohol and donated the money they saved (Ozawa 1973, 427). In Kyushu, 1,638 Korean households donated 12 million yen and 1,471 community members physically constructed the Kyushu Junior and Senior High school in time for its opening in April 1956 (Pak 1982, 211).

By April 1956, the system included 243 schools with 24,614 students and 857 teachers (Pak 1982, 210). Moreover, in 1956 Chongryun granted 20 million yen respectively to schools in Tokyo, and senior high schools in Aichi, Osaka, and Hyogo, and by April 1956, 17 new and extended schools opened, and 13 new schools were being constructed. In the areas of Tochigi, Miyazaki, Iwate, Aomori, and Hokkaido where ethnic education was not accessible, afternoon and night schools were established (Pak 1982, 210). The new schools were the Kyushu Joseon Junior-Senior High school, the Shimonoseki Elementary Joseon School, and the Tokuyama Joseon school (Kim 2004, 155). However, despite significant community aid the rapid development of the school system the Chongryun’s resources were still limited. See Table 3.2 for the 1956 school budget (Chongryun Central Table Education Bureau quoted in Kim 2004, 167).
Table 3.2 1956 School Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Funds Required</th>
<th>PTA allotment</th>
<th>Total income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>86,210,000</td>
<td>20,690,400</td>
<td>65,519,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High school</td>
<td>47,840,000</td>
<td>22,080,000</td>
<td>25,760,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High school</td>
<td>20,976,000</td>
<td>11,012,000</td>
<td>9,963,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea University</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>6,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal/Branch Schools</td>
<td>11,976,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>11,976,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Classes</td>
<td>5,313,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>5,313,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Classes</td>
<td>2,802,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2,802,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbook Expenditure</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Administration Fees</td>
<td>15,480,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>15,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>208,597,000</td>
<td>61,382,800</td>
<td>147,214,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consolidation of Chongryun education

*Chongryun*’s education system was strengthened by the establishment of Korea University in 1956, funding from the DPRK in 1957, and the repatriation program to the DPRK that began in 1959. First, from a global perspective, the *Chongryun* school system became the first migrant-founded school system in the world to offer a comprehensive education from kindergarten to university. Korea University was established on April 10, 1956, beginning as a two-year teacher college in Jūjō Tokyo with 10 teachers and 60 students. The initial curriculum taught special skills required for teaching in Korean and because many of the trainee teachers were graduates of Japanese universities, included extra classes for teaching Korean history, Korean geography,
music, and ethnic dancing (Korea University 2017). In 1958, Korea University expanded to a four-year program and in 1959 it moved to its current campus in Kodaira, Tokyo. Subsequently, by 1964, 500 students were enrolled in the university’s five faculties of education, letters, history and geography, politics and economics, and science and engineering (Korea University 2017).

Second, in conjunction with the DPRK Youth League’s tenth anniversary, on January 6, 1956, the DPRK cabinet passed a bill authorizing financial aid for the Chongryun’s schools. It should be noted here that in this period the DPRK was not the poor country as it is seen today. The figure is debatable, but according to DPRK sources, the average growth rate of the DPRK economy, the Net Material Product (NMP)\(^9\) between 1953 and 1980 was 12% when the ROK’s GDP was 6.9% (Kim, Kim and Lee 2007, 566).

Hence, following approval by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s government in March 1957, from April 1957 the DPRK commenced the Education Aid Fund and Scholarships (Kim 2004, 166). The first remittance of 121,099,086 yen in April 1957 was followed by a second one of 100,510,000 yen in October 1957 (Lee & De Vos 1981, 9

\(^9\) The NMP is comparable to the net national product less the value added of most services (Kim, Kim and Lee 2007, 566)
Although previously promised, the funds consolidated Chongryun’s system, reassured the stateless and disenfranchised community that they were not forgotten, and reinforced a DPRK Overseas Citizen identity and an ongoing loyalty towards the DPRK. In fact, the Korean community, which was struggling financially to provide ethnic education, described the aid as “Seimei Mizu” (life water) (Kim 2004, 167; Han 2006, 75). As pledged, the financial assistance funded scholarships in Joseon schools and for Koreans studying in Japanese universities (Han 2006, 78-79). Furthermore, the unforeseen capital enabled the community to rebuild the dilapidated wooden schools into modern concrete buildings and these sturdy buildings remain a symbolic reminder to the community of their obligation towards the DPRK. See Table 3.3 for the increase in concrete building types built between 1955 and 1971 (Ozawa 1973, 428).

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10 The Education Aid Fund from the DPRK continues. As of 2012 remittances total over 469 billion yen (Song 2012, 162).
11 By April 1977, the DPRK had remitted 23 billion yen (Lee & De Vos 1981, 170) and an April 2017 report in the Chongryun-managed Chōson Sinbo newspaper stated that over the last 60 years, there have been 163 remittances totaling over 480 billion yen (Oh 2017). The funds were supervised by the KEA and paid to the various schools directly or through Chongryun credit unions or Japanese banks.
Table 3.3 School buildings built between 1955 and 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Construction</th>
<th>Completion</th>
<th>Building type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>4 schools</td>
<td>Wood – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9 Concrete – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>205 schools</td>
<td>Wood – 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Concrete – 117 schools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall budget for the Chongryun school system relied on tuition fees (paid by the local communities), Chongryun membership fees, donations, and the DPRK funds (Lee & De Vos 1981, 170). However, in accepting the funds from the DPRK, Chongryun also accepted DPRK governance over Zainichi education (Song 2012, 140). Hence, in 1958, in recognition of the DPRK’s commitment to Zainichi Koreans and to raise education standards, improve Korean language education, and replicate DPRK
technical training courses (for potential repatriates), Chongryun created the Kim Il-sung Patriotic Movement Research Centre. Accordingly, a Kim Il-sung Patriotic Movement Research Centre and a Fatherland Research Room were established in every school (Oh 2019, 111-114).

Third, the repatriation program to the DPRK. At the September 9, 1958, 10th National Foundation Day in Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung announced that he would offer financial support, protection and welcome the repatriation of Zainichi Koreans to the DPRK. Subsequently, in August 1959, the Japanese Red Cross and the DPRK Red Cross signed the Calcutta Agreement to allow Zainichi Koreans to repatriate to the DPRK. The proposal to expatriate Zainichi Koreans to the DPRK coincided with the 1957-1958 economic recession in Japan when Koreans were stateless, denied basic human rights, suffered prejudice, and lacked freedom of movement. Furthermore, Morris-Suzuki (2007, 199) contends that motivated by prejudice, economic and security concerns, the idea of repatriation was a collaborated effort between Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s government and the Red Cross. However, Chongryun claims the Repatriation Program was the initiative of Zainichi Koreans originating at a Kawasaki Chongryun branch meeting in August 1958 called “getting to know the fatherland”

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12 Many of these designated rooms were later used as storage facilities.
Regardless, Chongryun used its position to proselytize the benefits of working for the fatherland, creating patriotic Overseas Korean Citizens identities, and expanded and strengthened the school system. Consequently, some 90,000 Koreans repatriated in a total of 187 boats sailing between December 1959 and December 1967, and again between 1971 and 1984 (Pak 1989, 401).

Hence, when the repatriation began in 1959 enrollments in the Joseon schools increased significantly as children transferred from Japanese schools to learn the Korean language in preparation for life in the DPRK (Han 2006, 88). For example, in 1959 there were 30,644 students; but by 1960 the student cohort swelled to 46,249 (Pak 2012, 722). The schools became quasi-repatriation centers and special groups were created to promote repatriation and patriotism. To encourage students in the repatriation classes (gwigug geub) and teach them about the DPRK, epistolary novels were compiled and bound from letters sent to teachers and classmates from repatriated students. For example, in 1960 at the Tokyo Joseon Junior High school, the 500 or more letters received from former students now living in the DPRK were compiled into a book and titled “A Collection of Letters from Returned Students: In the Heart of the Fatherland” (Jogug-ui Pum-eseo) (Kim 2004, 176). Furthermore, to encourage

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13 Many schools also provided Korean language instruction and preparation courses for adults.
repatriation and to familiarize students with the fatherland, annual school trips to the port of Niigata were organized. En route, students watched DPRK movies and at Niigata, they were presented with Korean musical instruments, books on animals and plants, and fruit and sweets brought specially from the DPRK. This Niigata experience of seeing the boats come and go from the DPRK gave the students direct exposure to the fatherland for the first time (Han 2006, 88-89).

So far, this analysis has established that the Chongryun school system grew mainly due to community involvement and the significant assistance and guidance from the DPRK. As far as the DPRK was concerned, the backing was conditional, and education focused on loyalty to the DPRK. However, this strong affiliation and allegiance to a foreign government did cause concern for the Japanese, the United States, and the ROK governments.

The creation of a hybrid curriculum under Chongryun

Regardless of Chongryun’s reliance on the DPRK to strengthen infrastructure and govern Chongrun Koreans, reproducing the DPRK system of education in Japan was impractical. For Japan was a democratic state (as opposed to the DPRK socialist state) and the Zainichi Korean population per se was diversified in beliefs, ideologies,
and lifestyles. From another point of view, Fujishima and Ozawa (1966 146-147) argue that teaching ideology of “patriotism to the fatherland” was not an attempt to mimic DPRK ideology but necessary to unite the community.

In 1960, Kim Il-sung did recognize the unique circumstances for Zainichi Koreans and instructed Chongryun not to reproduce DPRK education and keep the school system the same as Japan’s six-three-three-year system (Song 2012, 140).14 Hence Chongryun (like Chōren) continued to emulate the Japanese school system and curriculum with three semesters and 35 school weeks per annum, a three-year kindergarten course, six years of elementary school, three years of middle school, three years of high school, four years of university. This also eased transferring between Japanese and Joseon schools and enhanced job offers for graduates in Japanese society. Furthermore, the similarities to the Japanese system enabled Chongryun educators to continue collaborating with Japanese academics (Oh 2019, 108).

In 1955 the initial curriculum focused heavily on the Korean language because Chongryun was still restructuring the system. However, a new curriculum was officially launched in April 1956 and the elementary school curriculum expanded to include

14 In the DPRK children spend one year in kindergarten, four years in primary school and six years in high school (asianinfo.org 2010).
Korean language, mathematics, physics, education, natural science, music, art, Japanese, and other subjects. See Table 3.4 for the 1956 Elementary school curriculum under

*Chongyun* (Lee 1556, 150).

### Table 3.4 1956 Elementary school curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Annual Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Reading</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean grammar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Common Sense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drawing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weekly Hours</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1956, junior- and senior-high school level curricula, Korean language studies continued to dominate the curriculum. However, the curriculum expanded to include algebra and geometry in mathematics and biology, and chemistry in science. Japanese language instruction was also incorporated as a foreign language and the allocated teaching hours were longer than Korean history (*Joseon yeogsa*) and
geography. At this time, in Japanese high-school curricula, English was offered as a foreign language. However, to prevent Korean children from being swayed by just one foreign culture the Joseon schools determined to offer four hours of Russian, English, or Chinese as electives (Lee 1956, 159). See Tables 3.5 and 3.6 for the 1956 junior and senior high school curricula (Lee 1956, 151).
Table 3.5 1956 Junior High school curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>1 Weekly Hours</th>
<th>2 Weekly Hours</th>
<th>3 Weekly Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean literature</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Grammar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algebra</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geometry</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physics</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biology / Plants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biology /Animals</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean History</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World History</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Geography</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Geography</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Geography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Common Sense</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian/ English/Chinese</td>
<td>4 ~</td>
<td>3 ~</td>
<td>3 ~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drawing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Science</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
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</table>
Table 3.6 1956 Senior High school curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>1 Weekly Hours</th>
<th>2 Weekly Hours</th>
<th>3 Weekly Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean literature</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Grammar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mathematical analysis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Astronomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biology Dissection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basics of Darwinism</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean History</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World History</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Geography</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Geography</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian/ English/Chinese</td>
<td>4 ~</td>
<td>4 ~</td>
<td>4 ~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drafting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Science</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chongryun textbooks and the DPRK

Prior to Chongryun, the Minsen between 1951 and 1954 had attempted to incorporate DPRK texts into the curricula. However, due to opposition from Korean
teachers in the municipal *Joseon* schools,\(^\text{15}\) *Minsen* set out to produce its own unique texts. For instance, educators were critical of the DPRK texts that were designed for native Korean language speakers, and the extensive vocabulary was impractical for *Zainichi* children whose first language was Japanese (Oh 2019, 137). Many also felt that the content was unsuitable. For example, the images of the DPRK flag, the portrait of Kim Il-sung, a lack of topics to inspire homeland reunification, and the frequent war images were inconsistent with Japanese “peace education” and deemed incompatible with life in Japan. See Table 3.7 for 1954 *Minsen* texts (Quoted from a November 8, 1954, Report for the Central Teacher’s College in Kim 2004, 146).

Table 3.7 1954 Texts under *Minsen*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Full time</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ri Eun-chik</td>
<td>Geography and History</td>
<td>Ri Jin-gyu</td>
<td>Current Events and Korean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heo Nam-gi</td>
<td>Korean Literature, History, Classics</td>
<td>Gang Ji-sam</td>
<td>Chemistry and Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Deung</td>
<td>Physics and Mathematics</td>
<td>An U-sik</td>
<td>Korean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ri Chan-ui</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Yun Gyeon-Won</td>
<td>Accounting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bak Han-jong</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rim Gwang-cheol</td>
<td>Korean History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Gi-hak</td>
<td>Logic and Korean Grammar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Gu-bae</td>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bak San-deuk</td>
<td>Education Psychology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Chan-sik</td>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishii Tomoyuki</td>
<td>Biology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oka Kunio</td>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumi Keiko</td>
<td>Russian Language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuki Masashi</td>
<td>World History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Jang-an</td>
<td>Dance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak, Kyong Sik</td>
<td>History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{15}\) At a December 28, 1954 meeting in Tokyo to discuss new texts (Oh 2019, 135).
As for *Chongryun*, it was keen to identify with the DPRK and considered DPRK education superior. Therefore, using the DPRK as a prototype, the Korean Education Association (KEA) created a unique curriculum in 1955 and 1963 by reproducing DPRK textbooks published through the *Hagu Seobang* in Tokyo. By the end of 1955, Pak (2012, 730) notes there were 2,000 reproduced DPRK texts on 69 different subjects for school use. However, like *Minsen*, *Chongryun* educators encountered difficulties with DPRK texts and recognized that their incorporation was not feasible. Hence at the 7th *Chongryun* Central Committee meeting in October 1956, *Chongryun* agreed that texts should reflect the differences in the Japanese and the DPRK education systems and focus on topics such as differences in seasons, environment, and language (Oh 2019, 137).

For example, the above picture, titled “the path of a ballistic missile,” is from a 1957 DPRK-reproduced *Chongryun* Year 8 Physics textbook, and demonstrates how direct DPRK reproductions were impractical for education in Japan (Oh 2019, 141).
In due course, the new revisions incorporated DPRK nation-building topics to encourage patriotism, themes related to life in Japan, and universal subjects such as Korean history, culture, nature, and geography (Oh 2019, 137).


**Table 3.9 1960-1961 DPRK-reviewed texts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Editor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reading literature for Year 7</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Mun Sang-bin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reviewed by the DPRK Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading literature for Year 8</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Ri Chang-gu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reviewed by the DPRK Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading literature for Year 9</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Editor unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reviewed by the DPRK Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading Literature for Year 11</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Chongryun Writers Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reviewed by the DPRK Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Korean for Transfer Students</td>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Chongryun Central Education Cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The theme for the 1963 curriculum was based on encouraging a contribution to the fatherland and, as DPRK Overseas Citizens, to promote goodwill with peoples of the world (Pak 2012, 732; Song 2012, 142). Furthermore, due to ongoing repatriation, the language and political content of the texts prepared the Chongryun community for
life in the DPRK. However, research and fieldwork for this study found that there was minimal contact between Chongryun and DPRK educators because Chōsen-seki Koreans were not issued with re-entry permits and hence unable to travel outside of Japan (Jeong 2011, 35-36). Moreover, direct consultations in Pyongyang with DPRK educators on textbook revisions did not begin until 1983 (Ryang 1997, 25). This suggests the texts in circulation until then were generally Chongryun hybrid versions of DPRK textbooks because receipt of DPRK textbooks must have been sporadic and dependent on Chongryun visiting delegations. Furthermore, the KEA would have needed to simplify and redraft the DPRK texts to accommodate Zainichi Koreans.

Beyond the impractical issues of language competency and ideology in DPRK texts, the issue of using Chinese characters (hanja) and the Japanese language in the curriculum differed from DPRK education. For in the 1950s the DPRK slowly phased out the use of Chinese characters and eventually began to use hangul exclusively. However, for Zainichi Koreans, literacy in Chinese characters was essential for communication in Japan and for corresponding with family in the ROK (Oh 2019, 146). To accommodate these special circumstances Chongryun educators devised unique texts in hangul incorporating the standard set of Chinese characters (jōyō kanji)

\[\text{The majority of Zainichi Koreans originated from the southern areas on the Korean peninsula.}\]
used in Japan. From 1957 standard Chinese characters were introduced from Year 3 covering the equivalent of the Japanese Grades 1-4 over the six-year elementary syllabus.\(^{17}\)

The teaching and interpretation of Japanese, too, was a bone of contention for Korean educators. While colonial forced assimilation through language was still fresh in everyone’s memory, Japanese literacy was important for living in Japan. Furthermore, Korean educators believed that including Japanese language study was important to enhance an appreciation of Korean culture (Lee 1956, 158). As mentioned previously, considerable teaching hours were allocated to the teaching of Japanese. However, the first Japanese texts used in the schools were published by Japanese companies,\(^{18}\) until 1969,\(^{19}\) when the *Hagu-Seobang*-published the Japanese textbook titled *Nihongo no Benkyō* (Japanese Study) (Oh 2019, 151-152). The elementary Japanese syllabus included the basic 50 sounds of Japanese, modern literature, and the standard Chinese characters. In both junior high-school and senior high-school levels, students were taught to interpret Japanese as a foreign language, and the senior-level selected syllabus included Japanese classics and modern literature (Oh 2019, 151-152). However, the

\(^{17}\) The Japanese Chinese characters were improvised with Korean interpretations.

\(^{18}\) *Chūkyō-sha* for the elementary level, *Kyōiku Shubbansha* for the junior-high level, and *Taishūkan Shuppan* for the senior-high level

\(^{19}\) Before 1969, the KEA was preoccupied with creating a new curriculum based on DPRK texts.
KEA enforced strict stipulations on how the texts were to be taught in the “Japanese”
class. For example, Japanese was taught as a foreign language, and teachers were
ordered to refrain from discussing ethical issues with the students in the Japanese
language.\textsuperscript{20}

By April 1966, at the time when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) tendered
the first submission of the Foreigners’ School System Bill the \textit{Chongryun} school system
was educating 34,388 students in 142 schools from elementary level to university. In
addition, 25 kindergartens welcomed 918 students; additionally, there were 4,880
students taking classes at 245 night schools (Ozawa 1973, 435). As discussed earlier,
\textit{Chongryun} relied on the DPRK for financial and moral support, and members identified
as DPRK Overseas Citizens. However, from the beginning, the main purpose of ethnic
education was to accommodate \textit{Zainichi} Korean needs. What is more, educators were
critical about using DPRK texts; for they believed that reproducing a DPRK education
system in Japan for \textit{Zainichi} Koreans was not feasible. Hence it is reasonable to assume
that most of the texts in use were generally designed and published in Japan to
accommodate \textit{Zainichi} Koreans.

\textsuperscript{20} Due to agreements with regional authorities in municipal and prefectural branch schools the subject of
Japanese was taught by Japanese teachers who were employed at the affiliated school.
The Foreigners’ School System Bill

Prior to repatriation in 1959, the DPRK Government and Chongryun lobbied the Japanese Government for approval of DPRK education funding, because the Joseon schools were crucial for promoting repatriation to the DPRK. Consequently, in March 1957 Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke fully endorsed the DPRK Education Aid remittances to the Joseon schools (Kim 2004, 165); for the Japanese public supported the repatriation of Koreans, and this, in turn, enhanced the government’s approval ratings at a time when popular opinion was against the 1960 renewal of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.

Therefore until 1961, when repatriation to the DPRK began to decline the Japanese Government endorsed the schools and did not interfere with school administration. However, after 1961, in preparation for the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the Japanese Government again assumed a disapproving stance towards the Joseon schools in numerous xenophobic Cold-War discourses in the Diet, Joseon schools were raided by police, and in the negotiations for the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the ROK demanded that Joseon schools be closed.
The “Korean concern”

After 1961, to influence public opinion in support of the Treaty between Japan and the ROK, the Japanese Government, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the police, and the media again took to focusing on the “Korean concern” (*Zainichi Chōsenjin mondai*), and the *Joseon* schools became the main target of scrutiny. The following are examples of criticisms against the schools that appeared in public debates.

First, on October 13, 1961, the Minister of Education Araki Masuo was questioned by the Education Commission in the 39th Diet session (Diet of Japan, 1961) regarding racist remarks he had made at the Chief Education Research Council meeting in Matsuyama on July 21, 1961. Araki Masuo, according to Fujishima and Ozawa (1966, 232), was an LDP member that demonstrated no remorse for Japan’s military invasions of Korea, China, or other Asian countries. In context with Japan’s homogeneous narrative, he had referred to Japan as a superior country and due to Japan’s hardworking ancestors was thankful, he was not born as a Korean or an African native. At the commission hearing, Araki refused to retract his comments (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 232).

At the June 7, 1963, LDP Security Council Proceeding on a *Nikkyōso* (Japan Teachers’ Union) policy, members debated the *Joseon* schools. The members

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21 In 1962 some 569,350 Koreans remained in Japan (Morita 1996, 103).
determined Korean education was inferior to Japanese education and that the government needed a more efficient national accreditation system to control these schools. However, most members were oblivious to the fact that, indeed, the schools did hold “miscellaneous” accreditation. Reservations on the substantial aid coming from the DPRK, the teachings of “hannichi (anti-Japanese) ideologies” and the Chongryun schools’ opposition to the Treaty between Japan and the ROK were also discussed. Furthermore, LDP members also claimed that the schools were training sites for communist partisans and “North Korean” spies and referred to Chongryun Koreans as unruly and as if they were entitled to extraterritorial jurisdiction (Proceedings of the LDP Security Council quoted in Osawa 1971, 38-39).

On June 11, 1963, Secretary of Education Fukuda Shigeru, Shida Yoshinobu a former councilor, Hoshina Zenshirō a former navy officer and counselor, and Yoshie Katsuyasu a former Yamanashi governor and councilor convened the LDP Research Commission on National Security meeting. At the gathering, the Joseon schools were referred to as a security concern and beyond the jurisdiction of the MOE. Reasons cited included the ineffective school closures in 1950 and rumors that the schools were training places for North Korean spies. The schools were again declared uncontrollable because the committee believed Chongryun adhered only to the DPRK’s extraterritorial
law. The commission’s solution was to grant “miscellaneous” accreditation to all schools. After which they could legally enforce closure (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 233).

In the 43rd Diet Session on June 13, 1963, the National Police Agency Safety Division Bureau Chief Ōtsu Hideo was questioned regarding two violent incidents involving Korean and Japanese youths. In the autumn of 1962 and the spring of 1963, Korean students had been attacked by Japanese students from Hosei and Kokushikan High schools. In the Hosei attack, a Korean youth was hospitalized, but in both cases, Ōtsu contended that the Japanese were antagonized by the Koreans. Profoundly, the police portrayed the Japanese assailants as victims and the Korean victims as assailants (Diet of Japan Proceedings 1963). Osawa (1971, 40) maintains this was the first instance of racist group violence against Koreans in postwar Japan and signified a new trend in xenophobia with the racist element in the attacks being played down and presented instead as a Korean delinquent problem.

On March 25, 1964, in the 46th Diet Session, at the Education Committee on Chōsenjin Shōtei no Kyōiku Mondai ni tsuite (In regard to Education Problems of Korean Children), first the Minister for Education Nadao Hirokichi noted that as most Koreans intended to stay in Japan, ethnic education was unjustified. He professed that
there were likely no cases of foreign governments sanctioning minority schools that teach native languages (Diet of Japan Proceedings 1964). However, education Minister Nadao was significantly misinformed. For Japanese in Hawaii, the Foreign Language School Law was revised in April 1949, and the schools were placed under state jurisdiction. Subsequently, Japanese language schools officially reopened and new textbooks were compiled and published in 1949 and 1950. In 1950 there were 66 schools registered under the Japanese Nikkei diaspora managed Hawaii Education Board and by 1963, 87 Japanese schools were operating in the state of Hawaii teaching 14,118 Nikkei students (Tanaka 2005, 322-323). Subsequently, by September 1964, the State of Hawaii Education board began assessing students at Japanese Language schools to allow them to transfer their Japanese language credits to public schools (Japan Special Collection 2019). In the same meeting, the Administration Bureau Chief Sugie Kiyoshi was critical about the Joseon schools and the current system of accreditation saying that “miscellaneous” accreditation was easily attained in the prefectures and regional jurisdiction was responsible for hindering Korean cooperation with Japanese authorities (Diet of Japan Proceedings 1964).

Following the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in June 1965, in context with national security, the government’s
criticism of the DPRK and the *Joseon* schools escalated. For example, in June 1965, the LDP’s Security council’s midterm report titled “Far East State of Affairs and Japan's Security Measures,” reported on the alleged infiltration of DPRK spy agencies. Furthermore, in context with the Mongolian and the northern Korean kingdom *Goguryeo’s attempted invasion of Japan during the Kamakura Period* (1185–1333), the LDP suggested the possibility of a DPRK invasion with the JCP and *Chongryun* as the DPRK’s vanguard (Nihon Kyōiku-kai Kyōiku Seido Kenkyū Iinkai 1970, 43-44). Or an August 1965 LDP periodical titled the *Jiyū Minshu* headline read: “the JCP and *Chongryun*, united as anti-Japanese partisans – in the name of ethnic education *Chongryun* teachers act under extraterritorial law.” Then, the LDP’s affiliated organization the *Kokumin Kyōkai’s* September periodical erroneously reported that Korea University was conducting military training on its campus (Kim 2004 196).

On December 4, 1965, at the Japan-ROK Special Committee, the Socialist Party member Kobayashi Takeshi, a former schoolteacher from Hokkaido, questioned Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and the Minister of Education Nakamura Umekichi on their sentiments of the *Joseon* schools. Kobayashi’s questions intended to contextualize the term “*hannichi.*” First, he criticized politicians’ frequent use of the term “*hannichi*” to describe the educational aim of the *Joseon* schools. According to Kobayashi, this
abstract term required more specific clarification. Both Satō and Nakamura were unable to reply. In lieu, Satō did acknowledge that as former Japanese subjects, the circumstances for Koreans in Japan differed from that of other foreigners. However, he argued that ethnic education based on colonial transgressions was detrimental to Japan’s friendly relationship with the ROK. Furthermore, he contended that the principles of Korean independence should not be taught in Japan because Korea was now a sovereign country. Nakamura, who also had been unable to describe the term hannichi, contributed to the debate by accusing the schools of teaching hannichi dogma (Japan-Korea Special Committee Conference 1967). It should be noted here that the claims made by the politicians regarding hannichi teachings were not entirely incorrect because of the schools’ links with the DPRK. However, Japan’s lack of remorse for colonizing Korea and Satō’s aversion to Korean independence teachings in Japan strongly suggests that even without the DPRK link the attitude against the Joseon schools would probably be the same.

In addition to the above-mentioned public discourses, Joseon schools were often raided for minor issues. For example, on February 2, 1962, the Ibaraki Joseon School was raided by 150 police, and school documents were investigated after a student failed to present his Alien Registration Card which he was required to carry at
all times to the police (Kang 2002, 380). In another case, in 1965 two junior high students at the Chuo Osaka Joseon School failed to present their Alien Registration Cards and were detained for two days, during which time the students’ homes were searched (Ōsaka Minzoku Kyōiku 60-Nen Shi Henshū Iinkai 2005, 4).

Education for Koreans under the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea

The treaty between Japan and the ROK was signed in Tokyo on June 22, 1965, following 14 years of intermittent negotiations that had begun in October 1951 under the ROK’s first president, Syngman Rhee. Previously, the division of the Korean peninsula and the establishment of Mindan and Chongryun had ideologically divided the Korean community in Japan. The Treaty, however, legally divided the community on nationality. Moreover, Ozawa (1973, 488) contends that the treaty provided Japan with an opportunity to counteract unity in the Zainichi Korean community. To clarify, in collaboration with the ROK government, Japan granted permanent residence status (kyōtei eijū) to Zainichi Koreans who chose ROK citizenship. In the Treaty, the Japanese government granted permanent residence to Koreans who (1) had continuously lived in Japan since August 1945 and up to the time of the application; (2) those who
were born in Japan after April 16, 1945, as decedents of persons in the above category; and (3) children born after January 16, 1971, of parents who received permanent residence under categories (1) and (2) providing the child was registered within 60 days of birth (Lee & DeVos 1981, 147).

Hypothetically, all Koreans were free to choose their affiliation (Mindan or Chongryun); however, the Japanese Government supervised the process and determined who was entitled to become a ROK citizen and receive permanent residence. For example, the Japanese Government accepted 350,000 applications between January 17, 1966, and January 16, 1971. After conducting harsh background checks only 216,000 applicants were granted ROK citizenship with permanent residence in Japan. Those who were disqualified retained their precarious Chōsen-seki stateless with no legal residency status (Ozawa 1973, 492).

In previous treaty negotiations, compensation, fisheries, and cultural assets were allocated to special committees. However, issues on Zainichi Korean education were negotiated in the Subcommittee on Nationality. Ultimately in the treaty, the issue of education for Koreans was included in Article IV. In the preliminary talks at the

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22 Article IV
(a) The High Contracting Parties will be guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual relations. (b) The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in promoting their mutual welfare and common interests (Treaty on Basic Relations 2018).
25th meeting on nationality on January 29, 1952, both Japan and the ROK agreed not to make specifications on Korean education in the Treaty. Moreover, the Korean delegate Yu Chin-u agreed that education and social welfare issues for Zainichi Koreans should be left up to Japan. Henceforth the Japanese government’s financial responsibility for Korean education and welfare issues was debated concurrently (McKee 2013, 34-36).

However, later the ROK advocated that Koreans be entitled to enroll in Japanese public or private elementary and junior-high schools. Furthermore, the ROK requested special conditions for the Mindan Korean schools so graduates could matriculate to Japanese higher education institutions.23

The Japanese government agreed to permit Koreans with permanent residence status to enroll in Japanese schools; however, it maintained that mandatory education was the right of Japanese citizens, and due to the significant financial burden, it could not guarantee future generations. The ROK government lobbied against this clause and on June 15, 1965, the Japanese government conceded. Yet, on special conditions for the Mindan schools, the government refused to compromise, arguing that “miscellaneous” schools were equivalent to bridal schools: they were inferior and would depress

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23 In January 1965, there were seven Mindan Korean schools located in Tokyo, Osaka including the Baekdu Hagwon and the Keonguk School, Kyoto and Hokkaido (Mc Kee 2103, 39). However, Ikekami (1965, 91) quotes that there were four Mindan schools under “miscellaneous” accreditation, two “regular” schools and four unregistered schools in 1965.
mainstream Japanese education. In response, in April 1965 the ROK yielded on the exclusive accreditation for the *Mindan* schools and agreed to Japan’s terms on condition that the Japanese government shut down all the “North Korean communist” schools (McKee 2013, 38). However, it is important to note here that concerning *Zainichi* Koreans, the ROK President Syngman Rhee fundamentally embraced a “policy of abandonment” arguing that they were all Japan’s responsibility. Hence, from an anti-communist standpoint, he was eager to have *Chongryun’s* schools abolished, but he was also generally indifferent to the *Mindan* schools (Ozawa 1973, 450).

Following the signing of the Treaty, the ROK’s case against the *Chongryun* schools provided the Japanese government with a justification to bring *Chongryun’s* schools under government control. Hence, in preparation, the LDP and the MOE established respective committees. The LDP-led Foreign Education Subcommittee Meeting was created in March 1965 and in April 1966 the MOE established the Foreigner Education Liaison Board in alliance with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Public Security Intelligence Agency. Both committees worked under the pretense of reviewing education for all foreigners in Japan; however, it was clear the *Joseon* schools were the primary focus of the review as at the time, they comprised approximately 90% of all foreign schools (Pak 1966, 61).
The LDP Subcommittee convened eight times between March 26 and May 19, 1965. The subcommittee had 15 members, including LDP politicians, and personnel from MOE, MOFA, the National Police Agency, and the National Public Safety Commission. Fujishima and Ozawa (1966, 232) refer to the LDP committee members who belonged to the so-called security group in the LDP, as “pig-headed old men” of the old-guard. The committee chairman was Araki Masuo, who was notorious for his comment (mentioned previously) that denigrated Koreans and Africans. Other members included Aikawa Katsuroku, who had worked as a division chief in the wartime Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau and Tanaka Tatsuo, who, as the governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture (mentioned in the previous chapter) attempted to close the Joseon schools during the U.S. occupation (Mc Kee 2013, 42).

Rumors circulated about the teaching of hannichi dogma and training communist partisans in the Joseon schools (Pak 1966, 60) and in unison with the LDP and MOE committees, the media, and government journals criticized the Joseon schools. For example, in a July 1965 Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office periodical an article on the “Korean concern,” suggested that all Zainichi Koreans should naturalize and assimilate to prevent future ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, the article emphasized that Joseon schools were teaching communist ideologies and compromising Japan’s
security. Therefore, because MOE was incapable of controlling Chongryun education, it advocated closing the schools (Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office quoted in Egawa 2003, 122).

Correspondingly, the MOE’s Foreigner Education Liaison Board synchronized exclusively with the LDP Subcommittee and mulled the issue of permitting Koreans with permanent residence to enroll in Japanese schools on condition of no special treatment. However, the main issue on the agenda was a discussion about abolishing all accreditation to the Joseon schools. The reason given was the hannichi dogma taught in the schools which was creating a public security issue (Pak 1966, 60). Both committees agreed to file a submission to the Diet to revise sections of the School Education Law to include a clause on foreign schools. Fundamentally the revision and article on the foreign schools proposed:

- to revise the School Education Law and establish a Foreigners’ School System
- that foreign schools must “promote goodwill” with other countries, and not encumber Japan’s national interest and security
- that the MOE would have jurisdiction over the schools and have the authority to terminate accreditation when necessary
- that the MOE would have the right to inspect schools at any time, issue orders to change the curriculum, terminate classes or close schools if school administration failed to meet terms of accreditation
- that details regarding qualifications of principals and teachers, textbooks and curriculum must be submitted to the MOE
- to establish rules regarding tuition fees and student punishment
- to enforce penalties on schools that fail to comply (Kim 2004 201).
Changes in the law would have given the Japanese government the right to inspect and potentially close the Joseon schools at any time. However as documented in this chapter distinct from the DPRK, the schools were continually improving a hybrid ethnocentric curriculum, but to stay in operation required DPRK assistance. Anderson (1983, 12), argues that to understand concepts of nationalism the previous interaction of components in culture is more significant than the apparent dogmas. Hence, for the Joseon schools, beyond the links with the DPRK, ethnic education was created due to Japan’s colonial policies that caused disenfranchisement and cultural dispossessions. Prime Minister Satō Eisaku Satō too acknowledged that as former Japanese subjects, the circumstances for Koreans in Japan differed to other foreigners. Though in xenophobic debates in the Diet this fact was consistently disregarded. Instead, using the abstract term of “promoting goodwill,” the Joseon schools were accused of encumbering Japan’s national interest and security.

Preliminary preparations for the Foreigners’ School System Bill

Preparation for the Foreigners’ School System Bill by way of revising the School Education Law was initiated by the Minister of Education Fukuda Shigeru soon after Japan and the ROK signed the June 1965 Treaty. In December 1965, the minister
sent two official Tsūtatsu (notifications) to the prefectural governors. The first tsūtatsu (December 18) was titled “Notification regarding the Education of Korean Children in Japan” and advised that under Article IV in the Treaty, regarding mutual welfare and common interests, ROK citizens with permanent residence status would be permitted to enroll in Japanese elementary, junior- and senior-high schools\(^24\) (Ministry of Education, Monshozai 464. Tokyo, 1965). The second tsūtatsu (December 28) titled “Regarding the Handling of Educational Facilities for Koreans” informed prefectural governors that in agreement with the Japan/ROK Treaty the Japanese Government countenanced the enrolment of Koreans in Japanese schools. Moreover, Governors were advised that the teaching of ethnic nationalism in Japan was considered redundant and because Joseon municipal and prefectural branch schools were in violation of the Treaty, the relevant authorities were urged to inquire into Joseon school administrations and close the schools. Furthermore, to augment international “goodwill” in foreign school education, the Minister of Education announced that the government would explore the feasibility of a new comprehensive system for foreign schools (Ministry of Education, Bunkan 210. Tokyo, 1965).

Following the two tsūtatsu, five Joseon prefectural schools in Kanagawa, three

\(^{24}\) The same conditions for enrollment in Japanese schools applied to Chōsen- seki Koreans.
in Aichi, and eight in Hyogo became autonomous; but all prefectural governors continued to grant them “miscellaneous” accreditation. For example, nationwide, from 1953 to 1975 prefectural governors approved accreditation for 153 Joseon schools (Kim 2004, 186), and in 1966, following the tsūtatsu, there were 26 schools accredited in Miyagi, Gifu, Tochigi, Mie, Ibaraki, and Hiroshima. In sum, the prefectures ignored the MOE’s orders and continued to accredit the Joseon schools because at a community level people in regional areas approved of their neighborhood Joseon schools.

The second tsūtatsu did not implicate the Mindan schools that were now called Kankoku Gakkō, because in 1951 the Baekdu Hagwon in Osaka was accredited as a “regular” school and followed a Japanese curriculum. However, the remaining schools were generally accredited as “miscellaneous schools” with a curriculum recognized by the ROK government. Furthermore, Ikegami Tsutomu (1965, 91), who worked as a superintendent in the MOJ immigration bureau, wrote that the Kankoku Gakkō were not a concern for the Japanese government because in 1965 there were only four Mindan schools under “miscellaneous” accreditation, two “regular” schools and four unregistered schools. The teachers were sent from the ROK, and the curriculum in the Kankoku Gakkō was designed to assimilate Korean students into Japanese society. Moreover, in 1971, Ozawa (1973, 446) informs that there were three Mindan schools
and 1,324 students.

To promote the Foreigners’ School System Bill as nondiscriminatory, part of the groundwork was based on a comprehensive report titled “Survey on the Education of Foreign Children living in Foreign Countries” published in February 1966 and compiled in partnership with MOFA (Nihon Kyōiku-kai Kyōiku Seido Kenkyū Iinkai 1972, 83-132). The objective of the survey was to formulate a comprehensive policy on education for foreign children in Japan using overseas prototypes. The survey included 41 countries querying:

1) Are there any foreign schools?
2) Are the schools approved or registered by the state?
3) What are the laws on foreign schools?
4) What judicial office supervises the schools?
5) What types of schools are permitted?
6) What is the nationality of the principal(s)?
7) What are the nationalities of the teaching staff?
8) What are the qualifications of the teaching staff?
9) Are there any restrictions on the curriculums and/or textbooks?
10) What are the graduates’ qualifications?

The results: 35 countries participated in the survey. For state approval: 17 countries

25 North America: United States, Canada; South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia; Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, USSR, UK, Yugoslavia; Asia: Burma (sic), Ceylon (sic), Republic of China (Taiwan), Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan; Middle East and Africa: Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Ethiopia, South Africa; Oceania: Australia, New Zealand.
replied that foreign schools must be approved by the state, nine must be registered and seven had no requirements. Overall, the results varied from no requirements to some countries placing restrictions on the curriculum, three countries banned universities for foreigners, and Mexico banned foreign religious schools. Peru, Finland, and Thailand had the strictest policies on language, curriculum, and textbooks. However, there was no uniform response regarding restrictions on foreign schools (Nihon Kyōiku-kai Kyōiku Seido Kenkyū linkai 1972, 83-132). For the results of the survey in Appendix C.

At the time of this survey, all respondent countries had diplomatic relations with Japan. However, this 1966 survey failed to include the ROK, notwithstanding that after concluding the June 22, 1965, Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan, and the Republic of Korea, the two countries began diplomatic relations.

Subsequently, in April 1966 the public relations division in the MOE announced the establishment of a Foreigners’ School System to be incorporated into Article VII for “miscellaneous” schools in the existing School Education Law. The changes proposed including all foreign schools as “miscellaneous,” to safeguard the schools and promote “international goodwill” between Japan and other countries (Pak 1982, 286).

The outline for the 1966 FSS Bill is as follows:
1) In principle, the education of foreign children in Japan will be sanctioned.

2) To sanction the above, the Fundamental Law of Education will be revised, and a Foreign School System will be established.

3) For foreign children in Japan, Foreign Schools will be deemed legal when education institutions are administered by organizations and offer more than one year of education.

4) Education in Foreign Schools must promote understanding and friendly relations between Japan and foreign countries. The education in Foreign Schools must not impair Japan’s national interest or public security.

5) The MOE will be the monitoring agency for the Foreign Schools. The Minister of Education will have the right to permit the establishment of new schools and closures or changes to accreditation.

6) When the Foreign Schools do not meet the requirements for accreditation the Minister of Education has the right to order changes, suspension of lessons, and school closures. The Minister may also request reports on teaching and make inspections.

7) The headmasters of Foreign Schools must report when teachers are dismissed, the curriculum textbooks, and the school rules to the Ministry of Education.

8) For schools in operation, the prefectural governors will be responsible for managing applications to the new system.

9) Regulations on tuition fees and disciplinary action against students will be established.

10) Organizations established only to manage Foreign Schools will be permitted. All costs for the schools will be the responsibility of the schools.

11) Violation of suspension or closure orders will be punished. Failure to report changes will be punished.

12) This system will be enforced six months after it becomes law. After it becomes law schools in operation will be given one year to comply (Pak 1966, 61).

For the Joseon schools, the conditions in the Foreigners’ School System Bill would have given the Japanese Government jurisdiction to regulate the curricula contents and legally close the schools. Furthermore, the interpretation of the Treaty’s Article IV in the bill – for “promoting understanding and friendly relations between Japan and foreign
countries and Japan’s upholding Japan’s national interest or public security” – was very ambiguous and open to many interpretations.

Subsequently, as a component of revising Article VII in the School Education Law on “miscellaneous” schools, the Foreigners’ School System Bill was submitted to the Diet twice in April 1966 and again in July 1967. Theoretically, in context with Zainichi Korean education, the LDP contended the bill was supposed to finalize agreements in the 1965 Treaty with the ROK. However, the LDP campaigned to marginalize and exercise strict control over Joseon schools by exploiting the term hannichi in the name of “national security” and “national interest.” Yet, in the Diet, the LDP’s attempts to pass the bill failed, due to intense opposition by the Japanese Socialist Party and the JCP (Lee & DeVos 1981, 177).

Chongryun’s stance

First, due to the Japanese Government’s failure to recognize the sovereignty of the DPRK, the Chongryun regarded the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea as antagonistic, oppressive, and as an unethical evasion of past transgressions. Moreover, following the signing of the Treaty, Pak (1982, 283-285) declared the treatment against Chongryun Koreans became more racist and this was most evident in the domain of education. As an example, Pak notes the appointment of
the former Minister of Education Araki Matsuo (who had publicly denigrated Koreans in 1961) to the LDP-led Foreign Education Subcommittee.

The revisions of the School Education Law as a component of the Foreigners’ School System Bill were interpreted by Chongryun Koreans as a violation of their civil rights as foreigners and ethnic education liberties. The Chongryun accused the MOE Foreigner Education Liaison Board, which worked in alliance with the MOJ, the MOFA, and the Public Security Agency, of being biased to falsely incriminate the Joseon schools as hannichi, “anti-American,” and “communist red” (Kim 2004, 198-199). As far as Chongryun was concerned, with no concrete evidence, the use of abstract terms such as hannichi education, and compromising Japan’s “national interest” served only the Japanese Government’s determination to close the Joseon schools.

In response to the impending bill, on April 9, 1966, the Chongryun issued a formal statement titled “The Japanese Government must guarantee Zainichi Koreans the Right to Ethnic Education.” In the statement, Chongryun quoted a March 29, 1966, Asahi newspaper article pointing out Japan’s double standard on ethnic education for Japanese in Brazil who like Zainichi Koreans were a minority. The heading read: “Preserving the Japanese Language: Adult Japanese in the Homeland are saddened to see Japanese Children in Brazil forgetting their Mother Tongue, Japanese" (Fujishima
The DPRK interpreted the Foreigners’ School System Bill as another attempt by the Japanese government to expunge Korean ethnic education. On April 16, 1966, the DPRK Foreign Affairs division issued a statement titled “Issues related to Suppression against Ethnic Education” which stressed two points: first, due to colonial transgressions, Japan was legally responsible for supporting Korean ethnic education and second, Chongryun Koreans as DPRK Overseas Citizens had a sovereign right to ethnic education. The statement went on to challenge the Satō Government’s accusations that the Joseon schools were hannichi, harmful to Japan’s “national interest,” and a “national security threat” (Fujishima and Ozawa 1966, 258-259).

Furthermore, in April 1967 the Chongryun Zainichi Korean Ethnic Education Board issued a statement stating that against a backdrop of unrelenting racism against Koreans, the oppression against ethnic education was deliberate and under international law, the Foreigners’ School System Bill was an infringement of universal rights to ethnic education. Chongryun claimed that the Japanese Government’s claims against ethnic education were simply a pretext to enforce a security law against Koreans while attempting to assimilate them once again (Kim 2004, 201-202). From Chongryun’s perspective, the Foreigners’ School System Bill was not just Japanese suppression of the
Joseon schools but a Cold-War strategy against the DPRK because closing the Joseon schools was integrally copied into the Japan-ROK Treaty.

The accreditation of Korea University

Korea University first opened in 1956, and reopened in Kodaira, Tokyo on June 13, 1959, on a 66,000-meter plot with four new buildings. Accordingly, the university applied for “miscellaneous” accreditation for tax-exemption, teaching-aid concessions, and student discounted commuter passes (Lee & De Vos 1981, 173-174). Hence, in a hand of fate, while the debates over the Foreigners’ School System Bill raged the first two submissions to the Diet in 1966 and 1967 were shelved, and the accreditation of Korea University became a decisive factor in the success or failure of the bill after 1968. Due to lobbying by the Japan Socialist Party, Japanese political parties, labor unions, various civic organizations, and citizens’ movements who saw the university as the mainstay of Korean ethnic education, on April 22, 1966, the application was accepted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.

Previously, between 1959 and 1966, opposition by the Japanese Government, the LDP, the MOE, right-wing groups, and the Mindan, the Tokyo Government had blocked the university’s application for gaining “miscellaneous” status. For example, in a consistent effort to block accreditation, the MOE issued two tsūtatsu on November 29,
1965, titled, “Regarding the Accreditation of Korea University” and the “Procedures Regarding Withholding Accreditation for New Joseon Schools” (Kim 2004, 204-206). Moreover, the MOE Minister Kennoki Toshihiro implied that even if the university gained accreditation by the Tokyo Government should the Foreigners’ School System Bill became law, it would be revoked (Lee 1981, 176).

The LDP’s argument against accrediting Korea University was based on the conditions of the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education, which according to the LDP had been formulated exclusively for the benefit of Japanese education to nurture Japanese identities and develop academic skills (Liberal Democratic Party 1971, 82). Again, the LDP linked teachings of Chongryun’s patriotic ideology at Korea University with problems for national security. Therefore, the LDP emphasized that the government required an appropriate law to regulate education for foreigners and that the Tokyo Government should wait until the Fundamental Law of Education became law (Lee 1981, 178).

To block accreditation, in September 1967 for edifying LDP members about Korea University, the LDP and the LDP Public Relations Bureau stepped up its campaign against accreditation by circulating five booklets exclusively within the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party 1971, 72). The booklets of similar content demonstrate how
the LDP in connection with the Foreigners’ School System Bill applied the concept of “national interest” and “national security” to prevent Korea University accreditation. First, a summary: the first booklet, “The Perilous Education at the Self-styled Korean University” begins with this disclaimer: “due to issues linked to accreditation of Korea University, texts and notebooks are not accessible to the public.” Concerning transparency and access to Korea University documents, realistically, due to the LDP’s opposition to the university, it is improbable the university would have released this information to the LDP. However, at the same time accreditation procedures may have prohibited the literature from being circulated to the public. The first booklet creates an image of Korea University students as revolutionary militants loyal only to the DPRK through Kim Il-sung and Marxism-Leninism ideologies who abhor America and Japan. Introducing the curriculum as thus: Basics of Marxism-Leninism, Introduction to Marxism-Leninism Classics, Communist Declaration, Lenin’s Collected Works, State, and the History of Modern Korean Revolutionary Movements, the History of Korean Liberation Movements, Complete Collection of Kim Il-sung’s Works, Memories of Anti-Japanese Partisans, the Rodong Newspaper, and the Chosun Sinbo (Liberal Democratic Party 1971, 74).

The second booklet, “Education at the Self-styled Korean University” also
begins with a disclaimer of there being insufficient evidence, and similar to the first writes that the university is the pinnacle institution in the Chongryun School system, conducts ethnic education based on Kim Il-sung and Marxism-Leninism philosophies.

The third booklet, “The Curriculum at the Chongryun schools – the reality of Anti-Japanese Education” explained that the graduates of Korea University taught in the Joseon schools, or work in Chongryun umbrella organizations. Furthermore, university students are obedient only to the DPRK and Chongryun to oppose the Japan/ROK Treaty and support ROK communist movements.

The fourth booklet, “Why Korea University cannot be Approved – Our Thoughts and Problems,” lamented over the lack of appropriate laws to supervise the education of foreign children in Japan. Problematic for Japan, it noted first, that the Chongryun chairman Han Deok-su had inappropriately stated that Chongryun had created the first global example of a comprehensive DPRK system from elementary school to university when “miscellaneous” accredited schools were essentially just hairdressing, cooking, and tea ceremony school standards. Second, in the absence of diplomatic relations between Japan and the communist state, Korea University was a beneficiary of DPRK guidance and financial support. Third, students were nurtured to be proud DPRK Overseas Citizens and ethnic cadres taught to abhor their enemies, such
as the American puppet Park Chung-hee, and condemn the Japan-ROK Basic Relations Treaty (Liberal Democratic Party 1971, 82-83).

The final booklet from the LDP Public Relations Committee, “Problems Concerning Accrediting Korea University,” reiterated information in the fourth booklet and from a legal perspective attempted to justify why the university should not be accredited (Liberal Democratic Party 1971, 72).

The above literature was not made available to the public and articulates the LDP’s united position on the Joseon schools. Due to considerable civic support for the accreditation of the Korea University and ethnic education (to be discussed next), it is feasible that this literature was circulated because the LDP needed to create a cohesive ideological argument against the schools. Hence, by focusing on the political persuasion of the Korea University over ethnic education the LDP constructed an image of the Joseon schools as a microcosm of the DPRK. The two major arguments presented here are the frequently reiterated intangible argument regarding the teaching of hannichi ideologies and compromising “national interest.”

Contrary to the opposition to Korea University’s accreditation by LDP and other right-wing organizations, pockets of Japanese society displayed significant support for Korean ethnic education. Many people did not agree with Korea
University’s political persuasion but understood that the university was crucial in the *Joseon* school system to provide ethnic education and cultivate positive ethnic identities (Lee & DeVos 1981, 180). Consequently, on June 23, 1966, the Kodaira city council, where the university was situated, and on November 10, 1966, the Tokyo prefectural council, voted unanimously to support accreditation (Lee & DeVos 1981, 176). Furthermore, in 1967 some 3,000 eminent Japanese including Professor Ōuchi Hyōe, economist and former dean at Hosei University, and other intellectuals, people involved in Japan-DPRK cultural exchange and Japanese teachers signed a petition in support of the university (Kim 2004, 204).

Subsequently, on August 6, 1967, the Tokyo Government submitted the case to the Tokyo Private School Council and its decisions were reported on April 6, 1968. The council recognized that Korea University did have sufficient financial resources and educational facilities to operate as a university. However, the general tone of the report was evasive and failed to recommend accreditation. In response, from a legal perspective, five faculty of law academics advocated the university as a candidate for accreditation. Decisively, the Tokyo Governor and economics academic and socialist Minobe Ryūkichi did not advocate ethnic education rights but granted accreditation to the university on the basis of Japan’s constitution’s statutory laws (Lee & De Vos 1981,
The accreditation of Korea University did indeed work against the LDP’s Foreigners’ School System Bill. It had already failed submissions in 1966 and 1967 and on December 5, 1967, the Minister for Education Nadao Hirokichi announced that for the sake of friendship with Japan, the ROK Government had requested the Joseon schools be closed. Hence, in correlation with the provisions in the Treaty, a separate Foreigners’ School System Bill would be submitted to the Diet in 1968 (Inamoto 1968, 101). Under the premise of promoting international goodwill, and Japan’s “national interests,” the bill was officially submitted on March 1, 1968 (Nihon Kyōiku-kai Kyōiku Seido Kenkyū linkai 1970, 65) (see Appendix D for a summary of the Bill). Between 1968 and 1972 the bill was debated sporadically and in 1972, it was passed in the Lower House of Representatives and submitted to the House of Councilors; however, it again failed to pass (Ozawa 1973, 509). Between 1966 and 1972 the bill was submitted seven times before being finally scrapped (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, 2019). Like the public support for Korea University accreditation, there was considerable opposition to the Foreigners’ School System Bill across Japanese society. For example, an intense lobby in support of the Joseon schools consisted of all opposition parties, over 3,000 or more civil groups including the Japan-DPRK
Friendship Association, the Nikkyosō (Japan Teachers’ Union), the Japan Senior High School Teachers Union, Labor Unions and a collection of 5,300 signatures from academics, educators, intellectuals, and lawyers. In Kyoto, Osaka, and Fukuoka prefectural assemblies and 180 local assemblies communicated their resolutions and recommendations to the Japanese National Government in support of the Joseon schools. Furthermore in 34 prefectures and 66 regions organizations formed to voice their support for ethnic education (Pak 1982, 300).

If the Foreigners’ School System Bill had passed, it would have given the Minister of Education a pretext for deciding which country’s education was in Japan’s “national interest” (Ozawa 1973, 518). Furthermore, it would have given the MOE the power to approve teachers, investigate school administration and curricula, and license or close schools. In sum, it would have given the Minister of Education unlimited power over Joseon schools in Japan (Lee & DeVos 1982, 174).

Conclusion

In the 1970s due to a reliance on heavy industries and Juche principles in agriculture, the DPRK economy reportedly grew at an average of 16% per annum
In this milieu, the DPRK government could generously fund Chongryun schools. For example, in 1975, aid from the DPRK to the Joseon schools peaked when it sent 3.7 billion yen (Kōrai Hakubutsukan 2014, 14). Thus, in the early years, under Chongryun 50% of the education budget was contingent on DPRK financial support (Lee & De Vos 1981, 170). For this aid, the Chongryun was indebted and with insufficient education resources, was dependent on the DPRK for some curriculum guidance.

However, until the early 1970s contact between Chongryun and DPRK educators was limited and this lack of contact further reduced the use of original DPRK textbooks. Therefore, the Japan-focused curriculum was designed to advance the welfare of Zainichi Koreans, and DPRK ideology was tailored to unite, rather than indoctrinate. In other words, through written technology, the curriculum and school system created a hybrid space, wherein Anderson’s (1983, 46) words, a “fatal diversity of a human language created the possibility of [an] imagined community.”

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in 1959 Japan agreed that parents are responsible for choices in their children’s education when it ratified Article 7 in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Moreover, the government
recognized equal education for all people in Article 26 in Japan’s constitution. However, against a background of Cold War politics, after Korean repatriation to the DPRK decreased, from 1961 the Japanese government once again assumed a critical stance against the Joseon schools. With dubious evidence, using abstract terms stereotypes of the Joseon schools resurfaced. Moreover, imitating the United States’ anti-communist stance, both Japan and the ROK disregarded equal opportunity in education. Instead, both countries embroiled the Joseon schools in Cold-War politics by slating the Foreigners’ School System Bill (Inamoto 1968, 101-102). To pass the Bill, abstract terms in Article IV in the Japan/ ROK Treaty relating to education promoting mutual relations, mutual welfare, and common interests were applied against the schools (Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea 2018). In reality, the Bill was no about education but a politically motivated security bill to suppress the Joseon schools (Pak 1966, 60).

Ultimately, the Bill was unsuccessful, because the public realized the importance of ethnic education over bureaucratic prejudice. The supporters came from two factions, first people, who acknowledged Japan was politically accountable for invading Korea; and second, people who opposed the abstract concept of “national interests” to close the schools (Ozawa 1973, 520). The significant public opposition to
the Bill is a good example of the sentiments of the time when there was still considerable support for the *Joseon* schools.

While the case of the Iejima *Joseon* School in the Seto Inland Sea is an anomaly, it is a good illustration of autonomy and political negotiation in the hybrid space between Japan and the DPRK. Furthermore, it should be noted here that in context with hybridity there were many Japanese women married to *Zainichi* Koreans who sent their children to the *Joseon* schools. This factor and the case of the Iejima *Joseon* School demonstrate how in regional Japan the schools were very much a part of Japan’s social fabric. The question that remains is, would the trajectory of Korean ethnic education in Japan have changed if the ROK had acknowledged the *Joseon* schools as a postcolonial discourse rather than a Cold-War discourse?
CHAPTER IV

Cultural Translation: the Joseon schools, a Break from the DPRK amid Lingering Cold War images: Exclusion from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program

(1972-2019)

Many parents want to send their children to Joseon schools but find the images of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il too political. Hence, if we want to welcome students from the ROK we need to change. The present situation is critical and if we want a future, we must acknowledge that change is inevitable and adapt to accommodate our community’s needs (NHK 2003).

These comments were made by the headmaster at East Osaka Joseon Junior-high-school Bu Yeon-uk to the Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) in 2003 following the DPRK’s 2002 revelation that it was responsible for kidnapping Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.

Introduction

The previous chapter analyzed the 1955-1972 period when the Joseon schools, with DPRK assistance, established an ethnic education system to accommodate a dynamic Zainichi community. On the other hand, cheered on by the ROK government, the Japanese government chose not to recognize the need for ethnic education and using
the Japan/ROK Treaty as a pretext, attempted to legislate the Foreigners’ School System Bill against the Joseon schools.

In the context of cultural translation and a continuing trend against incorporating DPRK ideology, this analysis will document change over the second (1974-1977), third (1993-1995), and fourth (2003-2005) curricula. Ramos (2013, 5) explains that cultural translation is a double process of “decontextualization and reconceptualization” where people freely choose what disciplines they will translate. As demonstrated in previous chapters the Joseon school curriculum as part of the “Third Space” has consistently regenerated and evolved as a “cultural hybrid” in a milieu of change, political negotiation, exchanges, and translation to produce something new. Furthermore, the curriculum challenges the binary of colonizer and colonized, and socio-political complexities within Japan. Sweeping statements on the Joseon schools have fossilized stereotypes and fail to consider that change is a normal process. For example, Rohlen (1981, 206) professes that the curriculum in the Joseon schools is “patterned closely on North Korean educational practices” and that “the textbooks come from North Korea.” Okano (2011, 102) states that until recently the curriculum has supported the Pyongyang regime because most Chongryun Koreans expect to return to a united Korea.
By the 1990s second- and third-generation Koreans were self-identifying as Zainichi Koreans rather than DPRK overseas nationals. These younger generations were resolved to live in Japan and, to a degree, to integrate into Japan’s social and cultural framework. Consequently, to retain students and accommodate their unique circumstances, the school community acknowledged that reform was inevitable. In this period “democratic education” is often used as jargon to explain curricula changes. The meaning of “democratic” is generally not clarified. Though in a community petition to be discussed in this chapter “democratic” is defined as a consolidation of the curriculum, textbooks, teacher training, school administration, and the acquisition of human rights.

However, despite changes in the schools, against a background of lingering Cold War discourses, the Joseon schools have been excluded from the 2009 High-School Tuition Waiver Program, and the Japanese Government has exclusively deliberated with the abductee issue, Chongryun, and sanctions against the DPRK.

**Background**

*Chongryun*’s public profile as the DPRK’s de facto embassy in Japan began to deteriorate significantly following the October 9, 1983 bombing in Rangoon, Burma

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1 On October 9 in Rangoon, Burma, DPRK agents attempted to assassinate the ROK President Chun Chun Doo-hwan, killing 17 senior ROK officials and journalists.
by DPRK agents, and the fatal November 29, 1987, Korean Air Lines incident.\(^2\) Furthermore, in connection with the 1989 *Pachinko Giwaku*\(^3\) in Japan’s House of Representatives on October 17, 1989, *Chongryun* was referred to as a “dangerous organization,” and on October 20 a “severe threat to Japanese security” (Oh 2015, 159). Subsequently, *Chongryun* branches were inundated with threatening phone calls, became targets of hate-speech, and students at the *Joseon* schools were attacked (Oh 2015, 158-159). Between April and June 1994 there were approximately 1,206 cases of hate speech, physical violence, and other forms of intimidation, such as the slashing of female *chima chogori* uniforms (Nada 1995, 287).

The organization faced yet a greater crisis following Kim Jong-il’s 2002 confession of abducting Japanese citizens, which shattered *Chongryun*'s unity and instigated unprecedented internal turmoil. The organization was weakened as members dropped out, assumed ROK citizenship, and transferred their children to Japanese schools. Some also joined religious organizations to cope with the guilt they now shouldered over the abductions. Furthermore, those who stayed in *Chongryun* publicly voiced their dissatisfaction and demanded that the organization immediately initiate

\(^2\) When two DPRK agents carrying Japanese passports – Kim Hyun-hee and Kim Seung-il detonated the Korean the aircraft over the Andaman Sea.

\(^3\) The Japanese government accused pachinko parlors run by *Chongryun* members of financing the DPRK nuclear program.
fundamental reform to retain its membership.

For the first time since the establishment of Chongryun, the public expressions of internal dissension against the DPRK and Chongryun were momentous. Moreover, Chongryun members reached out to the abductee’s families and apologized for the group’s reiteration of the DPRK’s stance of denial on the abduction issue. For example, in a 2003 NHK interview, the chairman of the Kashiwada East Chongryun branch, Geo Geo-geon, contritely acknowledged that he had naively deceived the Japanese people and other Chongryun members for trusting in Chongryun’s stance on the abductee issue. Moreover, the 37-year-old chairman of the Chongryun Kosaka Branch, Baek Seong-bo, met with the abductee’s families and later declared that:

the DPRK does not have the authority to tell Zainichi Koreans how to think and act because we are residents of Japan and this is our home. I believe that Zainichi Koreans should be independent of the DPRK (NHK 2003).

However, despite calls for change in context with Chongryun’s declining public profile and the abductee issue, Chongryun became embroiled in Japanese sanctions against the DPRK.

Following the launch of seven DPRK missiles on July 5, 2006, into the East Sea/Sea of Japan, to pressure the DPRK government to cooperate in the abduction investigations, the Japanese government strengthened the imposed economic sanctions against the DPRK. The sanctions were regarded as a “diplomatic red card” against the
DPRK and, due to widespread public anger, received bipartisan backing (Miyamoto 2006 44-46). The sanctions prevented the DPRK ship *Man Gyong Bong* 92 from entering Japan, banned visits by DPRK government officials, and declined authorization for DPRK charter flights from landing. Furthermore, to prevent weapon development, the government froze DPRK deposits and withdrawals, and the overseas remittance licenses of 15 bilateral groups and one individual. After October 13, 2006, Japan prohibited port entry to all DPRK ships (Miyamoto 2006 22).

Against the background of the Japanese Government-prompted Cold War discourses used to justify Japan’s national interest and security. Again, using Bhabha's hypothesis of the Third Space, this chapter will focus on adjustment in the *Joseon* schools between 1972 and 2019 through “cultural translation” and a distancing from the DPRK. This chapter is divided into two sections. First, using *Joseon* school textbooks, and *Chongryun* literature, the study documents DPRK involvement, cultural translation in the curriculum, and lobbying for social inclusion. Second, using primary sources such as the Japanese Diet Minutes, audiovisuals, *Chongryun* secondary sources, and

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4 The laws did not require UN resolutions or support. The framework for sanctions was the 2004 revised Foreign Exchange Trade Control Law (FEFTCL) and the 2004 enacted Interdiction of Port Entry by Specific Ships (LSMCIPRESS) (Miyamoto 2006 24).

5 The ship *Man Gyong Bong* 92 was built in 1992 from *Chongryun* community donations and until Japan banned its entry in 2006 it mainly transported *Zainichi* Koreans and cargo between Wonsan in the DPRK and Niigata in Japan. Furthermore, the ship was symbolic because it fostered a closer connection between *Chongryun* Koreans and the homeland, DPRK.
newspaper articles the study analyzes how *Joseon* schools as foreign schools were embroiled in the government’s public security debate in context with the abductee issue and sanctions against the DPRK to exclude the schools from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program.

This chapter considers two primary questions: How in the context of domestic and international politics, the curriculum in the *Joseon* schools evolved to cater to *Zainichi* Korean needs; and how the Japanese government continued to use the allegedly impartial High-school Tuition Waiver Program to use Japan and DPRK diplomatic issues as cause for discriminating against the *Joseon* schools? Table 4.1 is a timeline of events that affected the trajectory of the *Joseon* schools between 1970 and 2014.
Table 4.1 Timeline 1970-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Private School Education and Research Grant issued to Joseon schools in Tokyo (December)</td>
<td>Osaka Mindan school Konko Gakuin accredited as a “regular school.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Japanese Govt. abolishes nationality clause in the national health insurance scheme (April)</td>
<td>*Kobe Joseon school admitted to the NHK All-Japan School Choir Competition (June) *Pachinko giswaku – Korean students attacked (Oct-Dec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Japanese Govt. Announcement of Special Permanent Residence Status for all Korean decedents of colonial residents of Japan (January)</td>
<td>*Japan High School Baseball Federation agrees to admit Kanagawa Joseon High school (May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Amendments in Alien Registration Law and special permanent residents exempt from fingerprinting (January)</td>
<td>All Japan High School Athletic Federation admits “miscellaneous” and vocational schools (May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Japan Govt. ratifies the UN Rights of the Child convention</td>
<td>*Railways issues discounted commuter passes to Korean students (April) *DPRK Nuclear tests, Joseon school female students’ chima chogori uniforms slashed (April-July)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1993 | Japan Federation of Bar Associations submits a recommendation to Prime Minister on ethnic education rights (February) | |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1995 | Japanese Govt. Agrees to fund rebuilding for all foreign schools following the 1995 Hanshin Earthquake (February) | |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1998 | Japan Federation of Bar Associations submits a recommendation to Prime Minister on ethnic education rights (February) | |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2000 | ROK- DPRK Summit (June) | |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Japan- DPRK Pyongyang Declaration (September)</td>
<td>Slashing of chima chogori uniforms following Kim Jong-il’s confession to kidnapping Japanese citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>*Japan Govt. MEXT grants tax incentives to “Western” and International schools. *Japan Gov. MEXT authorizes foreign school graduates to apply for Japanese National Universities (Joseon schools included in special screening)</td>
<td>Asian schools denied tax incentives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2004 | Korea University students permitted to sit for the National Bar Exam | |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Revision to Fundamental Education Law (December)</td>
<td>DPRK missile tests. Rise in hate speech against Chongryun and Joseon school students’ DPRK experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2009 | An attack against Kyoto Joseon School by the Zaitokukai (December). | |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Japan Govt. Excludes Joseon schools from the National Tuition Waiver Program (March)</td>
<td>Osaka, Hiroshima, Aichi, and Fukuoka Joseon schools sue the Japanese Government for exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program. (January)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2013 | | |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2014 | Tokyo Joseon school trial begins (February) | |}

(Kōrai Hakubutsukan 2014, 44-45; Zai Nihon 2006, 61).

**Cultural translation and the Joseon schools**

The preceding chapter analyzed Chongryun’s first standardized curriculum in 1963 and previous endeavors coordinating with the DPRK to foster DPRK Overseas
Korean identities in preparation for repatriation to the DPRK (Song 2012:142). The analysis also established that despite a reliance on the DPRK, practical issues in the context of limited contact with DPRK educators and the incompatibility of reproducing DPRK texts in Japan facilitated a hybrid curriculum including Japanese language classes, incorporating Chinese characters, and topics to accommodate Zainichi Koreans. The following analysis of the three curriculums since 1974 will document transformation following the challenges the Foreigners’ School System Bill inflicted on the Joseon schools. Furthermore, the main changes between 1972 and 2019 were a consequence of generational change and external events that have prompted a gradual break away from the DPRK.

**Second curriculum (1974-1977)**

The second curriculum was introduced in April 1977\(^6\) and compiled in recognition of third-generation Japan-born Zainichi Koreans who now considered Japan their “home.” After the Foreigners’ School System Bill was shelved in 1972, the schools continued to benefit from DPRK subsidies, but, as a safeguard measure, chose to assume a lower public profile. For example, Rohlen (1981, 205-206) writes that

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\(^6\) Revised again in the 1980s.
Japanese leftist academics were rarely granted visits to the schools and university
anymore, and he, as an American (considered the DPRK’s greatest enemy), was not
welcomed by the schools. Therefore, due to this self-imposed isolation, the
information on this curriculum relies on secondary sources published after 1980 when
the Chongryun began seeking a more positive public profile mainly in context with
accreditation and public subsidies.

Regarding DPRK involvement in the curriculum, it is conceivable that in the
1970s the DPRK had more influence due to the schools’ increased contact with the
DPRK. This followed the issuance of re-entry permits for family travel to the DPRK
from March 1972 and cultural exchange for Joseon school students from August 1972
(Jeong, 2011, 37). Furthermore, DPRK intervention increased significantly after 1983
when Chongryun educators began visiting Pyongyang every summer for curriculum
guidance. This contact transformed into a focus on the Kim Il-sung cult, across the
overall curriculum and in particular the national language Korean (Gugeo), history
(Yeogsa), and revolutionary history (Ryang 1997, 55). The main revisions in the second
curriculum were the additions of Social Studies (Sahoe) and Japanese language
education (Song 2012: 143). Here follows an analysis of the second curriculum.

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7 Prior to 1972 when the Foreigners’ School System Bill was shelved there was more frequent contact
between Chongryun and Japanese academics.
The Social Studies syllabus was designed to better prepare Zainichi Koreans for life in Japan and to interpret global, regional, and ethnic history (Byeon, and Chon 1988, 186). Lessons generally focussed on the link between the fatherland DPRK and Zainichi Koreans and the year 6, year 9 and year 11 texts incorporated Japan’s role in world politics, economics, and culture. Furthermore, DPRK and ROK politics, economics and culture, Zainichi political movements, and the DPRK’s commitment to unification were incorporated in year 10, and “world history of thought” and Juche\(^8\) were taught in year 12 (Byeon, and Chon 1988, 186).

In Japanese language classes, the first Japanese textbook written by Chongryun educators was introduced in 1969 and this gave students a chance to interpret and express their DPRK Overseas Citizen identity in the Japanese language (Ryang 1997, 55). Subsequently, from 1982, so students could speak and write “Japanese style Japanese,” Chongryun educators addressed the importance of raising the level of students’ Japanese language proficiency to the equivalency of students in Japanese schools. Teaching hours in the elementary curriculum were increased from 709 to 897 hours, in the junior high from 315 to 525 hours, and in the senior high from 265 to 400 hours. Moreover, the overall syllabus included 60-85% of Japanese literary

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\(^8\) DPRK philosophy for life ideology.
works from well-known Japanese novelists, authors, playwrights, and poets (*Urihakkyo o Tsuzuru kai* 2007, 137). From year 9 to year 12 Japanese classics, such as The Tale of the Bamboo Cutter, *Tsurezuregusa*, *Heike Monogatari*, Matsuo Bashō’s The Narrow Road to the Deep North, and Other Travel Sketches, *Man’yōshū waka*, Chinese Analects, Mencius, Laozi, and Han Feizi were incorporated (Byeon, and Chon 1988, 192-193).

See Table 4.2 for Japanese writers and poets incorporated in the curriculum (Byeon, and Chon 1988, 192).

**Table 4.2 Japanese writers and poets in the curriculum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Junior High</th>
<th>Senior High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kawasaki Daiji (Proletariat children’s writer)</td>
<td>Miyazawa Kenji (Novelist)</td>
<td>Kunikida Doppo (Meiji Period Novelist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muku Hatojū (Children’s writer)</td>
<td>Akutagawa Ryūnosuke (Writer)</td>
<td>Ishikawa Takuboku (Meiji “free-style” poet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitahara Hakušū (Poet)</td>
<td>Sōseki Natsume (Novelist)</td>
<td>Shimazaki Tōson (Meiji/Taisho and early Showa romantic poet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinoshita Junji (Playwright)</td>
<td>Shiga Naoya (Novelist)</td>
<td>Mori Ogai (Meiji/Taisho Army surgeon/translator/poet/novelist)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another important aspect of these language classes and the overall curriculum was the steps taken to improve Chinese character literacy. For example, following MEXT’s guidelines (for Japanese schools), the 1945 *Jōyō kanji* characters were incorporated with
The teaching of Korean (*Gugeo*), again was closely associated with fostering a Korean identity but catered more closely to the students’ needs as *Zainichi* Koreans. By 1974, former criticism against reproducing DPRK Korean texts was taken to heart; and educators advocated teaching Korean as a foreign, rather than an ethnic language with the goal of their attaining the required 9,000 words over their 12 years of education\(^9\) (Byeon, and Chon 1988, 185). Therefore, to improve the students’ poor speaking skills, the subject “speaking” (*malhagi*) was introduced from years 1-6 and narratives by north and south Koreans, *Zainichi* writers on pre-war and modern topics were added (Pak 2012, 736).

Fundamentally, the history (*yeogsa*) syllabus was designed to reinforce Korean identity by teaching Korea’s 5,000-year history. In the elementary grades, to promote patriotism, Korean historical personages and unique facts about Korea were taught. For example, in the texts, the world’s oldest observatory *Cheomseongdae*\(^{10}\) and the world’s first printing machine, the Korean *Jikji*,\(^{11}\) were introduced (Byeon, and Chon 1988,

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\(^9\) Daily conversation requires a knowledge of 3,000 words.

\(^{10}\) In Gyeongju

\(^{11}\) Invented in 1377.
The junior-high-school syllabus began with Korea’s primitive period and ended with the 1919 March First Independence Movement. Furthermore, the senior-high-school syllabus reflected changes in DPRK autonomous historical research and incorporated the five stages of Marxist Stage Theory – Primitive Communism, Imperialism, Feudalism, Capitalism, and Socialism/Communism. However, the syllabus was still very much dominated by a DPRK perspective. In fact, Kang (2010, 226) points out that with a concentration of topics on colonial liberation and Cold War ideologies it failed to teach a diverse perspective on North-East Asian politics and cultural exchanges.

The subjects of art and music were as before designed to reinforce Korean identity. Moreover, beyond DPRK revolutionary genres, to promote international understanding, it included discussions on Beethoven, Chopin, Mozart, Tchaikovsky, and in art Leonardo da Vinci, Monet, and Renoir.

However, in the overall curriculum, incorporating DPRK revolutionary and ideology genres proved to be problematic, and it is said to have decreased students’ motivation. Not only were the topics inappropriate for life in Japan, but the history and ideologies of the Worker’s Party of Korea (Joseon Rodongdang) and the country’s leaders were considered as overly repetitive. For example, in the Japanese and English
texts, even if the students did not understand the subject matter, they could guess the meaning because they had learned the revolutionary jargon in other classes (Urihakkyo Tsuzuru kai 2007, 136). Therefore, in response to community, parents, and teachers’ criticism, and in consideration of the lifestyles of Zainichi Koreans, at the Chongryun’s 1986 14th national convention, a ten-year strategy to create a more innovative curriculum (Urihakkyo o Tsuzuru kai 2007, 136).

**Third curriculum (1993-1997)**

The third curriculum to be discussed here coincided with further generational change as many students were now third-generation Zainichi Koreans who regarded Japan as their “home.” Chongryun was still in close contact with educators in the DPRK, but changes signified a further distancing from the DPRK core curriculum. Again, this curriculum focussed on nurturing ethnic pride, and through 30 new texts, it introduced more wide-ranging topics separate to Chongryun and DPRK ideologies (Ryang 1997, 56). The slogan for this curriculum was, “education to promote ethnic awareness and international understanding” (Urihakkyo o Tsukuru Kai 2007, 139).

Previously Chongryun educators had relied heavily on DPRK for guidance in compiling the Korean syllabus. However, in the third curriculum, for the first time, the
syllabus was designed and written exclusively by Zainichi Koreans (Urihakkyo o Tsukuru Kai 2007, 139). In new changes for Korean, considerable class hours were allocated to teaching language construct, accent, reading, listening, vocabulary, writing, and composition to ensure language fluency by the end of 12 years of education. Moreover, in senior high school, a subject called Bilingual Training was introduced as an elective.

The new history syllabus still taught Korea’s rich 5,000-year history to instill ethnic pride and acquaint the students with Korean culture, traditions, historical Korean figures, and the role Korea played in transmitting culture to neighboring countries. However, for the first time, in a break away from DPRK dominance to accommodate Zainichi Korean children whose ancestors originated from the southern areas of Korea, lessons incorporated the Goguryeo Kingdom of the north, the southern kingdoms of Baekje, Silla, the Gaya Confederacy, and accounts of notable politicians in the Joseon Kingdom (Kang 2010, 227).

The Japanese language syllabus was designed to accommodate Koreans as native Japanese speakers, and teaching hours were extended by 120 hours per year. Moreover, except for the of lessons titled Chōsen’s East Sea in year 2 (Pak 1997, 247), a Korean children’s story “My brother from Korea” (Pak 1997, 253), or “A Visit to the
Chōson Sinbo” in year 6 (Pak 1997, 254), Japanese authors dominated the syllabus, including renowned writers like the translator Uchida’s Risako’s Russian children’s story “The Giant Turnip” or the famous proletarian literary Kawasaki Daiji’s “Friend’s on the Swing” (Pak 1997, 244-245).

As for other subjects, teaching hours for English language classes were increased by 40 hours. Moreover, to encourage students to think from a global angle, the syllabus included compositions written by native speakers and extra time was allocated for conversation practice (Pak 1997, 198-200). The music and art, syllabi were built on the former curriculum and texts again promoted ethnic and international awareness. In the elementary music syllabus, games based on Korea’s unique Jangdan rhythm and melodies were included, and for the first time lessons included songs popular in the south as well as the north such as the southern-born poet Lee Won Soo’s 1925 nostalgic “Spring in my Hometown.” The art syllabus again integrated European notables such as Leonardo da Vinci, Rembrandt, Van Gough, Picasso, but added Japanese artists such as Hokusai Katsushika, Yokohama Taikan and Aoki Shigeru. In other amendments, new subjects such as basic programming, word processing, and graphics, basics on information technology, were added to the junior-high curriculum; and the Senior-high syllabi introduced information processing. See the following Tables 4.3 and 4.4 for the
1996 Elementary and Junior-high-school curricula and teaching hours (Pak 1997, 195-196).

Table 4.3 Elementary School Curriculum 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching hours by subject</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Year 6</th>
<th>Hours/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts/PE</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Teaching Hours</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>5821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4 Junior-high-school Curriculum 1996 (Pak 1997, 196)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching hours by subject</th>
<th>Year 7</th>
<th>Year 8</th>
<th>Year 9</th>
<th>Hours/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech/Art</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE/Home Sc</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Teaching Hours</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>3360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over the ten years, the third curriculum (until 2003) was offered in the Joseon schools, educators were still in close contact and relied on DPRK guidance. However,
the main objective in the Japan-based schools was to maintain a link with the DPRK and simultaneously formulate a curriculum practical for third-generation Zainichi Koreans. This analysis so far has documented the changes in the curriculum up to 2003 and demonstrated that there has been a slow and consistent move away from DPRK dominance. The third curriculum discussed here and the creation of the current curriculum (released in 2003) followed lobbying by Chongryun educators and the community who wanted something new and compatible for Zainichi Koreans.

**Fourth Curriculum (2003-2005)**

Before the discussion moves onto the fourth curriculum, first an analysis of the petition that was the catalyst for profound change in the current curriculum. On December 5, 1998, following a three-year survey conducted across the community, the Tokyo Joseon Junior- and Senior-high-school Building Committee, in collaboration with the teaching staff, parents, students, and school district community submitted a detailed proposal to the Chongryun Central Committee for yet another new curriculum.

Crucially the proposal pointed out that irrespective of a declining birth rate, the Tokyo Joseon school was losing 50 Korean students per year to Japanese schools. Hence, a radical overhaul in the Joseon school system was required to attract future
students. In the petition, “democratic ethnic education” was explained as a consolidation of the curriculum, textbooks, teacher training, school administration, and the acquisition of human rights. Once more, it noted that to promote positive identities through the teaching of language, history, culture, and traditions, community participation was essential (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo Sin Gyosa Geonseol-Wiwonhoe 1998, 2).

The petition to be discussed here demonstrates cultural translation and political negotiation in the Joseon schools and the community.

To initiate reform, the proposal began with a sweeping declaration that first attitudes in the overall community must change. It suggested reaching out to Mindan members and promoting goodwill with Japanese people. Also, the group put out a call for an end to gender discrimination, ideologies of seniority, feudal patriarchal dogmas, and racism, to face challenges and be more innovative in the Chongryun community (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo 1998, 4-5). The committee proposed the following strategies.

Raising the level of education was flagged as the most important issue together with encouraging independence, autonomy, and incorporating diversity. The main areas identified for reform were the subjects Korean, history, social studies, information studies, and the introduction of sex education and career counseling (Dokyo
Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo, 1998). Regarding Korean teaching in the third curriculum, the main criticism focused on the students’ inadequate Korean language proficiency. For the students were reported to have a capacity of just 3,000\textsuperscript{12} words at the senior level, which was comparable to the lower school levels in the DPRK. Their intonation was poor and accordingly rather than “beautiful Korean” their Korean had evolved into a unique “Zainichi style Korean language.” As a plan of action, it was proposed to incorporate basic language teachings in reading, writing, and listening and to reinforce conversation across the entire curriculum. Further proposals included training teachers in comparative linguistics, reducing the current 9,529 vocabulary target to a more practical 6,000-7,000 words, and reinforcing new vocabulary daily over the 12-year curriculum (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo 1998, 7).

In the proposal, history was recognized as a cornerstone of ethnic education to communicate ethnic traditions, aesthetics, and customs that would normally be taught in the home. Due to former petitions for a change in the third curriculum, the revolutionary and ideology genres across the curriculum did decrease, but considerable content still existed. However, radical reforms for the history syllabus posed a sensitive issue with the DPRK, for the Korean history and the Modern Korean Revolutionary History

\textsuperscript{12} The 1974-1977 curriculum ideally aimed to teach 9,000 words over 12 years of education.
(Hyeondae Hyeogmyeong Yeogsag) that they offered in the senior high school grades, was heavily controlled by educators in the DPRK. Considering this, the committee advocated introducing history from year 4 and reducing the content of Modern Korean Revolutionary History. All agreed that revolutionary history content spilled over into all areas of school life\textsuperscript{13} and, to alleviate the burden it created for students, proposed integrating this content into the history syllabus. Furthermore, the committee motioned to remove military phrases such as Guard Corps, Death Squad Bodyguards, Assault Squad, Defend to the Death, Bombshell Spirit, Self-Explosive Spirit, Loyal Subject, and Traitor from the texts because they felt that the context was inappropriate for students who would never live in the DPRK (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo 1998, 23). In addition to these changes, the committee also suggested including before-and-after liberation public figures from both the ROK and DPRK such as patriotic martyrs, independence activists, Christian dissidents, scholars, and artists (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo 1998, 11-15).

In the social studies syllabus, the inclusion of more topics on the ROK was proposed because most of the students’ forebearers were migrants from the southern areas and few could claim a hometown (gohyang) affiliation with northern Korea. Also

\textsuperscript{13} Revolutionary ideologies were also taught in the Korean Youth League and in general education.
proposed was the incorporation of more studies on Korean diaspora in other countries. For the senior courses, simplification of History of Human Thought, Juche, and Juche and Values were proposed because, again, the content was believed to be too difficult and unrealistic for young Koreans living in Japan (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo 1998, 16). Furthermore, to systematically accommodate adequate class hours per subject, it was proposed to include Japanese issues such as politics, economics, and history in the Japanese language syllabus so that issues on Japan could be discussed in Japanese (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo 1998, 17).

In the 1990s, following DPRK acts of terrorism: the 1996 Gangneung submarine infiltration incident, rumors of the DPRK abducting Japanese, the 1998 Daepodong-1 satellite launch, and the controversial 1997 defection to the ROK of the DPRK politician Hwang Jang-yop, the Joseon school students became targets of hate speech incidents. In this milieu, the committee recommended that the entire community assume responsibility for the safety and welfare of the students and advocated teaching how to interpret and deal with controversial issues, social stigma, media criticism, and hate attacks. Consequently, to raise awareness of these issues, the committee suggested introducing films, videos, excursions, and social encounters with first-and second-generation Koreans (Dokyo Joseon Jung-Gogeub Haggyo 1998, 23). The
propositions in this comprehensive petition were later incorporated into the fourth curriculum.

In context with cultural translation, the above-mentioned petition and the subsequent curricula changes validate that modifications in the fourth curriculum were essentially choreographed by the overall community and demonstrate the importance of community engagement in the *Joseon* schools. In another example, on the 2003 curriculum (NHK 2003) Choe Yu-gi a history teacher in Osaka and editorial committee member commented:

I recently visited Pyongyang to try and convince DPRK textbook editors that we need to reform our history curriculum. However, the DPRK educators believe their version of history is legitimate and aren’t aware of our circumstances. At the meetings, we argued for days, but they finally agreed. We don’t need to comply with DPRK regulations anymore. Now we must compile textbooks ourselves to accommodate our unique circumstances. Previously our curriculum devoted considerable time to teach about Chairman Kim Il-sung, however, we removed much of the content and now include ROK history. For example, in the old texts, we used the term “Our Beloved Leader,” but for the new texts we referenced ROK texts and now include topics on all Korean ethnic movements and photos of ROK leaders.

Furthermore, a (third-generation *Zainichi*) parent commented:

We need to have lessons that focus on the present and not the past. Of course, we must consider students’ aptitudes, but we need to reform.

A (first-generation *Zainichi*) grandparent commented:

For a long time, our education was politically biased, but now we need to return to our roots and focus on ethnic education. If we can do that, it will make me incredibly happy. To me, the word “us” (*uri*) is the most important word and concept in our schools.
At this point the DPRK was increasingly perceived as malevolent by most Japanese and many *Chongryun* Koreans began identifying less with the DPRK. Hence, more than ever before, the community understood the need for a curriculum to accommodate the needs of the fourth and fifth generations. The new curriculum was less politically biased and focused more on the fundamentals of ethnic education. The slogan for the fourth curriculum became “all-embracing ethnic education” (*Gwangpog-ui Minjog Gyoyug*) (General Association of Korean Residents 2003). The curriculum is based on three basic themes:

- nurturing a strong ethnic identity and an understanding of *Chongryun* community history, and teaching students the skills needed to be successful both in Japan and overseas
- the importance of a unified *Chongryun* community
- a new and more liberal education for students in the 1st-9th years by incorporating other values and beliefs separate from *Chongryun* ideology (Pak 2012, 40).

In the fourth curriculum, the reduction in DPRK ideology is significant (Muraguchi 2004, 178). For example, in previous curriculums, Kim Il-sung was referred to as *Dear Leader*, and a considerable portion of the curriculum was dedicated to his life and the effort he made to provide ethnic education for *Zainichi* Koreans in the challenging period after the Korean War. However, in the new texts, there are fewer references to Kim Il-sung and even after his death, he is mentioned simply as Chairman.
Furthermore, following the June 15, 2000, the North-South Joint Declaration a “One Korea Policy” education theme was incorporated in the schools. Hence, the ROK, where most Zainichi Koreans had their roots, came to be recognized as an important partner and referred to as the “homeland” (gohyang) and the DPRK as the “fatherland” (jogug). Moreover, the Korean Unification Flag intended to represent all Korea has replaced the DPRK flag at year 1-9 events (Muraguchi 2004, 177).

The Korean Unification flag used at the Chiba Joseon school sports day

Consistent with previous curricula, the fourth revision again focused on nurturing a positive ethnic identity. The main revisions for Korean, history, Korean geography, mathematics, science, Japanese, art, and music reflect this, and due to more transparency and technology are chronicled on the Chongryun website and accessible to the public (General Association of Korean Residents 2019).
See Tables 4.5 (Pak 2012 41) and 4.6 (Tōkyō Chōsen Chū Kōkyū Gakkō 2009) for the current curriculum.

Table 4.5 Elementary and Junior High School (2012)

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<td>140 140 140</td>
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<td>English</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<td>70 70 70 70 70</td>
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<td>35 35 35 35 35 35</td>
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Table 4.5 Senior-high-school Curriculum (2012)

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<th>Year 12</th>
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<td>Bus/IT</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>23 (for Semester 1&amp;2)</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>World Geography</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Biology</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Information and IT</td>
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<td>Admin Calculations</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Shorthand</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>General Commerce</td>
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</table>

School Hours per Week | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32
The Korean syllabus focused on teaching the four basic skills of listening, speaking, reading, and writing, with extra time dedicated to speaking practice and stories relevant to Zainichi students. The Korean geography syllabus acquaints the students with climate, special products, and unique locations in the northern, central, and southern areas of the Korean peninsula.

In the social studies syllabus, significant changes were introduced to foster an ethnic identity, help Zainichi students understand their local environs, and in a broader context from “home” in Japan encourage students to think about reunification. Hence, to create a sense of belonging students are taught about Korean culture and how to link the “fatherland” (DPRK), the “homeland” (ROK), and the Chongryun community in Japan. Furthermore, in a break from the past, the greater part of the syllabus from years 3 to 9 is like the social studies textbooks used in Japanese schools. In this context, except for some lessons that teach Korea’s role in conveying culture to Japan, the new content focuses on Japanese history, geography, politics, and economics. See Table 4.7 for a detailed summary of the year 3-year 9-content of the social studies syllabus.
Table 4.7 Social studies (Sahoe) Syllabus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3    | * It begins with a lesson on children caring for a tree and plants gifted from the Fatherland DPRK and pictures of Korean birds and animal specimens in the science laboratory. Musical instruments such as drums and Gayageum harps sent from the DPRK are explained in terms of “love from the fatherland.” However, children are reminded that they are also beholden to the Chongryun community for assistance. 
  * Subsequent lessons do not refer to the DPRK and focus on topics such as “Uri Haggyeo,” family, Korean language and customs, the local area, and the Zainichi community. | 
| 4    | * In the context of school life, the emphasis is on students’ connection with their local area, modern services such as electricity, and mutual responsibility to the environment, for example, recycling garbage. 
  * Lessons on Japan include basic knowledge of regional areas, the terrain, climate, and industries. 
  * There is a focus on how Korean culture evolved and a brief explanation of how it influenced Japan’s culture. | 
| 5    | * Lessons one to five cover Korea. The first three lessons introduce the DPRK with pictures of Pyongyang, the DPRK national anthem the Aegukga, and the national flag the Ramhongsaek Gonghwagukgi, education, art, accomplishments in nation-building and science, IT, and agriculture. 
  * Lesson four introduces the ROK with pictures of famous sites in Seoul, the ROK’s prosperous culture, the US Army presence, and anti-American demonstrations. 
  * Lesson five highlights unification with a picture of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il at the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, the joint Korean team at the 14th Asian Games, and the North-South family reunions. 
  * The major focus is on Japanese history. Twelve lessons on Japan begin with a timeline of Japanese history encompassing the Jomon, Yayoi and Heian periods, the medieval period, the Meiji Restoration, and Japanese militarism. The content is similar to texts used in Japanese schools, except for occasional references to the transmission of culture from Korea to Japan, Japan’s invasions of Korea, and how Yi Sun-shin’s turtle ship fought against Japanese invasions, and a critical analysis of Japan’s militarism. | 
| 6    | * The focus is on Japanese and global politics, economics, modern society, and the Zainichi Korean community. 
  * Lessons on the Zainichi community are designed to teach the students their rights as foreign residents of Japan, and the last lesson teaches the organization and branches of Chongryun. | 
| 7    | * Focus is mainly global geography with eight lessons on Japan and four lessons on the division of Korea, the two economic structures, diplomacy, and north-south reunification issues | 
| 8    | * Year 8 presents a comprehensive course on Japanese history from the Jomon period to the Meiji Restoration and Japanese militarism. 
  * Lessons in modern world history include the Great October Socialist Revolution, ethnic liberation movements in Asia following WWI, Japan’s defeat in WWII, and the Cold War. 
  * The last segment covers the end of the Cold War and the complications the two Koreas currently face in the new economic world order and demobilization. | 
| 9    | * The focus is on the political, economic, legal, and cultural foundations of society in Japan and other countries. 
  * The last lesson focuses on historical explanations for current problems faced by Zainichi Koreans, for example, human rights, organization, and the future of the Zainichi community. |
Furthermore, in a break away from the past, the new history syllabus was restructured to focus less on the Cold War and ideological conflict between the north and south Koreas and focus more on a united Korea with topics relevant to Zainichi as an overseas diaspora. A new unit was added to teach modern history in the context of Korean culture, traditions, and the impact Korea had on its neighboring countries. New content was significantly influenced by ROK democratization, and the interpretations of ROK contemporary historian Kang Man-gil and dissident ROK journalist Song Kŏn-ho. For both believed that ethnic history should be written beyond anti-communist taboos and north-south separate ideologies of independence.

As previously proposed by the Tokyo Joseon Junior- and Senior-high-school Building Committee, topics on Korean independence activists such as the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Shanghai, the anti-Japanese partisan groups, the Korean Liberation Army, the Korean Volunteer Army, Korean independence movements such as the Singanhoe, cultural activists, agricultural movements and Koreans who contributed to culture, the arts, academia, and science between 1920-1945 were introduced in the social studies syllabus. Furthermore, in the year 8 syllabus 100 Korean historical figures from both north and south Korea were added for the first time. See

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14 In 1988 Song was one of the founding members of the Hankyoreh Newspaper
15 Consequently, in 2002 the ROK revised four Korean history texts for years 11 and 12 including objective references on the DPRK.
Table 4.8 for the historical figures in the year 8 syllabus (Kang 2010, 228-229).

Table 4.8 Historical Figures in Year 8 History Syllabus

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Historical figures</th>
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<td>Cho Man-sik</td>
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<td>Kim Chwa-chin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yi Dong-hwi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahn Changho (protestant activist in America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians and Activists</td>
<td>Lyuh Woon-hyung (ROK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Gu (Premier of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lee Bong-chang (independence activist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pak Yol (anarchist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zhou Baozhong (Chinese activist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Han Sorya (DPRK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paek Nam-un (DPRK economist, politician and academic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholars</td>
<td>Hong Myong-hui (DPRK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Han Yong-un (Buddhist Poet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ri Ki-yong (novelist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yun Dong-ju (Korean resistance poet)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kang Kyeong-ae (Korean feminist writer)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chung Yang-mo (ROK historian and author)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Choe Hyeon-bae (ROK linguistic scholar)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ri Geug-no (DPRK Hangul scholar)</td>
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<td>Ri Sung-gi (DPRK Scientist)</td>
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<td>Kim Yong-kwan (ROK Scientist)</td>
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<td>Na Woon-gyu (Korean film director)</td>
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<td>Choi Seung-hee (DPRK dancer)</td>
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<td>Sports</td>
<td>Sohn Kee-chung (1936 Berlin Olympic athlete)</td>
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<td>Governors-General of Korea</td>
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<td>Minami Jirō</td>
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</table>
The analysis so far has documented a curriculum that has steadily changed to accommodate the unique needs of Zainichi Koreans. Another aspect of the Joseon schools as a Third Space is civic engagement. In postwar Japan to safeguard ethnic education the Joseon schools have increasingly tried to integrate into Japan’s local social fabric and have politically lobbied for social acceptance. The main issues concerning the schools have been accreditation, subsidies, the right to matriculate to Japanese universities, and participation in national sports events with Japanese peers (Pak 1995, 15-16).

Lobbying for social inclusion

Despite Chongryun’s policy of non-interference in Japanese politics, it has consistently advocated that Japan respect and support Koreans’ right to ethnic education. By 1983, there were 152 Joseon schools (including 83 elementary, 56 junior high schools, 12 senior high schools, and one university) accredited by prefectural authorities as “miscellaneous” schools (Pak 1997, 174). As “miscellaneous” accredited schools, like other foreign schools, the Joseon schools receive around 10% of the subsidies allocated to “regular” schools. However, under “miscellaneous” accreditation guidelines, the schools have the autonomy to pursue ethnic education without Japanese government
Moreover, from the 1970s many regional governments acknowledged the high standard of *Joseon* schools and began allocating subsidies (Pak 1992, 72). For example, in 1970, the Tokyo metropolitan government was the first local government to subsidize 22 *Joseon* schools under a Private School Education and Research Grant and by 1990, 119 schools in 20 prefectures\(^{16}\) received grants as social inclusive strategies. In 1978, as part of Kanagawa Prefecture’s campaign for “internal civic diplomacy,” the prefecture acknowledged that the education standard in the *Joseon* schools was equivalent to “regular” schools and the facilities and teaching staff surpassed “miscellaneous” standards. Consequently, it approved a “Private School Expense Grant” of approximately 61,400 yen per child per annum (Pak 1992, 72-73). In 1991 Nara Prefecture advocated that with an advance in internationalization, the traditions and culture of ethnic minorities should be respected. Furthermore, it recognized that the *Joseon* schools taught the Japanese language, Japanese social studies, Japanese culture, and allocated a “Facility Improvement Grant” of 200,000,000 yen to the *Joseon* schools (Pak 1992, 75). In 1991 Shiga Prefecture recognized that education in the Shiga *Joseon* school was equivalent to Japanese education and in stride with internationalization and

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\(^{16}\) Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Ibaraki, Gunma, Hokkaido, Fukushima, Aichi, Nagano, Gifu, Fukui, Shizuoka, Kyoto, Shiga, Nara, Wakayama, Osaka, Hyogo, Hiroshima.
equal opportunities in education allocated a “Foreign Schools Facility Improvement Grant” of 200,500,000 yen for a new school building (Pak 1992, 76).

The Joseon schools were also benefactors of municipal grants. For instance, in 1991 the Kyoto City Board of Education granted 600,000,000 yen to the Kyoto Joseon schools. On a smaller scale, because DPRK boats frequently docked in the Sakai Port in Tottori Prefecture, in a step forward in internationalization and promoting friendship between Japan and the DPRK the Sakai City Board of Education granted the Matsue\textsuperscript{17} Joseon school students (who resided in Sakai City) 5,000 yen each for school travel (Pak 1992, 79).

As discussed in the previous chapter, Korea University is the mainstay of the Chongryun education system, and students from the Joseon schools are encouraged to apply. However, in recognition of students’ career choices as residents of Japan, since the 1970s another important aspect of social inclusion has been matriculation to Japanese universities. This in turn has influenced the trajectory of Joseon school education, affected changes in the curriculum, and augmented transparency. In the 1970s the channels for applying to a Japanese university from a “miscellaneous” school were tenuous because Korean students first had to sit the University Entrance

\textsuperscript{17} In Shimane Prefecture.
Qualification Certificate Examination *Daiken* exam. However, graduates from “miscellaneous” schools were disqualified from taking the *Daiken* exam. Therefore, to qualify, many Korean students “double-schooled,” and enrolled in government-accredited Japanese night schools or correspondence high-school courses. Furthermore, due to different funding procedures national and public universities differed in matriculation requirements.¹⁹

From 1977 many public and private universities began accepting *Joseon* school graduates based on the schools satisfying the requirements for the School Education Law 56 Requirements for Matriculation and Article 69 – Rules for Conducting Education. Consequently, by 1991, 17 public universities and 162 private universities were accepting applications from *Joseon* school graduates (Pak 1995, 16). As for national universities, at the June 1998 Eighteenth session for the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Article 13 mentioned the “unequal access by children of Korean origin to institutions of higher education” (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 1998). However, despite UN criticism, the exclusion of *Joseon* schools from national universities continued until 2003. In March 2003, in connection with the Obuchi

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¹⁸ Discontinued in 2004 and replaced with the Certificate for Students Achieving the Proficiency Level of Upper Secondary School Graduates, the *Daiken* exam was a qualifying exam for Japanese students who had not completed three years of high-school education at a “regular” high school.

¹⁹ National universities are managed by the national government and rely on national funding, whereas public universities are managed and funded by prefectures and local municipalities.
government’s foreign investment policies, MEXT\textsuperscript{20} announced that only graduates from the 16 international high schools would be eligible to sit the national university entrance exams. These schools predominantly represented wealthy western nations, and in contradiction to MEXT’s internationalization policy, it omitted the two Mindan schools, 10 Joseon high schools,\textsuperscript{21} and 13 Brazilian high schools (Tanaka 2003). However, following, public condemnation in September 2003, MEXT announced a three-point policy for national university applications from (1) international schools with international accreditation, (2) verification of completed education in the home country, or (3) respective screening at national universities (NPO Dōhō Hōritsu Seikatsu Sentā 2019). The Joseon schools qualified for respective screening and the schools’ curriculum was methodically examined for eligibility. Later in this analysis, in the context of the High-school Tuition Waiver Program, the government’s claims of lack of transparency in the Joseon schools will be discussed. However, it is important to note here that in the matriculation screenings at national universities the Joseon schools’ curriculums were thoroughly scrutinized and the schools were compliant.

The “miscellaneous” status of the Joseon schools also prohibited students

\textsuperscript{20} In 2001, the MOE (Ministry of Education) was renamed MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology).

\textsuperscript{21} In 2003, senior high schools were located in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Ibaraki, Aichi, Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Kyushu.
from competing in national sports competitions run by the All Japan High School Athletic Federation until the 1990s. Hence, students were restricted to competing within the small Joseon school system, and, according to comments in the community, the exclusion from playing sports at a national level was demoralizing for the students (Pak 1992, 30). To instigate change, in May 1990 the Osaka Joseon school volleyball team joined the Osaka Prefecture Senior-high-school Sports Federation; however, after qualifying for the semi-final round, the team was disqualified as ineligible because of the schools’ “miscellaneous” status. Subsequently, 12 Joseon senior-high-school\textsuperscript{22} principals petitioned the respective Japan Senior-high-school Sports Federations for inclusion. Moreover, in October 1992, in support of the schools, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations filed a petition to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) and in May 1993 the Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union) submitted a petition with 200,000 signatures. Accordingly, the Japan Senior High-school Sports Federation agreed to allow the Joseon schools to participate in the Inter-high-school Championships, and in May 1994, the Hiroshima Joseon school joined the Hiroshima Prefecture Senior-high-school Sports Federation as an associate member (Pak 1995, 18). As of 1996 Joseon school students were permitted to

\textsuperscript{22} In 1992 the 12 Joseon schools were: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Ibaraki, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Aichi, Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, and Kyushu.
participate in all public sports events,\textsuperscript{23} and in 1997 the Junior-high-school Sports Federation agreed to allow foreign schools to participate in all events.

Furthermore, on June 11, 1989, NHK authorized the Joseon schools’ participation in the NHK All-Japan School Choir Competition (Ko 1996, 283). Moreover, in 1992, following intensive campaigning by school parents Japan Railways (JR) agreed to issue discounted commuter passes to Korean students.

Following the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, public attitudes and government policies towards the schools improved significantly. At this time the Kobe Joseon School was inundated with food supplies from Chongryun communities nationwide and welcomed hungry and homeless Japanese neighbors to take refuge in the school; for many, it was the first time to enter a Joseon school.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, pressure on the community to finance the rebuilding of the Kobe Joseon schools was further relieved when a MEXT directive declared that all foreign schools would receive subsidies (Ko 1996, 207).

So far, this analysis has demonstrated that through cultural translation in the space that overlaps Japan, ROK, and DPRK cultural and political boundaries, the

\textsuperscript{23} Baseball is not played in the Joseon schools.

\textsuperscript{24} In the Mainichi Newspaper following the earthquake headlines read: “Surmounting ethnic divisions, Korean mothers serve ethnic food to tired and hungry Japanese in evacuation centers” (Ko 1996, 207).
Joseon schools did not replicate the DPRK education. Instead, this dialogue has between the “local and the global” (Ramos 2013, 7). The curriculum is, as Ramos (2013, 8) states, a socially built narrative created through the personal, group, teacher, and student experiences. Hence, the curricula in the Joseon schools have been regularly revised to accommodate change and social inclusion has been actively pursued to create a Third Space so members could identify with one another.

Exclusion of the Joseon schools from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program

The second part of this chapter will analyze how, against a background of change in the Joseon schools, negative stereotypes were recreated in context with Cold War images and DPRK acts of terrorism to exclude the Joseon schools from the ostensibly non-political High-school Tuition Waiver Program. Racial messages, according to Mendelberg (2008, 109), are said to awaken predispositions, and the stereotypes of race shape politics because leaders produce a dialogue to maintain or enhance a disadvantage over (in this case) African Americans in the United States. Moreover, in some cases, stereotypes remain static while new stereotypes are “invoked and in a range of settings” (Spoonley 2019, 1). Mendelberg’s hypothesis resembles that
of politically created negative stereotypes that the Japanese have used against the
Joseon schools.

**Provisions to include the Joseon schools in the High-school Tuition Waiver Program**

In 1978, Japan ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in Article 13 recognized free education from years 1-9. In section 2 it executed paragraph (a) and suppressed implementing paragraphs (b) and (c):

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that with a view to achieving the full realization of this right:
   (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all
   (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
   (c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education (OHCHR 2019).

Until 2010, Japan lagged behind other developed countries in this regard as parents were liable to pay fees for their children’s senior-high-school education. However, on September 16, 2009, at the 172nd Diet session, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s party the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) released a manifesto promising subsidies for families, and in stride with other developed countries, free tuition for all high-school students.

Following the 2009 announcement, in March 2010 the DPJ enacted the Public
High-school Tuition Waiver/High-school Scholarship and Stipend Law allocating 118,000 yen per annum per student at “regular” public schools. Significantly, the government included private schools, vocational schools, and “miscellaneous” accredited international and ethnic schools. Later, in 2013, the Law was revised to include income restrictions designated as the Law Regarding Financial Support for Senior-high-school Students (Ishii, 2018, 62). For stipends to be allocated only for education, the new law required that students submit formal written requests with parents’ tax certificates. Public schools collected tuition directly from the government and in private schools, the parents were billed the counterbalance (Ishii 2018, 62). In the October 2009 Tuition Waiver budget, the 10 Joseon senior high schools were included with other foreign schools (IO Gekkan 2015, 19).

Processing foreign schools

The basic conditions for inclusion in the Tuition Waiver Program were a senior school level three-year school curriculum including physical education and art. Furthermore, foreign schools would not be compared, and the content of the curricula would not be monitored. Other specifications included qualified teachers, adequate

25 For example, families with two children and an income of less than 2.5 million yen were granted two-fold the subsidy and families with an income of under 3.5 million yen were granted 1.5-fold (Gekkan IO 2015, 22).
facilities, transparency in financial management, and respect for Japan’s “best interest” (Kim 2010, 17). Moreover, following School Education Law 124, the Tuition Waiver Program subsidies for foreign schools, would be directly allocated to the student.

To process foreign schools, under Article 1 of the Tuition Waiver Law, MEXT divided the schools into three categories: “i,” “ro” and “ha.” The first category “i” included ethnic schools that could verify a senior-high-school level equal to that of Japanese schools through their respective embassies in Tokyo. This category included Mindan Korean, Chinese, German, and Brazilian schools. The second category “ro” included international schools with international accreditation. The third category “ha” included schools that were already accredited by MEXT with education standards of three years for senior high school and a comprehensive curriculum (Ishii 2017, 063). To evaluate the eligibility of the schools in the “ha” category separate screening was required. However, in Diet deliberations, it was unanimously emphasized that

26 WASC – Western Association of Schools and Colleges is an internationally recognized accrediting commission in the United States providing assistance to schools in California, Hawaii, Guam, Asia, the Pacific Region, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe operating with the Office of Overseas Schools under the U.S. Department of State. Currently there are 5,000 schools registered (WASC 2019).

IBO – International Baccalaureate Organization is an internationally recognized accrediting commission based in Geneva, Switzerland and managed through Cardiff, the United Kingdom. The organization offers a range of programs in international education and to teach IB programs, schools must be authorized. Currently there are 5,000 schools registered (IBO 2019).

CIS – Council of International Schools is a global non-profit organization, providing assistance in accreditation to elementary, secondary schools, and higher education institutions. Currently the organization supervises more than 1,300 institutions (736 schools and 618 colleges and universities) in 116 countries (CIS 2019).

ASCI – Association of Christian Schools International is an internationally recognized accrediting commission for Christian schools. The ASCI have 20,000 member schools in the United States and globally and with some 5.5 million students (ASCI 2019).
diplomatic relations were of no concern, and decisions would be based solely on education standards (Ri 2018, 56). In particular, screening for schools in the “ha” category would be based on clauses in the Private School Law to determine if the schools regularly convened a board of director meetings, submitted fiscal reports, had no legal violations in the past five years and had been approved in Article 13 in the Private School Law27 (Nakagawa 2018, 64).

In the beginning, the Joseon schools were hypothetically included in the “ha” category. However, possibly due to Prime Minister Hatoyama and MEXT Minister Kawabata’s comments for prioritizing schools with diplomatic ties (to be discussed later), the Joseon schools were never formally included. Taiwan, however, does not have diplomatic ties with Japan, but the two Taiwan affiliated schools in Tokyo and Yokohama were included in the “ha” category in April 2010. Moreover, the Horizon Japan International School,28 which had no affiliation, was added in August 2011, followed by the independent Korea International School in Osaka in December 2011 (Gekkan IO 2015, 23). See tables 4.9 and 4.10 for qualifying schools (MEXT 2017, 18).

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27 Article 13: Chairman as head of a board of directors/Chairman must report the appointment of the directors to the relevant prefectural governors/Chairman must attend Private School Council meetings and dismiss committee members when necessary.

28 Now accredited by ECIS (European Council of International Schools) and CIS (Council of International Schools).
Table 4.9 Qualifying ethnic schools for the Tuition Waiver Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of School</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Registration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British School in Tokyo (Showa Campus)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2010. 4. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International French High School in Tokyo</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>2012. 7.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The German School of Tokyo Yokohama</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2010. 4. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escola Paralelo (Ota, Gunma)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instituto Educacional Centro Nippo Brasileiro (Oizumi cho Gunma)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2012.12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instituto Educacional TS Recreacao (Uesato Saitama)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2017.1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colegio Isaac Newton Japao (Minokamo, Gifu)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2012. 1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British School in Tokyo (Showa Campus)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2012. 4. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International French High School in Tokyo</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The German School of Tokyo Yokohama</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2010. 4. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escola Paralelo (Ota, Gunma)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instituto Educacional Centro Nippo Brasileiro (Oizumi cho Gunma)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2012.12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instituto Educacional TS Recreacao (Uesato Saitama)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2017.1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colegio Isaac Newton Japao (Minokamo, Gifu)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2012. 1.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.10 Qualifying ethnic schools for the Tuition Waiver Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Accreditation</th>
<th>Registration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hokkaido International School</td>
<td>US/other</td>
<td>WASC</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tohoku International School</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American School in Japan</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Academy in Japan</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. International School Tokyo</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seisen International School</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>CIS/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International School of the Sacred Heart</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC/CIS</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mary's International School</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC/CIS/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Maur International School</td>
<td>Europe/US</td>
<td>CIS/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizon Japan International School</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC/CIS</td>
<td>2012.12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama International School</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>CIS/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagoya International School</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto International University</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>ACSI</td>
<td>2011.5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka International School, Kyoto</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>IBO/ WASC</td>
<td>2012.12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Academy</td>
<td>Europe/US</td>
<td>WASC/CIS/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marist Brothers International School</td>
<td>Europe/US</td>
<td>WASC</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima International School</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>CIS/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka International School</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC/IBO</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Christian School International</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>WASC/ACSI</td>
<td>2010.4.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other

| Korean International School                                           | Unspecified       | none           | 2011. 12.8   |
Joseon schools affected by “North Korean” sanctions

As previously documented, in the past the Joseon schools were heavily influenced by the DPRK. However, despite increasing transparency, the government was slow to recognize the continuous change in the curricula. Hence, in political and security circles, and support organizations for abductees, many still believed the Joseon schools were controlled by the DPRK and dutifully administered by Chongryun. Before this discussion moves on to analyze the additional screening for the Joseon schools, first an assessment of the political debates in connection with the inclusion of the Joseon schools.

Prior to the enactment of the March 2010 Public High-school Tuition Waiver/High-school Scholarship and Stipend Law Bill, political debates on whether to include the Joseon schools were generally linked with the DPRK, the abductee issue, sanctions against the DPRK, and public opinion against the schools. The earliest statement of opposition came from the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission/Minister of State for Disaster Management/Minister of State for the Abduction Issue Nakai Hiroshi on February 21, 2010, when he petitioned the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology/Minister of State for Science and Technology and Policy Kawabata Tatsuo to exclude the Joseon schools. Nakai
contended that with no progress on the abduction issue, excluding the schools could be used as a pretext to put pressure on the DPRK. Then, on February 23, 2010, Nakai convened a press conference at the National Public Safety Commission and using nationality as a pretext to sanction the schools, stated that Joseon school students were Kita Chōsen (DPRK) nationals and thus subject to the same level of sanctions against the DPRK (Japanese Communist Party 2010). Consequently, Nakai’s comments triggered a series of “for and against” debates. First, on February 23, 2010, Minister Kawabata convened a press conference and stated that the Tuition Waiver Program was non-partisan and diplomatic issues between Japan and the DPRK were of no concern (Minzoku Kyōiku Mondai Kyōgi-kai 2010). Then, on February 24, 2010, The United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) praised the Tuition Waiver Program initiative, for its impartiality but was critical of Minister Nakai’s request to bar the Joseon schools. Furthermore, CERD requested an inquiry into how exclusion might affect education for Korean children (Fujimoto 2010). However, at a press conference on February 25, 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, stated that priority in the Tuition Waiver Program would be given to countries with diplomatic ties and inferred that the Joseon schools might be excluded (Kim 2010, 15).

To clear the stalemate on excluding the Joseon schools, on March 3, 2010,
members from the Social Democratic Party (SDP), including the Deputy Party Leader Mataichi Seiji and the Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology Tanaka Makiko, made official visits to the Tokyo Joseon High School. The SDP delegation observed the year 10 and 11 English, Japanese, Music, and Computer classes. Afterward, they met with teachers and parents and listened to a lecture on the school’s history, curriculum, and administration. In his report, Mataichi expressed how “bright” he found the students and emphasized that it would be illegal to exclude the Joseon schools from the Tuition Waiver Program because equal rights for all children in Japan are guaranteed in the constitution and the Basic Law of Education. Furthermore, the SDP Policy Chief Abe Tomoko remarked that the schools play an important role in future Japan-DPRK relations. Following the visit, the SDP delegation submitted a petition to the Deputy Minister of Education Suzuki Kan for the inclusion of the Joseon schools (Choson Sinbo 2010).

In that afternoon Tanaka Makiko and 23 DPJ members visited the Tokyo Joseon High School and observed years 10 and 11 Japanese, Korean, Calligraphy, and English classes. Afterward, the delegation met with students, teachers, and parents. Principal Sin Gil-ung and School Chairman Kim Sun-eon explained the school history, the curriculum,

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29 The term Basic Law of Education is MEXT’s new title that overrides the term Fundamental Law of Education
and school administration before handing Tanaka a petition with 5,000 signatures requesting that the school be included under the Program. Following the visit, Tanaka remarked that the visit and class observations were informative and that discussions were frank. She also stated that she was optimistic that the schools would be included in the Tuition Waiver Program (Choson Sinbo, 2010).

Furthermore, in support of the schools, on March 5, 2010, 332 lawyers of the Association for Problems Concerning Foreign Schools and Ethnic Schools submitted a petition noting that the Joseon schools legally qualified to be included in the Tuition Waiver Program. However, the LDP debate on the Joseon schools consistently linked the schools and abductee issue via association with the DPRK (Fujinaga 2013, 17). For example, at an LDP Financial Research in Education Committee meeting on March 11, 2010, the following was:

The Joseon Schools are very intricately linked with the home country Kita Chōsen, and the textbooks are compiled by the intelligence agency, the United Front Division of the Workers’ Party. This agency is not a genuine education organization, but an ideological school that supports the regime and it is also rumored that the agency spies on Japan (quoted in Fujinaga 2013, 17).

Following Nakai’s February 23, 2010 comment on nationality, on March 26, 2010, at the 174th Session of the Diet, Communist Party member Yamashita Yoshiki asked Minister Nakai to clarify his statement on Kita Chōsen nationality. In response,
Nakai confirmed that Joseon schoolteachers and students were indeed Kita Chōsen nationals. However, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) official Tauchi Masahiro, in attendance at the meeting, clarified no Kita Chōsen nationals resided in Japan. Tauchi explained that before 1965, all Koreans were recorded as Chōsen-seki, then following the 1965 normalization between Japan and the ROK, the classification for Zainichi Koreans was altered to Kankoku (ROK nationals) or Chōsen. However, Chōsen-seki does not designate DPRK nationality because those who identify as Chōsen-seki are not formally acknowledged by the DPRK. Furthermore, Chōsen-seki defines stateless Koreans who are not officially acknowledged by Japan because it does not recognize the government of DPRK. Following this clarification, the Diet minutes note that Nakai retorted that he had never used the term DPRK nationals but was referring to “Kita Chōsen nationals in Japan” who choose to attend Joseon schools that follow a Kita Chōsen ideology and curriculum. In concluding, a confused Nakai stated that irrespective of Kankoku or Taiwanese nationality they all live in Japan but originate from countries “over there” meaning “Kita Chōsen” (Diet of Japan Proceedings 2010). Then, at the Extraordinary Diet session of the 176 Diet Proceedings, on December 3, 2010, the LDP member Yoshiie Hiroyuki (Senior Vice Minister at MEXT)

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30 Referred to as Chōsen-seki.
31 「国籍がろうとなかろうと日本におられて、向うの国の方じゃないでしょうか？」
stated that it was the government’s opinion that in matters of education and personnel management, the Joseon schools’ close link with Chongryun conflicted with Article 16 (which includes “miscellaneous” schools) in the Basic Law of Education (Diet of Japan Proceedings, 2010).

In other circles, organizations in support of the abductees such as Kazoku-kai (National Association of Families of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea), Sukuu-kai (National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea), RENK (The Society to Help Returnees to North Korea), the National Public Safety Commission, and the media, mutually lobbied to exclude the Joseon schools. In particular, the Sukuu-kai and the Mamoru-kai members frequently petitioned by meeting with politicians and government officials (including a meeting with President Bush in 2006), submitting petitions, and communicating their stance on websites and in various publications. For example, on August 5, 2010, the Mamoru-kai issued a statement titled “Objection to the Government’s Policy on Granting Tuition Waiver to Joseon Schools.” The statement pointed out variances in historical perspectives in Joseon school textbooks, claiming the inaccuracy of DPRK’s assertion that the Korean War was started

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32 Considered as a political organization.  
33 Article 16: Education must not be subject to improper controls and must be provided in accordance with this and other Acts; educational administration must be carried out in a fair and proper manner through appropriate role sharing and cooperation between the national and local governments MEXT 2009).
by the ROK, different perspectives on the “1987 KAL incident,” and Chongryun’s failure to issue an official apology on the abductee issue. Furthermore, if the schools were to be included in the program the Mamoru-kai requested the disclosure of history textbooks, that the textbooks cease praising the “fabricated history” of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and that ethnic education be conducted from a free and humanitarian perspective (Mamoru-kai 2011). Subsequently, on December 20, 2010, the Sukuu-kai Secretary-General Masumoto Teruaki met with Prime Minister Kan Naoto and demanded that the abductee issue be the sole reason for the exclusion of the Joseon schools (Sukuu kai 2010).

At the National Public Safety Commission press conferences, the Joseon schools and the Tuition Waiver issue were debated in connection with the abduction issue. For example, on January 28, 2011, the Minister for the Abduction issue Nakano Kansei, who had previously met with the abductees’ families and five prefectural governors, advocated more scrutiny in the screening of the Joseon schools. Then on February 4, 2011, Nakano Kansei declared that the screenings (to be discussed later) for the Joseon schools had been discontinued due to the Yeonpyeong Island incident (National Public Safety Commission 2011). Furthermore, at the committee’s February 7, 34 Following the November 23, 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident.
2012, meeting, the new Minister Tanaka Keishu discussed Osaka Mayor Hashimoto Toru’s objection to subsidies to the Osaka Joseon schools in sympathy for the abductees as a feasible solution for the national government (National Public Safety Commission 2012).

Again, at a press conference on March 2, 2012, Tanaka stated that due to serious issues within Chongryun and the feelings of the abductees’ families the inclusion of the Joseon schools in the Tuition Waiver Program, the issue should be dealt with carefully. However, he did mention that the parents of Yokota Megumi, Yokota Shigeru, and Yokota Sakie\(^{35}\) wanted the Joseon schools to be included. As far as the Yokotas were concerned, the schools were only indirectly linked to the abduction issue through Chongryun’s association with the DPRK (National Public Safety Commission March 2012).

In the media, between February 11, 2010, and October 1, 2012, the ultra-conservative Sankei Newspaper\(^{36}\) published 14 articles (and sometimes two a day) as part of an offensive to directly discredit the schools (Tanaka 2013, 63-64). Most of the Sankei articles were written in the context of fiscal corruption in Chongryun and the DPRK’s authority over the schools. For example, the article on February 11, 2010,

\(^{35}\) In an interview with the magazine Shukan Kinyobi (see Tanaka 2015, 138).

\(^{36}\) Some of the articles were provided by the Mamoru-kai.
“Sent from the North. 46 Billion Yen for the Joseon Schools” stated that the Japanese government believed that the DPRK education funds were still being used to cultivate political domination over the schools, and according to disgruntled Chongryun members the funds were not allocated evenly. Moreover, according to the article, the irony of Chongryun’s misdemeanors came to light after applications for the Tuition Waiver Program. Subsequent articles reported on Chongryun educators’ consultations with the DPRK, misappropriation of funds, debts, and in context with teachings on the abductee issue the submission of a bogus textbook to MEXT. This wide-ranging social and political debate against the inclusion of the Joseon schools continued while the schools were being screened.

Screening the Joseon schools

Following the April 1, 2010, enactment of the High-school Tuition Waiver Program, from April 30, 2010, MEXT commenced subsidies for 31 foreign schools. These included 14 ethnic schools (eight Brazil, two Chinese, one (Mindan) Korean, one English, one French, and one German) in the category “i” and 17 international schools in the “ro” category. However, due to government opposition concerning the Joseon schools’ links with Chongryun and the DPRK, it was decided that extra screening would
be conducted by a special committee of anonymous specialists and academics to debate eligibility. At this stage, Maekawa Kihei, a former vice-minister in MEXT, claims there was no discussion within MEXT on excluding the Joseon schools due to their association with Chongryun or with the DPRK. In fact, he understood that most MEXT personnel believed it was more practical to include the schools, for they understood the level of education was equal to Japanese schools. The students were also third- and fourth-generation Zainichi who, unlike students in other French or German “ethnic schools,” were integrated into Japanese society and would remain in Japan (Tottori Rūpu 2018).

The committee convened five meetings between May 26 and August 19, 2010 and mulled a wide range of topics (MEXT 2010). The committee members acknowledged that the MEXT minister had the final decision, but it was their responsibility to analyze the Joseon schools within an objective and systematic framework (MEXT 2010). Basically, Maekawa recalls that the meetings were merely a formality because MEXT and all committee members were in favor of including the Joseon schools (Tottori Rūpu 2018).

According to the meeting minutes, at the first meeting members queried how far they could delve into the so-called hanniichi education but agreed that the Joseon
schools deserved special consideration because of the students' long experiences of living in Japan that transcended multiple generations. At the second meeting, members watched an audiovisual made by the MEXT secretariat on the lessons, and facilities at the Tokyo Joseon school, as they perused high-school textbooks on loan from the school. At the third meeting, members conferred on the similarities between the Joseon and Japanese school curricula and agreed that Joseon schoolteachers, as graduates of the Korea University Faculty of Education, were professionally qualified to teach. At the fourth meeting, to compare differences between Joseon schools in different areas, they screened an audiovisual on regional Joseon high schools and mulled over the language of instruction and student cohort. Maekawa attended the final meeting and reported on his previous visits to the Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe schools (in the audiovisual) where he observed classes and inquired into the schools’ management. He noted that in the Japanese language class, the students studied Japanese classics and composed haiku (Tottori Rüpu 2018). At the final meeting, the members circulated a translated text of modern Korean history and acknowledged that rumors of a lack of transparency in the schools were misleading the public.

Following the five meetings, the committee's findings were announced on August 30, 2010. The report confirmed that the Joseon schools met the required
three-year (800 teaching hours per year) standard of Japanese schools, had a qualified
teaching staff, included art and physical education and that there would be no criteria on
curriculum content. Moreover, like other foreign and ethnic schools, the Joseon schools
met the criteria for “miscellaneous” schools and thus qualified under the Tuition Waiver
Program (Kim 2010, 16).

Subsequently, on November 5, 2010, the MEXT Minister Takagi Yoshiaki
made an announcement. In the beginning, he recognized that students with ROK and
Japanese citizenship also attended the Joseon schools. Moreover, under prefectural
accreditation, the schools had a long history in Japan, and he commended the schools
for consistently abiding by the School Education Law in the “miscellaneous” category
and subsidy applications. Furthermore, under Private School Law 64, the minister
declared that private schools have a right to autonomy and invited the Joseon schools to
apply for the Tuition Waiver Program subsidies by the November 30, 2010 deadline.

However, external issues continued to complicate the situation of these schools. He
further pointed out that people in the government were concerned about their lack of
progress with the DPRK in the abductee issue and the schools' potential links with
Chongryun and this foreign government. Thus, screening of the Joseon schools would
require more careful consideration (Gekkan IO 2015 26).
However, in contradiction of the non-partisan and nonpolitical stance between Japan and the DPRK, following the November 23, 2010, DPRK artillery attack on ROK’s Yeonpyeong Island, on November 24 Prime Minister Kan Naoto announced that screening for Joseon schools would be temporarily halted (Ri 2018, 56). Subsequently, on August 29, 2011, MEXT screening resumed, the committees convened regularly but after seven meetings in September 2012 the committee vaguely communicated that the matter was “under consideration” and that there would soon be an announcement on the reopening of screenings (Ri 2018, 56). According to Maekawa, in MEXT administrative terms, “under consideration” is the last stage before approval and, bearing in mind that MEXT’s intention of special screening was to incorporate the Joseon schools, he too presumed the schools would be approved (Tottori Rūpu 2018). In fact, MEXT Minister Tanaka Makiko was expected to approve the Joseon schools. However, in November 2012 she became embroiled in a scandal regarding the accreditation of three new private universities. Tanaka consequently lost her seat in the December 2012 election and the succeeding LDP MEXT minister, Shimomura Hakubun, came with a different agenda. When in the opposition (2009-2012) as the LDP Vice-Chairman in the Party Policy Research, Shimomura had opposed the screening for

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37 留意事項
the *Joseon* schools and questioned how the government could justify using taxpayer’s money when the schools were operated by the DPRK umbrella organization *Chongryun*. Shimomura supported his negative views with familiar accusations about the schools: that teachers in the schools were *Chongryun* cadre members, the schools lacked transparency, they rejected anything Japanese, they were loyal to the DPRK, and the focus of education was *Juche* and an *hannichi* dogma. Shimomura’s solution to the problem was to resolve the issue from a diplomatic standpoint by connecting it with the abductee issue (LDP 2010).

The LDP returned to power on December 26, 2012, and two days later, on December 28, Minister Shimomura Hakubun convened a press conference. The first item on the agenda was the *Joseon* schools. Shimomura declared that in the context of the Tuition Waiver Program, he had the support of the office of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, MEXT, MOFA and the Minister in charge of the Abductions Issue. Furthermore, with no progress on the abduction issue, he stated that the Japanese public would not support granting subsidies to the *Joseon* schools. Shimomura ignored the points in the previous screening report and vaguely criticized the schools for maintaining strong ties with *Chongryun*, and the apparent lack of transparency in the curriculum, personnel, and administration. Henceforth, to exclude
the *Joseon* schools from future applications with backing from the prime minister, Shimomura announced that he would introduce an ordinance to erase the category “*ha*” based on public comments (MEXT 2012).

In response to questions, first Shimomura declared the new steps did not discriminate against Koreans. However, in the revised regulations the LDP proposed to include issues of diplomacy and curriculum content. Regarding the so-called insufficient transparency in *Joseon* schools’ affairs, he cited the Japan Central Intelligence Bureau’s report, stating that the schools’ curriculum, personnel, and administration were strictly controlled by *Chongryun*. Moreover, he stated the MEXT personnel were investigating the schools but did not have any new information. In conclusion, Shimomura suggested that if the *Joseon* schools were displeased with the intended measures they should consider becoming “Japanese” through “regular” school accreditation or wait until the DPRK could gain normalization by Japan. The results of the public comments were released on February 19, 2013, and out the 30,510 comments submitted there were 15,846 votes to exclude in and 14,164 to include the schools (*Mushō-ka Renraku-kai* Ōsaka 2017). Consequently, on February 20, 2013, in a revision to the Tuition Waiver Ordinance, the category “*ha*” was removed, and the ten *Joseon* schools were disqualified from future applications to the Tuition Waiver
The legal justification for including the Joseon schools

Civic groups, politicians, academics, and some media argued that the Joseon schools were lawfully eligible to be included in the Tuition Waiver Program. Public feedback also suggests a significant number of people still supported the Joseon schools. On March 5, 2010, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations Chairman Miyazaki Makoto (2010) submitted a statement to Prime Minister Hatoyama and the MEXT Minister Kawabata Tatsuo. Miyazaki reconfirmed that the Tuition Waiver Program was supposed to provide equal access to education to all children independent of political and diplomatic matters. He argued against the government’s claims that Joseon schools lacked transparency and refused to make the curriculum public. Miyazaki contended the schools submitted relative documentation when making applications for “miscellaneous” accreditation, university screening, and all school websites posted curriculum information (see Appendix E for full text). Moreover, from a legal standpoint, the exclusion of the schools violated the Japanese constitution.

Miyazaki’s assertions were precise: in Japan education is not mandatory for foreign children. However, according to Ishii’s (2018, 62) interpretation, Article 26 in
Japan’s Constitution guarantees free education to all children regardless of nationality.

Article 26 reads:

All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law.
All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free (The Constitution of Japan 2019).

Furthermore, in the Basic Law of Education (2006), Article 4 also guarantees equal opportunity to education for all people (Ishii 2018, 62). Article 4 reads:

The people must be given equal opportunities to receive an education suited to their abilities and must not be subjected to discrimination in education on account of race, creed, sex, social status, economic position, or family origin.
(2) The national and local governments shall provide the necessary educational support to ensure that persons with disabilities receive an adequate education per their level of disability.
(3) The national and local governments shall take measures to provide financial assistance to those who, despite their abilities, encounter difficulties in receiving education for economic reasons (MEXT 2009).

In the same vein, a February 2, 2012, Kanagawa Newspaper editorial pointed out that when the Tuition Waiver Program was introduced the government assured foreign schools that there would be no political interference in the curricula. However, from the outset, the government was exceedingly judgmental of the Joseon schools’ curricula, while it remained silent regarding American school texts which included controversial material such as the United States’ justification for dropping atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the Chinese school texts that teach about the Rape of Nanking (Kanagawa Newspaper 2012).

The Osaka model for exclusion

Linking the Joseon schools to an illegal-nation state, in March 2010, Osaka Prefecture ceased the Private Foreign School Endorsement Subsidy to the Osaka Chōsen Gakuin Senior High School, and the prefecture cautioned it would discontinue all grants to other Joseon schools unless the schools:

- follow a Japanese curriculum
- disclose the schools’ financial status to the public
- set boundaries between the schools and a “certain political organization”
- remove the portraits of “certain” political leaders (Fujinaga 2013, 22).

The underlying aim of the Osaka policies was to close the Joseon schools and assimilate Korean children into Japanese schools. For example, at the Osaka Prefecture Trustees Regular Meeting on September 25, 2011, the Education Committee member Nishino Koichi commented:

Children who attend foreign schools are also entitled to enroll in public (Japanese) schools. If foreign children attend Japanese schools, Japanese children will develop an international understanding, and importantly foreign children will understand more about Japan. I think foreign children attending Japanese schools is the best option for all (Fujinaga 2013, 18).

38 The Osaka Chōsen Gakuin began receiving subsidies from the Osaka Prefecture in 1974 under various categories. The Private Foreign School Endorsement Subsidy was established in 1991 and funded teacher’s salaries (Fujinaga 2013, 22).
39 Chongryun
40 Images of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.
Furthermore, on October 31, 2010, Mayor Hashimoto added:

If it were up to me, I would send my children to a normal school rather than a school that follows a curriculum authorized by a country designated as an illegal nation-state. I do not intend to interfere with Korean students’ right to study wherever they want, but they will be appropriately accepted at prefectural and private (Japanese) high schools (quoted in Fujinaga 2013, 17).

In Osaka, Mayor Hashimoto Tōru devised his version of a local Tuition Waiver Program proposing free high-school tuition for all students with a household income of fewer than 6.1 million yen. Under these circumstances, poorer Korean families who were struggling to pay the increased fees at the Joseon schools were reluctantly obliged to enroll their children in Japanese schools.

In 2010 the Joseon schools in Osaka were the beneficiaries of a total of 120.99 million yen from the prefecture, and Osaka city had subsidized 27 million yen per annum to the Osaka Chōsen Gakuin Senior High School. However, in March 2011 all subsidies to Joseon schools in Osaka were canceled (Fujinaga 2013, 22). Consequently, the canceling of subsidies in Osaka became the catalyst for the central government’s campaign to abolish all subsidies to Joseon schools.
A National Tsūtatsu

In connection with the abductee issue, in 2010, Tokyo, Saitama, Osaka, Miyazaki, and Chiba halted subsidies to the Joseon schools. Then, to urge more prefectures to follow suit, on March 29, 2016, the MEXT Minister Hase Hiroshi issued an official legally binding tsūtatsu (notification) to 24 prefectural governors, cities, and to Hokkaido titled, “Matters for Consideration when Issuing Subsidies to Joseon Schools.” The tsūtatsu first recognized that subsidies to Joseon schools are issued at the discretion of prefectural and local authorities. However, it warned all authorities to be aware that the Joseon school curriculum, human resources, and financial administration are controlled by the DPRK and Chongryun. Hase recommended their being considerate to Joseon school students, but before dispensing subsidies, prefectures should consider the public interest, the curriculum, subsidy use, and a lack of transparency in the schools. Furthermore, he advised the governors to communicate the sentiments of the tsūtatsu, to cities, wards, towns, and villages where Joseon schools were located (MEXT 2016).

In response to this tsūtatsu, the Japan Federation of Bar Association Chairman Nakamoto Kazuhiro issued a statement declaring that the central government was violating the constitution in obstructing regional administration. Furthermore,

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41 In 2010 Osaka ceased subsidies to the Joseon senior high schools and in 2011, ceased subsidies to all school levels (Gekkan IO 2015, 28).
42 27 文科際第 171 号
Nakamoto reiterated that because the students’ civil rights guaranteed them access to education, and because the government had failed to provide any factual evidence against the Joseon schools, the government was required to retract the tsūtatsu. Furthermore, discrimination against the Joseon schools violates Japan’s Constitution’s Article 26 and Article 13 and direct discrimination against the students violates Article 14 and breaches Article 4 in the Basic Law of Education (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 2016). Moreover, he repeated the 2014 CERD criticism of the Japanese government for excluding Joseon schools from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program, the suspension and decrease of funding by local governments, and demanded the government reverse the decisions (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 2016).

43 Article 26. All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law. All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2019).

44 Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2019).

45 Article 14. All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin. Peers and peerage shall not be recognized. No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2019).

46 Article 4. (1) The people must be given equal opportunities to receive an education suited to their abilities, and must not be subjected to discrimination in education on account of race, creed, sex, social status, economic position, or family origin; (2)The national and local governments shall provide the necessary educational support to ensure that persons with disabilities receive an adequate education in accordance with their level of disability; (3)The national and local governments shall take measures to provide financial assistance to those who, in spite of their abilities, encounter difficulties in receiving education for economic reasons (MEXT 2009).

47 On Korean schools: the Committee is concerned about the legislative provisions and government’s actions that hinder the right to education of children of Korean origin, including: (a) the exclusion of Korean schools from the High-school Tuition Support Fund; and (b) the suspension or continued decrease of funding allocated by local governments to Korean schools (art. 2, 5) (CERD 2014).
By 2017, regardless of petitions and lobbying by civil groups, in response to nationwide lobbying by Sukuu-kai, opposition from national security circles and politicians, there was a significant decrease in local subsidies. Out of 28 prefectures with Joseon schools, 16 ceased subsidies due to developments in the DPRK, the so-called lack of transparency in Joseon schools, and the 2016 MEXT Tsūtatsu. While as the schools in 2006 were the beneficiary of 624 million yen, by 2017 this amount had decreased to 122 million yen (Doi, Shinpei, and Gen Okamoto 2017). See Table 4.11 for prefectural subsidies between 2009 and 2016 (Gekkan IO 2015, 28).

Table 4.11 Prefectural Subsidies between 2009 and 2016

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<td>23.57 Million</td>
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<td>Saitama</td>
<td>8.98 Million</td>
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<td>Osaka</td>
<td>185.11 Million</td>
<td>X/O</td>
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<td>Miyazaki</td>
<td>1.54 Million</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Chiba</td>
<td>5.62 Million</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>13.8 Million</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Niigata</td>
<td>1.2 Million</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>2.45 Million</td>
<td>O</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>72.48 Million</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>O*48</td>
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*48 Subsidies given directly to parents.
Joseon schools and litigation against the government

The removal of the category “ha” formally disqualified the Joseon schools from submitting further applications. In response, the schools in Aichi, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Osaka, and Tokyo determined to sue the government in the judicial system.

On January 24, 2013, the Aichi and Osaka Joseon schools filed a lawsuit against the Japanese Government, followed by the Hiroshima Joseon school on August 1, 2013, Fukuoka on December 19, 2013, and Tokyo on February 17, 2014. The five lawsuits were based on the illegality of excluding the Joseon schools from the non-partisan Tuition Waiver Program for political and diplomatic reasons. Briefly, in Aichi prefecture, ten students sued the Japanese Government for psychological trauma caused by the government’s decision to exclude the schools from the Tuition Waiver Program. The sum of damages was for 550,000 yen for each student (Gekkan IO 2015, 44). In Hiroshima, the Hiroshima Joseon School Director Kim Yeong-ung and alumni sued the Japanese government for money they failed to receive due to the exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program. The sum of damages was 56 million yen (Gekkan IO 2015, 49). In Osaka, the Osaka Chōsen Gakuin sued the Japanese government for discontinuing subsidies based on an administrative mandate (Gekkan IO 2015, 46). In Fukuoka, 67 students sued the Japanese Government for 110,000 yen each because of
the infringement of their rights to ethnic education and the right to learn (Gekkan IO 2015, 51). In Tokyo, 62 students sued the Japanese government for infringing on their rights, contending that the schools’ removal from the “ha” category was based on political reasons that contradicted the spirit of the Tuition Waiver Program’s equal opportunity for all. Furthermore, the Tokyo Joseon High School claimed it qualified for inclusion in the Tuition Waiver Program because it satisfied the Program’s requirements. It set the sum of damages for 100,000 yen per student. (Tōkyō Chōsen Kōkōsei no Saiban o Shien Suru kai 2104).

Regarding court judgments, the decisions were mixed. For example, on July 17, 2017, the Hiroshima court rejected the plaintiffs’ demands stating that the school was under the influence of Chongrun and voiced concern regarding the use of the subsidies. On July 28, 2107, the Osaka Court upheld the plaintiff, Osaka Chōsen Gakuin’s demands. In the court’s summary, the judge declared that the government’s deletion of the schools from category “ha” was illegal and found no basis for the government's claim that the Joseon schools were dominated by Chongryun. Furthermore, MEXT was ordered to include the Osaka Chōsen Gakuin in the Tuition Waiver Program. However, on September 2, 2018, in the Osaka High Court, this judgment was overruled. The High Court’s new ruling reasoned that Chongryun's
control over the schools hindered autonomy of education because textbooks highly praised the DPRK leaders and the Workers’ Party of Korea (Joseon Rodong-dang) and were therefore contrary to the conditions for the Tuition Waiver Program (Sankei, 2018).

All other lawsuits since were overruled: for Tokyo on September 13, 2017, and in the High Court on October 30, 2018, for Hiroshima on July 19, 2017, for Aichi on April 27, 2018, and in the High Court on October 3, 2019, for Fukuoka on March 14, 2019, and the Fukuoka trial in the High Court continues. Furthermore, on August 28, 2019, the Supreme Court blocked the Tokyo Joseon School and the Osaka Osaka Chōsen Gakuin from future appeals.

As seen here, the Joseon school appeals for justice have all been based on the illegality of exclusion. In a small victory, the Osaka Court did rule in favor of the Osaka Chōsen Gakuin, but all final rulings focus vaguely on Chongryun’s close link with the Joseon schools and how the stipends might be used. Clearly ongoing biases against Korean ethnic education prevailed over the illegality of excluding the Joseon schools from the Tuition Waiver Program.
Conclusion

The elements of racial stereotyping and cultural hybridity are important mechanisms in the construction of the Third Space. Postcolonial discourse compels mainstream society to decide who is worthy of inclusion, and to rationalize “othering,” stereotypes are constructed to create a legitimate reason for exclusion. To reiterate, stereotypes are systemic and operate at an individual and community level, are generally accepted, and rarely contested. Kunda and Spencer (2003, 540) state that once a stereotype is activated, the intensity of the intent will influence the extent to which the perceiver will reapply. However, at the other end of the spectrum, hybridity in the Third Space transpires because of the dialectical connection between hegemony and subjugation as members disavow discriminatory actions.

This chapter has established that between 1972 and 2019, there have been three significant curricula revisions that have demonstrated a gradual move away from the DPRK. Within the Joseon schools, the catalyst for each curricula modification has been generational change and transnational events that have overlapped Japan, the ROK, and the DPRK. As a Third Space, the Joseon schools are attuned to choosing what disciplines they wish to translate to develop a unique curriculum to accommodate
younger generations who regard Japan as their “home;” and are at the same time integrating into Japan’s social and cultural framework.

Following DPRK acts of terrorism, many Chongryun members actively voiced their dissent of Chongryun policies, demonstrating that although members support ethnic education in the Joseon schools, Chongryun’s policy of deference to the DPRK is not shared by all. Ryang (1997, 29) writes:

the Chongyun adjusts and readjusts North Korean identity to keep pace with change within Chongyun and conditions surrounding it. It involves the development of a body of knowledge and pedagogical technology that gives rise to legitimate discourse used within the organization. This is a process that crosses time and space, various sites and managements.

Ryang’s analysis (ending in 1997) of the Chongryun in context with change and social conditions in Japan is, I believe, correct. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Joseon schools have relied heavily on the DPRK for financial funds and assistance in education. However, this study has demonstrated that rather than accommodating a “North Korean” identity in “pedagogical technology” the schools have naturally distanced away from the DPRK, and as a Third Space, there has been more focus on the creation of a Zainichi Chōsenjin identity.

However, against a milieu of curricula change, and some degree of social inclusion, the pervasive dormant negative stereotypes towards Chongryun Koreans and
the Joseon schools were reactivated following DPRK acts of terrorism. Kunda and Spencer (2003, 530) write that:

Self-enhancement goals can sometimes be satisfied by despairing or esteeming another person. Events that strengthen such goals may prompt the activation of stereotypes that support the desired impression and the inhibition of stereotypes.

Hence, to sway public opinion in political debates, the government labeled Chongryun a “dangerous organization” and a “severe threat to Japanese security” (Oh 2015, 159).

Furthermore, Japanese politicians failed to acknowledge the hybrid curriculum (which the Joseon schools candidly submitted), and recommendations from personnel in MEXT and the independent screening committee to include the Joseon schools in the non-partisan 2009 Tuition Waiver Program. Instead, backed by media, the National Public Safety Commission, the Central Intelligence Bureau, and abductee support organizations, politicians manipulated stereotypes in their campaign to exclude the Joseon schools. As demonstrated in the curricula guidelines concerning the onset of the Korean War, the Joseon school community does acknowledge a DPRK connection. However, the Joseon schools’ argument for inclusion in the Tuition Waiver Program is based on a basic right to ethnic education. When, in fact, the government's exclusion violated Japan’s constitution and the Basic Law of Education that guarantees equal opportunity for all to receive an education and respect for differences in race, creed, sex, social status, economic position, and family origin (Basic Law of Education Article 4).
Moreover, when the government issued the 2016 Tsutatsu to prefectures it overruled prefectural authority on the Joseon schools.

Writing against socio-political stereotypes, this chapter has established that since 1972 the Joseon schools have built on the Foreigners’ School System Bill crisis and accommodated Zainichi Koreans via a changing curriculum and actively pursuing social inclusion. However, while regional bureaucracies have recognized the Joseon schools’ social contribution to society and the standard of education the schools provide, this has not been reflected in national policies that consistently link the schools to the DPRK to exclude. One might ask whether the politically constructed Cold War stereotypes to exclude the Joseon schools are, in fact, ongoing colonial racism against Koreans in general.
CONCLUSION

The Kinyō kōdō (Friday action) song

Join in voice, join in song
How loud must we shout?
For too long our voice has been lost
Can you hear us? Are you listening?
Our anger is in our voice
*Sori moyeora norae oneo ra*\(^{49}\)
Let’s join in voice and song
*Dongmuyeo moyeora norae bureuja*\(^{50}\)
Join in voice and unite in song
Gather friends and sing a song

It hurts when you pretend not to hear
Our faded shouts go nowhere
But we sing with someone
A single voice will never be heard
*Sori moyeora norae oneo ra*
In a weakened voice, we still sing
*Dongmuyeo moyeora norae bureuja*
More voices and a stronger song
*Sori moyeora norae oneo ra*
We just want to live like you
*Dongmuyeo moyeora norae bureuja*
We just want to live like you

Move your feet
The anger of 4-24 revives
If you step on us, we will stand again

---

\(^{49}\) Let’s gather in voice and sing
\(^{50}\) Gather friends and sing a song
With you, we can fight again
Sori moyeora norae oneo ra
In song, we’ll be heard
Dongmuyeoro moyeora norae bureuja
Gather friends and sing a song (Ri 2018)

Every Friday at 4 pm in front of the Ministry of Education in Kasumigaseki

Tokyo, Korea University students coordinate a demonstration and sing the Kinyō kōdō (Friday action) song to protest the exclusion of the Joseon schools from the Tuition Waiver Program. As of February 21, 2020, since 2013 the Joseon school supporters have staged 200 protests (Tokyo Shinbun, 2020). The size of the crowd varies from 20 up to 1,000 protestors and regular attendees include Korea University academics, Joseon high-school students, teachers, parents, Chongyun activists, and lawyers. Japanese supporters include politicians, members of Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union), Japanese academics, some journalists, and the public. From the ROK, the citizens’ groups NPO Modang Yeonpil (based in Seoul and established in 2011) and Uri Hageyego hwā Aideul eul Jiki nn Shimin Moim (A civic collective to protect “our schools” and Korean children; Seoul based and established in 2014) regularly participate with affiliated ROK teachers’ unions, agricultural unions, and religious groups who travel from the ROK to submit petitions for the Joseon schools to the Japanese government.

The Kinyō kōdō song was written by Korea University academic Ri Yeong-chol and the Faculty of Japanese Language students in 2015. The song does not specifically mention
the schools’ exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program, but by reviving the April 24, 1948, *Hanshin* Education Struggle, the lyrics unmask the school community’s long frustrations of being ignored and denied basic human rights. According to Lewis (1984, 40), in political movements, music is rarely censored or taken seriously by authorities, and it empowers and reaches a broader audience. Hence, the Korean language lyrics in the *Kinyō kōdō* song link traditional ethnic values and create unity. Furthermore, since 2015, the song defines yet a new social ideology of oppression as it helps members identify with the *Joseon* schools.

Or for another visual representation of the *Joseon* schools as a Third Space where the cultural and geopolitical boundaries of Japan, ROK, and DPRK overlap: in context with reunification on the Korean peninsula, on April 11, 2015, a Seoul based Tongil News journalist/activist visited the Yokohama *Joseon* School to report on the Entrance Ceremony. At 10 am, excited parents including a Japanese journalist father, grandparents, the school community, and Japanese holding slogan banners that read “congratulations” in Korean and Japanese assembled in the school gymnasium. The music began and eleven beaming first graders, adorned with big cherry blossom badges and nametags written in *hangul* entered as older students showered them with handmade confetti. Their teacher dressed in a pink *chogori* gently guided them under
five flower arches towards the stage that displayed a welcome banner and the school emblem. The six-year-old students sat down facing the gathering and the ceremony began. First, a congratulatory telegram from Pyongyang was read aloud, followed by the headmaster’s welcome and his mission statement to uphold ethnic education. Then students and their respective families were introduced to the school community. Textbooks and school supplies were presented by various Chongryun affiliated committees and bouquets from year 6 students. In response, a first grader stood at the podium, and speaking in well-rehearsed Korean, thanked the school for hosting the ceremony, and promised all new students would obey the school rules and study hard. The ceremony concluded with the school song, and students, families, teachers, and the Japanese citizens’ groups lined up for photos. Afterward, Japanese school teachers, members of the Japan-DPRK Friendship Society (Nitchö kyōkai), YMCA members, Yokohama City employees, and citizens met privately with the headmaster and local Chongryun members to discuss how they could assist in issues related to subsidy cuts and recent hate incited incidents.

The question central to this research is how, contrary to geopolitical postwar and Cold-War-sanctioned representations, the Joseon schools have interpreted history, culture, and power as they have adjusted to Japan to create a Third Space. First, from
the social gatherings explained above, with Korean and Japanese activists united in song, Japanese people celebrating Korean children’s milestones and Joseon schools requesting assistance from concerned Japanese citizens, it is difficult to understand how the politically constructed loyal DPRK Joseon school stereotypes are applicable.

Against oppression, the Joseon Schools as a Third Space have created a place where Zainichi Koreans can gather and share common experiences. Moreover, the Third Space revealed in this study is never static, and to survive the schools have continually emerged as the interconnected postcolonial and geopolitical Cold War discourses of Japan, ROK, and DPRK are reinterpreted. For example, to accommodate cultural displacement and teach the Korean language for repatriation the early curriculum in the Gugeo Ganseupso schools was based on translations of Japanese textbooks, and Korean educators complied with CIE screening and modified content for a license to operate. From the beginning, Korean educators collaborated with Japanese intellectuals, and in the early 1950s when the curriculum was being restructured many educators found DPRK texts inappropriate for use in Japan. Furthermore, the current curriculum incorporates a “One-Korea” education theme and due to ROK democratization, more ROK content has been integrated.

However, the highly political and social interpretations of the Joseon schools
disregard the Zainichi Korean history of displacement, repeated acts of violence against Joseon school students, a desire for reunification, raising ethnic awareness, and curriculum and school structure that corresponds with Japanese schools. To Japanese authorities, the Joseon schools are a visual reminder of the invisible Zainichi Korean minority in Japan. In fact, many Japanese people describe their feelings about the Joseon schools using the term iwakan (a feeling that the schools don’t belong in Japan), but the same people voice their support for German or French ethnic schools in Japan.

The underlying rationale behind this ongoing prejudice can be traced back to a failure in decolonization between Japan and Korea. As pointed out previously, Japan and SCAP’s policies for decolonization hinged only on repatriation. Furthermore, decolonization was unsuccessful between Japan and Korea (ROK and DPRK) due to the United States and the Soviet Union’s involvement in North-East Asia and the escalation of the Cold War in Asia. According to Watt (2009, 12), the presence of the United States created a status quo called “third party decolonization.” In this regard, third-party decolonization absolved Japan of its colonial rule as American’s post-war dominance in the Pacific region from 1945 to 1953 established an ongoing “vertical regime” whereby the capitalist countries in the region – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines – communicated through the United States (Cummings 2005, 472).
In context with the creation of a Third Space and bureaucratic oppression, the important points in the *Joseon* schools’ 100-year history are: the Japanese colonial binary of assimilation and exclusion created a separate subjectivity for Koreans in prewar and post-war Japan. When Japan annexed Korea it hypothetically assured that all Koreans would prosper and there would be lasting peace in the “Orient;” however, the commitments were never realized (Grajdanzev 1944, 280). For example, on the peninsula, education for Koreans remained “voluntary” in contrast to education being compulsory for Japanese children (Caprio 2009, 207). The education system for Koreans was basic and shorter in duration, more focused on agriculture and vocational training to transform Koreans into submissive Japanese (Rim 1952, 12).

Koreans in *Naichi* Japan, were Japanese subjects who were pushed through the cracks of colonial policies on the peninsula and policies for Japanese (Wagner 1951, 20). In *Naichi* Japan, ethnic education was regarded as subversive and closely monitored by police agencies. Regarding education policies, Koreans as Imperial subjects were never treated on par with Japanese nationals. As discussed in chapter 1, by 1942 the school enrollment statistic for Koreans in *Naichi* Japan at 64.7% (Pak 1982, 153) was higher than on the peninsula whereby 1945, only some 20% of Korean children attended school (Eckert 1990, 263). However, the statistic fell well below the 100% enrollment
for Japanese children in Naichi Japan (JICA 2004, 21) and on the peninsula (Grajdanetz 1944, 262).

In postwar Japan, the non-partisan language Gugeo Ganseupso schools and later the Joseon schools were created in response to displacement and cultural dispossession. Japan and SCAP believed ethnic education would expedite repatriation and initially did not interfere. Therefore, Koreans managed to create an extensive school system. However, from 1947 SCAP adopted an uncompromising anti-communist stance and, based on dubious evidence, accused all schools run by Chōren of teaching communist ideologies. Consequently, on SCAP’s orders, the Japanese Government ordered the schools to conform to Japanese education standards and forced most schools to close between 1948 and 1949. The Chōren schools were the main target, but it should be noted here that beyond the anti-communist stance, racism played a part in the school closures as 56 Mindan schools were arbitrarily closed too. Moreover, due to the Koreans’ opposition to closing the schools, SCAP and the Japanese government degenerated the issue of ethnic education into a security concern.

Chongyun was established in 1955, and as the DPRK’s delegated overseas organization pledged to protect the rights of Zainichi Koreans and adhere to a policy of non-interference in Japanese politics. Chongryun flagged ethnic education as one of its
most important priorities; it was also instrumental in preparing Zainichi Koreans for expatriation to the DPRK from 1959. Furthermore, the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea officially divided the Zainichi Korean community and for stateless Chōsen-seki Koreans identification with the Joseon schools became even more important. By 1966 the Chongryun school system was educating some 40,186 students, in 142 schools from the elementary to the university level. The system also included 25 kindergartens and 245 night-schools (Ozawa 1973, 435). Chongryun was partially reliant on the DPRK for financial funding and assistance in education, but Chongryun’s education system focused on a community inclusive commitment and ethnic education was designed to cater to Zainichi needs. However, the autonomy of the Joseon schools was again threatened when the Japanese government attempted to pass the Foreigners’ School System Bill between 1968 and 1972. The bill would have given MEXT the right to terminate permits for schools and sanction inspections. Following this incident, as a safeguard, the schools opted to keep a lower public profile, and this silence, in turn, has exacerbated Joseon school stereotypes that still linger today.

The present curriculum (2003) was introduced as the schools were attaining a higher public profile in Japanese society. The curriculum relies less on DPRK political
ideology and emphasizes ethnic identity, community history, and skills to prepare students for life in Japan. In the new texts, Kim Il-sung simply represents a symbolic link with the “fatherland” and is celebrated for his resistance against Japanese colonialism.

Since 2010, the exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program has obliged the Joseon schools to become more active in civil society. For example, the community has petitioned at the United Nations, engaged with Japanese civil society, and, on occasion, sought ROK support. Pragmatically the Tuition Waiver Program was supposed to include all foreign schools. To gain inclusion, the Joseon schools accommodated the external review processes and permitted Japanese authorities to scrutinize their once closely guarded curriculum. However, despite meeting the government's curriculum requirements on teacher qualifications, facilities, and management, the Joseon schools were immediately rejected from the Program due to Chongryun’s connections with the DPRK. In contrast to the public support for the Joseon schools during the 1968-1972 slating for the Foreigners’ School System Bill, the media and the government magnified the abductee issue to exclude only the Joseon schools from the universal Tuition Waiver Program and the 2016 Tsūtatsu was formulated by the national government to stop regional subsidies, again only for the Joseon schools. Consequently, the Japanese
government includes the Brazilian, Korean (ROK), Chinese, Taiwanese, Indian, Indonesian, French, German, British, and all international schools\textsuperscript{51} in the program, but it continues to exclude the \textit{Joseon} schools.

How have external factors motivated curriculum change and innovation in creating a Third Space in the \textit{Joseon} schools? To reemphasize, stereotyping is entrenched in the hegemonic dogma and discourses of racism and operates at the individual and structural levels in the racialization of minorities (James 2004). The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard said, “when you label me you negate me” (quoted in Bloomfield 1976, 169), and this negation applies to the generally accepted stereotypes about the \textit{Joseon} schools.

Contrary to the rarely contested stereotype that members of the \textit{Chongryun} community and the \textit{Joseon} schools have a rigid outlook, this study has demonstrated that over 100 years, the \textit{Joseon} school community has created the Third Space by continually changing its beliefs through cultural translation and political negotiation to accommodate external cultural, economic, and political changes. In Adler’s (2002, 3-4) words “the identity of the “multicultural,” far from being frozen in a social character, is more fluid and mobile, more susceptible to change [and] more open to variation.”

\textsuperscript{51} The American School in Japan is categorized as an International School.
Moreover, Bhabha (1994, 247) defines culture as a “strategy of transnational and translational. It is transnational because contemporary discourses are rooted in specific histories of cultural displacement.”

Bearing in mind Adler’s description of fluid social characters, and using Bhabha’s Third Space hypothesis to interpret the Joseon schools it is feasible to say that the schools have created a hybrid culture due to the cultural translation of a myriad of transnational factors such as displacement, the division of the Korean peninsula, financial aid from the DPRK, the repatriation program, recent contact with the ROK, social inclusion, prefectural accreditation, DPRK acts of terrorism and the hegemony of national policies. That is, the early Gugeo Ganseupso schools were founded in response to cultural dispossession. The DRRK 1957 Korean Education Assistance Fund reassured displaced Zainichi Koreans that they were not “forgotten nationals” (Lee & DeVos 1981, 99). The initial funds also fostered a “DPRK Overseas National” identity and spontaneously aroused an ongoing obligation and loyalty towards the DPRK, resulting in a curriculum coordinated with the DPRK to prepare the Chongryun community for life in the DPRK. Against a milieu of division on the Korean peninsula and in the Zainichi community following the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, texts based on DPRK material were devised so
stateless *Chōsen-seki* Koreans could identify with the DPRK. Moving on, against a degree of integration into Japan’s social fabric and generation change, the curriculum in the 1990s renewed a focus on community history, the nurturing of ethnic pride, and began to incorporate more wide-ranging topics. Then, due to a thawing of north-south relations on the Korean peninsula, the schools have incorporated more ROK material and adopted the “One-Korea” policy as an educational theme. However, the negative impact of the 1993 missile tests, nuclear testing, and the bittersweet 2002 Pyongyang Declaration when the DPRK confessed to abducting Japanese citizens also required significant changes in the curriculum to accommodate the mixed feelings in the *Joseon* school community and a distancing from the DPRK.

On the other hand, over a hundred years, Japanese national policies have consistently linked Korean ethnic education with national security. The national policies: *Kyōwakai* education, the *Joseon* School Closure Orders, the Foreigners’ School System Bill, and exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program. With each policy endorsement, the *Joseon* schools have been accused of compromising Japan’s national security. However, for the *Joseon* schools, the prospect of being side-lined by government policies has consistently prompted an obstinate response to protect ethnic education. Moreover, to accommodate the political implications and diverse opinions in
the community, the Joseon schools have demonstrated innovative skills to create change.

This study has established that the Joseon schools as a Third space have been created against a recurring discourse of inclusion and exclusion. At the local levels, Koreans have become part of Japan’s local social fabric and frequently prefectural policies have been more sympathetic towards the Joseon schools. In fact, without this support, the Joseon schools would not be in operation today. However, on the other hand, discrimination against Koreans has fortified national policies that have been more biased against the schools. Regrettably, Korean ethnic education to cultivate positive identity, and the teachings of national ideologies of independence have been interpreted exclusively in the context of national security and in post-war Cold War discourses against the DPRK.

Writing against nationally endorsed subversive, communist, hannichi, and “North Korean” stereotypes of the Joseon schools, this dissertation has endeavored to present a different perspective of the Joseon schools as a Third Space created over 100 years as a consequence of gains and provocations through cultural translation and political negotiation. Beyond the changing curriculum, recent innovations in the system are also testimony to change. For example, Korea University (the mainstay of the
Joseon school system) holds open campus events and convenes an annual international symposium on Zainichi Korean issues with overseas academics. Furthermore, in the 2019 and 2020 winter terms, students from the United-States-based DePauw University arranged “exchange weeks” at the Korea University, stayed on the campus, and socialized with the Faculty of Foreign Language students. Joseon schools are active in social media, and every school has a website. Moreover, the Chiba Joseon school headmaster Mr. Kim Yusop provides daily updates with information on his school to his 5,000 ‘friends’ on Facebook. Nationwide, the schools engage with local communities and often hold “exchange teaching days” with local Japanese schools. In many areas, to foster understanding, neighbors are invited to school concerts, the schools hold Korean cooking classes and Korean language classes for local Japanese. Moreover, other important aspects of the Joseon schools as a Third Space are the numerous support networks that have been established by Japanese and ROK supporters. For example, on October 30, 2014, Mr. Horikawa Hisashi, a former Chairman of the Chiba High School Teachers' Union established the “Prefectural Citizen’s Network to Support Joseon Schools” or for short: Chiba Haggyeo no Kai. Members include prefectural assembly members, Japanese teachers, lawyers, and members of the local community. The objective of the network is to promote understanding for the Chiba Joseon school by
encouraging exchange with local Japanese schools, attendance at events at the Chiba Joseon School and to lobby on behalf of the school for local subsidies and improved conditions.

Regarding the student cohort, any child of Korean heritage (regardless of nationality) can enroll in the Joseon schools. Current students include Chōsen-seki, ROK, Japanese, Chinese, and other nationalities. For example, in the 2015-year 9 class at the Chiba Joseon school, seven students were not “traditional” Zainichi students (personal communication, September 27, 2015), and included the child of a Christian minister from the ROK. Likewise, as a symbol of diversity, at the 2015 Entrance Ceremony in the Hokkaido Joseon School, a six-year-old girl from Seoul was chosen to represent the new students and impressed the audience with her fluent Korean. Across the school system children from multicultural families with parents from African countries, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Russia, China, and Nepal also attend the Joseon schools. Moreover, in an interview conducted by the Chongryun IO magazine, Sanju Udas from Nepal (who served as the head of the father’s committee in 2014), and wife Mihyang Kim mentioned that they decided to enroll their children in the West Tokyo 2nd Joseon school because they were enthusiastically welcomed by the community (Ri 2014, 57).
The Joseon schools today have evolved to openness, but they are still often criticized for a lack of transparency by politicians and in the media’s official discourses. However, to promote public understanding of ethnic education the Joseon schools frequently accommodate Japanese and foreign media outlets. Moreover, popular culture has played an important role in changing outside perceptions, and to reinforce community pride the schools go beyond what a Japanese school might do. For example, the documentary Uri hakkyo (Kim 2006) by ROK director Kim Myeong-joon, candidly reveals daily life in the Hokkaido Joseon school. In 2013, Seoul-based director Park Sa-yu and third-generation Mindan-affiliated director Pak Donsa (Park & Park 2013) released their documentary 60 Mankai no Torai (60,000 tries) on the Osaka Joseon school rugby team at the Hanazono finals in Osaka. The documentary Urubo, Nakimushi Bokushingu-bu (Crybaby Boxing Club) (Lee 2015) by Seoul-based Lee Il-ha addresses identity issues of Korean youth in the Tokyo Joseon high-school boxing club. Lastly, from the Joseon school community Park, Yeongi’s Sorairo no Symphony (Park 2015) captures a rarely acknowledged human side of the DPRK as Park’s camera follows the year 12 students on their graduation trip to DPRK.

Gains in civil liberties for Joseon school graduates now permit students to matriculate to Japanese universities and many Korea University graduates do
postgraduate courses in Japanese universities or find work in Japanese companies. Thus, being a graduate of Joseon schools is no longer an impediment and many Japanese companies value the students’ bilingual talents. Furthermore, many Joseon school graduates have gone on to become academics in Japanese universities and qualified attorneys in Japan.

What are Japan’s responsibilities towards the Joseon schools? Article 97 in the Constitution of Japan (Prime Minister of Japan, 2019), guarantees:

- civil liberties such as the right to liberty and the rights to freedom of expression, thought, conscience, and religion.
- social rights such as the right to receive education and the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living.

Furthermore, Japan’s Basic Law of Education “maintains the basic principle of education is "individual-oriented education" (MEXT 2009). However, as of October 1, 2019, in addition to the exclusion from the Tuition Waiver Program and major cuts in prefectural subsidies the Japanese government has excluded 88 “miscellaneous” foreign kindergartens, including all 40 Joseon kindergartens from the Kindergarten Tuition Waiver Program. Parents who choose to send their children to the Joseon schools do so because they believe the schools are vital in nurturing ethnic identity and maintaining an ethnic community. However, this recent exclusion will put more financial strain on families already paying rising fees (due to subsidy cuts) at Joseon schools. Hence, it is
expected that many parents will be forced to send their children to tuition-free Japanese kindergartens. The Joseon school community regards the exclusion from the new Kindergarten Tuition Waiver Program as another intentional measure to financially squeeze the Joseon schools out of operation because children who attend Japanese kindergartens will invariably choose to attend a Japanese school with their classmates.

A founding principal of Chongryun was non-intervention in Japanese politics. However, due to the loss of cultural identity stemming from Japan’s colonization of Korea (Oh 2015, 79-80) Chongryun has advocated that Japan is legally responsible for recognizing and supporting the Joseon schools. Moreover, it advocates that ethnic education is a human right that is internationally recognized. In context with Chongryun’s argument, it should be noted here that without obstruction Japan has freely established Japanese schools overseas. For example, the first Japanese school in the postwar era was established in Bangkok, Thailand in 1956, and as of 2017, there are 819 Japanese schools in 50 countries educating some 21000 Japanese children (Iwajiri 2017, 20).

This study documents change within the Joseon schools as a Third Space. Regarding implications, the Third Space methodology builds on previous studies and focuses on Japan’s postcolonial obligations to Zainichi Koreans. The application of the
Third Space hypothesis may procure varied responses from the diverse Joseon school community. However, the results will probably be acknowledged by younger generations who now consider themselves Zainichi Chōsenjin and identify with the Joseon schools’ collective history of oppression over a connection with the DPRK. Furthermore, by writing against existing DPRK stereotypes this study offers the Japanese public an alternative interpretation of the schools as unique cultural hybrid spaces of empowerment and insight for accepting Japan’s legal responsibilities.

However, despite the previously mentioned stipulations in Japanese laws to respect individual choice in education, the Japanese Government has not recognized its obligation to respect Korean ethnic education. At the national level, the government has politicized the schools, denied Koreans universal rights to education, and failed to recognize that the Joseon schools fundamentally function as a consequence of Japan’s colonization of Korea. Therefore, this study appeals to the Government of Japan in context with Japan’s postcolonial responsibilities to recognize that Joseon schools are different from other foreign schools and initiate a national level dialog beginning with an official inquiry into why the Joseon schools were established and how they have been embroiled in geopolitical forces.

What is the future of the Joseon schools in Japan? The school community now
contends that the government is trying to financially squeeze the Joseon schools out of operation. Many schools might indeed close for safety reasons due to threats against the schools and financial motives as family budgets compel Korean parents to enroll their children in Japanese schools. However, the community now has some 100 years of history in managing ethnic education and has prevailed over oppression countless times.

Bhabha (Rutherford 1990, 216) states that political negotiation instigates hybridity (or in this case the Third Space) and “when a new situation, a new alliance formulates itself, it may demand that you should translate your principles, rethink them, [and] extend them.” As for the Joseon schools, over time, the ties with the DPRK have weakened and many in the Joseon school community have become de facto members of Chongryun with ROK or Japanese nationality. When the Korean community was struggling to provide ethnic education in postwar Japan the DPRK reached out and assisted the displaced community. Therefore, the Chongryun community’s obligation and loyalty towards the DPRK will continue. However, it is the collective memories of the violent 1948 4-28 Hanshin Education Struggles and repeated oppression that unites the Joseon school community rather than the link with the DPRK.

Continued existence has become the most important issue at hand and the community has begun a new dialog. Some proposals suggest allowing the ROK to
provide financial aid, integrating the Chongryun school districts, offering empty classroom space to other ethnic minorities, accepting Japanese students, streaming classes, educating elite students, and allowing more diversity in the methods of education. Hence the current curriculum is testimony to change as it emphasizes fostering a strong ethnic identity but suggests a weakened political identification with the DPRK, incorporates an appreciation for Chongryun community history, teaches students skills for living in Japan, and recognizes other values and beliefs separate from Chongryun ideology.

In Bhabha’s words, the Joseon schools as a Third Space are again undergoing “transnational dimension[s] of cultural transformation [through] migration, diaspora, displacement, [and] relocation mak[ing] the process of cultural translation a complex form of signification” (Bhabha 1994, 247). The Joseon school community refers to their schools as “Uri Haggyeo” (our school) or the “Joseon schools” as Joseon denotes the undivided Korean peninsula. Hence, in this translational and transnational space, following the recent exclusion from the High-school Tuition Waiver Program and prefectural subsidy cuts, as a Third Space, the Joseon schools are now navigating a new path. The next curricula revision may reflect this current setback and to retain students focus even more on the basics of ethnic education and a shared community history.
This study is a unique and progressive endeavor to depoliticize the *Joseon* schools. By underscoring the geopolitical and transnational influences, and the binary of oppression and cultural transformation it has determined that the *Joseon* schools are far from being microcosms of DPRK education. On the contrary, the schools are a displaced community-based unified and empowering hybrid Third Space in Japan where over generations of multilayered traditional Korean and Japanese values have been reinterpreted to help members identify with one another.
# Tables

## Table 1

1911-1945 *Zainichi* Korean Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th><em>Zainichi</em> Korean Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th><em>Zainichi</em> Korean Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>275,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3,171</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>298,091 (418,989)¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>3,635</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>311,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>390,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3,917</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>456,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>5,624</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>573,695</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>14,502</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>625,687</td>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>22,411</td>
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<td>1919</td>
<td>26,605</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>735,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>30,189 (40,755)²</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>799,878</td>
</tr>
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<td>38,651</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>961,591</td>
</tr>
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<td>59,722</td>
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<td>1,190,444</td>
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<td>80,415</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,469,230</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>118,152</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,625,054</td>
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<td>129,870</td>
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<td>1,882,456</td>
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<td>143,798</td>
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<td>1,936,843</td>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>2,115,594</td>
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(Zai Nihon Daikan Minkoku Mindan 2013)

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¹ National Census Statistic
² National Census Statistic
Appendix A

“Miscellaneous” School Regulations

Purpose

Regulations for “miscellaneous” schools are determined according to the 1947 School Education Law 82.

Maintaining Standards and Improvement

“Miscellaneous” schools are expected to maintain education standards and make efforts to improve.

Course length

School courses must be over a year; however, non-academic courses maybe be three months to a year.

Class Hours

For schools offering one or more-year courses, school hours must be over 680 hours per year. For courses under a year, school hours may be reduced.

Student numbers

Student numbers may be determined in consideration with the number of teachers and building capacity.

When classes are held collectively there must be less than 40 students in each class; however, more students will be permitted if the standard of teaching is maintained.
Admission Qualifications

Schools must decide on appropriate entry procedures according to the level of the course.

Principal

The principal of the school must have experience in education.

Teachers

There must be more than three teachers in the school.

a) The teachers must have previous training in the subject they teach.

b) Teachers must strive to improve their knowledge.

Facilities

“Miscellaneous” schools must maintain hygienic standards.

(1) To fulfill the intentions of education, the schools must have suitable buildings and education aids.

(2) The size of the schools must be over 115.70 square meters and offer at least 2.3 square meters per student. However, exceptions will be made if the standard of education is upheld.

(3) There must be classrooms, an office, and a toilet in the school building.

(4) The schools must provide training sites.

(5) According to the type of education and number of students, schools are required to provide enough education aids.

(6) Schools are expected to enhance and improve curriculums.

(7) For night schools, appropriate lighting is required.
School Name
The name of the school must be appropriate.

Title
Following accreditation from the prefectural authorities and the governor, the schools will be permitted to display the certification.

Miscellaneous school administration
If the owner has other business enterprises, the school administration must be carried out separately.

The founder of the school must have experience in education or be suitable to oversee the administration (MEXT 2009).
Appendix B

SCAPIN-33: PRESS CODE FOR JAPAN 1945/09/19

1. News must adhere strictly to the truth.

2. Nothing should be printed which might, directly or indirectly, disturb the public tranquility.

3. There shall be no false or destructive criticism of the Allied Powers.

4. There shall be no destructive criticism of the Allied Occupation and nothing which might invite mistrust or resentment of those troops.

5. There shall be no mention or discussion of Allied troop movements unless such movements have been officially released.

6. News stories must be factually written and completely devoid of editorial opinion.

7. News stories shall not be colored to conform with any propaganda line.

8. Minor details of a news story must not be over-emphasized to stress or develop any propaganda line.

9. No news story shall be distorted by the omission of pertinent facts or details.

10. In the make-up of the newspaper no news story shall be given undue prominence for the purpose of establishing or developing any propaganda line.
Appendix C

Survey on the Education of Foreign Children living in Foreign Countries (Nihon Kyōiku-kai Kyōiku Seido Kenkyū Iinkai 1972, 83-132)

1) Are there any foreign schools?
   35 countries replied the affirmative.
2) Are the schools approved or registered by the state?
   Out of 35 countries 17 countries replied that foreign schools must be
   approved by the state, nine must be registered and seven no
   requirements.
3) What are the laws on foreign schools?
   23 countries replied that foreign schools are required by law to be
   approved or registered.
4) What judicial office supervises the schools?
   19 countries replied that foreign schools are supervised by the national
   government.
5) What types of schools are permitted?
   23 countries have special regulations for approval and registration. In
   the case of Finland, Indonesia, and Thailand universities for foreigners
   are not permitted. In “Burma” only international schools are permitted.
   In Mexico, certain religious schools are banned.
6) What is the nationality of the principal(s)?
   In America, Brazilian, Peru, Taiwan, and Thailand the principals must
   be a citizen of the host country.
7) What are the nationalities of the teaching staff?
   In Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Finland, and the Philippines some of the staff
   must be citizens of the host country.
8) What are the qualifications of the teaching staff?
   In America, Argentina, Brazil Mexico, Bolivia, France, Indonesia,
   Philippines, Thailand, and Iran must have teaching qualifications in the
   country.
9) Are there any restrictions on the curriculums and/or textbooks?
   Fourteen countries impose restrictions.
a) Peru, Bolivia, and Finland- the curriculum must be approved by the national government.
b) Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Finland- the curriculum must conform to public schools in the host country.
c) Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Finland, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand- the textbooks are screened or accredited by the Ministry of Education.
d) Peru, Finland, Thailand- the language of education must be the national language.
e) Peru, Finland, Indonesia, Thailand, Iran, Israel- compulsory study of the host country’s national language.
f) Peru, Finland, Indonesia, Thailand, and Israel- compulsory history lessons of the host country.
g) Peru, Finland, Indonesia, Thailand- compulsory geography lessons of the host country.
h) Peru, Finland, Thailand- compulsory religious or morals classes of the host country.

10) What are the graduates’ qualifications?

21 countries replied that graduates can matriculate to universities in the host country.
Appendix D


Purpose

Article 1- this law is for the education of foreign children in Japan. Japan aims to foster international goodwill through foreign schools. Furthermore, foreign schools must foster harmony and promote Japan’s national interests.

Foreign Schools

Article 2- foreign schools are institutions to educate non-Japanese citizens.

(2) Offer more than one year of education.

(3) Class hours as required by law.

(4) More than 40 students.

Education in Foreign Schools

Article 3- Schools must promote cordial international relations. Schools that do not promote international goodwill, obstruct, disobey laws, criticize or act against Japan’s national interest will not be permitted to operate.

Establishment of Schools

Article 4- Foreign Schools must satisfy the following conditions:

(2) Adequate economic resources to operate the school.

(3) Administrators must be experienced.

(4) Administrators must be socially esteemed.
Headmasters and Teachers

Article 5- Foreign Schools must have headmasters and teachers. The headmasters and teachers must satisfy the requirements of article 9 in the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education.

Foundation and Accreditation

Article 6- The establishment of foreign schools, closure, changes in directors, or objectives must be authorized by the Minister for Education.

(2) On receiving an application for accreditation, the Minister for Education must ensure the conditions stipulated in article 2 to article 5 have been fulfilled.

(3) Changes in school circumstances must comply with requirements for accreditation

(4) If the Minister for Education denies an application, the applicants must be allowed to explain and submit relevant documents.

(5) If the Minister for Education denies an application, he/she must provide written reasons to the applicant

Corrective Order

Article 7- If a corrective order is to be enforced the opinions of the Private School Council must be adhered to.

Restrictions

Article 8- The MOE can demand the foreign schools comply with laws that have been violated

Closure Law

Article 9- The Minister for Education retains the right to order foreign schools that have violated the law and failed to adhere to the terms in Article (1) issue an order to close the school.
(2) Before the Minister for Education issues a closure law, the foreign school officials will be offered an opportunity to explain.

(3) When the Minister of Education issues a closure law concerning violations of Article 1 school officials will be notified with a reason in writing.

Notification and/or Inspections

Article 10- For foreign schools to comply with Article (1) when necessary the Minister of Education will notify the school. Also, the Minister for Education retains the right to make inspections to confirm the specifications of Article (2) are being obeyed.

(2) Inspections will be conducted when the Minister for Education detects that the stipulations in Article (1) and (2) are infringed.

(3) When inspections are executed, the Ministry of Education officials will carry identification and on request provide identification.

(4) Inspections regarding infringements of Article (1) and (2) must not be comprehended as criminal investigations.

Order to stop classes

Article 11- the Minister of Education can notify foreign schools without accreditation to make an application. However, the schools must apply within a month.

(2) The Minister of Education can order schools that failed accreditation criteria to comply with the standards.

(3) Article 9 (2) (before the Minister for Education issues a closure law, the foreign school officials will be offered a chance to explain) will apply in this case.

Delegation of authority

Article 12- Under the Minister for Education the prefectural governors will be delegated limited authority.
Penalties

Article 13- Schools that violate Article 9 (the Minister for Education retains the right to order foreign schools that have violated the law and failed to adhere to the terms in Article (1) issue an order to close the school) or Article 11 (2) (the Minister of Education can order schools that failed accreditation criteria to comply with the standards) are liable to 6 months in prison or 10,000 yen in fines.

Article 14- The Schools that do not comply with Article 10 (1) (for foreign schools to comply with Article (1) when necessary the Minister for Education shall be notified. Also, the Ministry of Education retains the right to make inspections of the schools to confirm the specifications of Article (2) are being obeyed) or Article 10 (2) (Inspections will be conducted when the Minister for Education detects that the specifications or Article (1) and (2) are infringed) and do not report, file a false report or do not allow, obstruct inspections will be liable to fines of 5000 yen.
Appendix E

Japan Federation of Bar Association- Statement on Subject High Schools of the Free Tuition Bill (Miyazaki 2010).

A bill to waive tuition for students at public high schools and to provide subsidies to private high school students, the so-called “Free High School Tuition Bill,” was submitted this Diet session and the government is considering whether or not North Korean schools should be covered under this bill because Japan is imposing sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

However, the main purpose of this bill is to contribute to the creation of equal educational opportunities by alleviating the financial burdens of high school education. Educational opportunities should not be affected by political or diplomatic matters and should be guaranteed for children studying at North Korean schools as well.

Also, there is reportedly an opinion that the curricula of North Korean schools are unable to be confirmed. However, it is easy to research their curricula as related information was submitted when they applied for accreditation as miscellaneous schools and also the curricula are available on the school websites. It should be noted that most universities have granted entrance qualifications to graduates of North Korean schools.

If this bill excludes students of North Korean schools, and unfairly treats them differently from those at high schools, specialized training schools, international schools, and Chinese schools, it would violate the right to secondary education and the right to ethnic education based on equality under the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan. Furthermore, it is discrimination prohibited by the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and no reason can justify this discrimination.

The Japan Federation of Bar Associations strongly urges that North Korean schools are not unfairly excluded from the application of the Free High School Tuition Bill.
GLOSSARY

Organizations

*Airin-kai* 愛隣会  
*Baekdu Hagwon* 白頭学院  
*Bankaku Yagako* 晩覚夜学校  
*Bengakuin* 勉学院  
*Chōgin* 朝銀信用組合  
*Chongryun* 在日本朝鮮人總聯合會/재일본조선인총련합회  
*Chōren* 朝聯 在日本朝鮮人連盟, 재일조선인련맹  
*Chōsen Gakkō* 朝鮮学校  
*Chōsenjin Shinshin-kai* 朝鮮人新進会  
Democratic Party of Japan 民主党  
*Fusei Gakuin* 普成学院  
*Governor-General Police Affairs Division* 朝鮮総督府警務総監保案課  
*Gwangju Student Independence Movement* 光州 学生運動  
*Hagu Seobang* 学友書房  
*Hokuseikai* 北星会  
*Ichigetsukai* 一月会  
*Interior Ministry of Security* 内務省警保局長  
*Japan National Union Council of Trade Unions* 日本労働組合全国協議会 加盟  
*Japanese Communist Party* 日本共産党  
*Japanese Labor Union Zenkyo* 全協  
*Jungang Choryeon Sabeom Hakkyo* 中央朝聯朝鮮師範  
*Kankoku* 韓国  
*Kansai Kyōmei Gakuin* 共鳴学院  
*Kazoku-kai* 家族会  
*Keonguk school* 建国学校  
*Kinka Seinen-kai* 槿華青年会  
*Kokutōkai* 黒潮会  
*Korea University* 朝鮮大学  
*Korean Christian Church Youth League* 大阪朝鮮人基督教青年会  
*Korean division of the Special High-ranking Agency* 特別高等警察  
*Korean Education Association in Japan (KEA)* 在日朝鮮人教育会  
*Korean Labor Union in Japan- Osaka Korea Labor Branch* 在日本朝鮮労總同盟大阪 朝鮮労働組合  
*Korean School PTA Federation* 在日本朝鮮人学校 PTA 連合会  
*Korean Student League in Japan* 在日本朝鮮李留学同盟  
*Korean Teacher’s League* 在日本朝鮮教育者同盟  
*Kyōshin-kai* 協進会
Kyōwakai 協和会
Liberal Democratic Party 自由民主党
Mindan Korean Residents Union in Japan 在日朝鮮人居留民団
Minohara Gakuin 耳原学院
Minshūtō 民主党
Modang Yeonpil 봉당연필
Minsen 民戦
Naisen Doaikai 内鮮同愛会大和田支部
Naisen Dōshikai 内鮮同志会
Naisen Kyōwakai 内鮮協和会
Osaka branch of the Korean Youth League 在日朝鲜青年同盟大阪支部
Ōsaka Chōsenjin Kyōkai 大阪朝鮮人協会
Osaka Choseon Sabeom Hakkyō 大阪朝鮮師範
Osaka Eishin-kai 大阪栄信用
Osaka Korean Labor Association 大阪朝鮮労同盟会
Osaka Korean Student Association 朝鮮人留学生大阪学友会
Osaka Rōka Gakuin 浪華学院
Sangetsukai 三月会
Seiji-han Shakuhō Undō Renmei 政治犯釈放運動促進連盟
Seishin Yagakkō 誠信夜学
Singanhoe 新幹会
Shinkō Kagaku Kenkyūkai 新興科学研究会
Sōaikai 相愛会
Social Democratic Party 社会民主党
Social Division in the Ministry of Home Affairs 内務省社会局
Sukuu-kai 救う会
Takada Gakuin 高田学院
Tōkyō Chōsen Musan Seinen Dōmeikai 東京朝鮮無産青年同盟会
Tokyo Korean Labor Association 東京労働同盟会
Uri Haggyeo wa Aideul eul Jiki n Shimin Moim 우리학교와 아이들을 지키는 시민모임
Zainihon Chōsenjin Renmei 在日本朝鮮人連盟
Zainichi Korean Worker’s Union in Japan 在日日本朝鮮労働同盟
Zai Nihon Chōsen Kyoryū Mindan 在日本朝鮮居留民団
Zai Nihon Kankoku Kyoryū Mindan 在日本韓国居留民団

Terms
“A Visit to the Chōson Sinbo” チョウソン新報社を訪ねて
“Accessible ethnic education” 開かれた民族教育
Alien Registration Order 外国人登録令
“An issue relating to compulsory school attendance for Korean children” 朝鮮人児童
“Education at the Self-styled Korean University” いわゆる朝鮮大学の教育について
“Education to promote ethnic awareness and international understanding” 民族の自覚と国際感覚を持った人材育成
Fundamental Law of Education 教育基本法
Foreign School Administration Grant 外国人学校運営費補助金
Foreign Schools Facility Improvement Grant 在日外国人施設整備補助金
Foreigners’ School System 外国人学校制度
Fundamental Law of Education 教育基本法
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Foreign Schools Facility Improvement Grant 在日外国人施設整備補助金
Foreigners’ School System 外國
Heike Monogatari  平家物語
Ichiji Kisen Shōmei Seido  一時帰鮮証明制度
Imperial Oath  皇国臣民ノ誓詞
Imperial Order  勅令
Imperial citizens  帝国公民
Imperial subjects  帝国臣民
Imperial system of education  天皇制教育
In the Heart of the Fatherland  帰国学生手紙集・祖国のふところの中で
Internal civic diplomacy  内なる民際
Isshidōjin  一視同仁
Japanese travel certificates  渡航証明書
Japan and Republic Korea Treaty of Basic Relations  日韓基本条約
Japan Senior High-school Sports Federation  高体連
Joseon Kingdom  朝鮮王朝
Juche  主体
Kim Il Sung Patriotic Movement Research Centre  金日成元師愛国活動研究室
Kōjō-hō  工場法
Kōminka  皇民化
Korean Education Ordinance  朝鮮教育令
Korean Youth League  朝鮮少年団
Kyōtei Eijū - 協定永住
Kyōwakai booklets  協和会手帳
Law Regarding Financial support for Senior High School Students  高等学校等就学支援金の支給に関する法律
Loyal subject and a Traitor  忠臣奸臣
Manpower Mobilization Ordinance (国家総動員法)
Man'yōshū waka  万葉集
Matters for Consideration when Issuing Subsidies to Joseon Schools  朝鮮学校に係わる補助金交付に関する留意点について
Miscellaneous schools  各種学校
Modern Korean Revolutionary History  現代革命史
Moriyama Joseon school  守山朝鮮学校
Multicultural symbiotic society  共生社会
“My brother from Korea”  朝鮮からきた弟
Notification regarding the Education of Korean Children in Japan  在日朝鮮人子弟の教育に関する文部次官通達
National Studies  国民化
Oath of Imperial Rescript on Education  教育に関する勅語
“On how to handle schools established by Koreans” (朝鮮人設立学校の取り扱いについて)
Other Travel Sketches  奥の細道
Our Beloved Leader  敬愛なる首領様
One Hundred Year Education Struggle 100 年の民族教育闘争
Pachinko Giwaku パチンコ疑惑
Private Foreign School Endorsement Subsidy 私立外国人学校振興補助金
Private School Administration Grant 私立学校運営補助金
Private School Education and Research Grant 教育研究補助金
Private School Expense Grant 私立学校経常費補助金
“Problems Concerning Accrediting the Korea University 朝鮮大学認可をめぐる問題
Procedures for Korean Immigration 朝鮮人移住の対策
“Regarding the establishment of Joseon schools” 朝鮮人の学校設置に関する件
“Regarding the Handling of Educational Facilities for Koreans 朝鮮人のみを収容する教育施設の取り扱いについて
“Regarding the setting up of Joseon schools” 朝鮮人学校の開設について
Regular schools 一条校
Sangokujin 三国人
School Education Law 学校教育法
Self-Explosive Spirit 自爆精神
Silla 新羅
Special Permanent Residents 特別永住
Spring in my Hometown 高향의 봄
Standard Chinese characters 当用漢字
“Surmounting ethnic divisions, Korean mothers serve ethnic food to tired and hungry Japanese in evacuation centers” 飢え疲れた日本人に・オモニの味振る舞う・在日コリアン民族の壁を越えて救助活動をしている
The Tale of the Bamboo Cutter 竹取物語
Tokō Shōkaijō Hakkyū Seido (渡航紹介状発給制度)
“The Curriculum at the Chongryun schools- the Reality of Anti-Japanese Education” 朝鮮総連系朝鮮人学校の居育内容について－反日教育の実態
“The Perilous Education at the self-styled Korean University” いわゆる朝鮮大学の教育の危険性
Tokyo Joseon Junior and Senior High School Building Committee 東京朝鮮中高学校新校舎建設委員会
Tōsō 通知
Tsūtatsu 通達
Tuition Waiver Ordinance 省令改正
Tuition Waiver Program 高校授業料無償化・就学支援金支給制度
University Entrance Qualification Certificate Examination Daiken 大学検定試験
“Why Korea University cannot be Approved-Our Thoughts and Problems” 朝鮮大学はなぜ認可出来ないか－我々の考えとその問題
Youth School Order 青少年学徒ニ賜ハリタル勅語
Zainichi style Korean language 在日朝鮮人式朝鮮語
Zainichi 在日
Names

Abe Shinzo 安倍晋三
Abe Tomoko 阿部知子
Ahn Changho 安昌浩
Aikawa Katsuroku 相川勝六
Akama Bunzo 赤間文三
Akutagawa Ryūnosuke 芥川龍之介
An U-sik 安宇植
Aoki Shigeru 青木繁
Aoyagi Ichirō 青柳一
Araki Masuo 荒木万寿夫
Ashida Hitoshi 芦田 均
Bak Han-jong 朴漢鎬
Bak Hyeon-nam 朴炯南
Bak I-sang 朴熙成
Bak Jun-gun 朴春琴
Bak San-deuk 朴尚得
Bak Seong-ho 朴盛浩
Bak Sun-yeong 朴俊栄
Bae Yeong-ae 裵永愛 Baek Gwan-su 白寛洙
Baeck Seong-bo 白星保
Bu Yeon-uk 夫永旭
Chae Su-gang 蔡洙鋼
Cheon Jong-gyu 千宗圭
Cho Man-sik 曹晩植
Choe Hyeon-bae 崔鉉培
Choe Yong-gun 崔瑢根
Choe Yu-gi 崔由紀
Choi Seung-hee 崔 承喜
Chung Yang-mo 鄭寅普
Eun Mu-am 殷武岩
Eo Dang 魚塘
Fukuda Shigeru 福田繁
Fuse Tatsuji 布施達治
Gang Ji-sam 康智三
Geo Geo -geon 高健輔
Goto Teiji 後藤 貞二
Han Deok-su 韓德錫
Han Jun-u 韓春愚
Han Sorya 韓雪野
Han Yong-un 韓龍雲
Hase Hiroshi 馳 浩
Hashimoto Toru’s 橋本徹
Hatano Kanji 波多野完治
Hatoyama Ichirō 鳩山一郎
Heo Nam-gi 許南麒
Hidaka Daishiro 日高第四郎
Hokusai Katsushika 葛飾北斎
Hong Deung 洪登
Hong Myong-hui 洪命熹
Hong Nan-pa 洪蘭波
Hoshina Zenshirō 保科善四郎
I Gi-dong 李起東
Im Gwang-cheol 林光徹
Im Yeong-sun 任英俊
Ishii Tomoyuki 石井友幸
Ishikawa Takuboku 石川啄木
Jang Ji-pil 張志喆
Jang Jun-Ha 張淳哈
Jeon Hyeong-pil 鄭亨澤
Jeong Gu-il 鄭圭一
Jeong Yeon-chang 鄭然昌
Jo Bong-am 趙奉岩
Jo Yeong-sang 姜永祥
Kan Naoto 菅直人
Kang Kyeong-ae 姜敏愛
Kang Man-gil 姜萬吉
Kawabata Tatsuo 川端達夫
Kawasaki Daiji 川崎大治
Kennoki Toshihiro 劔木 亨弘
Kim Chang-ok 金昌玉
Kim Chang-hyeon 金昌鉉
Kim Chan-sik 金昌式
Kim Chwa-chin 金佐鎮
Kim Gu-bae 金具培
Kim Gyeong-hwan 金京煥
Kim Gyu 金九
Kim Il Sung 金日成
Kim Jang-an 金長安
Kim Sang-gi 金尚起
Kim Sang-gu 金相求
Kim Saryan 金史良
Kim Seong-jin 金成津
Kim Sun-eon 金順彦
Kim Taeil 金太一
Kim Tal-su 金達寿
Kim Un-sun 金恩順
Kim Yeong-ung 金英雄
Kim Yong-kwan 金容瓘
Kim Yu-yeong 金裕永
Kinoshiba Junji 木下順二
Kishi Nobusuke 岸信介
Kishida Sachio 岸田幸雄
Kitahara Hakushū 北原白秋
Ko Jun-seok 高峻石
Kobayashi Takeshi 小林武
Kodera Kenkichi 小寺謙吉
Kokubun Ichitaro 国分 一太郎
Kon Huino 権嬉老
Kunikida Doppo 国木田独歩
Laozi 老子
Lee Won Soo 이원수
Lyuh Woon-hyung 呂運亨
Mak A-naen 막아네요
Masumoto Teruaki 増元照明
Mataichi Seiji 又一征治
Mencius 孟子
Minami Jirō 南次郎
Minobe Tatsukichi 美濃部 亮吉
Miyazaki Makoto 宮崎誠
Miyazawa Kenji 宮沢賢治
Mori Ogai 森森鷗外
Morito Tatsuo 森戸辰夫
Muku Hatojū 榛鳩十
Mun Ik-hwan 문익환
Na Woon-gyu 羅雲奎
Nadao Hirokichi 灘尾弘吉
Maekawa Kihei 前川喜平
Nakai Hiroshi 中井治
Nakamoto Kazuhiro 中本和洋
Nakamura Umekichi 中村梅吉
Nakano Kansei 中野寛成
Nam Il 南日
Nam Seung-u 南昇祐
Namekawa Shintarō 滑川新太郎
Nishino Koichi 西野弘一
O Hyeong-cheon 呉亨鎬
O Seok-gwan 呉澤寬
Oka Kunio 岡邦雄
Ōuchi Hyōe 大内兵衛
Ōtsu Hideo 大津英夫
Paek Nam-un 白南雲
Pak Kyŏng Sik 朴慶植
Pak Yol 朴烈
Ri Bon-chang 李奉昌
Ri Chan-ui 李贊義
Ri Cheong-cheon 李暎天
Ri Deok-Gyu 李德九
Ri Eun-chik 李殷直
Ri Geug-no 李克魯
Ri Hyeon-sang 李現상
Ri Heun-yeol 李興烈
Ri In-su 李仁洙
Ri Jin-gyu 李珍珪
Ri Ki-yong 李箕永
Ri Sang-yo 李相堯
Ri Sim-cheol 李心
Ri Sung Gi 李升基
Rim Gwang-cheol 林光徹
Saitō Makoto 斉藤実
Sato Eisaku 佐藤栄作
Shida Yoshinobu 志田義信
Shiga Naoya 志賀直哉
Shiikuma Saburo 椎熊三郎
Shimazaki Tōson 島崎藤村
Shimomura Hakubun 下村博文
Sin Gil-ung 善吉雄
Sin Hong-sik 申鴻
Song Gi-hak 宋枝學
Sohn Kee-chung 孫基禎
Song Kŏn-ho 宋健鎬
Sōseki Natsume 夏目漱石
Suga Yoshihide 菅義偉
Sugie Kiyoshi 杉江清
Sumi Keiko 角圭子
Suzuki Kan 鈴木寛
Suzuki Masashi 鈴木正四
Takagi Yoshiaki 高木義明
Takahashi Kihachirō 高橋喜八郎
Tanaka Keishu 田中慶秋
Tanaka Makiko 田中真紀子
Tanaka Tatsuo 田中龍夫
Tauchi Masahiro 田内正宏
Uchida’s Risako 内田 莉莎子
Woo Jang-choon 우장춘
Yamamoto Rihei 山本利平
Yamashita Yoshiki 山下 芳生
Yi Dong-hwi 李東輝
Yi Eungro 이응로
Yo Un-Hyung 呂運亨
Yokota Sakie 橫田早紀江
Yokota Shigeru 橫田滋
Yoshie Katsuyasu 吉江勝保
Yoshiie Hiroyuki 義家弘介
Yun Bong-gil 윤봉길
Yu Chin-u 兪鎮午
Yun Deok-hon 尹德昆
Yun Dong-ju 金東柱
Yun Gi-Seon 尹紀善
Yun Gyeon-Won 尹見遠
Yun Mu-sun 尹武俊
Yun Seong-ju 尹成柱
Zhou Baozhong 周保中
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