Fate of Pedantocracy: The Idea of Government by Intellect in the Nineteenth-Century Japan and Europe

Kōichirō Matsuda

1 John Stuart Mill and the concept of pedantocracy
2 Pedantocracy and the image of China
3 Debate on Elite Formation under the Tokugawa Regime
4 Meiji thinkers and pedantocracy
Conclusions

This paper aims to examine how the idea of government by educated elite was introduced and affected the Japanese political thought in the early Meiji period. In exploring this topic, firstly, I will focus on a term ‘pedantocracy’. Its coinage and background will give us a clear view of the intellectual atmosphere in the process of governmental rationalization in the nineteenth century Europe. Related to this point, I will examine how an image of ‘Chinese mandarin system’ was symbolically discussed in the mid nineteenth century Europe. Through examining these two points, how the idea of educated elite’s rule was discussed and developed in the Western intellectuals will make clear. Then, I will analyze how Japanese intellectuals accepted and modified the Western ideas on the government by intellectual elite in order to accommodate it to the actual condition in Japan.

1 John Stuart Mill and the concept of pedantocracy

‘Pedantocracy’ is a term which has been almost replaced by other term like ‘meritocracy’ for pointing the unfavorable rule by highly educated elite. However, ‘pedantocracy’ presented an ambivalent interest shared by the European intellectuals in the nineteenth century. While a body of educated elite who took charge of administration was indispensable for building an efficient government system, it was not acceptable for liberal intellectuals to praise the elitist rule without reservation.

It was John Stuart Mill who coined the word ‘pedantocracy’. The term was first appeared in the letter to August Comte of 25 February 1842

Apart from the serious degradation that political rule would quickly bring
about in the moral and intellectual customs of the speculative class \([\text{of philosophers}]\), it seems to me that such rule would in no way favor the intellectual progress which doubtless it was basically dreamed up to bring about. I find the example of China to provide excellent support for this view. In that country the structure of government comes perhaps as close as possible to Saint-Simon’s theory \([\text{of the rule of philosophers}]\), and with what result? A government most opposed to any kind of progress. The majority of an educated class may well be less disposed than any other to be led by the most advanced minds in its midst; and since this majority would doubtless be composed, not of great thinkers, but simply of scholars or of scientists lacking true originality, there could result only what one finds in China, a pedantocracy.

Comte’s reply of 4 March 1842 to this letter showed how much he was impressed by Mill’s neologism.

With reference to the basic principle, I cannot thank you enough for your profound and lucid analysis, expressed concisely and decisively in your valuable letter. You summed it up so well in your happy concept of pedantocracy to describe the dangerous utopia of the supposed rule of the spirit. I judge essentially, as you do, the irrefutable example of China. The need for and the nature of the continued antagonism \([\text{between the temporal and the spiritual}]\), without which human development is inconceivable, have, so it seems to me, never been better felt and better expressed. I am firmly convinced that in philosophical renewal the most difficult step is to bring about a real union of two truly original intellects; you can, therefore, imagine what great hope such an agreement \([\text{between us}]\) leads me quite logically to anticipate.

Then Mill used the term in one of his major works, *On Liberty*.

If we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of functionaries—above all a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements—if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind.

What was the background of Mill’s intention in discussing ‘pedantocracy’ prob-
lem? As the Mill’s letter which I previously cited shows, in the context of the French influence on Mill’s thought, his neologism can be understood as an expression of Mill’s departure from his early influence under the Saint-Simonism. In his early years, Mill was strongly attracted by the idea of entrusting the governing to the meritocratic elite. However, as his study of the French historiography and social science, especially the works of Guizot and Tocqueville, became deepened, he changed his opinion and started to alert the threat of the new type of tyranny—the bureaucratic elite’s despotism.

Coinage and uses of ‘pedantocracy’ had strong relevance to the political context of the time, too. There were controversies on the reform of the recruitment procedure of the British domestic and colonial civil services. Although the term ‘pedantocracy’ was not often used in the public discourse of the time, the topic such as ‘patronage versus merit’ was frequently appeared. ‘Merit’ was one of the key terms in the debate. For example, Lord Macaulay was one of the leaders who wanted to promote the ‘merit’ principle in the recruitment of civil servants. To this reformists’ plan, the opposition side criticized it as ‘wise despotism’ or ‘government by book worms’. Robert Lowe, one of the leading persons who promoted the competitive examination of the civil service recruitment, was attacked as a leader of ‘theorists’ whose principles were fundamentally alien to ‘the practical English people.’ The group who advocated the open competitive examination were denounced that they intended to ‘administer this country on the Chinese system.’

It was not only from the anti-reformists side but also from within the reformists that the attack against the idea of government by intellectual merit was made. Their criticism was not because the idea was ‘alien,’ but because it contained a potential threat to their democratic creed. For example, on the civil service reform issue, while Mill was apparently on the reformist’s side, he repeatedly alerted that one must not be too optimistic with the idea of government by superior intellect. In his On Liberty, he alerted that if the government attracted all the talented part of the nation, and if the education successfully achieved the supply of those talents to the central power, all the governed would become slaves of the intellectually superior governing power, and the men in the government institution would become slaves of the organization itself.

Using the term ‘public sprit,’ the similar way of discussion appeared in his Principles of Political Economy (1848).

There cannot be a combination of circumstances more dangerous to human
welfare, than that in which intelligence and talent are maintained at a high standard within a governing corporation, but starved and discouraged outside the pale. Such a system, more completely than any other, embodies the idea of despotism, by arming with intellectual superiority as an additional weapon those who have already the legal power. . . . The only security against political slavery is the check maintained over governors by the diffusion of intelligence, activity, and public spirit among the governed.  

Mill maintained that when the governing body monopolized the talent and intellect of the society, and, in consequence, when those merits became waned in the society outside the governing body, it must lead to the most dangerous condition for the nation’s well being. It would be the most powerful despotism with power and intellectual superiority reigning over the political slavery with no public spirit.  

Mills’ argument had a unique feature compared with the other comments in the debate in England. Mill was under the influence of the contemporary French thinkers. Francois Guizot's *Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe* was the most important of them. Under the influence of Guizot, Mill developed the idea of ‘systematic antagonism.’ Mill wrote that this principle was ‘the only condition under which stability and progressiveness can be permanently reconciled to one another.’ He stressed that this ‘antagonism’ was essential for the development of the European civilization. According to Mill’s explanation of Guizot’s main idea, this systematized ‘antagonism’ made the ‘co-ordinate action among rival powers’ possible and it caused ‘the spirit of improvement’ or ‘kept the human mind alive’ in Europe.  

Though basically accepting the idea of Guizot on the advantage of the European civilization, Mill stressed that the contemporary Europe was under the crisis of falling into predicament because European civilization was losing its ‘antagonism’ of different principles. We can also see the influence of Tocqueville to Mill in this sense of crisis. However, while Tocqueville saw the pernicious effect of the loss of antagonism primarily in the democratic-egalitarian tendencies of the American society Mill saw it in the contemporary condition of Europe or especially Britain.  

Although it is clear that French thinkers were the major intellectual sources for Mill in forming the idea of ‘pedantocracy’, it should be assumable that, without Mill’s coinage of the term, French thinkers might not have succeeded in clearly defining the pernicious tendency of the times toward the new type of despotism. That was the reason why Auguste Comte replied to Mill that he had strong ‘philosophical sympathy’ with the term ‘pedantocracy’ and asked a permission to use the term in his
books. It should be noted that, ironically, Comte used that term to attack Guizot who was greatly influential to the national education of France.

2 Pedantocracy and the image of China

China was frequently associated with ‘pedantocracy’ in Mill’s works and letters. For Mill, China was a country which featured all the essential factors of ‘pedantocracy.’

If the lettered and cultivated class, embodied and disciplined under a central organ could become in Europe, what it is in China, the Government unchecked by any power residing in the mass of citizens, and permitted to assume a parental tutelage over the operations of life the result would probably be a darker despotism, one more opposed to improvement, than even the military monarchies and aristocracies have in fact proved.

The problem of ‘pedantocracy’ was not only in the dominance of intellectual elite without being checked by other parties, but also in that this system was established on ‘the complete victory of one of the contending principles.’ This type of government absorbed ‘all the principal ability’ of the society and it would destroy ‘the mental activity and progressiveness’ of the government itself. In this sense, ‘A Chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator’.

Mill’s case was not just another example of liberals who criticized Oriental despotism in order to praise the Western liberalism. His statements on China presented a different point from his attack on the Oriental despotism in a wider sense. When Mill discussed the topic of Oriental despotism, he often mentioned India as well as China. However, for elaborating the idea of ‘systematic antagonism’ in contrast to the precariousness of the stagnated society, the example of China was more useful than that of India. He used the image of China in order to characterize a totally stagnated society which governed by a body of high intellect.

Moreover, for Mill, the ironical effect of the mandarin system was an urgent question to be considered. British liberals generally favoured the ‘merit’ for selecting governing elite. However, Mill had a strong concern with the idea of constituting a powerful meritocratic government. Therefore Mill tried to portray the mandarin system as an obstacle for the progress of society not because of its lack of efficiency or intellect, but of its failure to maintain the balance and diversity in the society.
The basic idea of Mill's discussion had obvious affinity with the theory of Guizot, however, the uses of the example of China seems to have been derived from other sources. As Guizot did not use the example of China, Tocqueville was more likely to be the source of Mill's idea. Tocqueville asserted that the perfect administrative centralization had made China a completely listless society, if he did not discuss the problem of centralization of the intellectual elite.

China appears to me to present the most perfect instance of that species of well-being which a completely central administration may furnish to the nations among which it exists. Travellers assure us that the Chinese have peace without happiness, industry without improvement, stability without strength, and public order without public morality. The condition of society is always tolerable, never excellent. I am convinced that, when China is opened to European observation, it will be found to contain the most perfect model of a central administration which exists in the universe.

Tocqueville's characterization of China should be evocative for Mill's consideration on the boundary of the central government. Mill's evaluation of centralization was ambivalent. As is well known, Mill asserted that the ideal standard for the relation between the central government and the local governments should be 'the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the centre'.

It was not only from Tocqueville, but also from the eighteenth century thinkers that Mill adopted the image of Chinese society. For example, Hume presented China as an empire which had 'a pretty considerable stock of politeness and science' but 'so slow a progress' in the science because of the complete uniformity of the society and of the too strong 'authority of any teacher'. Rousseau used China as a good example for his criticism of the science and art as the cause of the moral corruption.

There is in Asia an immense land where Letters are honoured and lead to the foremost dignities of State. If the Sciences purified morals, if they taught men to shed their blood for the Fatherland, if they animated courage, then the Peoples of China should be wise, free, and invincible. But if there is not a single vice that does not rule them; not a single crime that is unfamiliar to them; ... What benefits has China derived from all the honors bestowed upon them?
As several studies have discussed, China image in the eighteenth century European thinkers in general was much more idealized than Hume or Rousseau’s cases. For many of the French Enlightenment thinkers, China was a successful case of well-ordered statecraft without disturbances by religious struggles. Mill seems to have taken over the critical type of images of China and arranged them to describe his anxieties with his contemporary problem. For Mill, the contradiction among elite formation, a free government, and a progressive society was gravely serious.

3 Debate on Elite Formation under the Tokugawa Regime

Mill’s usage of China image functioned to guide Japanese intellectuals of the early Meiji period into the problem of elite formation and the modern state building. Before we examine the Meiji intellectuals thought on the topic, an overview of Tokugawa discussion on the mandarin system must be indispensable.

Despite the fact that China has always been the influential cultural source for Japanese society, Tokugawa government had never adopted Chinese bureaucracy recruitment system. Amenomori Hoshū (1668–1755), a Confucian scholar, a linguist of Chinese and Korean languages and a diplomat of Tsushima, criticized the examination system of the governing elite in China and Korea. He commended the flexible Samurai bureaucrats’ recruitment and promotion procedure in Japan as much better than the open competition by cram, bookish candidates in China because the Japanese system was a well-balanced mixture of the heritage principle and the merit principle. According to Amenomori, in the Japanese system, colleagues would understand the new member’s talent and character better because they could know each other in their closed society under the heritage system of Samurai bureaucrats of the Tokugawa regime. This sense of closeness was more valuable than screening the candidates by the examination of bookish knowledge.

The shortage of talented men in the government, jinzai in Japanese, of both Tokugawa and feudal lords, was one of the persistent problems especially after the later eighteenth century when the demand of public service grew higher with the development of complexity of the society. However, the demand for the reform of the Samurai bureaucracy organization did never raise the demand for the meritorocratic rule. The priority was not shifted from ‘birth’ to ‘merit’, but from ‘birth’ to ‘moral’. It is true that the contents of moral was quite ambiguous, still this ‘moralization’ of the reformers’ claims was the main current of the discussion of elite formation or the reconsideration of the relation between power and knowledge.

Karashima Ensei (1754–1839), a Neo-Confucianist scholar in the late Tokugawa
period, is one good example. He maintained that it was totally wrong to identify the education for making a man of merit with the training of administrative skills. For him the core of the education for the samurai bureaucrat must always be moral education, even though he admitted that teaching of technical knowledge should also be necessary. However, his statement met the trend of meritocracy as long as it was based on the idea that the quality of governing elites should be formed by the formal education rather than practical experience or family circumstances.

In contrast, Aizawa Seishisai (1781–1863) a leading ideologue of Mito school, stressed the virtue of leadership for the qualification of governing elite. Aizawa stated that morality did not mean the decency in everyday life nor religious life. Instead, responsibility and well performance of governing itself was the true expression of morality. Therefore, Aizawa lamented that in his times government tasks were undertaken by lower clerks who only learned skills for routine or technical administration. He named that situation shori no yo, or ‘the world of petit clerks’. He also criticized that the Confucian scholars of his times wanted to be detached completely from the government task and they were never interested in the practical political decision or administration. They indulged in playing a game with abstract notions in the classics. Aizawa pointed this problem as ‘gakumon to jigyō no bunri’ or the separation of education and government affairs.

However, Aizawa did not see the selection by academic achievement would work for finding the men of leadership. Aizawa presupposed that every person must have a role in society according to his given attribution. By interpreting Mencius' phrase ‘good and wise men are in high office and able men are employed’, he explained that while ‘wise’ meant natural born morality, ‘able’ meant acquired skills. Therefore he concluded that wise men must occupy the higher position of decision making and skilled men must work under their control. He presented a kind of division of labor theory in which, for the well being of the whole society, each person must play a role. This point shows Aizawa’s divergence from the orthodox mandarin ideal and his affinity for the theory of Ogyū Sorai. Sorai maintained that everyone, even a farmer or a merchant, must play a role as one of yakunin or a man who has official duties and criticized Neo-Confucianism for it urged everyone to follow the same model of sages. Even though Aizawa’s statement obviously defended the hereditary system, what he emphasized was the importance of statesmanship distinguished from the skill for the efficient administration.

Yokoi Shōnan (1809–1869), a renowned Neo-Confucian scholar and political adviser to Matsudaira Shungaku, an influential feudal-lord statesman at Bakumatsu...
times, also maintained that the separation between scholars and government officers were causing harm to the state in the times of crisis. He called it the separation of virtue and practice. On the other hand, Yokoi criticized the tendency of excess of the competitive situation among ambitious and intellectual young students. Yokoi denounced that these young students wanted to be ‘useful talent’ excessively and preferred political debates in order to show their ability.

Institutionally, Tokugawa government had started to consider the educational achievement of samurai as a condition of promotion since the late eighteenth century. However, the achievement examination, *gakumon ginmi*, never functioned as a formal qualification for the promotion in the government. No statesman or adviser could define clearly the true merit of *jinzai* they wanted. Therefore, in the later Tokugawa period, the well-balanced combination of the moral education and the technical knowledge became very important but gravely difficult issue for those who sensed the crisis of the regime. Against this background that we have examined so far, the issue of pedantocracy was introduced into Japan from the West.

4 Meiji thinkers and pedantocracy

Though there have been several versions of the Japanese translation of John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty* since the mid-nineteenth century, translation of the word ‘pedantocracy’ has been carrying a problem. The first Japanese translation of J.S. Mill’s *On Liberty* was published in 1872. The translator was Nakamura Masanao who was originally a Neo-Confucian scholar employed by Tokugawa government but also had an experience of study in Britain. In Nakamura’s translation, ‘pedantocracy’ was explained as the autocratic rule by bureaucrats with boastfulness. Although his explanation could not be immune from missing the point of Mill’s discussion, his understanding of the chapter five of *On Liberty* seems almost appropriate, at least on the topic of the limitation of central government.

However, the case of Fukuzawa Yukichi shows a clearer capturing of the point made by Mill. In his *Gakumon no susume* (*Encouragement of Learning*) of 1874 which was one of the most widely circulated book of the times, Fukuzawa wrote:

The present government is not only powerful: it is very quick in intellect too and never misses a cue... And how should the people regard all this? They are all saying that the government has power—not only power, but sagacity. The government is something beyond their reach; it stands above the clouds to rule the land; the people stand below, and all they can do is to obey and depend upon
it. Concern for the country is the affair of those above; the people below have little to do with it! In short, the government in old times used power, but the present government uses both power and wisdom. The former governments were ineffective in controlling the people, but the present government is highly efficient in it. The former governments violated the people into submission; the present government controls their innerminds.

Here we clearly see that Mill’s discussion had a resonance in Fukuzawa. The necessity of elite formation, the distribution of active spirit in the varieties of fields in society, and preventing the wise despotism and mental slavery were all grave problems that Fukuzawa was concerned deeply.

Also, it was not just a statement of Fukuzawa’s critical position against Meiji government. His intention was broader than that. One of the critical comments to the Fukuzawa’s thesis by Nishi Amane revealed the locus of issue.

During the old Tokugawa regime, scholars had limited themselves to be separated from practical and political affairs. People who handled those practical works were skilled clerks, not scholars. However, in the new era, those who had academic education want to handle governmental affairs. Though some people call it an unpleasant trend, still this transformation can be valued as the progress of society if we compare it with the situation in the old regime.

This statement by Nishi proves that the critical point was not whether intellectuals should be independent from the political power or not. What Nishi asserted was that the government by educated elite was an favourable factor for the modernization of the society. Nishi gave priority to the formation of meritocratic government than the hazard caused by the excessive centralization of the educated talents. In contrast, Fukuzawa focused on the latter problem.

In discussing the problem of centralization, Fukuzawa used the image of China to give an example of a boastful but stationary state. As we have seen in the previous part of this paper, there had been some cases of critical comments on the Chinese government and society by Japanese thinkers since as early as mid-Tokugawa period. The criticism became stronger especially after the Opium War, but the ironical connection of the well organized mandarin system and the spiritless stationary society appeared in the public discussion after the Meiji Restoration. Fukuzawa used China symbolically to give a clear image of the excessively centralized society.
According to Fukuzawa, China was dominated by one political principle, one centralized power and stagnated mind of the people. In contrast to China, Japanese society had an advantage in that it had not been dominated by one principle or power. The examples as the relation between the warrior government and the imperial rule, or the coexistence of different schools of thought and religion were given to prove the Japanese inherent capacity to build a dynamic society. Fukuzawa wanted to prove the existence of ‘the systematic antagonism’ in the Japanese history. Fukuzawa valued the condition of \textit{taji} (literally ‘many cases and events’) that meant ‘pluralism of social values and groups in livery competitive situation’ to promote civilization. It shows his affinity for the idea of ‘the systematic antagonism’ clearly. For Fukuzawa, Japan was \textit{taji} society and China was not. Now it is clear to see how the image of China functioned in his discussion.

The problem of pedantocracy was also linked with the issue of administrative centralization. In 1870s, the decline of local society was a serious topic in the public discussion, and the main cause of the problem was attributed to the centralization of talents. In the course of discussion, concepts of \textit{ki} and \textit{genki} were used to represent high spiritedness as the backbone of local society. \textit{Ki} itself originally derived from Chinese philosophy, in which \textit{ki} (\textit{chi} in Chinese) would function as basic element to constitute things along the principle (\textit{li} in Chinese) given from \textit{ten} or Heaven. However, the meaning of \textit{ki} in the discussion on the local society was modified to indicate the devotion to public affairs. Therefore the discussion on \textit{ki} and centralization was linked to the issue of restructuring the fief system and the samurai status into the new local government system. In Kido Takayoshi’s opinion on the samurai petition problem (1873) or in Fukuzawa’s \textit{Bunken ron} (=\textit{A Discussion on Decentralisation}) (1877), the idea of \textit{ki}, on samurai’s new role in the modern state, and on local government made a close linkage. In Obata Tokujirō’s translation of Tocqueville’s \textit{Democracy in America}, Obata used \textit{genki} for the translation of ‘public spirit’ and Fukuzawa referred to Obata’s translation in \textit{Bunkenron}.

The discussion of \textit{ki} had flourished since Bakumatsu times and was carried over into Meiji period. Encountering the word ‘public spirit’ or ‘public moral’ in the Western thinkers’ works, the term \textit{ki} was adjusted to be used in the discussion on the moral foundation in the changing society.

Conclusions

As we have examined, while the Japanese discussion on the merit and administrative power had been aroused under the Tokugawa regime, it was taken over in a
discussion of centralization and liberty under the new threat of bureaucratic despotism in the early Meiji. What made the resonance between the inherited discussion on jinzai and the imported idea of pedantocracy? We can approach this question from two different but possibly related points of view. First, the public discussion on jinzai or merit as government resource before Meiji was possibly already a ‘modern’ one in the sense that it was a problem in the increase of complicated government task. That can be the reason why Meiji intellectuals such as Fukuzawa found relatively little problem to learn the concept of pedantocracy from the Western thinkers. Secondly, it is important to see that the discussion by Western thinkers on ‘pedantocracy’ was rooted in moralistic discourse of the political issue. ‘Pedantocracy’ would ruin ‘public spirit.’ Moralization of political discourse was a common factor in the intellectual trend of West and Japan in the nineteenth century. Understanding of the term ‘public spirit’ by Fukuzawa indicates this point. The resonance between the discussions on jinzai and on pedantocracy presents a common difficulty that Japan and the Western countries were facing. They shared a question of how the utility of government and the ‘spirit’ of society should be balanced.

1) The early version of this paper was prepared as a research report for the Matsushita Foundation Research Grant in 1998. Also later stage of this study was granted by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 2001 of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. I express my gratitude to Matsushita International Foundation and JSPS for the grants.

(26)161

11) Varoukakis, op. cit.; J.M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, p. 112.
12) However, this concept of diversity as an advantage for the development of civilization should not be exclusively French. It is a possibility that Guizot was inspired by Gibbon’s history of Rome.
13) The Correspondence of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte, p. 71; Mary Pickering, op. cit.
14) Pickering, Ibid.
16) ‘Almost all the greatest men who ever lived have formed part of such an Opposition. Wherever some such quarrel has not been going on——wherever it has been terminated by the complete victory of one of the contending principles, and no new contest has taken the place of the old-society has either hardened into Chinese stationariness, or fallen into dissolution. A centre of resistance, round which all the moral and social elements which the ruling power views with disfavour may cluster themselves, and behind whose bulwarks they may find shetar from the attempts of that power to hunt them out of existence, is as necessary where the opinion of the majority is sovereign, as where the ruling power is a hierarchy or an aristocracy.’ in ‘Bentham’, CW, vol. X, p. 108.
19) For Mill’s position in the ‘Whig’ tradition of the ‘balance and diversity’ thought, see J.W. Burrow, Whig and Liberals: Continuity and Change in English Political Thought (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988), Chapter 5. In the same chapter, Burrow also referred to the tradition of the image of China as a stationary society.
20) Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Henry Reeve trans. (London, 1862), vol. I, p. 91. Varoukakis, in op. cit., stressed that Tocqueville characterized China as the society with strong tendency of neglecting theoretical speculation and of only pursuing the practical knowledge. However, with this passage that cited, it is clear that Tocqueville also used the example of China as a stagnant, status quo society, which was molded by the excessive centralization.
Fate of Pedantocracy: The Idea of Government by Intellect in the Nineteenth-Century Japan and Europe (Koichiro Matsuda)

33) Yokoi, Gakko tōmonsho, 1852, in Nihon shisō taisei, vol. 55, Watanabe Kazan, etc., p. 429.
34) In translating ‘pedantocracy’, two postwar translations of On Liberty used words such as kanbunjokurei, which means red tape, or kōron-seiji, which means a government filled with futile discussion. Both translations missed the point that Mill intended to make. See Hayasaka Tadashi trans., Jiyyōron (Tokyo, Chuo kōron sha, 1963) ; Shiojiri, Kimura trans., Jiyyōron (Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, 1971).
35) Jiyyō no ri, in Meiji bunka zenshū, Jiyyō minken hen, Jō kan (Tokyo, Nihon hyōronsha, 1927), p. 82.
checks and balances by different thoughts and groups.’ in Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū, vol. 7 (Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, 1959), p. 657.

39) For example, see Yūbin Hōchi Shinbun, May 5 1877. For the overview of this issue, see Kōichirō Matsuda, ‘Fukuzawa Yukichi to kō, shi, bun no sai hakken’, in Rikkyō hōgaku, no. 43, 1996.

40) Katei sōdan, no. 34, December 1876. Also, it is assumable that Fukuzawa was interested in the concept of ‘public spirit’ by reading the passage of Mill that I quoted p. 197.