

The Eisenhower Administration's Containment Policy and East-West Exchanges, 1955-60 (Part 1)

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I Introduction

The purpose of this article is to explore the problems involved in the East-West exchanges that the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration pursued as a means of containing Soviet expansionism in the latter half of the 1950's.

The late 1950's witnessed the apparently dramatic rise of the Soviet military threat symbolized in the successful launchings of the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the first artificial earth satellite in 1957. These years also saw the impressive economic progress of the Soviet Union, the annual growth rate of which was constantly at least twice as high as that of the United States. Reinforcing the perception that the U.S.S.R. was in the ascendant on the world stage and putting the United States on the defensive were the frequently delivered inflammatory speeches on Soviet power given by Nikita S. Khrushchev, who loudly predicted the final victory of Soviet socialism over American capitalism. One of his most memorable remarks was that "[w]e will bury you," a statement he made at the Polish Embassy in Moscow in November 1956. All these incidents contributed to arousing serious anxiety in the United States that the power balance, especially the military balance, might be shifting in the Soviet favor. This growing concern over national security sparked off a controversy alleging the existence of a "missile gap" which placed the nuclear missile capability of the United States in a position inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

At this point, two highly influential documents, National Security Council (NSC)

5724—the Gaither Report—and the Rockefeller Report, *International Security : The Military Aspect*, arrived and further intensified the controversy. In making an overall and critical reexamination of the Eisenhower administration's containment policy, both papers called for a massive increase in the defense budget and a nationwide construction of civil defense shelters. The “missile gap” became the major foreign policy issue that dominated the national political scene just before the 1960 presidential election.

In light of these internal and external circumstances, it is therefore surprising that the Eisenhower administration displayed considerable patience and restraint in its conduct of containment policy, and chose not to embark on a kind of rapid military buildup as the two documents and some vocal critics requested. Although the administration did increase its annual military spending by a few billion dollars and did strengthen the U.S. missile program, it steadfastly persisted in maintaining the balanced budget and refrained from taking certain vigorous measures that would escalate the U.S.-Soviet struggle ; it never accepted the ominous assessment of the Soviet military threat and the urgency of a huge U.S. military expansion as, for instance, the Gaither Committee proposed.

In a sense, Eisenhower made an extraordinary decision, or indecision in this matter, for the Harry S. Truman administration had handled a similar situation very differently some years before. In the spring of 1950, the Truman administration was tackling NSC 68, which had been drafted by April of that year. With the outbreak of the Korean War two months later, the administration promptly abandoned its fiscal conservatism and rushed to embrace the substantial contents of NSC 68. The defense budget reached \$50 billion, an almost 300% increase over the pre-Korean War level, and military personnel jumped from 1.5 million to 3.5 million. NSC 68 and the Korean War were the decisive factors in bringing about such a massive rearmament program.

In contrast, the Eisenhower administration rejected the main thrust of the Gaither and Rockefeller Reports, both of which were submitted just after Sputnik and seemingly justified by the preceding events. In spite of Sputnik and the alleged “missile gap,” military spending still hovered around \$40 billion and the conventional forces continued to decline according to the strategy of massive retaliation, the chief purposes of which were to balance the budget by reducing military expenditures and to emphasize the use of nuclear retaliatory power to deter a Soviet aggression.

In explaining Eisenhower's different approach, diplomatic historians have pointed out the following factors : the Eisenhower administration's staunch fiscal conserva-

tism that led to the adoption of massive retaliation strategy in the first place ; its tacit acceptance of the concept of nuclear sufficiency which was based on a condition of mutual deterrence established between the United States and the U.S.S.R. ; secret information on Soviet strategic forces collected by U-2 reconnaissance flights which appeared to prove the absence of a “missile gap” ; and the administration’s recognition of the emerging importance of the non-military aspect of the Cold War.¹⁾

This article does not purport to refute any of these factors ; all of them are reasonable and persuasive enough. Nevertheless, one important phase of the Eisenhower administration’s containment has escaped the scholarly attention so far. It is that in the face of the dazzling Soviet military and scientific achievements, the administration pursued East-West exchanges as a useful means of containment and was fully confident of the favorable results that containment was producing. Accordingly, it saw no necessity of reappraising containment policy and of resorting to such strong measures as to step up the Cold War which would surely result in a Soviet refusal to maintain or increase East-West exchanges, a key component in the policy of containment.²⁾

II East-West Exchanges as a Means of Containment

What then were the specific circumstances that enabled the Eisenhower administration to conclude that East-West exchanges would be a significant instrument for penetrating the Iron Curtain ?

First, with the passing of the Joseph Stalin era, the new Soviet government was introducing a definite change in foreign policy, thus posing a new kind of threat to the United States. As early as December 1954, NSC 5440 interpreted “[t]he Soviet switch to a ‘soft line’ ” since the old dictator’s death as “a significant new factor” in the international situation. NSC 5501 of the following month repeated this point when it noted the “emergence of increased flexibility” in the Soviet conduct of foreign policy. A State Department memorandum of May 19, 1955 explained that “[i]n recent weeks Soviet diplomatic activity has been of a range and intensity unequalled in the last decade.” Some notable examples representative of a more flexible Soviet diplomatic offensive included in this memorandum were the Soviets’ conclusion of an Austrian peace treaty, a new disarmament proposal, their acceptance of a summit meeting with the Western leaders, and announcement of a visit to Yugoslavia by the Soviet leaders. A State Department paper of October 3, 1955 anticipated that the coming period appeared likely to be characterized by “decreasing fear of overt Soviet aggression ; greater horror of nuclear war ; full exercise of

Soviet-Communist diplomatic resources ; and by prolonged negotiations with the USSR, and possibly Communist China," all of which indicated the emergence of a Soviet non-military challenge.³⁾

At an NSC meeting on June 30, 1955, President Eisenhower warned against the view of defining the Soviet threat simply in military terms and contended that "our real problem" was how the United States could "achieve a stalemate vis-à-vis the Russians in the area of the non-military struggle" as it had already done in the military field. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was of the same mind. On April 19, 1956, he told the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense that the Soviet Union was "now sufficiently committed to policies of non-violence" and requested that the U.S. military should take account of "some of the political changes resulting from the Soviet 'new look.'⁴⁾"

Of the Soviet non-military menace, the economic one was the most urgent and serious. Dulles analyzed at an NSC meeting on November 21, 1955 that as the scene of the battle in the Cold War was shifting, the United States must be prepared to cope with "much more serious Soviet economic competition" in the underdeveloped countries. Two months later he feared that if the United States failed to meet this new challenge, Moscow would wind up "dominating all of Asia." His younger brother, Allen, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), concurred. He admitted that the Soviet approach to the underdeveloped nations was "very astute" and these nations were "enormously impressed" with the Soviet industrial accomplishment "over a very brief period of time." In Allen Dulles' judgment, these countries deduced that since the Soviet success was largely due to the Communist system, a Communist system would likewise "prove most efficient in accomplishing their own industrialization." Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Theodore D. Streibert joined with them by remarking that the Soviets "assiduously and successfully" were arguing in Asia that Communism was "the wave of the future" and capitalism was "dying."⁵⁾

Still, the Soviet Union's new threat was not restricted just to the economic sphere. After Stalin's death, the Soviet cultural offensive against the West started to assume a significant aspect of foreign policy. On the Kremlin's serious efforts to increase contacts with the West, a State Department intelligence report stated that the Soviet cultural exchange in 1954 gained "an ever more commanding position" in its propaganda effort and that in the past two years the new leadership had implemented it "on a scale unequalled in the postwar period." The total number of exchange of delegations exchanged was 1046, which was nearly double that of 1953 ; of these

delegations, U.S.-Soviet exchanges involved 18.⁶⁾

Encouragingly to the Eisenhower administration, the Soviet people appeared genuinely eager for information and knowledge about American mass culture. Staff members of the American Embassy in Moscow recorded their firsthand observations on Soviet citizens' lively curiosity and interest in various aspects of the United States, ranging from living conditions and race relations to jazz, movies and sports. A Harvard University scholar even observed in his trip report to the State Department on September 18, 1956 that he was "struck by the tremendous interest shown" by the young people "in all aspects of life in the West," and encountered "an almost insatiable thirst for information about the daily and cultural life in the West, particularly the United States."⁷⁾

Second, parallel with the shift in foreign policy, Soviet society was moving in a new direction. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 100-7-55 of November 1, 1955, pointed out that a social transformation was, albeit gradually, under way in the Soviet Union: "There are signs that industrialization, urbanization, and the system of mass education have produced a bureaucratic and managerial group which might become increasingly devoted to the preservation of its privileges and vested interests and less willing to risk these to advance the cause of world Communism. If current Soviet policy is not reversed it is conceivable that such developments might reach significant proportions over a very long period and might ultimately create pressures for change within the [Soviet] Bloc,..."

Khrushchev's sensational denunciation of Stalin in his secret report to the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 provided the United States with further confirmation that the Soviet system was evolving toward a less autocratic one. According to a State Department intelligence report, the speech illustrated that the Soviet leaders had grown aware of a need for greater personal security for members of the Soviet elite and also revealed their concern for the threat of police terror. In addition, it demonstrated an end of "one-man control of the police"; reduction of "the threat of capricious coercion"; decentralization of "certain governmental and economic functions"; and distribution of "greater responsibility to the lower levels and to units outside of Moscow."⁸⁾

John Foster Dulles wrote the same point to Eisenhower on April 2, 1956. In Dulles' estimate, the Soviet leaders realized that the people had "a great yearning... for legality, for personal security, for tolerance of differences of opinion and for government genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the governed." The United States should welcome Khrushchev's speech, he reasoned, since it gave cause for hope that

“liberalizing influences from without and within can bring about peaceful change” in the Soviet Union.⁹⁾

To address this new situation, the Eisenhower administration's Soviet policy moved away from an aggressive approach to a modest one that would encourage the change in a gradual way within the U.S.S.R. On January 31, 1955, NSC 5505/1 stated that U.S. policy toward the Soviet bloc should “promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct. . . [and] stress evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.” On March 15, 1956, NSC 5602/1 followed this NSC paper by reaffirming that in carrying out containment policy, the United States should seek to “encourage evolutionary change in the Soviet system.”¹⁰⁾

Probably, the Eisenhower administration would not have judged it politically safe to adopt this gradual approach and to proceed with East-West exchanges if Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of the Republican Party still had exerted the pernicious influence upon the foreign policy issues. In the heyday of his political career, McCarthy attempted to block the appointment of Charles E. Bohlen, a career Foreign Service officer and Eisenhower's trusted Soviet expert, as Ambassador to the Soviet Union ; relentlessly accused the State Department of harboring communists and communist sympathizers ; seriously undermined the effectiveness of the government's overseas information programs by charging the Voice of America and the overseas information libraries for their alleged communist orientation ; and damaged the morale of the Army by investigating its personnel. Yet, the Senate finally voted to condemn the conduct of McCarthy overwhelmingly on December 2, 1954, thus ending the most virulent era of McCarthyism. The political downfall of McCarthy was the third factor that led the administration to count on East-West exchanges as a means in conducting the policy of containment.¹¹⁾

Fourth and last, President Eisenhower had a deep personal interest in the information and cultural program. Owing to his long experiences in the Army, he was cognizant of its significance. He had, after all, been one of the key witnesses to testify in Congress on behalf of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which was to provide for the U.S. overseas information and cultural activities in the Cold War. It might also be that his younger brother, Milton, the first chairman of the National Commission of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), reinforced Eisenhower's inclination.¹²⁾

In any case, soon after assuming office, Eisenhower made two major decisions in this area : establishment of the USIA, an organization whose mission was, while “avoiding a propagandistic tone, . . . [to] emphasize the community of interest that

exists among freedom-loving peoples and show how American objectives and policies advance the legitimate interests of such peoples” ; and appointment of C.D. Jackson, a former officer of the United States Strategic Services, to the newly created post of the President’s special assistant for psychological warfare. As Jackson left the administration in 1954, Nelson A. Rockefeller joined it as the President’s special assistant for Cold War strategy.¹³⁾

While Eisenhower was a Cold Warrior who had profound faith in the usefulness of an information and cultural program in winning the battle against the U.S.S.R., he was an ardent and even an idealistic believer that increasing international contacts among countries and peoples would make for a more peaceful and secure world. Eisenhower’s later advocacy and promotion of the People to People program exemplified the case. George V. Allen, Director of the USIA in the late 1950’s, remembered that Eisenhower “believed devotedly, almost mystically” in the value of the People to People program. Abbott M. Washburn, Deputy Director of the USIA throughout the Eisenhower years, also recalled that Eisenhower took “a good deal of interest” in this program, which, according to Washburn, grew out of Eisenhower’s wartime involvement in propaganda.¹⁴⁾

This was a combination of circumstances under which the Eisenhower administration judged and proceeded with East-West exchanges as an important instrument to permeate the Soviet bloc.

III Toward Implementation of East-West Exchanges

For the Eisenhower administration, a summit conference, which was finally arranged to be held at Geneva in July 1955, presented a precious opportunity to take up the matter for discussion.

President Eisenhower had demonstrated his concern for this subject in a conversation with Secretary of State Dulles on May 24, 1955. In it, Eisenhower told Dulles that the exchange program and propaganda should be “stepped up,” and summed up his Cold War strategy : “[W]e have called it psychological warfare for many years. It is an attack on the minds of men who will make war and win them around etc. rather than to put all our eggs in a basket of fighting war.”¹⁵⁾

On July 11, NSC 5524/1, which was meant to submit policy recommendations to the President who was soon to leave for Geneva, argued that in order to attain the ultimate objective of eliminating Soviet control over its satellites, the United States should, among other things, assert “increased accessibility of the satellites to information and influence from the free world.” The Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel

organized by Rockefeller and chaired by Walt W. Rostow, a noted economic historian, also advised that Eisenhower make a proposal providing for "free and unhampered international communications for the exchange of information and ideas" as well as for "an anti-jamming agreement." Rockefeller made a personal appeal to Eisenhower to place the issue of the free exchange of information and persons on the agenda at the summit. The British and French too backed the American position. On July 15, the tripartite working group proposed that the Western leaders should "at an early stage" in the meeting express their belief in the value of exchanges between the West and the Soviet bloc and their hope in furthering them.¹⁶⁾

Probably Eisenhower did not need this kind of counsel, since, as he later wrote, he had recognized that the question of cultural exchanges should be one of the "[p]riority subjects" to be taken at the summit. Indeed, in his opening remarks on the very first plenary session at Geneva, the President referred to the problem of "communication and human contacts among our peoples."

Although the summit failed to meet Eisenhower's expectation, the four leaders agreed to instruct their foreign ministers to "study measures... which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between people and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned."¹⁷⁾

In order to discuss these matters, the foreign ministers conference was to convene in late October at Geneva. Secretary of State Dulles appointed William H. Jackson as his special assistant for coordinating the U.S. position on East-West contacts. On September 29, Jackson wrote to Dulles that while risks were inherent in increasing East-West contacts, the United States would have "much to gain" in developing contacts with the Soviet bloc. In Jackson's judgment, "some of the barriers to free communications" could be removed at Geneva and "some arrangements for exchange of persons and freer travel" could be made: "This hope must then be parlayed into the more remote hope that the trend toward better understanding thus engendered may not be easy for the Soviet Government to reverse." Due to these considerations, the administration should advance "a positive program for increasing East-West contacts" at the conference. However, cautioned Jackson, "the heart of this program should be the elimination of barriers to freedom of information and communication."¹⁸⁾

Dulles had already leaned toward accepting Jackson's suggestion. He stressed

the principle of reciprocity and mutuality in East-West contacts and pointed out that he had particularly in mind the problem of radio communications and circulation of newspapers, because, although the United States did not jam Soviet radio broadcasts and gave “full publicity” to speeches made by the Soviet leaders, there was “a blackout” in the Soviet Union’s news about the United States. Dulles claimed that the Soviet media “distort[ed]” the American position on major issues and the Soviet people had “little choice but to believe these distortions.” This was “a dangerous situation” which the United States ought to “improve.”¹⁹⁾

Just prior to the conference, a State Department paper defined the issue in the context of the Cold War. Emphasizing East-West exchanges as an instrument for bringing about a favorable change within the Soviet Union, the paper argued that the expansion of East-West contacts would “provide valuable means of making more difficult the reversal of present Soviet trends, correcting the image of the West sedulously cultivated for years inside the USSR, and influencing the evolution of society and economy toward peace and peaceful development.”²⁰⁾

At Geneva, the American, British and French foreign ministers submitted a 17-point proposal on East-West contacts for : freer exchange of information and ideas ; progressive elimination of all censorship ; creation of information centers in each other’s capitals ; exchange of books, periodicals, newspapers, films and exhibitions ; development of private tourism ; further exchange of persons in the professional, cultural, scientific and technical fields ; cultural and sporting exchanges ;²¹⁾ exchanges of students ; and establishment of direct air transport services.

Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov did not reject this proposal out of hand ; he spoke “favorably” of an agreement to improve exchange of information and persons between the West and the Soviet Union. But, beyond the general line, Molotov did not budge ; he revealed no sign of willingness to take any concrete measure and appeared to be more interested in trade expansion without making corresponding concessions in the areas of special concern to the West.²²⁾

When the conference adjourned in mid-November, it had not achieved any appreciable outcome on East-West contacts except that the Soviets professed readiness to “take some practical steps, possibly bilaterally,” rather than multilaterally, on the matter. Dulles was responsive to this suggestion. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, joined with him in taking the Soviet response encouragingly. Merchant advised Dulles in a memorandum on December 21 to initiate the negotiation with the Soviets “on a bilateral basis” and reconfirmed now the commonly accepted view in the Department that grasped the issue in terms

of advancing the aims of containment : “[M]ore contact with the West will give Soviet officials a better understanding of Western realities and may help promote evolutionary trends in the USSR in the long run.”²³⁾

In spite of the seemingly meager results, therefore, the two conferences at Geneva in 1955 scored a considerable success for the Eisenhower administration ; they provided the United States with a vehicle for starting East-West exchanges in the improving international atmosphere.

In addition, the administration was groping for a few other steps, albeit modest ones, to open up the Iron Curtain. The first was a proposal of a magazine exchange ; the circulation of *Amerika* in the Soviet Union had been suspended since 1952 when U.S.-Soviet relationship had deteriorated to a very low point. In the spring of 1955, USIA decided to make a move with a suggestion for resuming publication of *Amerika*, justifying it as a means to penetrate the Soviet Union with “reliable, factual and positive information” concerning the United States. John Foster Dulles endorsed the idea.²⁴⁾

Four months later, the American Embassy at Moscow in a note to the Soviet Government proposed the distribution within the U.S.S.R. of an illustrated Russian-language magazine, *Amerika*, issued monthly. The Embassy at the same time indicated that, as a matter of reciprocity, Washington would be prepared to accord the Soviets similar distribution in the United States. In referring to the American note at the foreign ministers conference at Geneva, Dulles requested Molotov to respond in a positive way and explained that such a reply would serve to promote better understanding between the two countries. In mid-December, the Soviet Foreign Office stated its acceptance of the U.S. proposal. Both sides agreed that the total number of copies of each issue for distribution was to be 52,000. The following fall, the first issue of *Amerika* appeared in the Soviet Union, and *USSR*, a Soviet monthly magazine in the English language, came out simultaneously in the United States.²⁵⁾

Also worthy of notice in the area of East-West contacts was an exchange agreement on medical films. In response to a State Department note in March 1955, Moscow agreed to an exchange in this area on a reciprocal basis early in September.²⁶⁾

The Soviet government for its part took several measures to promote East-West contacts that year. It dispatched to the United States a total of four official delegations in the fields of agriculture, housing, journalism and engineering. Moreover, world famous pianist Emil Gilels visited the United States in October and made a concert tour across the nation. He was the first Soviet artist to perform in the United States in the postwar period. Another renowned artist, violinist David

Oistrakh, followed Gilels in November.²⁷⁾

The Soviets seemed ready to go beyond the cultural exchange and to increase the dialogue at the political level. The Geneva conferences were cases in point. An intelligence report, in assessing the Soviet contacts with the free world of 1955, observed that “[f]or the first time in the postwar period” Moscow had been “liberal” in issuing visas to U.S. legislators and other important officials, and arranging interviews with Soviet leaders for some of them. The report touched on an episode where Khrushchev and Nikolai A. Bulganin interrupted their meetings with German and Finnish delegations in Moscow in September to see some U.S. Senators, and noted that both leaders were “markedly frank” in conversation. This report also observed that attendance at Western receptions by the Soviet leaders had been “intensified” in 1955, the most notable example being the attendance of “almost all members of the Presidium [of the USSR Supreme Soviet]” at the American Embassy’s U.S. Independence Day celebration.²⁸⁾

NIE 100-7-55 probably best summarized the rationale for pursuing East-West exchanges as an effective instrument for containment in the less strained international situation :

An extended period of reduced international tensions and wider East-West contacts would present problems for the [Soviet] Bloc as well as the West. The relaxation of harsh police controls may be difficult to reverse, and the promise of higher standards of living may be difficult to abandon. . . . [A] relaxation of domestic controls and of the atmosphere of hostility in East-West relations could, if continued over the much longer run, combine with other factors to create real problems for the leaders in the Kremlin.²⁹⁾

The implication was clear : If the United States succeeded in furthering East-West exchanges while managing the less hostile relationship with the Soviet Union, it could, along with other means, create pressure inside the Soviet system for an inevitable change.

IV The Making of NSC 5607

By the spring of 1956, the Eisenhower administration was prepared to take a step forward. NSC 5602/1 of March 1956, for the first time in a basic national security policy paper, argued for the importance of East-West exchanges in implementing containment policy. Advocating that the United States should sponsor proposals

for a selective expansion of free world-Communist bloc contacts, the document maintained that the exchanges would promote "evolution in the Soviet society and economy toward peaceful development, . . ." As a policy recommendation, NSC 5602/1 supported "[f]oreign information, cultural exchange, educational exchange and comparable programs" as "vital elements" in conducting U.S. policies and proposed that these programs should be "materially strengthened."

Annex to NSC 5602/1, "Estimate of the Situation," following NIE 100-7-55, pointed out the close connection between reduced international tension and relaxation of domestic controls in the U.S.S.R., and predicted that a less hostile East-West relation and wider East-West contacts would bring about evolution within the Soviet system.³⁰⁾

According to NSC's Operations Coordination Board memorandum in mid-April, the prospect of East-West exchanges was indeed promising. It asserted that in several fields such as agriculture, medicine, and science, "the way has been opened up for the exercise of US influence ; such influence, small as it may be now, is probably more important than any effect exerted within the US by visiting Soviet groups." Therefore, the administration should initiate a program of "limited, controlled and reciprocal exchange with the European Soviet bloc,³¹⁾ . . ."

As it happened, John Foster Dulles emerged as an architect of a new policy statement which defined furtherance of East-West contacts in terms of containing Soviet expansionism. Dulles "personally" drafted a memorandum titled "East-West Exchanges" and circulated it in the State Department on June 6. In this memorandum, he started the discussion by setting out the basic strategy of the United States toward the Soviet bloc as follows :

(1) To promote within the Soviet Russia evolution toward a regime which will abandon predatory policies, which will seek to promote the aspirations of the Russian people rather than the global ambitions of International Communism and which will increasingly rest upon the consent of the governed rather than upon despotic police power.

(2) As regards the European satellites we seek their evolution toward independence of Moscow.

In Dulles' view, there was within the Soviet Union increasing education and consequent demand for greater freedom of thought and expression, and for greater personal security and for more consumer's goods and better living conditions. These

demands “must be considerable” since the Soviet leaders had been dealing with them with much seriousness. Within the satellite countries, a greater degree of nationalism and independence of Moscow had occurred. Titoism was now “respectable” in the region.

Dulles claimed that this was a condition where the United States should “intensively... seek projects which would have impact within the Soviet bloc and encourage the liberal tendencies referred to.” The problem of East-West exchanges must be considered in this context. “Our foreign relations are necessarily *defensive*, so far as the use of force is concerned. But they can be *offensive* in terms of promoting a desire for greater freedom, well-being and security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence within the satellites.”

In sum, argued Dulles, East-West exchanges should be an implementation of “positive” United States foreign policy in order to increase the knowledge of the Soviet people as to the outer world ; to encourage freedom of thought by demonstrating to the Soviet people and intellectuals the scope of intellectual freedom which was relished in the United States ; to spur the demand of Soviet citizens for greater personal security by showing them the degree of personal security which the American people were given by the constitutional and legal systems ; to stimulate their desire for more consumer’s goods by making clear that the American people enjoyed the fruits of free labor and that the Soviet people too could gain the fruits from their own government ; and to encourage nationalism within the satellite nations by reviving their historic traditions and by suggesting the great benefits which could be derived from a defiant policy such as Yugoslavia exhibited.

Dulles concluded his discussion by recommending that the United States should employ as a program guide the 17-point proposal submitted at the Geneva foreign ministers meeting.³²⁾

On June 28, an NSC meeting convened to discuss the Dulles memorandum. At the outset in this meeting, Dulles observed that the administration had been “too passive and inert” in the area of East-West exchanges. All the initiatives in East-West contacts had been left in the hands of the Soviets or private American groups, he continued. Dulles then described this situation as “wrong” and contended that the United States should assume “the offensive” in this field. He admitted that doing so would invite some risk that third countries might follow the U.S. example and become involved in exchanges with the U.S.S.R. Nonetheless, this was the risk for the United States to bear.

In Dulles’ assessment, the proposed exchanges, by providing the ordinary Soviet

citizens with "accurate knowledge" about the United States, would play an essential role in the policy of containment. For "[s]uch knowledge might well stimulate pressures on the Soviet Government to confer on its people rights and advantages similar to those enjoyed by U.S. citizens. Such pressures generated in the Soviet Union would certainly begin to absorb the thoughts, plans and resources of the Soviet Government and, accordingly, minimize the amount of energy and resources which the Soviet Government could devote to its attack against the free world on other fronts."

In response to Dulles' presentation, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), countered that the JCS were worried about the impact of the new policy upon the Western alliances. Acting Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., while "strongly in favor of taking the offensive" in East-West contacts, gave his "hearty endorsement" to Radford's concern and pointed out the possible effects of the proposed new policy on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., mentioned his "two special concerns" ; the problem of internal security posed by the admission of more Soviet and satellite citizens, and the requirement in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 for the fingerprinting of non-immigrants applying for visas for temporary entry to the United States. Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover agreed.

Interestingly, the most outspoken supporter for the Dulles proposal turned out to be Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, a highly conservative member of the Cabinet. He acknowledged, like Dulles, that a risk did exist in increasing exchanges and contacts between the two blocs. However, Humphrey reasoned, the United States should accept this risk, since "[t]here was certainly a chance that these increased exchanges would have a real effect on the people of the Soviet Union, and might play a real part in convincing the Soviets of the errors of their system." Humphrey then asserted, very aptly, that the proposed new policy statement "marked a point of new departure for a quite new U.S. policy" toward the U.S.S.R.

Despite some heated arguments stirred up at this meeting, the conclusion was a foregone one ; as Vice President Richard M. Nixon remarked, President Eisenhower, who could not attend this NSC meeting because of illness, had already consented to the Dulles paper. On the following day, Eisenhower approved the memorandum with slight revisions as NSC ³³⁾ 5607.

On the same day, June 29, the White House released a press statement that the

President had approved the recommendation of the NSC along the 17-point program put forward by the Western foreign ministers at Geneva the previous October.³⁴⁾

Two months later, the Department of State announced the creation in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs of the position of Special Assistant for East-West Contacts for dealing with interchanges between the United States and the Soviet bloc. Frederick T. Merrill was designated to this new post and William S. B. Lacy was nominated as Special Assistant for the Secretary of State for East-West exchanges with the rank of Ambassador.³⁵⁾

Although the Soviet Union's military intervention in Hungary in November forced the U.S. government to suspend East-West exchange programs and postpone the translation of NSC 5607 into action, it was a minor setback. A State Department intelligence report estimated that in spite of the Hungarian uprising, the Soviet exchange program enjoyed "its biggest year in history" in 1956. The free world's share of the entire Soviet exchange program jumped to 73%, compared with 64% in 1955. "The spectacular doubling of exchanges" with North America, Australia and New Zealand was mainly due to the increase of exchanges with the United States—79 in 1956 as opposed to 35 in 1955. "First-rate artists" such as Singer Jan Peerce, violinist Isaac Stern, and groups like the Boston Symphony and the "Porgy and Bess" troupe appeared in the Soviet Union and received "high praise in the Soviet press for their performances."³⁶⁾

Ambassador Bohlen remembered the "Porgy and Bess" troupe tour as one of the exchanges that stood out "most vividly in my memory." Although the opening night in Leningrad was "a near disaster," Bohlen recalled, "Porgy and Bess" began to gain in popularity and became a success toward the end of the tour. At a farewell concert, the cast "surprised the Russians by singing difficult classical arias in five languages, including Russian. The Russians had no idea that the black artists had been so solidly grounded in classical music."³⁷⁾

Also symbolic of the thaw setting in the U.S.-Soviet relations was a visit by Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, to Moscow in the summer. This was the first invitation extended to a high military official of the United States by the Soviet Union in ten years. Soon the visit gained special importance since Twining was to succeed Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1957.³⁸⁾

The Hungarian revolt offered the U.S. government another clear confirmation that containment was working in its favor. Eisenhower observed that the Kremlin "had taken a worse beating lately than at any time since 1945" and maintained that

the Hungarian development demonstrated to the world the Soviet "brutal imperialism." John Foster Dulles informed Nixon that the incident in Hungary was "the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Empire" and judged that the last two years had witnessed "a very drastic and very dynamic deterioration of the position" of the Soviet Union: "The men in the Kremlin do not now exert anything like the influence they exerted two years ago, either over the National Communist Parties outside the Soviet bloc or over the Soviet satellites themselves. Moreover, we can even discern in the Soviet Union itself a rising demand for greater freedom and a more liberal policy. All of this added up to a defeat and a setback for the Soviet rulers."³⁹⁾

Therefore, the Eisenhower administration believed that until international trends might suggest otherwise, the fundamental issue remaining for the American people to address was whether or not they could demonstrate to the rest of the world the freedom and liberty they knew at home.

A few months before the Hungarian uprising, Dulles had stressed this point in his San Francisco speech: "If we can continue to show freedom as a dynamic liberalizing force, then we need not fear the results of the peaceful competition which the Soviet rulers profess to offer. More than that, we can hope that the forces now at work within the Soviet Union and within the captive countries will require that those who rule shall increasingly conform to principles of freedom. This means that they shall increasingly recognize the dignity of the human individual, shall increasingly satisfy the aspirations of the people, and shall increasingly be themselves subject to peaceful change by the will of the governed. Thus will come about the beginning of a world-wide era of true liberalism."⁴⁰⁾

The Hungarian situation which developed within the next few succeeding months did not alter the outlook of Eisenhower and Dulles on this point.

V The Conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchange Agreement of 1958

By the spring of 1957, the Eisenhower administration was ready to lift the suspension of East-West contacts and proceed along the course recommended in NSC 5607. On March 27, 1957, Dulles forwarded Eisenhower a memorandum where he analyzed that the objectives of NSC 5607 were "now as pertinent as ever before" and advised the President to resume "gradually and carefully" the exchanges with the Soviet Union "some time this spring." Eisenhower concurred. A few days later, the State Department sent a telegram to the Embassy in Moscow about the plan of an "unobtrusive resumption" of East-West exchanges in the fields of technology and agriculture, and also notified that it had already given permission for Soviet partici-

pation in several international conferences to be held in the United States during the spring, including the one on nuclear physics in Rochester, New York.⁴¹⁾

Late in June, Ambassador Lacy proposed to the Soviet government that the two nations initiate a discussion for the regular exchange of uncensored radio and television broadcasts, a proposal that the Soviets accepted the following month.⁴²⁾ Soon both sides agreed to discuss a wide range of items in Washington.

Before starting a full-scale negotiation with the Soviet Union, however, the United States had to eliminate the chronic source of Soviet complaint on the fingerprinting provisions enacted in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Upon the President's request, Congress revised the Act in September which authorized the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to waive the fingerprinting requirement for all visitors.⁴³⁾

With the problem solved in a satisfactory way, Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin commenced discussions on the subject of technical, scientific, and cultural exchanges with Lacy on October 28.⁴⁴⁾

While the negotiation was under way, the Eisenhower administration made clear that it grasped the expected agreement as an effective instrument for containment. On December 10, a State Department intelligence report reaffirmed the view expounded in NSC 5602/1 and NSC 5607 on the desirability and necessity of creating a kind of international environment where East-West exchanges could play a key role in containing Soviet expansionism :

A decrease of East-West tension would be likely to be more favorable than increased tension for the long-run development of the sort of resistance which could force changes in the Soviet system. A genuine decrease of tension would make it difficult for the regime to justify extremely rigid controls and would facilitate East-West contacts. The experience of some freedom and contact with the outside world might result eventually in irresistible pressure for fundamental changes in the Soviet system.⁴⁵⁾

The talks between the two Ambassadors in Washington showed "rapid progress" and were concluded by late January. Lacy and Zaroubin signed the agreement on exchanges in the cultural, technical and educational fields on January 27. The agreement, the first bilateral one ever concluded between the two nations since the war, provided for exchanges of : radio and television broadcasts ; specialists in industry, agriculture and medicine ; cultural, civic, youth and student groups ;

members of the U.S. Congress and deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. ; motion pictures, theatrical, choral and choreographic groups, symphony orchestras and artistic performers ; scientists, university delegations, athletes and athletic teams ; exhibits and publications. The agreement also called for development of tourism and establishment of direct air flights.⁴⁶⁾

A policy statement by the State Department admitted that the Soviets had been hard bargainers and the United States had not got all it had wanted ; in particular, the Soviets never agreed to cease the jamming of foreign broadcasts and the United States failed to remove all barriers to free exchange of information and ideas. Still, this policy statement insisted that the agreement "could be significant in improving the flow of information" and, "if implemented faithfully, will represent progress toward U.S. objectives."⁴⁷⁾

Ambassador Lacy explained the logic behind the agreement to the Chinese Ambassador. In Lacy's view, the older generation of the Soviet elite was rapidly being displaced by a new elite, very few of whom had had the opportunity to go overseas. Because of the increasing dependence of the Soviet regime upon this new elite group, it was essential for the United States to "influence them in every way we can."

Lacy was more frank in a private conversation with his staff members where he called the agreement "most successful" from the United States viewpoint. In fact, continued Lacy, it was "[s]o successful, . . . that it is believed best not to state such a fact publicly for fear that the Soviets might be forced to renege on their agreement in order to salve their hurt pride."⁴⁸⁾

Lacy's comment revealed again the administration's firm belief that the exchange agreement would be a useful tool to attain the objectives of containment policy.

The subsequent discussion with the Soviets proved satisfactory to the Department of State. In July, Lacy sent Dulles an interim report on the execution of the agreement. He said that he "was happy to be able to report" that there had been more than ample reciprocity attained as a result of the exchange agreement. Lacy observed that exchanges in the fields of science, technology, education, cultural manifestations, and athletics were progressing well. Of these exchanges, noteworthy were that the Moiseyev Dance Company, pianist Emil Gilels, and violinist Leonid Kogan had had successful American tours, while the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, singers Blanche Thebom and Leonard Warren and conductor Leopold Stokowski had had successful appearances in the U.S.S.R. Also, Van Cliburn's first prize in the Tchaikovsky International Piano Competition in April 1958 demonstrated "more

than any single cultural event, . . . the quality of American musicians to millions of Russians.” Lacy claimed that in the cultural field, it proved possible to communicate “between many thousands of citizens” of both nations.

In the final portion of the report, Lacy noted that agreements for exchanges of films and exhibits were expected to reach soon and estimated that over 3000 American tourists would visit the Soviet Union that summer ; no Soviet tourist had as yet come to the United States, but American Express had opened an office in Moscow to handle the matter.⁴⁹⁾

To Lacy’s report, Secretary of State Dulles responded by saying that he had read it “with interest” and found it “indeed an encouraging one.”⁵⁰⁾

In spite of the promising start, though, a grave problem remained. The report from David Mark of the American Embassy in Moscow on September 4 illustrated the case. In this report, Mark acknowledged that “undoubtedly” members of American delegations under the exchange agreement had visited “more Soviet enterprises, farms, and government institutions during the last ten months than all American officials taken together since the war” and observed that they had received “a friendly reception everywhere,” adding that Soviet hospitality was frequently “overwhelming.” However, the American experiences were not always favorable, mainly because Soviet authorities, by showing their best work and concealing weaknesses by various means, had discouraged the American delegates’ contacts with ordinary Soviet citizens.⁵¹⁾

One important way for the United States to reach Soviet citizens directly was film. On October 9, 1958, the Department of State announced that Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, who had been conducting the negotiations with the Soviets, reached an accord for the exchange of films under the January agreement. By this agreement, the United States would purchase 7 Soviet feature films, which included *The Idiot*, *The Captain’s Daughter*, and *Swan Lake* ; the Soviets would purchase 10 U.S. feature films, among which were *Lili*, *Roman Holiday*, *Marty*, *The Old Man and the Sea*, and *Oklahoma*.⁵²⁾

One of the first films for distribution in the U.S.S.R. was *Roman Holiday* starring Audrey Hepburn and Gregory Peck. As Hans Tuch, who had participated in the negotiation as a State Department official, fondly recalled, the Soviets screened the film in the English version at the 8000-seat sports arena in Moscow over a period of four days with five shows a day. *Roman Holiday* was a smash hit. Every ticket was sold out and so the proceedings from these showings enabled the Soviets to finance the dubbing, copying and distribution of the film nationwide.⁵³⁾

Marty, which had won first prize at the Cannes Film Festival in 1955, was another movie which was premiered on November 10, 1959. Gary Cooper and Edward G. Robinson, who had both starred in the movie, attended the premier in Moscow. The American Embassy in Moscow reported that the film was received by the audience and newspaper critics "with considerable acclaim."⁵⁴⁾

Meanwhile, Eisenhower was toying with his favorite idea of gaining direct contact with the Soviet people: a large exchange of students with the U.S.S.R. He contended that it would be "in the interest of accelerating the awakening of Russia" and the logic for doing this kind of thing was "more compelling when we consider the benefits to be derived by us and the free world if Iron Curtain people could get a clearer understanding of American life and intentions." The number of students the President had in mind was "upwards of ten thousand."⁵⁵⁾

Dulles was not responsive. Explaining that "I am somewhat skeptical as to whether the proposal for the reception—or exchange of students—will make a big hit," Dulles did not support the idea. A State Department paper, agreeing with the Secretary of State, noted that it seemed "highly unlikely" that the Soviets would be receptive to a new U.S. offer to "exchange many more students than provided for" in the January agreement.⁵⁶⁾

Failing to win Dulles and the State Department over to his point of view, Eisenhower did not insist on acting on his proposal, at least for the time being.

VI The Eisenhower Administration's Assessment of the Cold War

As the Eisenhower administration was pursuing East-West exchanges as a valuable means of containment, the Soviet launchings of the ICBM and Sputnik set off a controversy over the "missile gap" in the United States. From the autumn of 1957 on, the administration was forced to defend its containment policy against the charges that the United States was lagging behind the Soviet Union in missile development and was losing its military lead rapidly. Democratic Senators such as John F. Kennedy, Stuart Symington and Henry M. Jackson, and leading journalists like the Alsop brothers, repeated these charges and faulted the President for his concern with balancing the budget and curbing inflation. In the winter of 1957-58, two exhaustive reports on national security by the Gaither Committee and the Rockefeller Panel, which virtually repudiated the Eisenhower administration's policy of containment, entered the debate over the supposed "missile gap."

The discontent with the administration's containment policy was not simply a partisan issue. Members of the Gaither Committee included such respected and

prominent bipartisan figures as Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy, Paul H. Nitze, James H. Doolittle, William C. Foster and James R. Killian, Jr. The founder of the Rockefeller Panel was Nelson Rockefeller, a former presidential assistant, who was to be elected as Governor of New York in November 1958 and to emerge as a powerful contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 1960.

As if to underscore the validity of the charge of the allegedly alarming decline of the U.S. power, Khrushchev often boasted not only that the U.S.S.R. had acquired the "absolute weapon" but also that it would soon catch up with and surpass the United States in economic power within a decade or so. In an interview given to the 42-year-old James Reston of the *New York Times* in October 1957, Khrushchev proudly predicted that Reston would live to see the establishment of a Communist system in the United States.

Apparently, the public's faith in Eisenhower's judgment on military affairs was eroding. The Gallup poll released in November 1957 indicated that 53 percent of the public expressed dissatisfaction with the administration's handling of defense policy while only 26 percent pronounced satisfaction. Eisenhower's approval rating, which had been slipping since the summer of 1957, fell to a low of 54 percent in March 1958. This was still an impressive figure for any president. But Eisenhower had enjoyed a high of 79 percent only fourteen months before.⁵⁷⁾

Nevertheless, under the adverse situation at home and abroad, the Eisenhower administration was calm in its assessment of the Soviet military threat and confident of its course in the Cold War. The view of emphasizing the non-military aspect of the Soviet menace remained prevalent. In mid-December, 1957, James H. Smith, Jr., Director of the International Cooperation Administration, referring to the Khrushchev speech made at the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, termed the Soviet economic competition as "a very serious challenge" to the United States. Vice President Nixon agreed that Moscow laid "much more emphasis" on the economic assistance and described the economic side of the Cold War as "the wave of the future." George Allen, USIA Director, joined with them. He complained that there were "many people" who still believed that all answers to international problems were "military" ones, a view that should be "correct[ed]."

Even Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy expressed "his real great concern" as to whether or not the United States could successfully engage "in real economic competition" with the Soviet Union. To this comment, Eisenhower replied by saying that he "couldn't agree more."⁵⁸⁾

Naturally, the Eisenhower administration regarded the Gaither Report as too

narrowly focused on the military factor of the Cold War. In criticizing the Report, Secretary of State Dulles argued that it dealt with "one aspect of the problem facing the United States, namely, the military problem" and failed to take "a rounded view of the total situation." According to him, the struggle against the Soviet Union was "not solely military" and "great danger" might occur if the United States concentrated on "the military aspects of the struggle." Dulles then observed that the Soviet Union had made "its greatest gains" in the years between 1945 and 1950 when the United States had been more powerful in military terms and that Soviet Union had not made "any appreciable gains" in more recent years even though it had obtained a great nuclear and military capacity. Thus, the Secretary of State strongly suggested that the Gaither Report, being unable to explain this apparently paradoxical phenomenon, distorted the whole picture of the Cold War.

Eisenhower, backing Dulles, wondered loudly if the Gaither Committee was going to advocate "the re-introduction of controls" on the U.S. economy as the Truman administration had introduced in the wake of the Korean War. This step was something that Eisenhower was never willing to accept. As to the Rockefeller Report, the President rejected it by warning that if the administration would "go into deficit spending," the defense budget would reach "in a few years" \$75 billion instead of \$41 billion, the current level of military spending.⁵⁹⁾

In sum, Sputnik and the "missile gap" did not alter the administration's judgment that its containment policy was producing favorable developments in the U.S.S.R. In the midst of the Sputnik shock, John Foster Dulles clearly understood this unfolding when he explained to Eisenhower that "[p]erhaps most encouraging of all is the fact that the leaven of freedom is perceptibly at work within the Soviet empire. This is the only long-run cure of the present situation."⁶⁰⁾

In mid-December 1957, Dulles had a chance to present his comprehensive view of containment to Senator J. William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In Dulles' assessment, the United States had a three-fold task in meeting the Soviet menace : the first was to have a military capability which would deter the Soviet Union from initiating a war ; the second was to counter Soviet probing or " 'nibbling' operations. . . in the form of small-scale aggressions" around the periphery of the Communist bloc ; and the third was to insure the economic progress of the underdeveloped areas. Dulles anticipated that if the United States could succeed in accomplishing these three tasks, eventually "a change" would occur in the Soviet Union that "would transform it into the kind of nation with whom we could have good relations in normal international society." What he was speaking

of was not “a revolution but... evolution.”

According to Dulles' understanding of the lessons of history, totalitarian regimes had existed on repressive measures in regard to their own peoples and these regimes could survive as long as they continued to achieve victories abroad. If these victories were denied, Dulles stressed, they were inevitably forced to ease these repressive measures, become “less authoritarian” and yield to the internal wishes of their peoples. Referring to Khrushchev's many troubles at home such as the abandonment of the five-year plan, the turnover in leadership, the unrest in the satellites and the end of the absolute dictatorship, Dulles insisted that “the evolutionary process was even now beginning” within the Soviet Union. While admitting that he could not determine whether the change in the U.S.S.R. would be “in five, twenty-five or fifty years,” he was convinced that if the Soviets could be denied external victories, the change would “inevitably” arrive.⁶¹⁾

Dulles reiterated the gist of these arguments to Eisenhower on March 25, 1958 : “There has been a definite evolution within the Soviet Union toward greater personal security, increased intellectual freedom and increased decentralization. This also increases the chances of peace.”⁶²⁾

As Dulles saw that containment was bringing about evolution within the U.S.S.R., the best way for the administration to cope with the Soviet threat was not to increase military spending enormously to the point where it would disrupt America's own liberal political and economic system but to maintain the kind of freedom and liberty at home that the American people had long enjoyed. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 10, 1958, Dulles cautioned against “[t]he great danger” that in combating a formidable enemy like the Soviet Union, the American people often might end up “by having to remake [themselves] in the image of the thing [they] are trying to destroy.”⁶³⁾

To Percival F. Brundage, Director of the Budget Bureau, Dulles explained that “in the long run we are going to win the battle only through [the] attraction of our freedoms and this has got to be so dynamic and vigorous that it penetrates the Soviet orbit.” A few weeks later, Dulles repeated this cardinal point to the public by declaring that if the United States were going to adopt the Soviet system of “regimentation of industry and labor” and the use of production primarily for military purposes, its military power could easily overwhelm the Soviet military establishment. Accordingly, continued Dulles, the question was not whether the United States was possessed of the material means superior to the Soviet Union, but whether the United States could “surmount the danger while *still retaining freedom.*” For the

demonstration of freedom was "so significant, so dynamic, so penetrating" that it would be "for all men a symbol of hope."⁶⁴⁾

President Eisenhower for his part noticed the evolution taking place within the Soviet system. Agreeing with Dulles, he asserted late in October 1957 that "the trend toward greater individual and national freedom is being manifest within the Soviet bloc."⁶⁵⁾

Also, Eisenhower considered the U.S. military power as sufficient to deal with the Soviet military threat and stressed the folly of undermining the domestic system through excessive spending on military purposes. At an NSC meeting on October 30, 1958, he explained as follows: "If the United States does not find some way to keep the military appropriations from growing and growing, we were going to have to adopt a different form of government than we had had in the past. We would not be defending freedom, but only defending lives and territory, which was a vastly different thing. . . . The main thing is the U.S. deterrent capability."

Dulles too reiterated the concept of nuclear sufficiency at this meeting. According to his forecast, the time might soon come to take "another hard look" at the question of U.S. military position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Dulles then questioned whether pursuing military superiority over the Soviets should be the U.S. goal, for if it were the case, "it would put us in an arms race with the USSR which could conceivably endanger our American way of life." Therefore, to maintain "a respectable posture of defense" was all the United States needed. This capability meant not a U.S. military superiority but "a U.S. capability of inflicting such heavy damage on the enemy as to deter him from attacking" the United States. "The past greatness of the United States had not depended upon the maintenance of military superiority. As long as we have an adequate military capability to deter attack by the Soviet Union, we did not require to be superior to the USSR in every area and at all times."⁶⁶⁾

In addition, there was an external factor that led the Eisenhower administration to feel secure about the international development in 1958. In late August Khrushchev accepted Eisenhower's dramatic invitation to negotiate a ban on all nuclear weapons testing with the United States. He did so in the middle of the second Taiwan Strait Crisis initiated by the Chinese Communist government. A few weeks later when Eric Johnston in Moscow concluded the agreement for the exchange of films, the Chinese shelling in the Strait was still going on. For the Eisenhower administration, which had been closely monitoring every indication of a possible Sino-Soviet friction, these two decisions by the Soviet government suggested that Moscow was

not happy with Beijing's seemingly reckless military adventure and the two Communist nations did not get along well.⁶⁷⁾

Throughout 1958, the Eisenhower administration believed it appropriate to continue its policy of containment and watched the international situation with considerable satisfaction. NSC 5810/1 on May 5 reaffirmed that as a means of preventing further expansion of Communist influence, the United States should resort to encourage the "expansion of Free World-Soviet Bloc exchanges and contacts" and continue to sponsor certain proposals with a view to "[s]ustaining current ferment in the thinking, and fostering evolutionary trends, within the Bloc." This paper also confirmed again that foreign, cultural and educational programs were "vital elements" in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. On July 1, John Foster Dulles informed the Congressional leadership that "no areas of the globe had been lost to Communism since 1952," and praised this "happy situation."⁶⁸⁾

To the favorable international current, the Eisenhower administration was convinced that East-West exchanges formed an essential contribution.

On September 15, 1958, the State Department announced an agreement with the Soviet government for an exchange of national exhibition to be held in the summer of 1959. The Eisenhower administration, having already regarded trade fairs or national exhibitions as another useful tool to open up the Iron Curtain and to reach directly the Soviet people, was now ready to act.⁶⁹⁾

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dennis J. Nolan for editing the English.

Notes

- 1) While there is an extensive literature on the subject of the Eisenhower administration's containment policy, the following are particularly pertinent to this article: Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, Vol. 2: *The President* (New York: 1984); Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment* (Baton Rouge: 1995); Edgar M. Bottome, *The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy* (Cranbury, NJ: 1971); Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford: 1990), pp. 81-227; Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear War* (New York: 1998); James C. Dick, "The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1961: Who Opened a Missile Gap?" *The Journal of Politics* 34 (November 1972), 1062-1110; Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the*

Soviet Satellite (New York : 1993) ; Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61* (London : 1996) ; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment : A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York : 1982), pp. 127-97 ; Louis L. Gerson, *John Foster Dulles* (New York : 1967) ; Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton : 1990) ; *idem*, *John Foster Dulles : Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in the U. S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington, Del. : 1999) ; Osamu Ishii, "Reisen no '55-nen taisei' " [The 'System of 1955' in Cold War History], *Kokusai seiji* 100 (August 1992), 35-53 ; Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management : A Study in Defense Politics* (Lexington, Ky. : 1977) ; Lee Jong Wong, *Higashi ajia reisen to kan-nichi-bei kankei* [U.S.-Korean Relations and Japan in East Asia's Cold War] (Tokyo : 1996) ; Roy E. Licklider, "The Missile Gap Controversy," *Political Science Quarterly* 85 (December 1970), 600-15 ; Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace : The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Westport, Conn. : 1993) ; Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds., *Reevaluating Eisenhower : American Foreign Policy in the Fifties* (Urbana, Ill. : 1987) ; Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence, Kan. : 1991) ; Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca : 1995) ; Takuya Sasaki, "Geisā hōkokusho to Aizenhawā seiken no fūjikome seisaku" [The Gaither Report and the Eisenhower Administration's Containment Policy], *Rikkyo hogaku* 47 (July 1997), 25-71 and 50 (July 1998), 242-82 ; *idem*, "Sobieto no aratana kyōi to Aizenhawā seiken no fūjikome seisaku : 1950-nendai kōhan" [The New Phase of the Soviet Threat and the Eisenhower Administration's Containment Policy in the Late 1950's, (Part 1)], *ibid.* 52 (March 1999), 99-162 ; David L. Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War* (Columbus : 1999). On Khrushchev's most famous, yet ill-considered statement, Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, recalled that he said so "extemporaneously" and "obviously" under the influence of vodka. See Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York : 1973), p. 437. Later Khrushchev explained to W. Averell Harriman that he made such a statement only "in a historical sense" and added as follows : "Socialism or Communism, . . . was a new and higher form of social organization bound to replace capitalism. The latter must give way. He never meant that Communism would physically bury the capitalist world. The proof of the superiority of the socialist structure is everywhere." Conversation between Khrushchev and Harriman, June 23, 1959, enclosed in Robert I. Owen to the Department of State, June 26, 1959, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*) : 1958-1960, X (part 1) (Washington, D.C. : 1993), 271.

- 2) On the U.S. approach towards East-West exchanges in general and cultural exchange programs in particular, see Paul J. Braised, ed., *Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations* (Washington, D.C. : 1968) ; Robert F. Byrnes, *U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union : Selected Essays, 1956-1988* (Boulder, Col. : 1989) ; Philip H. Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy : Educational and Cultural*

- Affairs* (New York : 1964) ; Wilson P. Dizard, *The Strategy of Truth : The Story of the U.S. Information Service* (Washington, D.C. : 1961) ; Charles Frankel, *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs : American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad* (Washington, D.C. : 1965) ; John W. Henderson, *The United States Information Agency* (New York : 1969) ; Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain : Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York : 1997) ; Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas : U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (New York : 1981) ; *idem*, *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Policy* (New York : 1996) ; Richard Pells, *Not Like Us : How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York : 1997) ; Yale Richmond, *U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986 : Who Wins ?* (Boulder, Col. : 1987) ; Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World : U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York : 1990). On the general background, see Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream : American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York : 1982).
- 3) NSC 5440, "Basic National Security Policy," December 14, 1954, *FRUS : 1952-1954*, II (part 2), 811 ; NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy," January 7, 1955, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XIX, 29 ; State Department memorandum, "Outline for a speech by the Secretary of State," May 19, 1955, *ibid.*, XIX, p. 79 ; paper prepared in the State Department, October 3, 1955, *ibid.*, XIX, p. 123.
- 4) Memorandum of discussion at the 253rd meeting of the NSC, June 30, 1955, *ibid.*, XX, p. 152 ; memorandum of a luncheon conversation, April 19, 1956, *ibid.*, XIX, p. 299.
- 5) Memoranda of conversations at the 267th and 273rd meetings of the NSC, November 21, 1955 and January 18, 1956, *ibid.*, X, pp. 32-33, 64-66. On the Eisenhower administration's response to the Soviet economic offensive, see Burton I. Kaufman, *Trade and Aid : Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961* (Baltimore : 1982) ; Osamu Ishii, " 'Seiji keizai sensō' toshiteno beikoku taigai keizai seisaku : Aizenhawāki" [United States Foreign Economic Policies and "Political-Economic Warfare" : The Eisenhower Years], *Kokusai seiji* 70 (May 1982), 100-19. In addition to the economic assistance, the Eisenhower administration relied heavily on covert operations run by the CIA in coping with the rising nationalist force in the Third World. On the administration's often awkward approach to this region, see Kanji Akagi, *Vietnamu sensō no kigen* [The Origins of the Vietnam War] (Tokyo : 1991) ; James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion : The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven : 1988), pp. 86-130 ; H.W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism : The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960* (New York : 1989) ; Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 : Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill : 1991), pp. 155-239 ; Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala : The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin : 1982) ; Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy : The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York : 1995) ; Naoki Kamimura, "Beikoku no reisen gaikō to raten amerika no kakumei : boribia kakumei to guatemala kakumei no hikaku"

- [U.S. Cold War Policy and Latin American Revolutions: The Bolivian and Guatemalan Cases], *Amerika kenkyu* 26 (1992), 89-107 ; Hiroshi Matsuoka, *Daresu gaikō to indoshina* [The Dulles Diplomacy and Indochina] (Tokyo : 1988) ; Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery : The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York : 1994) ; *idem*, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (Fall, 1986), 453-73 ; Kōji Terachi, "1958-nen indonesia no hanran to amerika no kanshō" [U.S. Intervention in the 1958 Rebellion in Indonesia], *Amerika kenkyu* 30 (1996), 57-77 ; *idem*, "Amerika gaikō to 1955-nen raosu sōsenkyo : Minshushugi no jissen to hankyōshugi" [The United States and the Laotian Elections of 1955 : Democracy and Anti-Communism] *Tokyo University American Studies* 3 (March 1998), 47-59.
- 6) The Department of State's Office of Intelligence Research, "The Soviet Exchange Program in 1954," January 20, 1955, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement (Washington, D.C. : 1979) (Microfilm version). On the Soviet cultural diplomacy, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive : The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton : 1960).
- 7) See, for example, John C. Guthrie to the Department of State, August 16, 1955, 761.00/8-1655 ; September 12, 1955, 761.00/9-1255, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, The Soviet Union : 1955-1959, Internal Affairs (Frederick, MD : 1989) (Microfilm version). On this point, see also several reports based on the interviews that the American Embassy in Tel Aviv conducted with the newly arrived immigrants from the Soviet Union to Israel. James S. Sutterlin to the Department of State, September 21, 1955, 761.00/9-2155 ; January 4, 1956, 761.00/1-456 ; January 18, 1956, 761.00/1-1856 ; February 2, 1956, 761.00/2-256 ; April 26, 1956, 761.00/4-2656 ; May 2, 1956, 761.00/5-256, *ibid*. On the report by Alex Inkeles of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, see William A. McFadden to the Department of State, September 18, 1956, 761.00/9-1856, *ibid*.
- 8) NIE 100-7-55, "World Situation and Trends," November 1, 1955, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XIX, 140 ; intelligence brief prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department, "The Desecration of Stalin," March 30, 1956, *ibid.*, XXIV, p. 80.
- 9) Dulles to Eisenhower, April 2, 1956, John Foster Dulles Papers, JFD Chronological Series, Box 13, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
- 10) Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, pp. 87-102 ; NSC 5505/1, "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities," January 31, 1955, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 21 ; NSC 5602/1, "Basic National Security Policy," March 15, 1956, *ibid.*, XIX, p. 254.
- 11) On the rise and fall of McCarthy, see Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear : Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate*, second edition (Amherst : 1987) ; David M. Oshinsky, *A Conspiracy So Immense : The World of Joe McCarthy* (New York : 1983) ; Richard H. Rovere, *Senator Joe McCarthy* (New York : 1959).
- 12) Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 99, 103-4, 129-30, 134.

- 13) Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*, pp. 52-55, 65-66 ; H.W. Brands, Jr., *Cold Warriors : Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy* (New York : 1988), pp. 117-37. James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the President, recalled that Eisenhower had showed much interest in the USIA "from the first day he went into office, as a matter of fact, from the first day he was nominated." James C. Hagerty oral history interview, February 9, 1968, p. 380, Eisenhower Library.
- 14) Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years : Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (New York : 1965), pp. 410-11 ; George Allen oral history interview, March 7, 1967, p. 128, Eisenhower Library ; Washburn oral history interview, January 5, 1968, p. 74, *ibid.*
- 15) Memorandum of a telephone conversation, May 24, 1955, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, IX, 524-25.
- 16) NSC 5524/1, "Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations," July 11, 1955, *ibid.*, V, p. 295 ; Summary of Recommendations of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel enclosed in Rostow to Rockefeller, June 10, 1955, *ibid.*, V, p. 219 ; Rockefeller to Eisenhower, July 11, 1955, *ibid.*, V, p. 300 ; report of the Paris Working Group, July 15, 1955, *ibid.*, V, p. 328. The Quantico Panel was instrumental in producing the Open Skies proposal that Eisenhower was to advance at Geneva. see Walt W. Rostow, *Open Skies : Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955* (Austin : 1982).
- 17) Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years : Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (New York : 1963), p. 507 ; delegation record at the first plenary session of the Geneva Conference, July 18, 1955, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, V, 365 ; directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955, *ibid.*, V, p. 528.
- 18) Jackson to Dulles, September 29, 1955, *ibid.*, V, pp. 603-4.
- 19) Memorandum of a conversation, September 20, 1955, *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 211-14.
- 20) Paper prepared in the State Department, October 3, 1955, *ibid.*, XIX, p. 125.
- 21) *Department of State Bulletin* (hereafter cited as *DSB*) 33 (November 14, 1955), 778-79.
- 22) Telegrams from the delegation at the foreign ministers meeting to the Department of State, October 28, November 1, 2, 6, and 9, 1955, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, V, 635, 655, 662-63, 693, 694n. ; Dulles to Antonio Segni, November 12, 1955, *ibid.*, V, p. 759.
- 23) Memorandum of a conversation, November 13, 1955, *ibid.*, V, p. 768 ; Merchant to Dulles, December 21, 1955, *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 215-17.
- 24) USIA undated memorandum, "Resumption of Publication of a Russian Language Magazine for Distribution in the USSR," enclosed in Dulles to the American Embassy in Moscow, May 2, 1955, 511.612/5-255, General Records of the Department of State, 1955-1957, Central Decimal File, Box 2176, RG 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
- 25) *DSB* 34 (January 2, 1956), 18-19 ; Dulles statement on East-West exchanges, October 31, 1955, *ibid.* 33 (November 14, 1955), p. 776 ; the Department of State's Office of Intelligence Research, "The Soviet Exchange Program in 1956," January 24, 1957, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The

Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement.

- 26) DSB 33 (November 14, 1955), 785-86.
- 27) The State Department's Office of Intelligence Research, "The Soviet Exchange Program in 1955," February 1, 1956, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement ; Richmond, U. S.-*Soviet Cultural Exchanges*, p. 4.
- 28) The State Department's Office of Intelligence Research, "Current Trends in Soviet Contacts with the Free World," September 23, 1955, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement.
- 29) NIE 100-7-55, November 1, 1955, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XIX, 140.
- 30) NSC 5602/1, March 15, 1956, *ibid.*, XIX, pp. 252-54 ; Annex, "Estimate of the Situation," *ibid.*, XIX, p. 261.
- 31) The NSC's Operations Coordinating Board memorandum, "Exchanges of Visits with Soviet-European Bloc," April 17, 1956, White House Office, National Security Council Staff : Papers, 1948-61, OCB Central File Series, Box 18, Eisenhower Library.
- 32) Paper prepared in the Department of State, June 6, 1956, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 220-23 ; memorandum of discussion at the 289th meeting of the NSC, June 28, 1956, *ibid.*, XXIV, p. 226. The paper was "an outgrowth of, and closely resembled" a draft paper Dulles had written the previous month. *Ibid.*, XXIV, p. 220n.
- 33) Memorandum of discussion at the 289th meeting of the NSC, June 28, 1956, *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 227-243. On Eisenhower's endorsement of the Dulles paper, see *ibid.*, XXIV, p. 220n. NSC 5607, "East-West Exchanges," June 29, 1956, in *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 243-46. In contrast to Eisenhower and Dulles, Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State in the Truman administration, was totally negative about East-West exchanges. Stewart L. Udall, who was then a freshman congressman from Arizona and later became the Secretary of the Interior in the 1960's, recalled that when he was attending a seminar sponsored by the Carnegie Council in 1956 to discuss topics including U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural exchange programs, Acheson broke his silence at the end of the meeting and "scolded" those present by claiming that they had been conducting " 'puerile speculation,' " since the Soviet Union was a rigid society and the only thing the Soviets responded was "military force." See Stewart L. Udall, *The Myths of August : A Personal Exploration of Our Tragic Cold War Affair with the Atom* (New York : 1994), p. 8.
- 34) DSB 35 (July 9, 1956), 54-55.
- 35) *Ibid.* 35 (August 13, 1956), p. 294 ; *ibid.* 35 (August 27, 1956), p. 366.
- 36) *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 252-53 ; Herbert C. Hoover, Jr., to the American Embassy in Moscow, November 13, 1956, *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 253-54 ; the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research, "The Soviet Exchange Program in 1956," January 24, 1957 in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement ; "Soviet Citizens Learning More About the West," April 17, 1957, *ibid.* The Soviet government signed cultural exchange

- agreements with Belgium and Norway in 1956. See Richmond, *U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges*, p. 4.
- 37) Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pp. 389-99.
 - 38) Twining to Eisenhower, July 5, 1956, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 246-49.
 - 39) Memorandum of discussion at the 307th meeting of the NSC, December 21, 1956, *ibid.*, XIX, p. 392 ; Eisenhower remarks to the legislative leaders, November 9, 1956, *ibid.*, XXV, p. 423 ; Dulles telephone call to Nixon, October 31, 1956, Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 5.
 - 40) Dulles San Francisco address, "The Contest Between Freedom and Despotism," June 21, 1956, *DSB* 34 (July 2, 1956), 7.
 - 41) Dulles to Eisenhower, March 27 1957, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 258-59. On Eisenhower's endorsement and the State Department's telegram to the Embassy in Moscow on April 4, 1957, see *ibid.*, XXIV, p. 259n.
 - 42) *DSB* 37 (July 15, 1957), 119 ; *ibid.* 37 (September 2, 1957), pp. 386-88.
 - 43) Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, pp. 151-52.
 - 44) *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 267.
 - 45) The Department State's Office of Research Intelligence and Analysis, "Dissidence in the USSR," December 10, 1957 in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement.
 - 46) *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 267 ; *DSB* 38 (February 17, 1958), 243-47.
 - 47) Policy information statement prepared in the Department of State, January 29, 1958, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (part 2), 3.
 - 48) Memorandum of conversation, June 24, 1958, *ibid.*, X (part 2), p. 9 ; memorandum of conversation, April 4, 1958, 511.61/4-458, General Records of the Department of State, 1955-1959, Central Decimal File, Box 2174.
 - 49) Lacy to Dulles, July 25, 1958, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (part 2), pp. 11-13. The major part of this report was published in *DSB* 39 (September 8, 1958), 390-92.
 - 50) *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (part 2), 13n.
 - 51) Mark to the Department of State, September 4, 1958, *ibid.*, X (part 2), pp. 14-18.
 - 52) *DSB* 39 (November 3, 1958), 696-98. Eric Johnston had a long talk with Khrushchev at the latter's dacha in the Black Sea area and submitted its report to the State Department. This was another valuable by-product of wider East-West exchanges. Johnston's report, October 6, 1958, in *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (part 1), 189-202 ; memorandum of conversation, November 4, 1958, *ibid.*, X (part 1), pp. 202-5.
 - 53) Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, pp. 134-35.
 - 54) Boris H. Klosson to the Department of State, November 13, 1959, 761.00 (W)/11-1359, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, The Soviet Union : 1955-1959, Internal Affairs.
 - 55) Dulles memorandum of conversation with Eisenhower, January 17, 1958, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (part 2), 1n. ; Joseph N. Greene memorandum, February 25, 1958, *ibid.*, X (part 2) p. 7n. ; Eisenhower to Dulles, March 21, 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower

Papers, Ann Whitman File : Dulles-Herter Series, Box 10, Eisenhower Library.

- 56) Dulles to Eisenhower, March 25, 1958, *ibid.* ; undated paper prepared in the Department of State, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (part 2), 7-8.
- 57) Sasaki, "Geisā hōkokusho to Aizenhawā seiken no fūjikome seisaku" [The Gaither Report and the Eisenhower Administration's Containment Policy] 47, pp. 25-71 and 50, pp. 242-82 ; *idem*, "Sobieto no aratana kyōi to Aizenhawā seiken no fūjikome seisaku : 1950-nendai kōhan" [The New Phase of the Soviet Threat and the Eisenhower Administration's Containment Policy in the Late 1950's] 52, pp. 99-162. Reston would live to see the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. He died in 1995. On Reston's own recollection of his interview with Khrushchev, see James Reston, *Deadline : A Memoir* (New York : 1991), pp. 210-13.
- 58) Memoranda of discussions at the 348th and the 359th meetings of the NSC, December 12, 1957 and March 20, 1958, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XIX, 705-7 ; *FRUS : 1958-1960*, III, 55.
- 59) Memorandum of discussion at the 343rd meeting of the NSC, November 7, 1957, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XIX, 633-34, 632 ; memorandum of a conversation, December 26, 1957, *ibid.*, XIX, p. 712 ; Eisenhower comments, April 23, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File : DDE Diaries, Box 32.
- 60) Dulles to Eisenhower, October 17, 1957, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, Box 5.
- 61) Memorandum of a conversation, December 10, 1957, *FRUS : 1955-1957*, XXIV, 187-88. Interestingly, Fulbright, who was to assume the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1959 and to emerge as one of the most thoughtful critics of containment in the late 1960's, was not convinced of Dulles' arguments at this meeting. While he admitted that the "evolutionary" process might happen within the Soviet Union "some day," Fulbright was not sure if it was "enough of a certainty for us to base our policy upon it." He countered that he was "enormously impressed" with the recent Soviet accomplishments and attached "much more significance" to them than the Secretary of State. Fulbright even acknowledged that he was "more 'scared' " of the Soviet war potential than Dulles. The conversation demonstrated that Fulbright was a highly conventional Cold Warrior in these years. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-89. See also Randall Bennett Woods, *Fulbright : A Biography* (New York : 1995), pp. 242-43. The same could be said of Sen. Frank Church of Idaho, who became the vocal opponent against the growing U.S. military involvement in Vietnam a few years later. In a May 1958 speech, Church warned that the United States was on the defensive in the world and might lose the Cold War. See LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer, *Fighting the Odds : The Life of Senator Frank Church* (Pullman, Wash. : 1994), p. 119.
- 62) Dulles to Eisenhower, March 25, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File : Dulles-Herter Series, Box 10.
- 63) Dulles testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 10, 1958, *Executive Sessions*, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C. : 1980), pp. 9-11.

- 64) Dulles telephone call to Brundage, November 29, 1957, Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7 ; Dulles article, "Our Cause Will Prevail," prepared for publication in the Dec. 23 issue of *Life magazine*, in *DSB* 38 (January 6, 1958), 19-22.
- 65) Eisenhower to Frank Altschul, October 25, 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File : DDE Diaries, Box 27.
- 66) Memorandum of discussion at the 384th meeting of the NSC, October 30, 1958, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, III, 144, 141.
- 67) Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 175-202. Mao Zedong gave Khrushchev, who had been in Beijing just before the Crisis started, no prior information on the timing of the military action. Khrushchev, worried that China might draw the Soviet Union into a nuclear conflict with the United States, began to reassess the Sino-Soviet atomic cooperation and finally decided to provide no further assistance to the Chinese nuclear program in the summer of 1959. The second Taiwan Strait Crisis was indeed a major milestone toward the breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance. See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War : From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass. : 1996), pp. 210-35.
- 68) NSC 5810/1, "Basic National Security Policy," May 5, 1958, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, III, 110 ; supplementary notes of the legislative leadership, July 1, 1958, *ibid.*, IV, p. 420. In the spring of 1958, Dulles was most concerned about the economic recession which had began a year before ; the unemployment rate reached a peak of 7.5% in April of this year, the highest level since 1941. In March 1958 Dulles implored the Secretary of the Treasury to "do something to reverse this trend toward depression." On this point, see Iwan W. Morgan, *Eisenhower Versus 'the Spenders' : The Eisenhower Administration, the Democrats and the Budget, 1953-60* (London : 1990), pp. 92-93 ; John W. Sloan, *Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity* (Lawrence, Kan. : 1991), pp. 143-49 ; Dulles telephone call to Robert Anderson, March 3, 1958, Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 8.
- 69) *DSB* 39 (October 13, 1958), 577-78.