

The Eisenhower Administration's Containment Policy and East-West Exchanges, 1955-60 (Conclusion)

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VII Exhibitions and the Cold War

The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration had already been aware of the emerging importance of trade fairs and exhibitions in the Cold War as the main battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union was shifting to the non-military sphere. As early as April 1954, the Operations Coordinating Board pointed out in its memorandum a new kind of threat posed by the Soviet Union: "[T]he Soviet Bloc has greatly increased its trade promotion and propaganda activities at international trade fairs and exhibitions in the last few years, . . . [T]he extent of Soviet Bloc participation in trade fairs and exhibitions has reached a degree of intensity that is adversely affecting American prestige and markets abroad." The memorandum noted that the Soviet Bloc nations, which had exhibited in an approximately 15 fairs primarily in the European area in 1950 and 1951, would "probably" participate in more than 60 international fairs and national exhibits in 1954 in all areas of the world outside the Soviet orbit. In contrast, U.S. official and unofficial participation had been reduced to "an insignificant level in most cases" and its increase in the near future would be doubtful owing to lack of funds and market interests. The memorandum called for the urgent consideration of this problem "on a coordinated basis. . . ."¹⁾

Theodore D. Streibert, Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), was also apprehensive of the situation. He argued that the Soviet government had found the international fair was "an effective device for impressing thousands with Communist production" and provided "a springboard for intensive publicity and

propaganda.”²⁾

Responding promptly to the Soviets' new offensive in this field, President Eisenhower requested Congress on July 24, 1954 to make an appropriation of \$5 million for setting up a President's Emergency Fund for Participation in International Affairs. In seeking support for the proposal, he specifically referred to “the fabulous success” of the “Porgy and Bess” tour in Europe. The Operations Coordinating Board declared that the basic purpose of the Fund was to promote “projects overseas that will demonstrate in a dramatic and effective manner the excellence of our free institutions as reflected in our products and our cultural values.” Congress approved the presidential request the following month.³⁾

Two years later, Congress passed the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956, thus enabling the U.S. government to engage in these activities on a continuing basis. The Operations Coordinating Board defined an international fair clearly in the context of the Cold War: “A trade fair exhibit should serve the most important U.S. psychological and foreign policy objectives and the selection of the host countries should be made with this in mind.”⁴⁾

For the Eisenhower administration, which came to regard U.S. participation in trade fair as an instrument of containment to counter Soviet ideological expansion, the Brussels Universal and International Exhibition in 1958 was the first major event of this kind. The Brussels Exposition was not simply one of the numerous international fairs held every year; it was a Universal and International Exhibition which was organized under the Convention Relating to International Exhibitions signed at Paris in 1928. A policy guidance document for the 1956 Act reasoned that U.S. participation in the Brussels Fair would be “a rare opportunity to demonstrate American contributions to international peace and progress, and to enhance the value of efforts made in other fields to acquaint the world at large with American ideals and the American way of life.” While meeting the Communist challenge through participation in international trade fairs was important enough, the memorandum stressed, it was “much more important” to meet its challenge through participating in a universal exhibition “embracing the whole range of national civilizations in which trade and commerce are only a segment.”⁵⁾

U.S. Commissioner General for the Brussels Exhibition, Howard S. Cullman, stated the U.S. objective in a more blunt way. He explained to Eisenhower that “[w]ith appropriate funds we can do a Sputnik culturally, intellectually and spiritually for the benefit of the nation. . . .” To Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Cullman pointed out the diplomatic implication of the Exhibition: “with

Little Rock, sputnik and international situations. . . , it seems tragic to me to have this Government—in an important exhibition that will I believe attract some forty million visitors—not fulfill its commitments on the highest level.” On another occasion, he claimed that the U.S. participation was “the greatest single opportunity since before World War II of presenting the United States to the people of Europe and of the world. . . . We realized that properly handled, this show would be America’s strongest public relations weapon in combatting Communist propaganda. . . .”⁶⁾

Eisenhower also knew that something had to be done for national prestige shaken by a series of events at home and abroad in the fall of 1957. “If the Russians again outshine us—this time at Brussels—we will be the ones to get the blame,” he warned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in discussing the Brussels Fair. The President formed an advisory committee for the Exhibition and selected as its members leading experts from the fields of architecture, fine arts, industrial design and crafts, science, music, theater, and film. As to the development of theme and exhibits program, prominent scholars and citizens like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Walt W. Rostow, C.D. Jackson, Jerome B. Wiesner, Walt Disney, Reinhold Niebuhr, David Riesman and Walter Lippmann agreed to cooperate.⁷⁾

The Brussels Exposition opened to the public on April 17, 1958 and carried on through the summer until October 19. Former President Herbert C. Hoover, who was well known and respected by the Belgians for his relief effort some forty years before, served as Eisenhower’s personal representative for the U.S. “official days.” Chief and popular exhibits at the American pavilion were fine arts, IBM’s RAMAC computer, color televisions, fashion shows, the Family of Man photography, Circa-rama, which was a 360-degree color motion picture, and voting machines.

As to performing arts, several notable performers who made appearances were violinist Yehudi Menuhin, mezzo soprano Blanche Thebom, pianists John Browning and Leon Fleisher, cellist Leonard Rose, and singers Harry Belafonte and Sarah Vaughan. In addition, the American Ballet Theater and Eugene Ormandy’s Philadelphia Orchestra with Isaac Stern and Van Cliburn made performances, and the film “South Pacific” was shown. Cullman estimated that the American performing arts program attracted an audience of more than 220,000.

Also, importantly, 191 multi-lingual American guides “of many races and creeds, and from all parts” of the nation turned out enormously popular at the American pavilion. “It is to the Guides’ great credit that as a group and as individuals, their performance and conduct were beyond question,” Cullman praised warmly. In his

assessment, these young guides “truly exemplified one of America’s greatest assets” and were so recognized by the pavilion visitors they had assisted “in an undeviant-⁸⁾ly courteous and friendly way.”

After inspecting the U.S. exhibit in June, USIA Director George V. Allen reported back to the President that his overall reaction was “favorable.” Still, the struggle of ideas for influencing the visitors at Brussels between the U.S. and the Soviet Union seemed to end in a draw. A comparative survey of visitor reactions indicated that the U.S. and Soviets exhibits were nearly equal in popularity : 68 percent of the visitors rated the U.S. exhibits as excellent or good, while 67 percent ranked the Soviet ones in the same way. To a question as to which pavilion was better, 40 percent preferred the U.S. and 45 percent the Soviet. Probably this outcome was highly satisfactory to the Soviet government, which had “spared neither money nor⁹⁾ talent” in presenting its exhibits.

Meantime, the Department of State was considering whether or not to mount a trade fair or an exhibition in Moscow. Apparently, Gottfried Neuberger, an owner of an obscure trade company in New York, brought the idea to the Department in the summer of 1955. Although the State Department vetoed the plan mainly due to a lack of time and funds that year, it was ready to move forward. U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles E. Bohlen strongly endorsed the idea. He expected that an American exhibition in Moscow would serve “the very useful purpose of acquaint-¹⁰⁾ing directly a huge Soviet audience with American products and methods” and advised that “heavy emphasis” upon consumer goods would appeal to the Soviet people.

The Eisenhower administration continued the effort to organize a Moscow fair in the following years. In the summer of 1956, the State Department again gave active consideration to the matter. Secretary of State Dulles thought the exhibit “next July [as] desirable” and dispatched in late October members of the Departments of State and Commerce and the USIA to Moscow to inspect the proposed site, Gorki Park, and to discuss necessary arrangements with the Soviet authority. On October 26, Ambassador Bohlen even informed Dulles that a U.S. sponsored exhibit was “feasible” in the summer of 1957 “in [the] absence [of] any adverse change in¹¹⁾ political climate.”

Bohlen’s cautious reservation turned out prophetic. A few days later, the Kremlin decided to crush the Hungarian revolt by sending the Soviet army, thus aborting the U.S.-Soviet discussion on this matter.¹²⁾

With the lifting of suspension of U.S.-Soviet exchange programs in the spring of

1957, the Department of State again informed the Soviets of its interest in staging an official exhibition in the summer of 1958. President Eisenhower requested, and Congress appropriated, \$2.2 million for this purpose. Before the Congressional budget hearings, Ambassador William S.B. Lacy, who headed the Department's staff on East-West exchanges, testified on June 4, 1957 that a Moscow exhibit was "a golden opportunity" and would "have great appeal" for the Soviet workers and elite. The Operations Coordinating Board, seeing the attempt in terms of implementing containment policy, argued in its memorandum on May 27, 1957 that a U.S. exhibit in Moscow would provide "a useful—and so far unique—opportunity to serve national policy as laid down in NSC [National Security Council] 5607. . . . It would be a vehicle for reaching directly large numbers of persons in Soviet Russia with visual evidence of the realities of life in the United States. Well-conceived displays of goods and information materials would confront these people with new and, it is hoped, thought-provoking facts and would afford a chance to combat Communist misinformation, distortion, and systematic withholding of information on the outside world in general and the U.S. in particular."¹³⁾

Nonetheless, to the frustration of the State Department, the Soviet Chamber of Commerce signed a contract with Neuberger on July 12 without making any prior consultation with the U.S. government and authorized his firm to conduct a private industrial fair in Gorki Park during the next summer. Under Secretary of Commerce Walter Williams complained to Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's trusted assistant, that he was "startled" by this contract, but in vain.¹⁴⁾

VIII The American National Exhibition in Moscow

Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on an exchange of national exhibitions on September 10, 1958, stipulating that an American exhibition in Moscow and the Soviet exhibition in New York be held in the summer of 1959. The details were worked out in the subsequent negotiations. The Soviet National Exhibition of Science, Technology, and Culture would be held at the Coliseum in New York, opening on June 29 and closing on August 10, while the American National Exhibition would open in Sokolniki Park, Moscow, on July 24 and close on September 4.¹⁵⁾

The Eisenhower administration welcomed the agreement. This was the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 that an American exhibit was to be staged in the Soviet Union. Barrett Reed of the USIA considered it as "the most extraordinary opportunity it has ever had to reach its target audience, the most politically

alert and potentially most influential citizens of the Soviet Union.” He proposed that the U.S. government should utilize “to the fullest extent” this opportunity to attain the U.S. objective toward the U.S.S.R., that was “to stimulate evolutionary processes which will reduce the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union.” In Reed’s view, the U. S. could do this “most effectively by contributing to the ferment in Soviet society, particularly among the ‘intelligentsia,’ rooted in dissatisfaction with Soviet life and methods, and a deep desire for greater freedom of action, well-being and security.” The Exhibition would offer “[t]he extraordinary opportunity... for advancing national policy” and therefore it would be “essential” for administration officials to grasp it “in terms of a propaganda exhibit, not a trade fair.”¹⁶⁾

As Robert Sivard, Exhibits Director of the USIA, put it, there were two major objectives in the exhibit. The primary one was “to create in the minds of the Soviet people a desire for a wider choice of quality goods and services than are presently available to them.” Sivard believed that “expansion of demand for consumer goods,” which would create “additional pressure” on the Soviet government, was “the most effective way to bring about modification of the economic plan at the expense of the aggressive potential.” The secondary one was “to emphasize the *peaceful* orientation of the U.S. economy.” Sivard asserted that the exhibit should show “how American technology and science work in the interest of the consumer.”¹⁷⁾

USIA memorandum, “Basic Policy Guidance for the U.S. Exhibit in Moscow in 1959,” reaffirmed the gist of the Reed and Sivard memoranda, by arguing that the basic objective of the Exhibit was to “increase understanding by the peoples of the Soviet Union of the American people and American life, with particular emphasis on American products, practices and concepts which might contribute to existing pressures tending in the long run toward a reorientation of the Soviet system in the direction of greater freedom.” Naturally, this memorandum cautioned, these objectives were “for planning purposes and not for publication.” The publicly stated objective was to “increase understanding by the peoples” of the U.S.S.R. of the American people, their land, and “the broad scope of American life, including American progress in the fields of science, technology and culture.”¹⁸⁾

Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Bohlen’s successor in Moscow, could not have agreed more. Enthusiastically, he contended that “[i]t would be scarcely possible in my opinion to overstate the importance of this opportunity to hold a US exhibit in Moscow provided we succeed in presenting one that is appropriate.” He even forecast that such an exhibition could have “an explosive effect” upon the Soviet people and might lead to significant political consequences of “incalculable

benefit" to the United States. Furthermore, Thompson, accepting the advice of the USIA on the political desirability of consumer goods to be shown in the fair, recommended that the exhibit should demonstrate to the Soviet people "our superiority both technically and in living standards" and should endeavor to "stimulate Soviet dissatisfaction with their present situation and the slight improvement in living standards achieved in recent years."¹⁹⁾

In January 1959, a conference was arranged in the White House to discuss the matter of the American National Exhibition in Moscow. On the onset, USIA Director George Allen criticized those who argued that this kind of project "was a waste of time, effort and money, and was a bad approach," and insisted that there should be another way but to "build more arms, and wait until they [the Soviets] break." In Allen's estimate, a possibility existed that "we might try to correct the misunderstandings of the Russian people about the United States through such available means as are open of this type. We have very few ways of trying to reach the Russian people." Every evidence indicated that the Russian people were interested in "things American—in anything foreign, but particularly in things American." To prove his point, Allen emphasized that a copy of *American Illustrated* (*Amerika*) on a newsstand went like "hot cakes."

Andrew Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, who was also at the meeting, reiterated the belief prevalent among his colleagues that East-West exchanges would eventually produce the favorable outcome in the U.S.S.R. : "we feel that there is a certain evolution now going on in the Soviet Union, an evolution that was not there, say even five years ago. There is an evolution toward more freedom of discussion, albeit still very limited ; there is an evolution toward a greater demand for the material things of life, again somewhat limited ; but it is an evolution that is growing. We feel that through the various exchanges that we can put on with the Soviet Union and an action such as this, the exhibition, that we can increase the acceleration of that evolution. We feel that evolution is really the only chance we have to reach a peace with justice with the Soviet Union, an evolution that brings about a change of thinking on the part of either the present Soviet government, or a succeeding Soviet government, so that we can really arrive at an agreement that means something. . . . [W]e in the State Department believe that this exhibition can be of tremendous significance to us in our foreign policy. It can induce, through the products that will be shown there, a greater demand on the part of the Soviet citizens for products like that [*sic*] themselves, and if we can increase the demand for consumer goods, eventually that demand will lower the possibility of

production for either heavy industry or, and more particularly, for war purposes. Soviet resources are limited, even though they are constantly growing, they are limited, and they devote to war production now a far greater proportion of their gross national product than we do. If we can just induce a greater demand on the part of their people for the better things of life, such as we have in the United States, I think we can bring about that gradual movement, and increase that gradual movement in the Soviet Union to the point where there will be less emphasis on military preparation, and more on the welfare of their own people, and a more enlightened idea of the United States.²⁰⁾ . . .”

Organization for the Moscow Exhibition by the Eisenhower administration followed the pattern of the Brussels Exposition in several important ways. First, like the Brussels Fair where a single manager had run the American pavilion, the President appointed Harold C. McClellan, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, as General Manager for the American National Exhibition.²¹⁾

Second, the President created an advisory committee for the Moscow Exhibition and appointed 51 leaders in the fields of industry, science, journalism, the arts and education as its members. The committee was composed of top executives from major companies like McGraw Hill, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, Chrysler Corporation, General Mills, Macy's, General Foods Corporation, Newsweek Magazine, IBM World Trade Corporation, Republic Steel Corporation, and Washington Post and Times Herald. In addition, Presidents of the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of International Education, and George F. Kennan of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, joined the committee.²²⁾

Third, Eisenhower decided to dispatch Vice President Richard M. Nixon to open the Exhibition in Moscow, as Former President Hoover had attended the Brussels Fair. Fourth, several exhibits, which had been hugely popular at Brussels, such as Circarama, voting machines, the Family of Man photography, fashion shows, and color televisions, reappeared in Moscow.

Fifth, Eisenhower demonstrated his deep personal interest in the Moscow Exhibition, which was probably deeper than that which he had had for the Brussels Fair. He was fully explicit in expressing the U.S. objective at a meeting with leaders of the plastics industry on February 10, 1959 :

The Moscow Exhibition next summer is a crack in the Iron Curtain. It will enable us to reach directly 3 1/2 million ordinary Soviet citizens—over a 6-week period—with the truth about America. We will reach them directly

with American concepts, with our vast array of consumer goods, with American culture and arts, and with American personnel. This, if successfully done, can be a real breakthrough—a kind of “D-Day”—in the struggle for international understanding. . . . The dollars we spend for this are, I deeply believe, some of the best dollars we can possibly spend. They are constructive dollars. They are not negative, sterile dollars that must go for arms. This can be a great step forward toward mutual understanding.

On June 29, the President made a surprise trip to New York to take an informal pre-opening look at the Soviet exhibit, thus displaying serious interest in the exhibition exchange.²³⁾

Six, after the example of the Brussels Fair, the Moscow Exhibition employed young guides, which were between the ages of 20 and 25, fluent in Russian, “well adjusted, well educated and of good appearance.” 75 guides were selected from almost 1,000 applicants after language tests and interviews. In mid-June, Eisenhower found time to meet with these guides in the White House. After making extemporaneous remarks, he even chatted with some of them, including four African-American guides.²⁴⁾

The U.S. government, which decided to disburse a total cost of \$3,600,000 to the Moscow project, planned it in such a way so as to demonstrate the American way of life with special emphasis on consumer goods rather than machinery and technology. At Sokolniki Park, a geodesic dome, which functioned as an information center of facts and statistics about the United States and its people, was the first building that the visitor would see. The dome included a seven-screen film picture and IBM's RAMAC computer, which could answer in Russian over 4,000 questions about the United States. Eight exhibit areas around the dome's perimeter focused on American labor, agriculture, public health and medicine, education, space research, peaceful atomic research, plastics, and basic scientific research.

Behind the dome, the glass and aluminum pavilion was erected. This second and larger building was devoted mainly to a display of consumer goods, such as food, clothes, and sporting goods. Also featured were American art, some 20,000 books, newspapers, musical instruments, a model kitchen, and a complete color television studio. The third major structure was Circarama. Outside these buildings were numerous display areas and pavilions devoted to American sculpture, fashions, polaroid cameras, magazines and periodicals, automobiles, voting machines, agricultural machines, boats and camping equipment, garden and lawn equipment, beauty

and cosmetics displays, a plastics demonstration, a model home, a children's playground, the Family of Man photographic collection, the architecture exhibit, and free samples of Pepsi-Cola.

As an added attraction in conjunction with the Exhibition, conductor Leonard Bernstein's New York Philharmonic Orchestra appeared on a concert tour in the Soviet Union, and also variety show host Ed Sullivan hosted American style TV programs in Moscow during the course of the Exhibition.²⁵⁾

Vice President Nixon, the highest American official who had ever visited Moscow, officially opened the Exhibition on July 24. With Nikita S. Khrushchev in attendance, he soon started an exchange of views in front of a model kitchen filled with the latest appliances. Their spontaneous "kitchen debate" on the merits of capitalism and communism was a symbolic illustration of the emerging new aspect of the Cold War, since the episode illuminated that in waging the Cold War, the two nations would now have to show by example which way of life would be more appealing to the rest of the world. The significance of total national power with greater emphasis on economy and culture came to the fore. Hereafter, the course of the Cold War would be largely dependent on which country would succeed in offering a more attractive way of life on the international scene.²⁶⁾

A week later, Thompson wrote Secretary of State Herter about the tremendous enthusiasm and near a chaos created by Soviet visitors at Sokolniki :

On preview night many books disappeared in spite of careful supervision. Since then through rearrangement [of] traffic flow and by installation [of] guard rails and employment [of] additional milit[i]a[men,] losses [have been] negligible. . . . Substantial damage [was] done, however, in [a] jungle gym area by constant pilfering [and] by visitors. Astonishing hunger for souvenirs results in serious damage daily. Crowd control [was] a major problem. Although [ticket] sales [are] limited [to] 50,000 per day our educated estimates reach upwards [to] 70,000 actual. Pepsi Cola dispensed 84,000 drinks [on] Wednesday operating less than full time and expects to reach 100,000 today. Yesterday 15 shows [were] given in dome including seven-screen at an estimate 5,000 each show. Clamor for automobile pamphlets [is] so vigorous [that] near riots occur whenever distribution is undertaken. No pamphlets [are] dropped to ground and safe distribution continues a plaguing problem. Cement floors [of] two principal buildings disintegrated completely with heavy traffic. Dust [was] so severe [and it] was necessary [to] close down RAMAC but McClellan

arranged overnight paving with asphalt which is now complete. . . . Serging [*sic*] crowds frequently create dangers but through assignment [of] personnel on hand area by area [we] have this well in hand. No serious incidents. . . . [I] cannot overstate obvious hunger for information demonstrated by Soviet visitors at every exhibit. While many [are] disappointed at limited heavy machinery and scientific installation, the impact towards objectives [is] tremendous. Everyone [is] working long hours seven days with crises [which are] occurring many times each day. Everyone within 100 miles [of] Moscow wants in. Continuing 50,000 ceiling for the second week. [I am] anticipating attendance [on] Saturday and Sunday [of] not less than 75,000²⁷⁾ each day.

Naturally, it was difficult, if not impossible, to judge to what extent the Eisenhower administration achieved its stated aim at Exhibition, where the total number of Soviet visitors reached 2,700,000. Khrushchev, discounting the American exhibits as "gadgets," declared that the attempt to "lure the Soviet people had completely failed" and "ridiculed the so-called Miracle Kitchen." He insisted to Eisenhower that "any attempt to lure them [the Soviet people] toward capitalism would fail."²⁸⁾

In sharp contrast, American observers gave a high mark to the Exhibition. Arthur Watson, President of IBM World Trade Corporation and a member of the advisory committee, told Eisenhower that his overall impression was "outstanding" and the Fair was "a real success." He recommended that the U.S. should "continue to sponsor more and more exchanges of people" with the U.S.S.R. In the similar vein, Nixon referred to the "great curiosity. . . [,] friendly interest, . . . [and the] favorable reaction" that the Soviet people showed to his visit. According to the Vice President, this attitude illustrated their "readiness to discount the unending propaganda" against the United States and it "will be stimulated when the hundreds who actually heard what I said here and there—and the additional thousands who will learn of this via the 'grapevine' which flourishes in this system of controlled information—compare what they know with the expurgated accounts they read in their own papers."²⁹⁾

Edward L. Freers, Counselor of the American Embassy in Moscow, transmitted a humorous episode to Secretary of State Herter: When one Soviet visitor left a message at Sokolniki, saying that "[i]f Exhibition re-presents American way of life then it is American way of life we should overtake," another visitor responded to this by pleading that "[j]ust let me off at America as we go by."³⁰⁾

The assessment of Ralph K. White of the USIA was more cautious. In popularity

or approval, the success of the Exhibit was “only moderate and somewhat equivocal,” he insisted in a preliminary report on visitors’ reactions to the Exhibition. Still, White admitted that “in communicating the ideas that Americans would like to communicate to the Russian people... its success appears to have been simply tremendous.” Of the numerous exhibits, the Family of Man photography, automobiles, color television, and Circarama were the best liked ones. In addition, White singled out the 75 young guides and commended their example as “the most subversive seed-of-thought, from the standpoint of an authoritarian Communist” and asserted that these guides were “the most important and successful part” of the Exhibition.³¹⁾

As White pointed out, the excellent reputation that the young guides enjoyed among Soviet citizens cheered the Eisenhower administration. J. Ramsay, staff of the Exhibition, paid a tribute to the young Russian-speaking guides in his report where he also mentioned an unpleasant incident one of the African-American guides had to endure. “The eighty-odd guides were probably the major attraction of the Exhibition and their contribution to *piercing the Iron Curtain* cannot be overestimated. Soviet citizens had probably never before encountered such a large number of Americans who could discuss things with them in their own language. This fact alone made the guides a major target both of audience curiosity and of officially-inspired agitational efforts. In doing their work, most of the guides were subjected at times to rather unusual heckling and unfriendly needling. One of the four Negroes was, for example, told by a group of Soviets : ‘Come on, now, we know you speak English, but what’s your real language?’ Despite such provocations, all guides bore up remarkably well and did a competent job under trying circumstances.”³²⁾

Hans Tuch, who had been involved in the cultural exchange negotiations for some time, concurred : “In my opinion, the overall success of the exhibit, ... is based on the fact that for the first time in the Soviet Union there was a dialogue between Americans and Soviets rather than the constant monologue which is Soviet propaganda. Normally, the Soviet citizen is exposed to only one version, the Soviet version about anything happening in the United States, ...” However, stressed Tuch, the Exhibition offered the Soviet visitors “a unique platform from which, for the first time, the other side of the story was presented” to them. These guides “were a group of intelligent, attractive, informed young people who could communicate to Soviet visitors what is meant by the ‘American way of life’ better than any display of goods could alone.” In Tuch’s judgment, what was most significant was “that the Soviet citizen saw another side of the US, heard another story about the US—that

it broadened his horizon, increased his desire for more information, heightened his curiosity and gave him food for thought.³³⁾

All in all, the U.S. government was ebullient over the reception. Just before the Exhibition came to an end, the Department of State claimed the outcome a "considerable success," observing that Soviet reaction "was one of intense interest and general approval" and that Soviet visitors demonstrated "enormous curiosity not only about the exhibits but also all facets of American life." The President himself rated the Exhibition as "highly successful." NSC 6013 of the following summer summed up the administration's general appraisal when it noted that the Exhibition "was the largest and probably the most productive single psychological effort ever launched by the U. S. in any Communist country."³⁴⁾

That the Soviet government did not accept any exposition of such magnitude in the following years probably suggests that the Kremlin was deeply concerned and distressed about the influence of this kind of event. Their reluctance was undoubtedly reinforced by the reception given to the Soviet exhibit in New York which, although it attracted over one million Americans, failed to draw the kind of enthusiastic response from visitors as the American Exhibition had done so well in Moscow. In subsequent negotiations, the U.S. government, turning down the Soviets' frequent requests to delete the provision for additional exhibitions, succeeded in holding several smaller exhibitions across the Soviet Union.³⁵⁾

IX The Deepening and Expansion of U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

The Moscow Exhibition appeared to validate the fundamental assumption inherent in the Eisenhower administration's containment policy that reduced international tension would inevitably lead to eventual evolution of Soviet society along less autocratic and authoritarian lines. On August 5, 1959, Vice President Nixon confirmed in a conference with the President that "the only long-range answer to the Russian problem is a gradual opening of the door through contacts. People are hungry for news of the outside world." In Nixon's view, East-West exchange pursued by the administration was the proper course to follow.³⁶⁾

On the very same day, NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," stated again the basic tenet of East-West exchange programs as defined in NSC 5607. In attaining the aims of containment, the NSC paper maintained, the United States should encourage expansion of U.S.-Soviet Bloc exchanges with a view to "[s]ustaining current ferment in the thinking, and fostering evolutionary trends within the Bloc." Foreign informational, cultural, educational and other psychologi-

cal programs, continued NSC 5906/1, were “vital elements” in the implementation of U.S. policies and these programs should be “selectively” strengthened. In carrying out these programs, “increased efforts” should be devoted to influence “civilian and military leaders, especially those visiting or being trained” in the United States, toward a better understanding of the United States.³⁷⁾

The USIA rationalized the exhibition approach in the following terms: “Our experience in Moscow last summer was thoroughly convincing evidence of the effectiveness of the exhibits approach in the Communist area. Not only are exhibits a medium of mass communication which is apparently more acceptable to Communist governments than other media, but as a means of communications in this controlled situation, they are highly effective. Exhibits have at least one outstanding advantage over other media in that they provide a stage setting for the person-to-person approach. An attendance of 2,700,000 was only a fraction of the audience reached through the Moscow show. The many visitors which each of the American guides talked to were, in turn, channels of communication to thousands of others. Furthermore, the impact on the public was greatly reinforced by the appearance and content of the Exhibition itself. Real objects add immeasurably to the credibility of words. There is no question that the emphasis on consumers’ goods was the one most calculated to appeal to the public’s interest at that time. Besides results in good will, there are clear indications that the visions of opulence enjoyed by the average American did, as we had hoped, stir the public to want, and the regime to provide, more for the consumer. In the period since the Exhibit, there has been a rash of Soviet government activity to improve the quality and quantity of their own products and services for the retail market. There is good reason to believe that in giving the public and officials an eyeful the exhibit was effective in reinforcing certain liberalizing tendencies in the economy.”³⁸⁾

Besides the exhibition, the student exchange remained an appealing approach in reaching directly the Soviet people. At an NSC meeting on May 21, 1959, Eisenhower again broached the idea of inviting “some thousands of young Russians to study” in the United States. He believed it essential to find “some means of achieving a break-through to the Russian people.” The rationale for his thinking was that the policy of containment was largely centered on the military field without paying due attention to other equally significant problems: “we were overinsuring ourselves on our deterrent military capabilities. Our vast military expenditures are actually weakening our economy instead of enabling it to expand. On the other hand, some little money spent... on these Russian students would add up to very

little and might do some real good." Without doubt, the President knew that, as an intelligence report noted, 17 Soviet students were studying in the U.S. and 22 American students were doing so in the Soviet Union. According to this report, this was "the one genuine break" in U.S.-Soviet exchanges and "the largest of its type with any free world country and marks the first time that Soviet students have gone abroad in any numbers."³⁹⁾

Although Nixon supported Eisenhower and went so far as to suggest "inviting a certain number of members of the Soviet managerial class who, . . . were not as dedicated to the Communist ideology as many other Soviet citizens," other government officials were not so eager. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Allen W. Dulles anticipated that the Kremlin "would probably not dare send 10,000 run-of-the-mill Soviet citizens to the U.S. for study." USIA Director Allen agreed, reminding Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, that the Soviets had been "reluctant" to accept even the 20 Soviet students for study in the U.S. on a reciprocal basis. Still Dulles and Allen did not oppose the proposal itself. Nonetheless, by mid-July Eisenhower had changed his mind and abandoned the idea, explaining that because of very strong "pressures on educational institutions from our own population," the United States might not be able to handle the Russian students.⁴⁰⁾

Two months later, Khrushchev was scheduled to make an official visit to the United States, the first such visit by the supreme leader of the U.S.S.R. During an almost two-week stay, he was to have a trip across the nation, stopping at Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Des Moines, and Pittsburgh.

For this visit, the State Department recommended Eisenhower that he should discuss an expansion of the U.S.-Soviet exchange program and request Khrushchev to cease jamming of foreign broadcasts and censorship. Eisenhower needed little urging. At his very first meeting with Khrushchev on September 15, he took up the subject of "wider exchange of ideas and people," complaining that "we are sending nearly 15,000 tourists to the Soviet Union and receiving only 100 Soviet citizens." Khrushchev was ready to discuss the matter. Both leaders, after reaffirming "their support of expanded scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges" in the discussion, stated in the joint communiqué that "substantial progress" had been made with respect to an increase in the U.S.-Soviet exchanges and "certain agreements" would be concluded soon.⁴¹⁾

Khrushchev's visit apparently brought several desirable results to the Eisenhower administration. First, the visit was almost likely to exert an educative influence

upon Khrushchev, who seemed to acquire a less narrow and shortsighted view of the United States. Just a few weeks before, Khrushchev had boasted to W. Averell Harriman, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that “Socialism or Communism, . . . was a new and higher form of social organization bound to replace capitalism. The latter must give way. . . . The proof of the superiority of the socialist structure is everywhere.” He had then claimed that “[w]ithin five to seven years we will be stronger than you.” When Harriman expressed his “surprise” that the Soviet estimate of the “maximum” economic growth of the United States was just 2 percent and asserted that the figure should be raised to 4 or 4.5 percent, Khrushchev would not budge. To Vice President Nixon, who had been engaged in the intense debate with the Soviet Premier at Sokolniki, he was “a man with a closed mind.” Nixon warned Eisenhower that Khrushchev would not be “impressed with what he sees in America.”⁴²⁾

In spite of these worrying signs, Khrushchev appeared to accept open-mindedly what he saw during the tour. United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who escorted him around the nation, wrote to Secretary of State Herter that the Soviet Premier “admired our high standard of living and said that it was in the United States that capitalism was at its best.” Lodge further claimed that Khrushchev said that he “had never denied that the United States had the highest standard of life and the most efficient methods of production in the world,” and added “that he didn’t think that the Soviet Union could catch up with the United States by 1970 ; while it might be able to catch up with the United States in the total volume of production, he didn’t think it would be able to catch up as far as per capita production was concerned.”⁴³⁾

Also, Lodge assured Secretary Herter that “[t]here is no doubt in my mind that as of this moment the gains on this trip definitely outweigh the losses and I can document this in many different ways.” As was different from Nixon’s gloomy prediction, Lodge’s appraisal of Khrushchev was optimistic : “Mr. Khrushchev has an open mind on some things, although not on the Communist ‘religion.’ He is a very good and attentive listener.” Lodge repeated that Khrushchev was “deeply impressed” with what he had seen and was struck “by the vitality of our people.” His conclusion was that Khrushchev “probably does not now really think” that the U.S.S.R. could surpass the United States, “at least anytime soon.”⁴⁴⁾

The State Department’s overall assessment was also upbeat. It claimed that “there seems every reason to suppose that our productive capacity, high standard of living, popular solidarity, etc., did make an impression on him despite his previous

statements that he already knew all about the US from films, extensive reading, etc.” Khrushchev “quite probably” believed what Soviet economists told him about the Soviet Union’s faster rate of economic growth, the Department conceded, but he “may well have carried away with him the conviction that, even granted these faster rates of growth, it would take the Soviet Union a long time to catch up with the US in standard of living.”⁴⁵⁾

Interestingly, Khrushchev himself was enormously pleased with his reception in the United States. Ambassador Thompson informed Herter in mid-November that Khrushchev “had been more than satisfied with his US visit which had exceeded his expectations[,] particularly in friendly feelings expressed both by people and gov [ernmen]t leaders and particularly [the] President and his family. He had most pleasant memories of his trip.”⁴⁶⁾

Second, shortly after Khrushchev’s departure, Moscow started to reduce the jamming of Voice of America, and by the spring of 1960, the program was heard in the Soviet Bloc virtually free from the jamming. NSC 6013 pointed out that the almost uninterrupted flow of information into the Soviet Union, coupled with the Soviet people’s first-hand experiences with the United States provided by the American Exhibition, “constituted a milestone in efforts to get the facts to people behind the Iron Curtain.”⁴⁷⁾

As the Eisenhower administration had always expected, the lessening international tension helped to promote East-West exchanges and make it easier for the United States to penetrate the U.S.S.R.

Third, the Khrushchev visit complicated further the relationship between Beijing and Moscow. On October 1, CIA Director Dulles, touching on celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China in progress, remarked that Khrushchev made a speech which “was perhaps not well received” in China and that “many potential areas of friction” between the two nations existed. Dulles also speculated that Beijing “had perhaps been cudgeled” into approving the joint U. S.-Soviet communique. Richard Bissell, Dulles’ deputy, was of a similar mind. On December 10, he stated at an NSC meeting that the Khrushchev trip “produced additional evidence of a divergence of views” between the two Communist states, while cautioning that it would not lead to “a rupture of the alliance.” A few weeks later, Ambassador Thompson’s penetrating telegram arrived: “Undoubtedly the most serious problem within the Communist bloc is that of Soviet relations with Communist China. I am convinced that the differences between the two countries are profound and will probably worsen rather than improve over the long run.”

Eisenhower confirmed this prevailing view in a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in January 1960 where he expressed cautious optimism about future relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and surmised that Khrushchev might fear the challenge of “a strong Red China.”⁴⁸⁾

Administration officials were right. Khrushchev’s U.S. visit was an additional factor that contributed to the final split of the Sino-Soviet alliance.⁴⁹⁾

Fourth, the visit paved the way for a steady expansion of East-West exchanges. In accordance with the joint U.S.-Soviet communiqué, negotiations for the second cultural exchange agreement began on November 4 in Moscow. On November 21, Ambassador Thompson and Soviet Minister for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries Georgi A. Zhukov signed an agreement on cooperation in exchanges in the fields of science, technology, education, and culture for 1960–1961. This was essentially the same one as the first, although the new agreement provided for a slight increase in exchange activity and in the same major fields as before with a few additions such as atomic energy and economics. Noteworthy was that both nations agreed on the exchange of at least 3 exhibitions during 1960–61. The American negotiators intended to circulate these exhibitions widely in the Soviet Union and hoped to have 25 guides in attendance at each of these circulating exhibits.⁵⁰⁾

Clearly, U.S.-Soviet exchanges entered into a new dimension in 1959. Khrushchev’s visit to the U.S. was preceded by trips of Soviet Deputy Premiers Anastas I. Mikoyan and Frol R. Kozlov, who had flown to New York to open the Soviet Exhibition, while besides Nixon, Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission John A. McCone, Chief Justice Earl Warren, a group of nine governors, and Harriman travelled to the Soviet Union. It seemed that mutual visits of high government officials and prominent figures of the two nations had become regular and common. And in the spring of 1960, Eisenhower was to be the first President to visit Moscow. Tourism was also growing. Private Soviet tourists to the United States swelled to about 400 in 1959 as opposed to approximately 65 in 1958 when they came to the nation for the first time. American tourists to the U.S.S.R. totalled 11,000 in 1959, as compared to about 5,000 in 1958. The number of U.S.-Soviet exchange programs, which had been 93 in 1958, jumped to 204 in 1959.⁵¹⁾

On June 15, 1959, in dealing with the expansion of East-West exchanges, the Department of State announced the creation of the Bureau of International Cultural Relations and assignment to the American Embassy in Moscow of a Counselor for Cultural Affairs, the first such appointment in a communist nation.⁵²⁾

An intelligence report of the State Department gave a concise outline of Soviet-free world exchanges and made a critical evaluation of their probable effect : "Since the death of Stalin the Soviet Union has expanded exchanges with the free world countries from virtually zero to a current total of approximately 2,000 exchanges of delegations and over 75,000 tourists visiting the USSR each year. . . . Increased contacts with the free world have introduced some fresh ideas into the thinking of the top Soviet leadership and intelligentsia and have brought the Soviet image of the outside world a little closer to reality."⁵³⁾

X The "Missile Gap," the U-2 incident, and U.S.-Soviet exchanges

In late January 1959, CIA Director Dulles, referring to Khrushchev's recent announcement that the Soviet Union had organized the "serialized" production of ICBMs, stated that his remark "fitted well with our U.S. intelligence estimates which have assumed that ICBM's would be coming off the production line in small numbers this Calendar Year." An intelligence estimate, on which Dulles had relied, rated that the Soviets would "probably achieve a first operational capability with 10 prototype ICBMs at some time during the year 1959." George B. Kistiakowsky, who was soon to become the President's second Special Assistant for Science and Technology, inferred in mid-January 1959 that the Soviets "now have an operational long-range missile force."⁵⁴⁾

Dulles observed seven months later that while the United States "today has a distinct military advantage" over the U.S.S.R., the latter's acquisition of intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles was changing the situation. "Within a few years—say by 1961 or 1962—the relation between the military strengths of the US and the USSR will probably have reached such a point that military advantage would lie with the side which seized the initiative." He added that the consensus in the intelligence community as to the date at which the Soviets would achieve a first operational capability with 10 ICBMs was "either in 1959 or 1960." National Intelligence Estimate on November 3, 1959 still anticipated that Soviet initial operational capability of 10 ICBMs would occur by the end of the year.⁵⁵⁾

Since Dulles had predicted in August 1958 that "[b]y the end of 1959," the Soviet Union could "probably produce ten to 100 ICBMs," obviously he had fallen into the bad habit of overestimating Soviet military power. Nevertheless, the CIA continued to push its range of estimates forward every year and insisted on Soviet superiority in this field.⁵⁶⁾ The "missile gap" controversy did not quiet down.

Senator John F. Kennedy, who had an eye on the 1960 presidential election, rose

to national prominence largely by criticizing the Eisenhower administration's defense policy and the alleged lack of presidential leadership. In his Senate speech made in August 1958, he argued that the United States must take whatever necessary steps were needed to close the "gap" which would appear in 1960-64 and demanded to "reverse... our willingness to place fiscal security ahead of national security." In a March 1959 interview, Kennedy made these ominous claims in a dramatic way :

In military preparedness I think that the reasoning of the Eisenhower administration is comparable to the predictions of Britains [*sic*] Stanley Baldwin during the Thirties—the enemy's capabilities are grossly and constantly underestimated. There isn't any doubt that the Russians are able to build accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles. I believe that the dangers of an unbalanced budget are far less than the danger to which the administration is determined to subject us by keeping us behind the Soviet Union in the ultimate weapon.⁵⁷⁾

Such Democratic hopefuls as Senators W. Stuart Symington, Henry M. Jackson and Lyndon B. Johnson joined Kennedy in raising the issue of the "missile gap" and charged the administration for failing to provide firm guarantees for national security. Joseph Alsop, one of the most influential journalists in the postwar period and an ardent exponent of the "missile gap," warned in a series of columns in late January 1960 that the Soviets had already obtained at least 150 operational ICBMs and these weapons could destroy the U.S. nuclear deterrent easily.⁵⁸⁾

Reluctantly bowing to the domestic pressure, Eisenhower decided to program a massive force of more than 1,000 strategic missiles by the end of his second term, while maintaining defense spending at approximately \$41 billion. Still, his skepticism of the "missile gap" remained profound. Although conceding its "possibility" in mid-January 1959, he questioned "the numbers and accuracy of such weapons" and doubted "whether this is a feasible means of making war." He believed that it would be "at least a few years before the Soviets could conceivably have enough missiles so as not to have grounds to fear retaliation."⁵⁹⁾

The President continued to regard the Soviet military threat in a less alarming way and explained in February 1959 that "we generally overestimate the capability of the USSR to outperform us," reminding Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Nathan F. Twining of the controversy over the "bomber gap" a few years before. In his last annual message to Congress on the State of the Union, Eisenhower proclaimed to the nation that the "bomber gap" had

been "always a fiction" and the "missile gap" demonstrated "every sign of being the same." At one point, Nixon aptly criticized the basic proposition inherent in the "missile gap," by arguing that it "resulted from an assumption that the Soviets would do all they were capable of doing and would make no mistakes, and from the further assumption that we would not do all we were capable of doing and would make a number of mistakes."⁶⁰⁾

Khrushchev himself seemed to acknowledge that he had been bluffing on this matter. When Ambassador Lodge paid a visit to Moscow in February 1960 and pointed out Soviet superiority in missile forces, Khrushchev made an unexpected reply: "no we're not; not really."⁶¹⁾

In coping with the Soviet challenge, the Eisenhower administration remained confident that its containment policy was producing favorable developments in the Soviet Union. At an NSC meeting on February 4, 1960, the President, again cautioning against overestimating the Soviet military power, predicted an ultimate transformation of the Soviet system: "[A]s a nation gets richer, it becomes more conservative. Perhaps as industrialization advances in the Soviet Union and as the Soviets have more to risk by an adventuresome policy, they will become more conservative. . . . Another fifty years might bring about quite a change in relations between the US and the USSR." Allen Dulles concurred. He said that he had always believed in "the possibility of evolutionary development" in the U.S.S.R. and read the following extract of National Intelligence Estimate 100-60, "Estimate of the World Situation": "Popular hopes for a better life are on the rise in the USSR. Some groups seek a greater degree of personal freedom from restrictions and there is a far more universal desire to enjoy more of the economic fruits of Soviet growth."⁶²⁾

In the dominant view of the administration, one significant way to further this trend was East-West exchanges. Ambassador Thompson's observation on January 29, 1960 was indeed encouraging on this point. "The opening up of cultural and technological contacts, the diminution in the jamming of our broadcasts and the increase in the publication of foreign news with the increase in knowledge of foreign points of view have already had an important effect, and the longer this is continued the more difficult it will be for the regime to reverse its policies." Thompson then insisted that "in any society there are inevitable pressures for change generated not only by unsatisfied human desires but also by unresolved operating problems" and that Khrushchev had committed to a course where "the changes already introduced, if successful, tend to encourage additional changes leading in time to a more normal society within the U.S.S.R." Although admitting that "[t]he pace of this evolution"

was difficult to gauge, he contended that it was “developing rapidly due in part to the fact that Khrushchev at 65 is a man in a hurry.” In Thompson’s opinion, “sound American policy” was “to facilitate this evolution in every way practicable.”⁶³⁾

Seeing this report, Allen Dulles suggested to Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State, that the latter distribute its copy dealing with “evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union” to the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad that had been just set up. Ambassador Lacy, too, endorsing these views, explained that one of the benefits expected from U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange programs was “the favorable influencing of Soviet public opinion and the encouragement of forces of change within the Soviet Union.”⁶⁴⁾

An intelligence report of the State Department agreed: “During the growth and increasing stability of the Soviet exchange effort, the most direct political impact in the USSR has been produced by foreign contact with the top leaders, who have travelled and have received foreign visitors to an extent unprecedented in Soviet experience. This contact has given them a clearer picture of the outside world and of foreign reactions to Soviet policies. . . . The ordinary citizen has benefited from a wider knowledge of the outside world. . . . The existence of a better-informed public, both in the USSR and abroad, makes it difficult for Soviet authorities to conceal arbitrary and unpopular actions and thus places a certain limitation upon their policies. Knowledge of Western standards, for example, has played an important part in whetting the public’s appetite for more consumers’ goods and better housing.”⁶⁵⁾

Even Bohlen, who was not so sanguine over the prospect of the coming evolution inside the Soviet system as Thompson and Lacy, was positive. Foreseeing that “it will be at least a decade if not more before” the process of evolution had “any fundamental effect” on the structure of power in the Soviet Union and on Soviet foreign policy, he acknowledged that “in the long run the evolutionary process in the Soviet Union will work in a direction favorable to ourselves.”⁶⁶⁾

Accordingly, it was extremely fortunate for the Eisenhower administration that in spite of the U-2 airplane incident in May and cancellations of the Paris summit and Eisenhower’s scheduled visit to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet government made “no effort. . . to slacken the pace of its exchange program with the free world. . . .” Although Moscow resumed the jamming of Voice of America in the wake of the U-2 incident, it was still on a selective basis.⁶⁷⁾

On July 18, 1960, Freers of the American Embassy in Moscow reported satisfactory progress in the field of East-West exchanges. He noted that in spite of the worsening political relationship caused by the U-2 affair, American culture “quite paradoxically

cally was spread throughout a large part of the country and enjoyed a phenomenal critical and public success." *My Fair Lady* had 21 performances in Moscow, 19 in Leningrad, and 16 in Kiev. Violinist Isaac Stern had recitals and orchestral concerts in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Vilnius, Riga, Minsk, and Tashkent. Roberta Peters, an opera singer, appeared in Moscow, Baku, Tbilisi, Erevan and Leningrad. In particular, Freers wrote, Van Cliburn was "presently causing near riots of popularity" in every city he visited and that the public adulation of Cliburn looked like "a kind of mass hysteria," caused by females "between the ages of 15 and 65." In Freer's view, "One has the impression that even if he were to play only chopsticks with two fingers, his 'audience' would cry 'Vanya' just as eagerly, pelt him with flowers, clutch at his clothes, follow him down the street and stand in front of his hotel waiting patiently for a friendly wave from his window." As to violinist Stern, he had the advantages of speaking the language as a Russian by birth and of forging personal friendship with such eminent artists as David Oistrakh, Leonid Kogan, and Emil Giles. "Isaac Stern, popular and recognized for the great artist that he is, again performed with tremendous public and critical success. . . ." In concluding the report, Freers advised "a continuation and an intensification of this program" and predicted that if East-West exchanges in this area with "the occasional spectacular presentation" continued, "U.S. culture will increasingly be recognized for what it really is : a vital, many-sided, free, expressive and multi-talented force which is part of our way of life."⁶⁸⁾

All in all, 1960 was not a bad year for U.S.-Soviet exchanges. "Despite a worsening in the political climate, 1960 was marked by a continuation of businesslike contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union," Ambassador Lacy told Bohlen. Rating the film exchange as "one of the most successful areas of the exchange program from the American point of view," Lacy wrote that American films enjoyed "a gratifyingly warm reception" in the U.S.S.R. ; by the end of 1960, the United States had purchased eight Soviet films and the Soviet Union had bought fourteen American films. He also noted that the number of American tourists to the Soviet Union reached around 12,000, which remained at about the 1959 level, while the number of Soviet tourists to the United States was 500 in 1960, an 100 increase over the 1959 level. An Intelligence report of the State Department recorded that the Soviet exchange program with the free world in 1960 increased approximately 12 percent.⁶⁹⁾

When the Soviet government took a new offensive in its exchange program with the Third World in October by establishing People's Friendship University which enrolled some 500 students from Asia, Africa and Latin America, and which promised

free tuition, housing and medical care, transportation to and from the Soviet Union, and stipends to the students, the Eisenhower administration was not alarmed. The major reason was that the administration had already realized that exchange students from developing nations in the U.S.S.R. were not satisfied with their conditions of study and were even “disillusioned by Soviet life as they see it” and returned home “convinced” that the Soviet system was not one for them to emulate. Hearing the news of People’s Friendship University, the American Embassy in Moscow informed the Department of State that African students at Moscow State University complained of racial discrimination in the Soviet Union, and referred to a story where a medical student from Uganda was “often disgusted” with medical practice in Soviet surgery.⁷⁰⁾

To Eisenhower’s sheer disappointment and frustration, however, the controversy over the “missile gap” continued, and the public’s dissatisfaction with containment persisted. In addition, the Soviet successful downing of the U-2 coupled with Eisenhower’s rather clumsy handling of the affair and the Japanese government’s abrupt cancellation of the presidential visit to their nation further damaged his political prestige. Senator John F. Kennedy constantly hammered away at the “missile gap” in the campaign and demanded strong presidential leadership. Soon after he won the Democratic Party’s nomination, Kennedy appointed Paul H. Nitze, the major writer of the Gaither Report and the leading critic of the Eisenhower administration’s containment policy, as chairman of his task force on national security policy. Vice President Nixon, the Republican presidential nominee, understood the national trend. In July he engineered with Governor of New York Nelson A. Rockefeller, who had been openly critical of the administration’s defense policy, a joint statement for the Party platform where both of them called for an increase in defense budget.⁷¹⁾ This announcement was a virtual rejection of Eisenhower’s stance on this issue.

When the presidential campaign entered the final phase, a U.S. Information Agency study on American prestige in the world was leaked to the media, delivering an additional political blow to Eisenhower and Nixon. This study showed not only that in most West European nations surveyed the Soviet Union was believed to lead the United States in military strength and in space development, but also that in most parts of the world the Soviet Union was expected to end up stronger than the United States twenty or twenty-five years later.⁷²⁾

In the face of these adverse circumstances, Eisenhower’s popularity began to slip. Gallup polls indicated that Eisenhower’s approving rate, which had been 71 percent

in January 1960, had plunged to 61 percent in June and had dropped to 58 percent in October.⁷³⁾

In the end, Eisenhower failed to dispel the pervasive perception that the United States was somehow drifting and he could not, or would not, take effective measures to rectify the situation. His failure on this point had an important bearing on the final outcome of the November election. This was certainly a bitter disappointment to Eisenhower, who felt that his containment policy had been rejected by the majority of the American people.⁷⁴⁾

XI Conclusion

Mansfield D. Sprague, Chairman of the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, reconfirmed the commonly accepted view in the administration in a report to the President on December 23, 1960. The Sprague Committee admitted that "a great and as yet insufficiently exploited opportunity lies" in educational, cultural and exchange programs, and argued that "[c]hanging world conditions" demanded "a particularly rapid expansion of" these programs. In the matter of exchange programs with the Soviet Bloc, the report proposed as follows: "Within the Soviet Union, . . . there are growing pressures for more individual freedom and more contact with the non-Communist world. . . . It is . . . important that we take every opportunity to penetrate the Bloc countries with influence, information and ideas in hope of lessening to some degree the hostility and aggressiveness of the governments and to increase frictions among them. Adequate appropriations should be made in order to exploit fully opportunities in the Soviet area for exhibits, cultural presentations, publication programs and other types of informational activity."⁷⁵⁾

Kennedy, who had sharply attacked the Eisenhower administration's foreign and military policy in the presidential election, was actually cognizant of the significance of cultural and informational programs and was a warm supporter of the USIA during his Senate years. The report of his task force on the USIA was in general accord with the Sprague report. Indeed, once he assumed office, President Kennedy followed and stepped up Eisenhower's approach to East-West exchanges. He appointed Edward R. Murrow, a highly respected journalist and a member of his task force on the USIA, to head the Agency and created a new assistant secretary for educational and cultural affairs.⁷⁶⁾ East-West exchanges were now firmly integrated into the policy of containment.

George F. Kennan once prophesied in an immensely influential article, "The

Sources of Soviet Conduct,” that by “a firm policy of containment,” the United States could ultimately force the Kremlin to find itself “in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing” of its power. Kennan’s prophecy materialized forty years later. This far-reaching consequence occurred not simply because the United States had applied relentless military and economic pressure to the Soviet Union. Equally indispensable was the cultural and ideological offensive against the Soviet Union.⁷⁷⁾

It is possible to see that the peaceful penetration of the U.S.S.R. launched by the Eisenhower administration in the form of East-West exchanges found its eventual place in the Helsinki Accords adopted at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. Of the Helsinki Accords, Principle VII of Basket I called for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and Basket III addressed cooperation in humanitarian efforts and educational and cultural exchanges. These provisions gave the significant impact on the Soviet Bloc and played the key role in undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet government from within. The Helsinki Accords have been rightly interpreted as decisive in determining the ultimate outcome of the Cold War. The objectives as defined in NSC 5607 by Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles finally came to fruition.⁷⁸⁾

Again, I am most grateful to Dennis J. Nolan for checking the English.

Notes

- 1) Operations Coordinating Board untitled memorandum, April 29, 1954, White House office, National Security Council Staff : Papers, 1948-61, OCB Central File Series, Box 12, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
- 2) Streibert report to the President and Cabinet, “Communist Propaganda in the Cold War,” July 1, 1955, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File : Cabinet Series, Box 5, *ibid.*
- 3) Eisenhower to the President of the Senate, July 27, 1954, White House Office, National Security Council Staff : Papers, 1948-61, OCB Central File Series, Box 14 ; Operations Coordinating Board memorandum, “General Policy and Operating Guidance for the President’s Emergency Fund for Participating in International Affairs —Fiscal Year 1959,” May 19, 1955, *ibid.*
- 4) Operations Coordinating Board memorandum, “Policy Guidelines for the President’s Special International Program,” August 27, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs : Records, 1952-61, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 2, Eisenhower Library. See also Bureau of Budget report,

- "Survey of U.S. Overseas Exhibit Activities," April 30, 1960, the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) : Records, 1959-61, Box 14, *ibid.*
- 5) Memorandum by the Office of the U.S. Commissioner General for the Brussels Exposition, "President's Special International Program," undated, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Records Relating to U.S. Participation in the Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958, Box 22, RG 43, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
 - 6) Cullman to Eisenhower, November 12, 1957, *ibid.*, Box 22 ; Cullman to Herter, October 28, 1957, *ibid.*, Box 8 ; Cullman New York speech, October 8, 1957, Central Files, Official File, International Trade Fair (4), Box 720, Eisenhower Library.
 - 7) Eisenhower to Dulles, November 16, 1957, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Records Relating to U.S. Participation in the Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958, Box 22 ; Cullman report, "The United States at the Brussels Universal and International Exhibition, 1958," May 30, 1959, Central Files, Official File, Brussels Universal and International Exhibition (5), Box 721 ; Gerson H. Lush to Jack Z. Anderson, undated, *ibid.*, International Trade Fair (4), Box 720.
 - 8) Cullman report, May 30, 1959, *ibid.*, Brussels Universal and International Exhibition (5), Box 721. An idea of Hoover's attendance appeared to originate with John Foster Dulles. See Dulles to Eisenhower, March 27, 1958, *ibid.*, Brussels Universal and International Exhibition (5), Box 721.
 - 9) Allen report to the President, June 29, 1958, *ibid.*, Brussels Universal and International Exhibition (5), Box 721 ; "Survey of Visitor Reactions to the U.S. and Other Exhibits at the Brussels International Fair," Records of the United States Information Agency, Office of Research Special Projects, 1953-1963, Box 15, RG 306, National Archives II ; report by the Bureau of Intelligence Research and Analysis, "The Soviet Bloc Exchange Program, 1958," January 30, 1959, O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement (Washington, D.C. : 1979) (Microfilm version). On the propaganda aspect of the Brussels Exposition, see also Robert W. Rydell, *World of Fairs : The Century-of-Progress Expositions* (Chicago : 1993), p. 211.
 - 10) Memoranda of conversations, June 27 and October 25, 1955, 861.191-MO/6-2755 and 861.191/10-2555, U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs (Frederick, MD : 1989) (Microfilm version) ; Dulles to the American Embassy in Moscow, February 2, 6 and March 2, 1956, 861.191-MO/2-256, 861.191-MO/2-656 and 861.191-MO/3-256, *ibid.* ; memorandum of conversation with Bohlen, April 17, 1956, 861.191-MO/4-1756, *ibid.* A British diplomat in the Moscow Embassy sent an interesting observation of Neuberger to the Foreign Office, saying that the American businessman "makes a most curious impression, and if it were not for his undoubted achievements I would have put him down as a highly daft romancer with a persecution

- complex.” A.J.C. Meyer to F.G.K. Gallagher, February 7, 1958, FO 371/135405/NS 1861/5, Public Record Office, Kew, London.
- 11) Dulles to the American Embassy in Moscow, July 30, 1956, 861.191-MO/7-3056, U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs ; William Lacy to Bohlen, September 20, 1956, 861.191-MO/9-2056, *ibid.* ; Bohlen to Dulles, October 19 and 26, 1956, 861.191-MO/10-1956 and 861.191-MO/10-2656, *ibid.*
 - 12) Bohlen to Dulles, November 5, 1956, 861.191-MO/11-556, *ibid.* ; Herbert C. Hoover, Jr. to the American Embassy in Moscow, November 5, 1956, 861.191-MO/11-556, *ibid.* ; Bohlen to Dulles, November 15, 1956, 861.191-MO/11-1556, *ibid.*
 - 13) Dulles to the American Embassy in Moscow, May 24 and June 28, 1957, 861.191-MO/5-2457 and 861.191-MO/6-2857, *ibid.* ; Herter to the American Embassy in Moscow, December 23, 1957, *ibid.* ; Charles H. Taquey memorandum, June 4, 1957, White House Office, National Security Council Staff : Papers, 1952-61, OCB Central File Series, Box 13 ; Operations Coordinating Board Trade Fair Committee report, May 27, 1957, *ibid.*
 - 14) Herter to the American Embassy in Moscow, August 2, 1957, 861.191-MO/8-257, U. S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs ; Williams to Adams, September 19, 1957, Central Files, Official File, Brussels Universal and International Exhibition (5), Box 721. On the general background of the U.S. consistent effort to sponsor a Moscow fair, see also C. Colburn Hardy memo for Adams, January 1, 1958, *ibid.*
 - 15) *Department of State Bulletin* (hereafter cited as *DSB*) 39 (October 13, 1958), 577-78 ; *ibid.* 40 (January 26, 1959), 132-34.
 - 16) Reed undated memorandum, General Records of the Department of State, 1955-1959, Central Decimal File, Box 2175, RG 59. Peter Maxey of the British Foreign Ministry inferred that the Exhibition would “have a big impact on Soviet opinion. The effort and expense should be amply repaid. It looks very much, indeed, as though the Russians are making a serious miscalculation.” Maxey memorandum, February 9, 1959, FO 371/143575/NS 1861/2, Public Record Office.
 - 17) Sivard memorandum, “U.S. National Exhibit, Gorki Park, Moscow, 1959,” October 2, 1958, General Records of the Department of State, 1955-1959, Central Decimal File, Box 2175.
 - 18) USIA paper, “Basic Policy Guidelines for the U.S. Exhibit in Moscow in 1959,” Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Records Relating to the American National Exhibition, Moscow, 1957-59, Box 7.
 - 19) Thompson to the Department of State, November 17, 1958, *ibid.* ; Thompson to the Department of State, October 3, 1958, 861.191-MO/10-358, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs.
 - 20) “Transcript of Tape Recordings : White House Conference, Moscow Fair,” January 1959, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Records Relating to the American National Exhibition, Moscow, 1957-1959, Box 7.
 - 21) McClellan report on the American National Exhibition in Moscow, December 1959,

- the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) :
Records, 1959-61, Box 19.
- 22) White House Press Release, May 21, 1959, Central Files, Official File, Moscow
Trade Fair (2), Box 722.
- 23) Eisenhower statement, February 10, 1959, *ibid.* ; *The New York Times*, June 30,
1959.
- 24) McClellan report on the American National Exhibition, the President's Committee
on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) : Records, 1959-61, Box 19 ;
Katherine G. Howard, "The 'Fair' Way of Making Friends," Katherine G. Howard
Papers, 1917-74, Box 26, Eisenhower Library ; Eisenhower remarks, June 15, 1959,
Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File : DDE Diaries, Box 42.
- 25) McClellan report on the American National Exhibition, the President's Committee
on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) : Records, 1959-61, Box 19 ;
the Seventh Semi-Annual Report on the President's Special International Program,
July 1, 1959-December 31, 1959, *ibid.*, Box 14. Eisenhower authorized to transfer \$3,
300,000 of U.S. Mutual Security funds for the Exhibition and an additional \$300,000 was
provided under the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation of
1956. See *ibid.*
- 26) *The New York Times*, July 25, 1959. Nixon also made a radio and television
address to the Soviet people on August 1. On Nixon's stay in the Soviet Union, see
Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon : The Education of a Politician, 1913-1962* (New York :
1987), pp. 521-32. On Nixon's own recollection, see Richard Nixon, *RN : The Memoirs
of Richard Nixon* (New York : 1978), pp. 206-13. The Vice President stopped off in
Warsaw on his way home and received an enthusiastic welcome. He reported to
Eisenhower that Poland was "the true Achilles Heel of the Soviet system." See John S.
D. Eisenhower memorandum of conversation, August 5, 1959, *Foreign Relations of the
United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*) : 1958-1960, X (Part 2) (Washington, D.
C. : 1993), 219.
- 27) Thompson to Herter, July 31, 1959, 861.191/7-3159, U.S. State Department Central
Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs. On Soviet visitors' overall
response to the American Exhibition, see Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain :
Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York : 1997), pp. 185-213.
- 28) Memorandum of conversation, September 26, 1959, *FRUS* : 1958-1960, X (Part 1),
469. Khrushchev also recalled in his memoir that the Exhibition was "a failure."
Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers : The Last Testament*, Translated and
Edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston : 1974), p. 364.
- 29) Watson to Eisenhower, July 31, 1959, Central Files, Official File, Moscow Trade
Fair (2), Box 722 ; Nixon to Eisenhower, July 31, 1959, *FRUS* : 1958-1960, X (Part
1), 376-77.
- 30) Freers to Herter, September 8, 1959, 861.191-MO/9-859, U.S. State Department
Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs.

- 31) White report, "Visitors' Reactions to the American Exhibit in Moscow : A Preliminary Report," September 28, 1959, the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) : Records, 1959-61, Box 14. In this report, White criticized the American people's attitude toward the Russians who showed "the friendly attitude... toward America and Americans, and the intense curiosity that were inextricably linked with it," by lamenting that "[i]t was particularly striking in contrast with what seems to me to be the great indifference of most Americans toward the Russian people. We are hostile to their government and occasionally stop to distinguish between their people and their government, being sympathetic with them because of their terrible government, but this doesn't imply any very active, warm friendliness toward them. In this respect they are different. In spite of years of intense anti-American Communist propaganda, they seem to have a warmth and sincerity of friendliness toward us that puts us to shame."
- 32) Leslie S. Brady to the State Department, October 6, 1959, 861.191-MO/10-659. U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs. *Italics mine.* All the officials involved in the Moscow Fair were unanimous in praising the excellent performance of these young American guides. See also Abbott Washburn oral history interview, May 1, 1968, p. 90, Eisenhower Library ; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years : Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (New York : 1965), p. 410. Ambassador Thompson had already reported on August 10, 1959 that "[o]utstanding feature for many Russian visitors is not exhibits but 75 young Russian speaking American guides. Wherever guides go knots of friendly eager Soviets follow asking questions about exhibition, US economic life and culture and personal experience of guides. Comments in guest books frequently compliment guides on courtesy, intelligence and Russian language facility." Thompson to Herter, August 10, 1959, 861.191-MO/8-1059, U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs.
- 33) Brady to the State Department, October 6, 1959, 861.191-MO/10-659, *ibid.* Tuch remembered that during his revisit to Moscow fifteen years later, he met a man, still wearing on his lapel an emblem of the American Exhibition, who told that his visit to the Exhibition "was a lifelong memory, a pleasant memory." See Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World : U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York : 1990), p. 64.
- 34) State Department report, "US-Soviet Exhibits a Successful Exchange," August 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 38, 39-40 ; Eisenhower annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 12, 1961, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States : Dwight D. Eisenhower* (hereafter cited as *EPP*), 1960-61 (Washington, D.C. : 1961), 916 ; NSC 6013, "Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1960 : Part 5—The USIA Program," undated, Records of the National Security Council Policy Papers 6005-6014, Box 52, RG 273, National Archives II. The British Ambassador to Moscow wrote to the Foreign Office that the Soviet visitors "were

- deeply impressed" with the exhibits, which "would also have tended to confirm the generally accepted conclusion that the Soviet Union has a long way to go except in a few specialist fields before it catches up with the United States." D. Patrick Reilly to Selwyn Lloyd, September 11, 1959, FO 371/143575/NS 1861/15, Public Record Office.
- 35) Yale Richmond, *U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986 : Who Wins ?* (Boulder, Col. : 1987), p. 26 ; State Department report, August 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 37. Leslie S. Brady, Counselor for Cultural Affairs of the American Embassy in Moscow, wrote to the State Department that one of the "unusual by-products" of the Exhibition was a collection of letters that Soviet citizens handed "surreptitiously" to the American guides. In his assessment, "the most salient feature" of these letters was the "outspoken hostility" to Communism and the Soviet government. See Brady to the Department of State, September 30, 1959, 761.00/9-3059, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Internal Affairs.
- 36) Memorandum of conference with Eisenhower, August 5, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 1), 382.
- 37) NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," August 5, 1959, *ibid.*, III, pp. 307, 310.
- 38) USIA paper, "The Exhibit Program in 1960-61 for the Soviet Area," March 21, 1960, *ibid.*, X (Part 2), p. 56. One of the major aims of President Eisenhower's visit to India in December 1959 was to attend an opening ceremony of the world's first International Agricultural Exhibition in New Delhi. See Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 500-2.
- 39) Memorandum of discussion at the 407th meeting of the NSC, May 21, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 26 ; report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "The Soviet Bloc Exchange Program, 1958," January 30, 1959, O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement. One of three graduate students who came to Columbia in the fall of 1958 was Alexander Yakovlev, who was to become the major architect of Perestroika in the late 1980's. See Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York : 1995), pp. 74-76.
- 40) Memorandum of discussion at the 407th meeting of the NSC, May 21, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 26-27 ; Allen to Gray, June 5, 1959, *ibid.*, pp. 30-31 ; memorandum of meeting with Eisenhower and Gray, July 13, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 35.
- 41) State Department memorandum, "Khrushchev Visit, Washington, September 1959," September 11, 1959, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File : International Series, Box 52 ; Eisenhower's talks with Khrushchev, undated, *ibid.* ; memorandum of conversation, September 15, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 1), 393 ; joint communiqué, September 27, 1959, *DSB* 41 (October 12, 1959), 499.
- 42) Conversations between Khrushchev and Harriman, June 23, 1959, in Robert I. Owen to the Department of State, June 26, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 1), 271, 279, 280 ; memorandum of conference with Eisenhower, August 5, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 382.
- 43) Memorandum of conversation, September 21, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 439.
- 44) Lodge to Herter, September 21, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 439n. ; memorandum of conference

- with Eisenhower, September 25, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 455.
- 45) Report on the Khrushchev visit, undated, *ibid.*, pp. 489-90.
- 46) Thompson to Herter, November 13, 1959, 611.61/11-1359, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1955-1959, Foreign Affairs (Frederick, MD : 1989) (Microfilm version). Khrushchev seemed to have no illusion about the U. S. ulterior motive for promoting East-West exchanges. He later pointed out that “[t]he Americans wanted a much broader exchange of tourists, scientists, and students.... Many of their suggestions were clearly intended to make us open our borders, to increase the flow of people back and forth.” See Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 409-10.
- 47) Allen to Eisenhower, September 23 and November 5, 1959, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File : Administration Series, Box 2 ; Brady to Herter, February 20, 1960, 511.604/2-2060, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, Box 1064 ; NSC 6013, “Part 5—The USIA Program,” undated, Records of the National Security Council Policy Papers 6005-6014, Box 52.
- 48) Memoranda of discussions at the 420th and 428th meetings of the NSC, October 1 and December 10, 1959, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Boxes 10 and 12 ; Thompson to the Department of State, January 29, 1960, 761.00/1-2960, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1960-January 1963, Internal Affairs (Bethesda, MD : 1998) (Microfilm version) ; memorandum of conversation, January 19, 1960, *FRUS : 1958-60*, XVIII, 262-63.
- 49) Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War : From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass. : 1996), pp. 201-202, 229-35 ; Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies : The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford : 1990), pp. 212-17.
- 50) *DSB* 41 (December 28, 1959), 951-57 ; USIA paper, “The Exhibit Program in 1960-61 for the Soviet Area,” March 21, 1960, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 56-58.
- 51) Reports by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “The Soviet Bloc Exchange Program, 1958,” January 30, 1959 ; and “Sino-Soviet Bloc Exchanges with the Free World in 1959,” February 9, 1960, O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-61, Supplement.
- 52) *DSB* 41 (July 13, 1959), 42 ; Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive : The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton : 1960), 1.
- 53) Report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Contacts between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc : A Review,” October 30, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 50.
- 54) Memorandum of discussion at the 395th meeting of the NSC, January 29, 1959, *ibid.*, X (Part 1), p. 260 ; an intelligence estimate, December 23, 1958, *ibid.*, X (Part 1), p. 260n. ; memorandum of meeting, January 12, 1959, *ibid.*, III, p. 172.
- 55) Dulles memorandum, August 18, 1959, *ibid.*, III, pp. 317-18 ; National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-59, “Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles,” Novem-

ber 3, 1959, *ibid.*, III, p. 327.

- 56) Memorandum of discussion at the 378th meeting of the NSC, August 27, 1958, *ibid.*, III, p. 136.
- 57) Kennedy Senate speech, August 14, 1958, *Congressional Record*, 104 (Part 14), pp. 17569-73 ; interview with Kennedy by Philip Deane, undated (March 1959), The Papers of President Kennedy, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, General Files 1953-1960, Box 539, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston.
- 58) Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca : 1995), pp. 128-33, 137-41 ; Alsop articles, January 25-29, 1960, *The New York Herald Tribune*. Joseph's younger brother, Stuart, was the first major journalist who used a "gap" to explain the alleged Soviet lead in long-range missile forces. His December 1957 article did a lot to propagate the concept of a "missile gap" widely across the nation. See Stuart Alsop, "How We Can Catch Up?" *The Saturday Evening Post*, December 14, 1957, pp. 27, 66-68. President Eisenhower detested Joseph Alsop, and almost certainly in responding to the latter's January 1960 columns, described him as "about the lowest form of animal life on earth." See diary entry, February 10, 1960, in George B. Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House : The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology* (Cambridge, Mass. : 1976), p. 250. On Joseph Alsop's view of the "missile gap," see also Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., *Joe Alsop's Cold War : A Study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue* (Chapel Hill : 1995), pp. 168-73.
- 59) Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, pp. 112-49, 172-93 ; memorandum of meeting, January 12, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, III, 172-73.
- 60) Memorandum for the record, February 12, 1959, *ibid.*, X (Part 1), p. 261 ; memorandum of discussion at the 430th meeting of the NSC, January 7, 1960, *ibid.*, III, p. 357 ; Eisenhower annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 12, 1961, *EPP, 1960-61*, p. 919.
- 61) Lodge to Herter, February 9, 1960, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 1), 507. The new Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, remarked at an NSC meeting in January 1960 that an intelligence estimate "now virtually says that there is no missile gap." Memorandum of discussion at the 430th meeting of the NSC, January 7, 1960, *ibid.*, III, p. 356. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, Ambassador Thompson had reached the same conclusion : "I am becoming increasingly convinced we are grossly overestimating Soviet military strength relative to ours. I of course am not privy to all our intelligence on this subject though I do see much of end product. It seems to me this overestimate has resulted from natural tendency [of] our military to assess enemy[']s capabilities at maximum as may be only prudent from this point of view." Thompson to Dean Rusk, January 30, 1961, 761.51/1-3061, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1960-January 1963, Internal Affairs.
- 62) Memorandum of discussion at the 434th meeting of the NSC, February 4, 1960, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, III, 370-71.
- 63) Thompson to the Department of State, January 29, 1960, 761.00/1-2960, Confidential

- U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1960-January 1963, Internal Affairs.
- 64) Merchant to Foy D. Kohler, March 16, 1960, 761.00/1-2960, *ibid.* ; Lacy to Raymond A. Hare, March 7, 1960, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, Box 1064.
- 65) Report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Sino-Soviet Bloc Exchanges with the Free World in 1959," O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement.
- 66) Bohlen to Herter, May 6, 1960, 761.00/5-660, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1960-January 1963, Internal Affairs.
- 67) Report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Sino-Soviet Bloc Exchanges with the Free World in 1960," February 1, 1961, O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement. On the Soviet intention of maintaining and furthering U.S.-Soviet cultural exchanges despite of the U-2 incident, see also Brady to the Department of State, July 22, 1960, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, Box 1064.
- 68) Freers to the Department of State, July 18, 1960, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 67-70.
- 69) Lacy to Bohlen, April 10, 1961, in Frank G. Siscoe report, "Report on Exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," January 1, 1961, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, Box 1063 ; report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Sino-Soviet Bloc Exchanges with the Free World in 1960," February 1, 1961, O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part XI, The Soviet Union : 1950-1961, Supplement. The Moscow Embassy sent a report to the Department of State in the summer of 1960 that American films, such as *Rhapsody*, *All About Eve*, *the Great Caruson*, *the Great Waltz*, *Lili*, and *Roman Holiday*, "seem to continue enjoying considerable popularity." Brady to the Department of State, July 28, 1960, 861.452/7-2860, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1960-January 1963, Internal Affairs.
- 70) Report by the Office of Research and Analysis, USIA, "The People's Friendship University in Moscow," September 30, 1960, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, "R" Reports, 1960-63, Box 3 ; report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "The Impact of Study in the USSR on Free World Students," December 18, 1959, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 51n. ; Boris H. Klosson to the Department of State, February 27 and March 28, 1960, 861.432/2-2760 and 861.411/3-2860, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files : The Soviet Union, 1960-January 1963, Internal Affairs. To be sure, racism was not an issue solely confined to Soviet society. Racial discrimination in the United States also remained the major test for the Eisenhower administration especially when the Cold War was in the process of spreading throughout Asia and Africa. In mid-November 1960, Eisenhower sent a letter of apology to a Central African Republic representative at the United Nations who had been refused

- service at a dinner near Baltimore on his way back to New York from Washington. The Department of State was deeply concerned that either incident or the letter might be made public. See editorial note, *FRUS : 1958-1960*, II, 438-39.
- 71) Robert A. Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1960* (New York : 1974), pp. 200-205, 211-13, 224-26 ; Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, pp. 140-41 ; Paul H. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost : At the Center of Decision. A Memoir* (New York : 1989), pp. 177-78.
- 72) *The New York Times*, October 27, 1960. See also report by the Office of Research and Analysis, United States Information Agency, "Free World Views of the US-USSR Power Balance," August 29, 1960, White House office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 25.
- 73) George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll : Public Opinion, 1935-1971*, Vol. 3 (1959-1971) (New York : 1972), pp. 1651, 1675, 1690.
- 74) Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower : The President* (New York : 1984), pp. 603-4. The Soviet government was apprehensive of the election result. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasiliy Kuznetsov informed Ambassador Thompson that "he had been disturbed by some of the President-elect's campaign remarks which indicated his first actions would be to step up U.S. military expenditures, and build up the U.S. military establishment to one of clear superiority over the USSR. He thought that such moves would be unfortunate and would add to the tensions existing between our countries." See "Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President," November 26, 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File : DDE Diaries, Box 54.
- 75) "Conclusions and Recommendations of the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad," December 1960, the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) : Records, 1959-61, Box 26. In December 1960, the Eisenhower administration signed a cultural and scientific exchange agreement with the Romanian government, the first such agreement between the United States and an Eastern European country. See *FRUS : 1958-1960*, X (Part 2), 70.
- 76) Report to Kennedy by the task force report on USIA, December 31, 1960, Kennedy Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, Transition Files, Task Force Reports, 1960, Box 1072 ; Frank Ninkovich, *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy* (New York : 1996), pp. 28-29. Kennedy supported the 1958 cultural exchange agreement by saying that "it has been a useful break-through and that it may have laid the groundwork for further agreements in the future...." Kennedy to Edmund Zawacki, March 4, 1958, Kennedy Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Legislation Files, 1953-1960, Box 691. When Senate Majority Leader Johnson, infuriated with Director Arthur Larson's careless remark about the New Deal, tried to reduce the USIA budget from \$144 to \$90 million for fiscal 1958, Kennedy was the few Democratic Senators who argued against the cut. Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War : The Story of American Propaganda* (New York : 1968), pp. 93-99.
- 77) [George F. Kennan]"X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July

1947), 566-82.

- 78) On the significance of the Helsinki Accords, William G. Hyland points out that “[i]f it can be said that there was one point when the Soviet empire began to crack, it was at Helsinki,” and even Henry Kissinger, for whom Hyland had worked in the Nixon and Ford administrations, concedes that “Basket III was destined to play a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet satellite orbit, and became a testimonial to all human rights activists in NATO countries.” See William G. Hyland, *The Mortal Rivals : Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York : 1987), p. 128 ; Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York : 1994), p. 759. On this point, see also John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War : Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York : 1992), pp. 25-26. Judging from Nixon’s numerous contacts with Soviet leaders and his apparently full appreciation of the significance of East-West exchanges in the Eisenhower administration, it seems necessary to make a reexamination of his attitude toward the CSCE. Although President Nixon’s stance has been generally interpreted as rather lukewarm and even negative, it is hard to imagine that he did not grasp the profound implication of some key provisions contained in the Helsinki Accords.