

Social Order and the Origin of Language in Tokugawa Political Thought¹⁾

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Yamaga Sokō and the ancient sages
- 3 Neo-Confucianism and immanent good
- 4 Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) and the innovative function of Language
- 5 Kokugaku and the God Given Language
- 6 Japanese Language and the modernization

1 Introduction

The origin of language was one of the most controversial topics in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Philosophers such as John Locke, Condillac, Rousseau, and J. G. Herder committed to the topic. In their discussion, language was a critical factor that mediated between individuality and social conduct.²⁾

Not only in the western tradition, but also in Chinese classics, the beginning of the system of language was an important question. In Hsün-tzu or in Mo-tzu, the beginning of civilized order and the establishment of the proper linguistic order were strongly connected.³⁾

However, comparatively few attempts have been made to examine this issue in the study of Japanese political thought. This paper aims to draw attention to Tokugawa intellectuals' ideas on the origin of language and its implications for the political thought of the times. By examining several exemplary theories on the origin of language, I will clarify a characteristic feature of Tokugawa socio-political thought.

There are two major points that this paper will focus upon. The first one is the logical structure of explanations by Tokugawa thinkers of the beginning of the social order. One position was clearly built on the assumption that the social order was determined by an authority outside or above the society itself. In this type of idea, they adopted a concept of the state of nature in a Hobbesian sense in which individuals in the society could not establish order without resorting to an absolute and external power. Some thinkers of this type expressed the idea of social con-

tract, though ambiguously. In contrast, the other type of thinkers maintained that the social order grew immanently or naturally from within the society. Consequently, there were critical exchanges over this issue.

Secondly, I will examine how the function of language was placed in a process of internalization of that social order. For one side of the debate, language was taken as a crucial device for members of society to internalize the social order in their minds. On the other hand, there were thinkers who asserted that such internalization was made possible only by proper practice and rituals.

This paper starts by examining the cases of several Tokugawa Confucianist thinkers, followed by *Kokugaku* or National learning thinkers. In closing, Meiji intellectuals will be discussed in order to explore the influence and continuity of the problem against the background of drastic change in the intellectual climate during the Meiji restoration process.

2 Yamaga Sokō and the ancient sages

Since the influential work by Maruyama Masao, modern scholars have been inclined to see Ogyū Sorai as the first Tokugawa thinker⁴⁾ who presented a Hobbesian view of the origin of the social order and political power. In their theses, Sorai was regarded as the first thinker who emphasized the absolute power of ancient sages and their art in establishing political order, which represented a strong contrast with the Neo-Confucianist vision of the world as a harmonized system of natural law. However, we can find precursors and contemporaries of Sorai who shared this type of view. To assume with this, it was not uncommon for Confucianist thinkers that *seijūn* or the ancient sages played an important role in establishing the social order. As culture heroes in the mythological sense, ancient sages were attributed to bringing culture and technology to human life.

Yamaga Sokō (1622-85) a good example of a scholar holding this view of *seijūn*. He was one of the early innovators of Tokugawa Confucianism and a well-known mentor of *Heigaku* or the school of military strategy. In his *Yamaga Gorui*, he asserted that it was not until sages established '*kyō*' or moral teaching that human beings came to know how to deter their selfish interests and sensual pleasures.

The desire of human beings knows no satisfaction. Therefore, it was necessary that a sage should introduce moral teaching to control human desire. Before the sage introduced the teaching, human beings' desire had made the world bestial: full of parricide and robbery. It was sage's teaching

that made people know the way of human beings.⁵⁾

Sokō described the origin of humanity using ideas about beasts, sages and humanity that we can easily find in classics such as Mo-tzu and Hsün-tzu. Sokō's pessimistic view of human nature obviously challenged Neo-Confucian school's view of fundamental goodness in *sei* or human nature. It is difficult to ascertain how Sokō handled the function of language in his system. He emphasized that the invention of 'rei' or rites by sages brought beast-like people to the civilized stage; thus proper rites were the solution to the problem of how people could be guided to internalize the principle of social order. It seems that Sokō did not see much importance in language as a device for internalizing order in the people's minds. He wrote, 'ancient sages transformed the principle of Heaven into mundane rule. They established a rule for everything from daily life to public ceremonies. If people observe sages' rules through rites, it leads them naturally from evil to good. Bad habits will be unconsciously eliminated. This is what I call the cultivation of sages.'⁶⁾

We will be able to see a consonance between Sokō and Sorai in this pessimistic attitude toward common people's ability to be cultivated by academic instruction. However, in Sorai's thought, language was inseparable from the system of rites for guiding people to social order.

3 Neo-Confucianism and immanent good

Immanent good in human nature was Neo-Confucian dogma. The Ansai school's view is a good example. As a loyal follower of Chu-shi, Yamazaki Ansai (1618-82) asserted that the true nature of human beings was immanent. When Ansai advocated his *Suika Shinto* theory, he maintained a Confucian standpoint. Devoted respect for the emperor inhered in the human - Japanese - nature at its very beginning, even in the state of chaos.⁷⁾ He rejected the possibility that something or someone from outside had implanted this reverence in people. However, a more fundamental Neo-Confucianist among Ansai's disciples, Satō Naokata (1650-1719) brought a different point of view to this idea of human nature.

It is well known that Satō Naokata and Asami Keisai (1652-1711), both disciples of Ansai, had a series of debates over the appellation of *chūgoku* (China) which had the connotation of the country at the center of the civilization.⁸⁾ The appropriateness of using the name of *chūgoku* was in question. Although generally Satō has been identified as a typical Sinophile and Asami as a typical nationalist, their differences were not so clear-cut.

Asami strongly opposed using the term *chūgoku* for China and calling Japan *iteki* or barbarian. Asami denounced calling one's own country barbarian as just as the same as despising one's own parents as uncivilized persons. Moreover, what he wanted to emphasize was that *chūka-iteki* dichotomy originated in China. He denounced it as no more than a self-satisfied Chinese concept.

On the other hand, Satō's main concern was that Confucian scholars should not abolish this *chūka-iteki* terminology. Satō asserted that such appellations had been established by the sages in ancient China. He criticized Asami for saying that the *chūka-iteki* dichotomy was invented due to the self-centered perspectives of the Ancient sages. If, as Asami put it, *chūka-iteki* was only an arbitrary and self-satisfied term, all the principles established by the ancient sages might be in doubt. Asami's opinion was unacceptable because the words of the ancient sages of China were the indispensable keys to understanding the truth of the world or the Way of Heaven. For Satō, the words of the ancient sages were more the basis of knowledge than merely an object of worship.

One of the few points of agreement in the debate between Satō and Asami was that, at degenerated times such as their own, distinction between *chūka* and *iteki* must not be judged by the contemporary moral achievement of respective societies. However, the intentions of Satō and Asami differed markedly. Asami maintained this view because he thought Japanese people should not call the other country the center of civilization, regardless of whether or not they recognized it as a highly moral country. Asami's emphasis was on the loyalty to one's own country. In contrast, for Satō, the most important thing was the undeniable fact that the ancient sages had established the order of things and words. Therefore, scholars must not deny the sages' terminology, even if contemporary China was no longer the land of sages.

Though he worshiped the sages of the Chinese classics, Satō was not a simple Sinophile. He admitted that contemporary China was not the ideal country. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the fundamental value of the Confucian classics was that they provided the basis of knowledge with which one could understand the world. In this sense, Satō presented a thesis which linked the ancient sages' terminology to an understanding of the world. His idea prepared the way for the later developments of philological study of Classics and the theory on the origin of socio-political order and authority.

4 Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) and the innovative function of Language

Ogyū Sorai went beyond the point that Yamaga Sokō and Sato- Naokata had reached. No less than Naokata, Sorai maintained that Chinese ancient words were the only clues to understand the ancient Way of Heaven. In his *Benmei*, he emphasized the importance of work on terminology used by the sages.

Names have been given to things ever since human beings came into existence. Names were originally established by ordinary people for objects with concrete shapes. When it came to things without form, which ordinary people could not assess, the Sages gave expression to these and assigned them names so that even ordinary people could see and understand them. This is called teaching with names. Names contain teachings, and the Sages were respectful of this.

Sorai clearly pointed to sages who had superhuman power in appalling 'names' to abstract things. 'Names' had such function of establishing the political and moral order.

Therefore, Sorai insisted on the necessity of learning terms used in Chinese classics in order to understand the core of the sages' vision. This was supported by his conviction of the superiority of the Chinese language. He asserted that the terms of Chinese were well articulated and had condensed meanings, while Japanese vocabularies were only composed of sounds and carried no meanings within themselves.

This recognition led him to criticize the method of studying classics in Japan. Most students of the time read the classics by the *yomikudashi* method. This means a way of reading Chinese with special signs (*kaeriten*) and Japanese words appended to the original texts to instruct one on how to read them. This method made the Chinese classics easier for the Japanese readers, but the signs and words were inevitably affected by the interpretation of the annotator. Sorai criticized this way of studying as useless or even harmful to an understanding of the true meanings of the ancient sages' words. The ancient language itself was the essential vehicle to convey the vision of the ancient sages. To add signs and words to the original texts was to modify and revise the words of sages. Confucian classics should not be understood as just a set of abstract ideas,¹⁰⁾ but as concrete integrated unit, thus one should try to comprehend the whole body of an ideal thing, including characters and

pronunciation originally used in the classics. Sorai wrote :

Those who wish to discover the Way of the Ancient sages must seek it in the Six Classics and to know the references to things in them, and then by examining texts prior to the Ch'in and Han dynasties come to understand the names.¹²⁾

Therefore, Sorai used the word '*mono*' or 'the thing' in explaining his attitude to the Confucian classics.¹³⁾ For Sorai, the classics were not just a collection of useful ideas which one could translate or paraphrase. Consequently, in Sorai's understanding, the sages' words were not constituted by fragments of thoughts and deeds. They functioned like knots signifying the whole relation between human understanding and the entangled state of things in the world.

Even earlier than his manifesto, *Kobunjigaku* or philological historicism, in studies of the classics in *Bendō* and *Benmei*, his comment on Hsün-tzu showed that Sorai agreed with the idea of invention of names by sages. One comment by Sorai on Hsün-tzu reads, 'When the Ancient Kings started establishing names, giving the name of *ten* to Heaven, *chi* to the Earth, they made a contract with all the people on determining of the meaning ... and that contract turned into convention'.¹⁴⁾

However, from the same Hsün-tzu, Sorai adopted a view that sages' major contribution to the moral order was *rei* or rites. Sorai's exceptionally long comment to a chapter of Hsün-tzu on vice in human nature showed his approval of the necessity of *rei* in order to deter vice.¹⁵⁾ Also this influence from Hsün-tzu can be seen in his later work *Benmei*. He quoted *Raiki* (*Li Chi*) with a modification to emphasize the critical function of the sages in establishing the system of rites and music.

(A lack of Sages' rites) produces in turn the mind of disobedience, fraud, licentiousness and disorder. And because of this, the strong dominate the weak, the many attack the few, the intelligent deceive the foolish, the brave are cruel to the timid, the ill are left not ministered to, the elderly, the young and orphaned, and the homeless are left untended. This is the road to great disaster.¹⁶⁾

In the original passage of *Li Chi*, the role of sages was not as clear as with Sorai's addition. His quotation was intended to emphasize the initiative of sages in establishing a moral order through practical rites, rather than by indoctrination using

language. Here it is not difficult to see the influence of Hsün-tzu. The problem is a tension with respect to evaluating the role of language for political and moral order within Sorai's system. This problem can be attributed to Hsün-tzu. As Pocock mentioned, Hsün-tzu¹⁷⁾ was a thinker who faced the problem of a dichotomy between 'names' and 'rites'.

In Sorai's system, how could he conciliate the function of 'names' and of rites? Sorai presented an explanation by drawing a line between academic learning by elites and the act of guiding common people towards political-ritual order, which we can see in the phrase, 'Gentlemen learn them, and small men rely on them'¹⁸⁾. To instill the order, legitimacy, loyalty and obedience into the minds of people, Sorai asserted that controlling people's behavior through the practice of ritual was much more efficient than indoctrination in moralistic concepts.

Thus, since in teaching rites and music one does not need to speak, the Ancient Kings showed their teachings through their execution for the actual rites and music ... Those who try to dominate others with words are people who are not yet able to dominate others.¹⁹⁾

When [small men] rely on these [rites], they will be transformed. When they have reached the stage that they are transformed, they 'will, without conscious effort on their part, act in accordance with the pattern of the Lord of Heaven.' How could there be any misconduct? How could laws and punishments reach this far?²⁰⁾

This point is related to the link between Sorai's ideas on the state of nature and the beginning of a linguistic order. For Sorai, establishing an impeccable system of rites was indispensable for the transition from the state of nature to the state of civilization. 'Names' were incorporated into the whole system of rites. To study 'names' in Confucian classics was essential to studying the whole system of rites established by sages. Only the practice of rites would lead people to the state of civilization and 'names' were the key to establishing the civilized social order.

5 Kokugaku and the God Given Language

Our country is the country of Amaterasu Ōmikami. It is superior to any other countries, therefore, our people's mind, behavior and language are graceful (*naoku miyabi*). It is peaceful and well in order. Stilted things that

often other countries value have never been adopted into our country.²¹⁾

These words by Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) show his utopian vision of a combination of mind, behavior and language in perfect harmony. However, was this ideal condition grown naturally from the innate quality of the people or was it installed by an external force? In his criticism of Kamo no Mabuchi (1697-1769), Norinaga took an opposing position to Mabuchi's explanation of *tenchishizen* (Heaven, Earth and Nature) and *onozukara* (natural way of things). Norinaga asserted that 'onozukara' must be understood as things granted by the Gods which must not suffer artificial modification. Mabuchi's use of the term '*onozukara*' meant the abiding law of nature, and Gods were part of nature, not outside it. In contrast, Norinaga asserted that *michi* or the Way did 'not derive from Heaven and Earth, not from human artifice, but from Gods.'²²⁾ *Kami no shiwaza* or acts of the Gods was something perfect and beyond human knowledge.²³⁾ Norinaga ejected attempts to explore the reason or nature of that *shiwaza*.

Therefore, when Norinaga debated with Ueda Akinari (1734-1809) on ancient Japanese pronunciation, he asserted that fifty sounds in oral Japanese corresponded to each *kana* letters. He took historical euphonic changes as a perversion of the 'true' Japanese. Norinaga made a clear distinction between the correct order of language and the 'natural' process of change. He did not see the *shizen* or natural adaptation of the oral language in the historical process was in line with the intention of the Gods. For Norinaga, it was only by the acts of Gods that the world of the ancient age, mind, things and words corresponded perfectly. All intentions and things were communicated with proper words in the ancient times. In contrast, Akinari conceded that the historical or situational modification of sounds and its effects on letters were a natural process. Therefore, change itself was not an artificial abuse of language against the will of the Gods.²⁴⁾

In Tokugawa intellectual history, the standard view has been that Norinaga took over the methodological approach of Sorai in his classical studies and visions of the ancient world. Together with this, since Maruyama Masao's work on this topic, emphasis on natural emotion by the *Kokugaku* school has been interpreted as an intellectual reaction against legalistic features in Sorai school's political thought. However, from our point of view, the relation between the Sorai school and *Kokugaku* was more complicated.

One of Sorai's disciples, Dazai Shundai (1680-1747), asserted that 'the proof that the Way had not existed in Japan prior to the introduction of Chinese learning lay

in the fact that there were no indigenous Japanese words for benevolence, righteousness, propriety, music, filial piety, and so on.' Kamo no Mabuchi criticized this view in his *Kokuikō*. Mabuchi maintained that those virtues had existed just as the movement of the four seasons had existed.²⁵⁾ For Mabuchi, the 'naturalness' of moral virtue was evidently the proof of built-in virtue in the Japanese mind. This shows that the divergence between Mabuchi and Norinaga is far greater than that between Norinaga and Sorai. Norinaga emphasized the integrity of ancient Japan, even though it lacked letters for writing. It was because the ancient Japan had God given language that was in perfect accordance with the ancient mind, not because that language was as natural as 'the four seasons.' This perfect language was bestowed by the Gods like a gift to human beings originally in chaos.

This assertion by Norinaga shows a clear association with the words of Sorai: 'the Way was constructed by the Ancient Kings. It is not natural.'²⁶⁾ To establish a link between the linguistic theory and the idea of the origin of the social order, it is less important to identify which school these thinkers were involved in than to ask how they envisaged the 'naturalness' or 'unnaturalness' of the language with respect to the social order.

6 Japanese Language and the modernization

What happened in the early Meiji period when Western languages were introduced to the world of Japanese intellectuals as a key factor in 'civilization and progress'? How did the intellectuals of the new age respond not only to the new system of language but also to the new system of thinking?

One of useful theory that aided intellectuals in evading the difficulties that might have been caused by the language of western thought was an idea that language must be treated as an instrument. For example, Nishi Amane (1829-97) wrote that 'Literature is the means for the investigation of truth'.²⁷⁾ Maejima Hisoka (1835-1919) submitted a proposal to the government that advised a restricted use of Chinese letters because 'for the high spirited Japanese nation, Chinese letters are too obscure'.²⁸⁾ A decade later, with the romanization of Japanese writing movement, scholars maintained that language as a tool must be simple and easy for common use. When Kurokawa Mayori (1829-1906), a Kokugaku scholar, denounced the romanization movement, he admitted that letters that Japanese use were originally from China and adopted only for convenience. He maintained that Japanese oral language itself had been the gift of the Gods. Therefore, the ground for his criticisms of the romanization was not conservation of tradition, but just the convenience

of the long-term convention of using Kana letters. What was at stake was not the integrity of the linguistic order, but utility.

Many of the so-called 'Enlightenment intellectuals' in early Meiji shared the idea that the Japanese language was not suited to the modernization of the society. For example, Mori Arinori (1847-89) published his opinion that Japan should limit the Japanese language to official use or in education, and otherwise adopt modified simple English. Contesting this assertion, Baba Tatsui (1850-88) wrote that the Japanese language would operate very well if used carefully and precisely.²⁹⁾

Whichever standpoint they chose, they shared a certain instrumental view of the relation between language and so-called 'truth'. It seems that the general intellectual climate in early Meiji lost the careful insight into the fundamental conundrum of language and humanity of Tokugawa thinkers. The instrumental view of language led to the understanding that all they needed was a language as a useful device for learning and teaching. In contrast to the Tokugawa thinkers that we have examined, the linguistic instrumentalism of Meiji neglected the importance of language as an indispensable part of the whole social order.

Moreover, this instrumentalism was strongly combined with an immanent theory of morals and sociability in human nature. In *Kokutai Sinron*, Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916) quoted Aristotle's concept of 'political animal' asserting that human beings have natural tendency to build a communal life. In the guise of a progressive Westernized view, Katō adopted a classical Chinese word *tensei* (taken from Mencius) to indicate the inherent property of human beings. His translation was unquestionably based on optimism about human inner morality and ability for mutual communication that had a strong affinity with Confucianism.³⁰⁾

Any concern about this instrumental view of language or optimism about the built-in morality was rarely heard in the process of 'the Enlightenment'. Ironically, it had a Confucian complexion precisely at the beginning of Westernization in the sense that the intellectuals seem to have believed that the latent ability for civilization was inherent in humanity. Language was now seen as only a tool for the expression of an immanent sociability. It is not difficult to see this intellectual climate in early Meiji period as the background to the Meiji government's steadfast effort to indoctrinate the people in order to build a 'modern nation.'³¹⁾ The ideological indoctrination strategy taken up by the Meiji government was based on the linguistic instrumentalism combined with the immanent theory of social order.

1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2001 Conference of Japanese

- Studies Association Australia at The University of New South Wales on 29 June 2001. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Sandra Wilson for useful advice to the draft of this paper.
- 2) For an overview of the topic in European thought, see Hans Aarsleff, *From Locke to Saussure : Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History*, University of Minnesota Press, 1982. On Herder and his intellectual context related to the problem of linguistic theory, see Sir Isaiah Berlin.
 - 3) See Pocock, 'Ritual, Language, Power: An Essay on the Apparent Political Meanings of Ancient Chinese Philosophy', in *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History*, University of Chicago Press, 1989
 - 4) Marumaya was not the first scholar who pointed to parallels between Sorai and Hobbes. In *Nihon kogakuha no tetugaku*, published in 1902, Inoue Tetsujiro mentioned Hobbes in his critical comment on Sorai's separation of political judgment from moralistic values. Iwahashi Junsei, *Sorai kenkyū*, published in 1934, developed Inoue's idea in order to point out the similar view of human nature between Sorai and Hobbes.
 - 5) Yamaga Sokō, *Yamaga Gorui* 33 in *Nihon shiso taikai* (Hereafter, *NST*) 32 *Yamaga Soko*, Iwanami Shoten 1970, pp 217-218.
 - 6) *Yamga Gorui* 11, in *Yamaga Soko zenshu shisohen*, Iwanami Shoten, 1940-42, Vol. 5, p. 342. See MaedaTutomu, *Kinsei nihon no jugaku to heigaku*, Pericansha, 1996, p. 207.
 - 7) Taira Shigemichi, 'Kinsei no Shinto Shiso' in *NST 39 Kinsei shinto ron*, p. 545 ff.
 - 8) Asami Keisai, 'Chūgoku ben', Satō Naokata, 'Chūgoku ronshū', in *NST 31 Yamazaki Ansai gakuha*.
 - 9) Ogyu Sorai, *Benmei*, in *NST 36 Ogyū Sorai*, p. 40. For this part, I used the translation by Tetsuo Najita, in Tetsuo Najita, *Tokugawa Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 35.
 - 10) Ogyū, *Kun'yaku Jimō*, Chapter 1, in *Ogyū Sorai Zenshū*, Vol. 2, Misuzu Shobō, 1974, p. 438. See Sawai Keiichi, 'Kobunjigaku ni okeru hyōgen no mondai', *Keisenjogakuen daigaku jinbun gakubu kiyō*, Number 2, 1990.
 - 11) Sawai Keiichi, 'Hōhō toshite no kobunjigaku', *Shiso*, Number 766, April 1988 p. 124 ff.
 - 12) Ogyū, *Benmei*, *NST36*, p. 41. Najita's translation, p. 36.
 - 13) Ogyū, *Gakusoku*, *NST36*, p. 192. For the idea of 'mono', see Hiraishi Naoaki, "'Mono" to "Gōketsu": Edo kōki shisō ni tuite no oboegaki', *Kaitoku*, Number 57, December 1988.
 - 14) Kitada Kazuichi (Ed.), *Sorai Sanjin Gaishū [Doku Junshi]*, Shinbishoin, 1941, p. 180.
 - 15) *Ibid.*, p. 201.
 - 16) Originally, Translation by Najita, *op. cit.*, p. 138. Najita mistook this passage for Sorai's own words.
 - 17) See Pocock, *op. cit.*

- 18) Ogyū, *Benmei*, *NST*, p. 70. Translation by W. J. Boot 'Approaches to Ogyū Sorai: Translation and Transculturalization', *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 54, No. 2, Summer 1999.
- 19) Ogyū, *Bendō*, *NST*, p. 25. Translation by W. J. Boot, *ibid*.
- 20) Ogyū, *Benmei*, *NST*, p. 70. W. J. Boot, *ibid*. The quotation within Sorai's sentence is from *Shi kyo (Shijing)* 241.
- 21) Motoori Norinaga, *Isonokami no sasamegato*, in *Motoori Norinaga Zenshū*, hear-after *MNZ*, Vol. 2, p. 68.
- 22) Motoori, Naobi no mitama, *MNZ*, Vol. 14, p. 96.
- 23) For the contrast of Motoori and Kamo no Mabuchi, see Aihara Kōsaku, 'Motoori Norinaga no gengo ron to chitsujo zō', *Tokyotoritsu Daigaku Hōgakkaizasshi*, Vol. 39, Number 1-3, June 1998, January 1999, July 1999.
- 24) Motoori Norinaga, 'Inshiebumidomo no subete no sada (1767-1771)', *Kojikiden*, Chapter 1, in *Motoori Norinaga Zenshū*, Vol. 9, tikuma shobō, 1973. See Sawai Keiichi, 'Jūhasseiki ni okeru "ninshikiron" no tankyū', in Momokawa ed., *Edobunka no hen' yō*, Heibonsha, 1994.
- 25) Saegusa Yasutaka, *Kamono Mabuchi*, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1962, p. 288. Peter Nosco, *Remembering Paradise: Nativism and Nostalgia in Eighteenth Century Japan*, Harvard University Press, 1990, p. 143 ff.
- 26) *Bendo*, in *NST36*, p. 14.
- 27) Nishi Amane, *Hyakugaku renkan*, 1870 in *Nishi Amane Zenshū*, Vol. 4, Munetaka shobō, 1981, p. 21.
- 28) Maejima Hisoka, 'Kyōiku fukyū no tame kokujikokubun kairyō no kengi', 1869 in *Nihon kindai shisō taikēi 6*, Iwanami shoten, 1990.
- 29) Baba Tatsui, 'Preface' in *An Elementary Grammar of the Japanese Language*, 1873, in *Baba Tatsui Zenshū*, Vol. 1, Iwanami shoten, 1987.
- 30) Katō Hiroyuki, *Kokutai shinron*, 1875, in *Meiji Bungaku Zenshū 3*, Chikuma Shobō, 1967 p. 163.
- 31) On language education in the formation of Meiji nationalism, see Osa Shizue, *Kinda nihon to kokugo nashonarizumu*, Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1998. The Meiji intellectuals' efforts to articulate ideas of Western origin in Japanese, see Douglas R. Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century*, University of Hawaii Press, 2001. Also see my review on Howland's book in *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Autumn 2002).