

The Cold War Diplomacy and Memories of the Pacific War: A Comparison of the American and Japanese Cases

Takuya Sasaki

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I Introduction

In a classic study of uses of history for policy makers, Ernest R. May wrote “framers of foreign policy are often influenced by beliefs about what history teaches or portends. Sometimes, they perceive problems in terms of analogies from the past. Sometimes, they envision the future either as foreshadowed by historical parallels or as following a straight line from what has recently gone before.”¹⁾

This article, starting from May’s premise, assumes that to an important degree Japan and the United States based their foreign policy in the Cold War years on their understanding of the Second World War in general and the Pacific War in particular. Questions to be explored are: How and in what ways have American and Japanese memories of the Pacific War influenced their own foreign policy in these years?; what kind of legacies and lessons have the war bequeathed to the United States and Japan?; how have the two nations applied these legacies and lessons to their foreign policy issues?

Primary emphasis for analysis is placed on memories of foreign policy makers, although an attempt is made to discuss interaction between policy makers and the general public over the war memories.

The argument in this article unfolds as follows. First, discussion of a number of the war legacies and lessons for the two countries. Following that is an examination of both nations’ view of the Soviet threat and the Cold War. After illustrating an interrelationship between their respective war legacies and foreign policy formu-

lation, the article focuses on the issue of nuclear forces and foreign policy. In conclusion, some suggestions for making use of the memories of the Pacific War toward a constructive Japan-U.S. relationship are offered.

II The Legacies and Lessons of the Pacific War

For the American people, the Pacific War was a good war in many ways. The United States entered it by way of Japan's "sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor, fought it for democratic principles against a totalitarian regime, and won a decisive victory. The war confirmed America's own self-image that the United States was on the right side of history. Being converted to internationalism, the American people grew fully confident of taking an active foreign policy abroad in the postwar world.

Also, they became convinced that sufficient military preparedness was the critical element in defending national security. While in the interwar years the United States had mainly relied on economic, financial and cultural measures rather than military ones to promote the national interest and international stability, the Pacific War demonstrated the absolute validity of military power in maintaining world peace.

In particular, Pearl Harbor, along with Munich, were the decisive events that shaped the basic assumption of postwar American national security policy. The Japanese surprise attack demonstrated not only that isolationism was no longer tenable but also that constant vigilance against a hostile power and a strong military establishment in peacetime were indispensable. Preventing a Pearl Harbor type of attack became the foremost task for American policy makers.

In economic terms, World War II had successfully expanded the American economy. The Gross National Product (GNP) jumped from \$ 91 billion in 1939 to \$ 220 billion in 1945; salaries and wages of workers more than doubled; and unemployment was virtually eliminated. The economic lesson from the war was that in the face of a grave international situation, the United States could expend enormous resources for military purposes while maintaining a high standard of living.

Fourthly, the Second World War seemed to confirm the policy makers in the view that autocratic government of a foreign country would inevitably lead to aggressive behavior overseas and present a serious military threat to peace-loving democratic nations. Accordingly, they believed, democratizing the totalitarian Axis regimes should be a matter of the highest priority once military occupation started.

Related to this assumption, American officials firmly believed that the Great Depression and the following chaotic economic situation in the 1930's gave rise to

totalitarian regimes and their autarkic practices, which in turn triggered the outbreak of the Second World War. The United States was now determined to integrate the defeated nations including Japan into a world of liberal capitalist internationalism once it achieved the objectives of occupation policy.

Lastly, the Pacific War played an essential part in rectifying racial and ethnic discrimination at home. Since Washington had to refute the Japanese charge that the United States was fighting for white people, it could not afford to neglect remedying legal discrimination that existed against citizens of Chinese ethnic background. In 1943, following an announcement of an end of the extraterritorial unequal treaties with China, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration abrogated the immigration law dating to 1882 that had banned Chinese immigrants and their eligibility for naturalization. Congress readily concurred (Three years later, Congress granted the same status to Filipinos and Asian Indians). The Roosevelt administration took these steps even while it forced 120,000 Japanese-Americans residing in the West Coast to resettle throughout the western states.

Quite naturally, the Japanese people had a fundamentally different outlook on the Pacific War. For them, it was the worst experience in history. In spite of tremendous military spending and a powerful armed forces, Japan not only suffered an overwhelming defeat but also witnessed the total devastation of its homeland. It also lost all its colonies. Hiroshima and Nagasaki came to symbolize the sheer destructiveness and inhumanity of war. Most Japanese grew profoundly skeptical of the usefulness of military power in protecting their well-being. The sickening revelations about the numerous atrocities committed in the occupied territories and the mistreatment Japan gave its war prisoners and civilian internees further aroused the people's disgust at the war and the military. Through the International Military Tribunal for the Far East the Japanese people knew for the first time, among other things, the Kwantung Army's plot and extensive involvement in the Manchurian Incident and the Nanking Massacre of 1937.

The war also brought the Japanese economy into a complete shambles; many were forced to face hunger and starvation. The rice harvest of 1945 dropped to a new low, half of the 1933 level. The Japanese government became gravely worried over the prospect that about 10 million people might die of famine. Only the timely American food relief averted the massive starvation. As a result of the war Japan lost 30% of its national wealth. It was not until the mid-1950's when Japan's economy finally returned to the prewar level. In the case of Japan, the war had not

paid in any respect.

Through these experiences, the Japanese people gained a strong sense of revulsion against war and military power. The public consensus was that the Pacific War was a terrible mistake and this kind of mistake should never be repeated. Conveniently forgetting that they had enthusiastically supported the war, the Japanese people felt somehow victimized by it, blamed the military for starting it, and were determined to reestablish Japan's international position by means other than military.

This public perception laid behind an almost enthusiastic embrace of the new constitution in which Article 9 renounced the use of arms to resolve international conflict. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida initially endorsed the provision, by claiming history demonstrated that "recent major wars had been fought in the name of self-defense of the nation. The Manchurian Incident was such a case. So was the Pacific War." On another occasion, he declared that Japan was ahead of the world on renouncing war.

The sheer reluctance of the Japanese people to take military measures in any international dispute might be one of the most significant lessons that they had drawn from the Pacific War. Suddenly, the United States and Japan found themselves changing sides as to their perception of the effectiveness of military power in protecting national security.

Also, in striking contrast to the case of the U.S., which was to embark on an active, dynamic, and global foreign policy, Japan became cautious, almost timid in taking an active part in international affairs outside its vicinity, and grew rather reactive to external events. Japan's egregious fiasco in constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere³⁾ and its utter defeat in the Pacific War had largely determined this passive attitude.

III The Outbreak of the Cold War

Soviet foreign actions in 1939-40 had already impressed American policy makers with many characteristics reminiscent of the military expansion by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In particular, Soviet actions against Poland, Finland, and the Baltic nations infuriated them.⁴⁾

In early December 1939, President Roosevelt, who had refrained from publicly attacking Soviet conduct since its conclusion of the nonaggression treaty with Nazi Germany, announced the moral embargo "of airplanes, aeronautical equipment and materials essential to airplane manufacture" against "nations obviously guilty" of

the “unprovoked bombing and machine gunning of civilian populations from the air.” He had clearly in mind three nations: the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan. In the same month, the American *Chârgé* in Iran approvingly reported back the Iranian Minister of Finance’s remarks during their conversation where the Minister had warned that “not unlike Japan in the Far East, the Soviets were now planning a ‘new order’ for the Middle East by adroit opportunism and a cynical defiance of reason and justice.”⁵⁾

The following summer, State Department’s Loy Henderson, who was to become a chief architect of the Truman Doctrine some years later, leveled an implicit criticism against the Roosevelt administration’s apparently conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet Union. “Is the Government of the United States to apply certain standards of judgment and conduct to aggression by Germany and Japan which it will not apply to aggression by the Soviet Union[?]. . . . Is the United States to continue to refuse to recognize the fruits of aggression regardless of who the aggressor may be, or for reasons of expediency to close its eyes to the fact that certain nations are committing aggression upon their neighbors[?]” His colleague, Edward Page, Jr., shared the same view of the Soviet ideological threat. He observed in October 1940 that although the Soviet Union had concluded a series of non-aggression agreements with neighboring nations such as Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania, the Soviet army had invaded Poland and the Baltic nations and occupied the Bessarabian and Bucovina provinces of Rumania. This Soviet behavior demonstrated, he charged, the non-aggression agreements “were wantonly swept aside in a manner legally and ethically indistinguishable from the aggressive acts committed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. . . .” Soviet leaders “have never departed from the ultimate aim to enlarge their domain and to include under the Soviet system additional people and territories.”⁶⁾

While these anti-Soviet perceptions became gradually submerged under the surface with the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities in June 1941, they resurfaced toward the end of World War II. Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, who had been an American Ambassador to Japan in the 1930’s, issued a dire warning in May 1945: “[A]s a ‘war to end wars,’ the war will have been futile, for the result will be merely the transfer of totalitarian dictatorship and power from Germany and Japan to Soviet Russia which will constitute in future as grave a danger to us as did the Axis. . . .”

In a speech on October 31, 1945, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes reiterated the belief prevalent among his subordinates that assumed the close interrelationship

between internal behavior of states and their external one. “We have learned by bitter experience in the past ten years that Nazi and Fascist plans for external aggression started with tyrannies at home which were falsely defended as matters of purely local concern. We have learned that tyranny anywhere must be watched, for it may come to threaten the security of neighboring nations and soon become the concern of all nations.” These views were no longer restricted to the Department of State. In June 1945, Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal asserted that the dynamics of philosophy of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and Hirohito “tended toward the concentration of power in the state.” Three months later, he claimed a racial affinity between the Japanese and the Russian people in contending that the Soviets were not trustworthy. “[T]he Russians, like the Japanese, are essentially Oriental in their thinking, and until we have a longer record of experience with them on the validity of engagements, . . . it seems doubtful that we should endeavor to buy their understanding and sympathy. . . . There are no returns on appeasement.”⁷⁾

That President Harry S. Truman naturally and dramatically made use of the ominous image of the former Axis enemies in explaining a new course of American foreign policy was not therefore surprising. In his major address to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, he announced that “The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will” and declared that it must be “the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”⁸⁾

Truman showed exactly the same response when he heard the news of the Korean War in June 1950; his immediate reaction was to search for a parallel in recent history. “In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remember how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier.” Six months later, in a State of the Union message to Congress, Truman again expressed his strong conviction: “If the democracies had stood up against the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, or the attack on Ethiopia in 1935, or the seizure of Austria in 1938, if they had stood together against aggression on those occasions as the United Nations has done in Korea, the whole story of our time would have been different.”⁹⁾

With the coming of the Cold War to Asia and the Chinese military intervention in the Korean War, the totalitarian analogy was now also applied to China. In

responding to the Indochina Crisis, President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a letter to British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill on April 5, 1954, urgently asking for “united action” to counter the Chinese military menace and invoking their common memories: “[W]e failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. . . . May it not be that our two nations have learned something from that lesson?” The following year, in the midst of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, Eisenhower again wrote to Churchill, claiming that “I compared the aggressiveness of the Red Chinese in the Formosa Strait with that of the Japanese in Manchuria and the Nazis in Europe in the 1930s. Concessions were no answer.”¹⁰⁾

All of these views illustrated the dominant view of American foreign policy makers as to the Cold War: The United States was again waging a fierce struggle against a powerful totalitarian state set on world conquest. In that sense, the Cold War was World War Three.

For most Japanese, the Cold War was a totally different story. The last thing the Japanese people would have imagined was that their prewar military actions had influenced in some way the American views of the Soviet threat. Neither would they have conceived that Pearl Harbor had formed a lasting lesson for American policy makers. Rather, as Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni’s following comment of September 1945 demonstrated, as soon as the war was over, the Japanese started to equate Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor, obviously trying to evade the responsibility for having started a war. “People of America, won’t you forget Pearl Harbor? . . . We people of Japan will forget the devastation wrought by the atomic bomb. . . . The war is ended. Let us now bury hate.”¹¹⁾

Naturally, then, in stark comparison to the American people who regarded the Cold War as another world war, the Japanese people saw it something simply as imposed by outside forces. Nonetheless, many conservative Japanese welcomed the outbreak of the Cold War. They expected that a U.S.-Soviet struggle would lead to a less harsh Allied control of Japan and promote Japan’s early reentry into international society. Future Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who had been arrested as a Class A war criminal, noted in his diary dated August 11, 1946, that his Sugamo Prison inmates agreed in seeing the breakup of the Grand Alliance “as a good chance for revival of Japan” and because of this new international situation, “his spirits soared for the first time in a long time.”¹²⁾

As Kishi expected, the Cold War in Asia changed the American policy toward Japan. When Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall in his January 1948 speech

strongly advocated a Japanese economic reconstruction in the face of the Communist threat in Asia, Yoshida felt encouraged. Two months later, George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, came to Tokyo to consult with General Douglas MacArthur, a visit which paved the way for the adoption of NSC (National Security Council) 13/2. This document argued that “economic recovery should be made the primary objective” of the U.S. policy in Japan “for the coming period” and that SCAP (Supreme Commander for Allied Powers) should be advised to terminate the reparations program soon, thus shifting the goal of occupational policy from democratization to economic rehabilitation. It did not take long before war criminals including Kishi started to be released.¹³⁾

With the coming of the Cold War to Asia, the Japanese government had determined to rely for its security on the United States. As early as the summer of 1947, Foreign Minister Hitoshi Ashida proposed to an American official an agreement by which in case of contingency, the U.S. would defend Japan by sending armed forces. In May 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida informed Joseph Dodge through his special representative, Hayato Ikeda, a Japanese readiness to accept the presence of American forces for the security of Japan. This formula became the prototype of the Japan-U.S. security pact of 1951.

The Korean War accelerated this evolutionary trend in American policy toward Japan. It expedited the Japanese economic recovery, redoubled the American effort to arrive at a Japanese peace settlement and led to concluding a security pact with Japan. The Truman administration, in setting forth principles on the Japanese Peace Treaty on November 24, 1950, proposed that the former Allied powers should renounce reparations claims in principle and should place no restriction on the Japanese economic recovery and rearmament. These terms formed the basic framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

To the great satisfaction of the Japanese government, the San Francisco Treaty provided for a lenient peace, thanks in large measure to the good offices of the U.S. government. John Foster Dulles successfully quelled complaints and protests from Western allies such as the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The Treaty did not ban Japanese rearmament; nor did it demand punitive reparations from Japan. It only stipulated that Japan did have to pay reparations to the former Allied powers according to its limited resources.¹⁴⁾

Meantime, much to the distress of other Asian countries, Japan failed to face up squarely to the part it had played in the bitter history of the 1930's and 40's. The Japanese people were satisfied simply to see a number of former military and

government officials prosecuted and executed. That the United States did not insist on the matter once the Cold War started was essential in allowing Japan to turn a deaf ear to its Asian neighbors. Although these countries continued to voice their concern, they were not powerful enough to force Japan and the United States. The international ostracism of China, which had suffered the most from the Japanese aggression, was an additional and even crucial element in the playing out of this issue.

Following the San Francisco conference, Washington, by helping Japan's application to the World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT, further hastened to integrate Japan into the U.S.-led multilateral economic system. Because of the Cold War, the Japanese people were able to reap major political and economic benefits under the military umbrella provided by the United States, while remaining complacent about blaming their military for what had happened in the Pacific War and averting sufficient atonement for their own war atrocities. This stance received an American tacit assent, for the United States had an enormous stake¹⁵⁾ in rebuilding a strong and anticommunist Japan in containing communism in Asia.

Still, the American transformation of Japan into a liberal-democratic and prosperous society has stood as a brilliant success. This has been the most enduring legacy of the American occupation of Japan. Common democratic values have formed a firm bond between the two nations and have constituted the cornerstone for maintaining a stable Asia-Pacific region. This achievement was all the more remarkable and even ironic because Gen. MacArthur, who had been responsible for a series of democratic reforms, was an ardent anti-New Dealer and a staunch conservative.

IV The Evolution of the Cold War

Paul H. Nitze, who was soon to become the very embodiment of the postwar national security policy, visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the fall of 1945 as a member of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey following his inspection trip in Europe. After the survey, Nitze submitted a summary report on the Pacific War where he emphasized the need for civil defense measures, scientific research and development, effective intelligence capabilities, unification of the armed forces, and the maintenance of strong military strength. Nitze referred to the lesson of Pearl Harbor in the concluding part of the report. "The Japanese would have never attacked Pearl Harbor had they not correctly assessed the weakness of our defenses in the Pacific and had they not incorrectly assessed the fighting determination of the

United States when attacked.” Nitze’s summary report on the Pacific War was important since it could be regarded as the forerunner of NSC 68 and NSC 5724—the Gaither Report—, two highly significant NSC documents in Cold War history.¹⁶⁾ Nitze turned out to be the principal figure who drafted these NSC papers.

In NSC 68 of April 1950, Nitze argued for an immediate, large-scale buildup of conventional and nuclear forces, the cost of which, he estimated, would reach approximately \$50 billion annually. This figure was more than three times the defense budget for fiscal 1950. Interestingly, Nitze considered that the military expansion proposed in NSC 68 was not only a realistic way to counter the mounting military threat of the Soviet Union but also an alternative to a surprise attack against the Soviet Union. In rejecting a preventive war, NSC 68 pointed out that such a course would be morally “repugnant” and “corrosive” to many Americans. Obviously, Pearl Harbor cast a moral restraint on the conduct of American foreign relations. In pleading for a dramatic increase in military spending in NSC 68, Nitze cited the economic lesson of the Second World War. “In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its gross product to these purposes [military expenditures, foreign assistance and military investment] (as it did during the last war), . . . One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living.” The Korean War pushed the defense budget up to \$ 50 billion without seriously hurting the economy, an evolution that apparently bore out the analysis of NSC 68.¹⁷⁾

In November 1957, Nitze reiterated the gist of NSC 68 in NSC 5724 which offered a highly critical assessment of the Eisenhower administration’s containment policy. Rejecting the administration’s fiscal conservatism, the Gaither report pointed out again the economic expansion during World War II. “This country is now devoting 8.5% of its production to defense, and 10% to all national security programs. The American people have always been ready to shoulder heavy costs for their defense when convinced of their necessity. We devoted 41% of our GNP to defense at the height of World War II and 14% during the Korean War.”¹⁸⁾

Those who participated in the making of the Gaither Report were prominent bipartisan figures like Robert Lovett, John McCloy, William Foster and Nitze. This document formed the blueprint of national security policy for the coming Democratic administration which all of them were to serve in various capacities.

In the heyday of the Cold War, Pearl Harbor also provided policy makers with a symbolic and useful metaphor for explaining to the public the grave international situation. In the late 1950's when the Soviet military threat seemed to rise sharply, the most frequent comparison to be used was Pearl Harbor. In July 1955, Senators Henry Jackson and Clinton Anderson, predicting in a letter to the President that Soviet possession of an ICBM could well lead to a "nuclear Pearl Harbor," demanded that he should put the ICBM on a "wartime footing" with a crash program and give it the highest national priority.

In the wake of Sputnik, Edward Teller, the "father" of the H-bomb, told that the United States had lost "a battle more important and greater than Pearl Harbor." Senator W. Stuart Symington of the Senate Armed Services Committee described Sputnik as a "technical Pearl Harbor" and maintained that the Soviet satellite destroyed the Eisenhower administration's claim that the United States enjoyed a qualitative if not quantitative military lead over the Soviet Union. Lyndon Johnson, Senate Majority Leader, stated in his opening remarks in the Senate hearings: "We meet today in the atmosphere of another Pearl Harbor." Joseph W. Alsop, one of the most influential journalists in the postwar period, observed in his January 1960 column that the United States was lagging behind the Soviets in missile capabilities and warned that "something much worse than Pearl Harbor can now be the result."

Even President Eisenhower, who emphatically refuted the Pearl Harbor analogy in the missile gap controversy, resorted to this metaphor in defending a secret aerial reconnaissance over Soviet territory. When the U-2 affair aborted his visit to Moscow in May 1960, Eisenhower justified the flight by saying in a press conference that "Nobody wants another Pearl Harbor."¹⁹⁾

The Pearl Harbor analogy was again frequently invoked during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the two superpowers closer to nuclear war than any other crisis in the Cold War years. According to Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, "In the debates recorded on Kennedy's tapes, Pearl Harbor has a presence as pervasive as Munich. . . . Absent Pearl Harbor, the whole debate about the Soviet missiles in Cuba might have been different, for supposed lessons from the Pearl Harbor attack shaped the intelligence collection apparatus that informed Kennedy of the missiles and kept him and his advisers abreast of day-to-day developments. Most important of all, Pearl Harbor served as a conclusive example of the proposition that a secretive government might pursue its ambitions, or relieve its frustrations, by adopting courses of action that objectively seemed irrational or even suicidal. This proposition haunts discussion of Soviet motives and possible Soviet reactions during

the missile crisis.” In other words, what the ExComm members most feared was “a Pearl Harbor in reverse.” George Ball, for instance, argued that a prompt air strike without warning was a kind of conduct that might be expected of the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Dean Rusk shared the same fear. Rusk told later that when he heard the FBI report that Soviet diplomats were destroying sensitive documents at their embassy in Washington, it reminded him that Japanese diplomats had burned documents the night before Pearl Harbor.

At the same time, an American surprise attack was out of the question. Robert Kennedy explained that such an attack was “not in our traditions.” His remark infuriated Dean Acheson who believed the analogy as inappropriate because the President repeatedly warned against installment of the nuclear weapon in the Hemisphere. Nonetheless, apparently touching the nerves of other participants in the ExComm, it was instrumental in winning their support for the naval blockade. Like NSC 68, the moral inhibition was significant in rejecting a preventive war strike like Pearl Harbor.²⁰⁾

In formulating Japan policy, the United States was determined to prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Its defense rebuilding should not lead Japan to the dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region that it had occupied in the 1930's.

Kennan, the key architect of the shift in occupation policy, contended in January 1948 that “Our primary goal” was to insure that American security “must never again be threatened by the mobilization against us of the complete industrial area [in the Far East] as it was during the second world war.” The security pact with Japan was considered as one of the indispensable vehicles for restraining Japan. As in Europe, United States Cold War diplomacy in Asia was to implement a dual containment of the former enemy——Japan——and the present enemy——international communism.²¹⁾

The Joint Chiefs of Staff's memorandum dated April 9, 1954 to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson illustrated the case. “[I]t believes that so long as the United States furnishes the principal offensive air and naval elements of the combined military forces in the Far East, adequate safeguards against the recrudescence of Japanese military power as an aggressive force would be provided.” Thirty six years later, the first Bush administration still recited the same view in its report on the strategic framework for the Asian Pacific Rim. “The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the critical linchpin of our Asian security strategy. . . . As Japan extends its regional economic influence, latent regional concerns may resurface. Increases in

Japanese military strength undertaken to compensate for declining U.S. capabilities in the region could prove worrisome to regional nations, especially if they perceive Japan is acting independent of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.²²⁾

Richard M. Nixon and Henry H. Kissinger were the most prominent public figures who expressed this outlook bluntly. On the eve of the first Sino-U.S. summit, Kissinger advised Nixon to explain to the Chinese that the United States did not oppose rearmament of Japan, but did oppose a “nuclear Japan.” Nixon agreed with him, by saying that the United States policy was to “keep Japan from building its own” nuclear bomb and to “oppose Japan ‘stretching out its hands’ to Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia.” Both mentioned the danger that if the United States did not restrain Japan, the latter could emerge as the major military power in the area.²³⁾

Like the repeal of the anti-Chinese immigration act, foreign policy considerations were again evident in the revision of the 1924 Immigration and Naturalization Act. In order to neutralize Soviet propaganda on U.S. racial policies, Congress approved the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 which repealed the 1924 Act, thus removing racial bars on immigration and naturalization and allocating a small annual immigration quota to Japan and other nations of the Asia-Pacific Triangle.²⁴⁾

Equally, the foreign policy implication of African-Americans’ legal status was grave. As Eleanor Roosevelt observed, civil rights “isn’t any longer a domestic question—it’s an international question,” one that “may decide whether democracy or communism wins out in the world.” The Attorney General stated in December 1952 in a brief for the cases involving segregation in public schools: “It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed. . . . Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.” Dean Acheson concurred. “Other peoples cannot understand how such a practice [the segregation of school children on a racial basis] can exist in a country which professes to be a staunch supporter of freedom, justice, and democracy.”

One of the involved cases led to the 1954 Supreme Court decision in the landmark case of *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka*.²⁵⁾

By taking the initial steps toward eliminating systematic discrimination against minorities, the United States demonstrated to the world that it was going to fulfill, albeit gradually, its public commitment to the democratic principles.

To a significant extent, the Vietnam War, the most colossal blunder in American history, was a product of the Pacific War. Major foreign policy makers like John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara belonged to the same generation who shared firsthand experiences of Munich, Pearl Harbor and World War II. They firmly believed that the United States had to repel the military aggression of the totalitarian regime of North Vietnam. Rusk was never tired of invoking the lesson of the Second World War. In March 1965, he stated that “Can those of us in this room forget the lesson that we had on this issue of war and peace, when it was only 10 years from the seizure of Manchuria to Pearl Harbor: about two years from the seizure of Czechoslovakia to the outbreak of World War II in Western Europe?... We cannot forget this experience.” On another occasion he repeated the same theme. “Once again we hear expressed the views which cost the men of my generation a terrible price in World War II. We are told that Southeast Asia is too far away—but so were Manchuria and Ethiopia.”

Johnson too defended his Vietnam policy by stressing the lessons of history. “Like most men and women of my generation, I felt that World War II might have been avoided if the United States in the 1930’s had not given such an uncertain signal of its likely response to aggression in Europe and Asia.” Johnson echoed the same theme in his speech on April 7, 1965: “The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next.”²⁶⁾

These policy makers adhered to the unshakable conviction that the United States could provide whatever resources were necessary to prevail in Vietnam. In this respect, the economic lesson of the Pacific War was again evident. Johnson declared to the nation in 1964 that “we have the resources and we have the will to follow this course as long as it may take.” McNamara informed his military advisers in 1965 that “there is an unlimited appropriation available for the financing of aid to Vietnam. Under no circumstances is a lack of money to stand in the way of aid to that nation.”²⁷⁾

By the early 1970’s, the Vietnam War instead of the Second World War came to figure prominently in the minds of American people. The lessening tension with the Soviet Union and China and the arrival of an era of detente furthered the trend. As a result, the memories of the Pacific War receded steadily into the background and those of the Vietnam War began to haunt continually subsequent American foreign and military policy.

Unlike the United States, Japan was not convinced that its security was seriously threatened by the Soviet Union or China. Especially toward China, Japan felt historical and cultural affinity interwoven with a guilty conscience. Besides, as Yoshida predicted an eventual breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the alliance's inherent unnaturalness reinforced the view that China did not pose a grave military menace.

Moreover, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, a deep sense of pacifism and the public's profound aversion to revival of militarism imposed a constant constraint in building the Self Defense Forces and explain the caution of the Japanese in handling the defense program.

When John Foster Dulles pressed the Japanese government to start an all-out rearmament program in 1951, Yoshida resisted the request by referring to the Japanese constitution, the negative effect of huge military spending upon economic recovery, and Japan's Asian neighbors' security concerns. Although Yoshida promised a limited rearmament plan, he regarded it as a price to satisfy the United States rather than as a step to counter the Communist threat. Successive Japanese administrations followed the Yoshida Formula where Japan, relying for its military security on the United States, should focus on economic development and proceed with defense programs carefully. Inevitably, the pace of the Japanese defense effort became a constant contention with the United States.²⁸⁾

While enjoying the benefits brought by the Cold War, Japan did not want to embroil itself deeply in it. The American government knew that Japan's moderate effort on defense was in tune with Japanese public feeling. A study of the Psychological Strategy Board in May 1952 stated that "[f]or many Japanese, the prospect of immediate involvement in another war is viewed with decided revulsion, a circumstance which injects an emotional and irrational element into popular opinion regarding rearmament." National Intelligence Estimate 41-58 dated December 23, 1958 noted that "Popular opposition to the idea of rearmament as well as to its cost will continue to restrict Japan's defense effort." NIE 41-60 dated February 9, 1960²⁹⁾ observed "widespread, but at present quiescent, neutralist sentiment in Japan."

Reflecting the popular perception, the Japanese Upper House adopted a resolution in 1954 against the deployment overseas of the Self Defense Forces. In 1976 the Takeo Miki administration decided that Japan should limit defense spending to 1% of GNP "in the interim period." It also set strict guidelines for arms exports which ban arms sale to the Communist bloc and nations involved in international conflict. It was only in 1976 when the United States and Japan began to consult on defense

cooperation in case of contingency.³⁰⁾

In marked difference to the example set by the United States, Japan's approach to its own racial and ethnical discrimination against minority groups has been lukewarm at best. In the Pacific War Japan had supposedly fought for the liquidation of European and American colonialism in Asia and had promised in the Declaration of the Great Asian Conference of 1943 the abolition "of systems of racial discrimination."³¹⁾

Nonetheless, after Japan was defeated in 1945, it subsequently failed to enact any specific legislation to deal with the matter. Much remains to be done in the matter of widespread discrimination against Korean and Chinese residents. In addition to the Japanese failure to confront racism, numerous statements delivered by prominent conservative politicians who glorified the brutal rule over the Korean Peninsula and other areas of Asia reaffirmed the prevailing impression in Asia that Japan failed to learn an important lesson from the Pacific War and continued to evade its war responsibility. According to a Korean diplomat who participated in normalization talks with Japan, Yoshida once remarked that "There are three men I detest most. . . . One of them is Dr. Syngman Rhee of South Korea. . . . When I was consul general in Shenyang, Manchuria, in the prewar years. . . , I visited the Korean Peninsula several times. . . . I understand that Japan, educating the people and developing the industrial infrastructure, agricultural and forestry industries, ruled the Peninsula well and wise. I cannot comprehend why the Korean people, not to mention Dr. Rhee, bitterly loathe the Japanese."³²⁾

This kind of remark was not unusual in certain conservative quarters. As historian Tadashi Aruga points out, these people have not been forced to acknowledge the horrible deeds of Japanese imperialism simply because Japan lost all its colonies after being defeated by the United States; the anti-Japanese resistance forces in East Asia were not decisive in expelling the Japanese power.³³⁾ Owing to the Pacific War, Japan escaped the painful process of decolonization.

Against this background in the 1950's and 60's, Japan normalized diplomatic relations with other Asian nations which had not attended the San Francisco peace conference, and conducted war reparations negotiations with Southeast Asian countries. In the latter negotiations, Japan not only whittled down its war reparations but also virtually converted the reduced reparations into an economic aid program that promoted the Japanese economic re-penetration into Asia. The U.S. encouraged this approach. Acheson had explained to Yoshida that the reparations for-

mula would “in fact be of benefit to the Japanese economy in that it would be enable Japan to employ its excess industrial capacity, give employment to the people and reestablish trade channels.” When Senator Mike Mansfield asked Raymond Moyer, Far Eastern program officer of the Foreign Operations Administration, in 1954 whether reparations would facilitate Japanese “penetration” of the Southeast Asian markets, Moyer answered in the affirmative that they “will immediately get the Japanese into business, . . . and trade will follow.”³⁴⁾

On this issue too, the United States was prepared to step in. The massive American military and economic aid given to the Southeast Asian nations was in a sense an indispensable supplement to their reduced reparations from Japan.

V The Issue of Nuclear Weapons

Since its inception, the policy of containment had firmly integrated nuclear forces into its vital component. President Truman approved NSC 30 in September 1948 that defined that the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize “promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons,” in the event of hostilities.³⁵⁾ Still, Hiroshima and Nagasaki cast a long shadow over American foreign conduct.

In the 1950’s, three major crises occurred where a nuclear option was debated inside government: The Korean War, the Indochina Crisis of 1954, and the first Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-1955. In all of these cases, the United States decided not to launch a nuclear attack. While the reason was different in each case, one important factor against the use always came into play: The United States must consider the moral dimension of the atomic attack, especially if it employed the weapon again against Asians.

Just before Truman’s casual remark on use of the atomic bomb in the Korean conflict, John Emmerson, Japan expert in the State Department, had written to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, that atomic bombardment would be disastrous to the United States’ standing in the international community. Indeed, hearing Truman’s press conference a few weeks later, several Asian nations stressed to administration officials the racist implication of using nuclear bombs against Asians.³⁶⁾

Although Truman repeatedly claimed that he was not troubled by the bombings of the two Japanese cities, he was clearly hopeful that he would never be forced to make a comparable decision. In May 1948, in touching on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he told the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that “I gave the order for

the others, and I don't want to have to do that again, ever." In his last State of the Union message, Truman stated: "We have entered the atomic age. . . . War today between the Soviet empire and the free nations might dig the grave not only for our Stalinist opponents, but also of our own society, our world as well as theirs. . . . Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men."³⁷⁾

The attitude of Truman's successor, Eisenhower, toward nuclear weapons is not easy to grasp. On the one hand, he adopted a strategy of massive retaliation in which nuclear weapons occupied a prominent role. NSC 162/2 in October 1953 stated that "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be available for use as other munitions." Eisenhower publicly expressed readiness to employ the atomic bomb in certain circumstances. But on the other hand, Eisenhower was deeply cautious in actually approving its use. In 1945 he had opposed the use of the atomic bomb against the Japanese, contending that "our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use" of the weapon. He reiterated the moral element during the Indochina Crisis. "You boys must be crazy. We can't use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than ten years. My God."³⁸⁾

Again, the moral factor played a key role in shaping the Eisenhower administration's stance toward the nuclear test suspension talks. When the administration finally agreed to the Geneva conference in the fall of 1958, international opinion was the essential factor. In supporting such negotiations, John Foster Dulles told the President that "steps must be taken to put clearly before the world the U.S. devotion to peace and to reduction of arms burden. Only by concrete actions can we counteract the false picture, all too prevalent abroad, of the United States as a militaristic nation. . . . [T]he slight military gains appear to be outweighed by the political losses, which may well culminate in the moral isolation of the United States in the coming years."³⁹⁾

The issue of nuclear forces reappeared in the American political scene in the first half of the 1980's. In response to the Reagan administration's largest peacetime defense buildup and a series of reckless remarks on nuclear war made by administration officials including the President, antinuclear NGOs organized the Nuclear Freeze Movement, which instantly gained unprecedented, popular support. The first massive movement of this kind in American history forced the Reagan administration to take a more positive posture towards arms control with the U.S.S.R. Jonathan Schell, author of the best-seller *The Fate of the Earth*, vividly described the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in spreading his antinuclear message. Nuclear

physicist Luis Alvarez, who had been aboard a scientific plane over the Hiroshima area on August 6, 1945 and later participated in developing the thermonuclear bomb, had by the early 1980's warned of the disastrous ecological effect of nuclear war upon the earth. The total destruction of the two cities was instrumental in projecting the horrific image of nuclear war onto the consciousness of the American people.⁴⁰⁾

The irony of the Nuclear Freeze Movement was that Ronald Reagan also became equally horrified by the prospect of nuclear war and he turned out to be a zealous crusader against nuclear weapons. In his memoirs Reagan recollected the sobering experience. "The Pentagon said at least 150 million American lives would be lost in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union—even if we 'won.' For Americans who survived such a war, I couldn't imagine what life would be like. The planet would be so poisoned the 'survivors' would have no place to live. . . . My dream, then, became a world free of nuclear weapons. . . . My deepest hope was that someday our children and our grandchildren could live in a world free of the constant threat of nuclear war." In order to realize his hope, Reagan was ready to go beyond nuclear freeze, since, according to him, nuclear freeze could not further the cause of peace: "[A] freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war." Reagan's proposal was, of course, the SDI which was, at least in his judgment, the only way to eliminate the danger of nuclear war.⁴¹⁾

While it is still controversial whether or not the SDI moved the Soviet government to make a series of diplomatic concessions that finally led to the end of the Cold War, several Soviet policy makers did acknowledge that the SDI forced them to admit that they could not outspend on military buildup. If that was the case, then, Reagan's moral uneasiness about nuclear weapons, undoubtedly provoked by the frightful image of nuclear war, contributed toward bringing the Cold War to an end.⁴²⁾

In Japan, being antinuclear with respect to the atomic bomb was the national consensus. The *Lucky Dragon* incident which occurred in 1954 initiated an all-out antinuclear movement in Japan. The crew of the Japanese fishing boat who were injured by the first U.S. deliverable hydrogen bomb in the Bikini Atoll were reported in Japan as the third nuclear victims. The U.S. knew the intense anti-nuclear feeling prevalent among the Japanese as the State Department observed that "Deep-seated pacifist, anti-nuclear inhibitions stemming from Japan's pre-war and wartime experiences are likely to dominate Japan's defense policies for the immediate future."

Still, the U.S. government grew concerned over the possibility of a nuclear Japan

following China's detonation of an atomic bomb in October 1964. In January 1965, Dean Rusk asserted that "Japan should think not in terms of an independent nuclear capability but of long-term defense cooperation with the U.S. and the U.S.-Japan⁴³⁾ Security Treaty, which is effective whether an attack is conventional or nuclear."

In the same month, Vice President-Elect Hubert H. Humphrey told Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki that he "had received some impression that, since the explosion of the Chinese Communist nuclear device, Japan and other countries such as India have been giving consideration to becoming nuclear powers in their own right." He said he would strongly oppose any competition in the nuclear arms race by Japan, India or any other country and assured Miki that "American nuclear power is the only safeguard for other nations. . . ." Humphrey concluded his remarks by expressing hope that Japan would not engage in the production of nuclear weapons. Miki tried to dispel the apprehension. "Japan, of course, had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons since it could produce plutonium." However, he continued, nuclear energy should be used for peaceful purposes instead of for arms.⁴⁴⁾ "Japan should not enter into atomic power politics."

Reflecting the Japanese public's consensus against the atomic bomb, the Eisaku Sato administration laid down in December 1967 three nonnuclear principles—that Japan will not possess, manufacture, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. Four years later the Lower House passed a resolution on the nonnuclear principles. On the instruction of the Foreign Ministry, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Takeso Shimoda assured an American audience in December 1967 that "the present consensus is that Japan should not develop its own nuclear deterrent, and our government is cooperating with the United States to bring about the conclusion of a non-proliferating treaty."⁴⁵⁾

The Japanese conservatives remained ambivalent about the nonnuclear principles though. The American Embassy in Tokyo reported that former Prime Minister Yoshida in mid-1962 publicly stated that Japanese nuclear armament must not be ruled out. Future Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, whose constituency was a district of the Hiroshima prefecture, startled his most trusted aid by remarking in 1958 that "Japan has to go nuclear" for self-protection. Prime Minister Sato, who was to receive a Nobel Peace prize for his nonnuclear principles, did in fact make several remarks against his public stand while in office. In September 1969 he described to Ambassador Alexis Johnson the nonnuclear principles as "nonsense," and stressed the importance of the nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. On another occasion Sato told that "the matter of fact is that a nuclear nation has a substantial voice over

a non-nuclear nation,” suggesting a necessity of nuclear possession.

Nonetheless, the special committee of experts formed by Sato to study a nuclear option arrived at the conclusion by early 1970 that because of technological, political, diplomatic and strategic restraints, Japan should not produce its own nuclear weapons; instead it should rely on nuclear protection extended by the U.S. The Defense Agency’s White Paper of 1970 explained that although Japan is able to possess a small-sized nuclear bomb “jurisprudentially,” it refuses to do so as a matter of policy. Japan did sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970 and ratified it in 1976.⁴⁶⁾

That the Japanese government needed six years to ratify the NNT demonstrated an uneasiness prevalent among the LDP’s conservative legislators on its ratification. Furthermore, the Japanese government had no intention of strictly enforcing its nonnuclear principles. Prime Minister Sato, in negotiating the return of Okinawa, allegedly concluded a secret agreement with President Nixon in 1971 whereby the U. S. reserves a right to introduce nuclear weapons into the island in case of emergency. The Japanese government also has acquiesced in the transit of American nuclear vessels into Japanese territory.⁴⁷⁾

In spite of several ill-conceived remarks made by Japanese leaders and their evasiveness on applying nonnuclear principles, the majority of the Japanese people strongly oppose Japan’s own nuclear development from moral and ethical viewpoints and agree to limit the defense program to the field of conventional forces. The large antinuclear movement in the early 1980’s further strengthened this widespread consensus. Still, this consensus has been directed against Japanese nuclear possession, not against the nuclear deterrence extended by the United States. In this respect, as former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa admitted in an interview, “The Japan-U.S. security pact in a sense has protected Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.” Many Japanese have accepted, albeit reluctantly, the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States.⁴⁸⁾

VI Conclusion

Not surprisingly, memories of the Pacific War affected both American and Japanese foreign policy in many ways. Nevertheless, while the Cold War was still going on, the United States and Japan did not need to come to grips with each other’s memories of the Pacific war in a way to promote mutual understanding. A strong and stable Japan as a bulwark against communism took precedence over everything else. Washington and Tokyo regularly ducked Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, and failed to conduct frank discussion of their differences on these incidents.

Their failure partly explains that with the receding Soviet military threat and the rapid rise of Japanese economic power in the late 1980's, the Japan-U.S. relationship took a marked downturn. In responding to the cumulative trade deficit with Japan, journalist Theodore White, who had been aboard the battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945 to see the ceremony of surrender, declared in 1985 that the Pacific War was still going on and Japan was winning. Some Americans began to argue for "containing" Japan; "bashing" Japan became popular in the United States. In response to this anti-Japanese trend, deep resentment arose in Japan. That *The Japan That Says No* was the best-seller in 1991 reflected such a reaction. The overwhelming military prowess the United States displayed in the Gulf War gave birth to a new word *ken-Bei* (dislike of the U.S.). The 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor might have been an excellent opportunity to put the matter to rest, but it settled nothing. The Kiichi Miyazawa administration did not offer any express apology for the attack; President Bush said in an NBC interview that he had no intention of apologizing to the Japanese for the atomic bombing. The fiasco over the *Enola Gay* exhibits at the Smithsonian Museum in 1995 reinforced the impression in Japan that the American people were not willing to understand Japanese sensitivity to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁴⁹⁾

Developments have acquired a new momentum in recent years. The California State legislature passed a law so that former POWs could sue Japanese companies for their wartime forced labor. The United States Congress enacted the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act in 1998 and the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act in 2000. The primary objective of the latter law is to direct the President to declassify "all classified Japanese Imperial Government records of the United States relating to the experimentation and persecution by the Japanese Government or its allies of persons because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion." The Bataan veterans, on the sixtieth anniversary in June 2002,⁵⁰⁾ repeated a request for an apology and compensation from the Japanese government.

Meantime, in July 2001, Japan's Education Ministry approved a controversial history textbook for junior high school students. The following month, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 Class A war criminals are enshrined. China and South Korea swiftly condemned the visit. Koizumi repeated the visits to the Shrine in April 2002 and January 2003, again drawing sharp criticisms at home as well as abroad.⁵¹⁾

This series of events illustrate that we are still living in the manifold ramifications of the Pacific War; they also suggest profound foreign policy implications for Japan and the United States: Memories of the Pacific War, while still casting a powerful shadow on two nations' conduct overseas, are taking on great importance and affecting bilateral relationship. While the horrendous 9/11 attacks and the following events dominate the current international situation, the two nations still need confront and address some fundamental differences over the bitter memories of the Pacific War and find a way to deal with the matter.⁵²⁾

Fortunately, we have shared liberal democratic values, developed interdependent economic bonds, established solid defense cooperation, fostered open societies, encouraged cultural interaction, and opened multiple communication channels. In particular, maintenance of the liberal democracy and the Wilsonian international economic system, and efforts directed toward eliminating racial and ethnical discrimination are basic lessons we could share. If we have any reason to be optimistic about settling the complicated questions left to us by our war memories, it is due to these new legacies of the last fifty years.⁵³⁾

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Notes

- 1) Ernest R. May, *“Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: 1973), p. ix.
- 2) For a general discussion of how historical analogies and war memories influence American foreign policy decisions, see Thomas E. Liffka, *The Concept “Totalitarianism” and American Foreign Policy, 1933-1949*, 2 vols. (New York: 1988); May, *“Lessons” of the Past: Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: 1965); Göran Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past?: The Munich Syndrome and Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era* (Lund, Sweden: 1982). Studs Terkel's *“The Good War”*: An

- Oral History of World War Two* (New York: 1984) is an excellent study of how the American people remembered World War II. On the racial aspect of the Pacific War and the revision of the anti-Chinese immigration act, see John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: 1986); Ma Xiaohua, *Maboroshi no shin chitsujo to Azia taiheiyō: Dainiji sekai taisenki no Bei-Chu domei no atsureki* (Illusionary New Orders and the Asian-Pacific: The Chinese-American Alliance in the War against Japan, 1941-1945) (Tokyo: 2000).
- 3) On the Japanese historical analogies and war memories, I have relied on Kiichi Fujiwara, *Senso wo kiokusuru* (Remembering Wars) (Tokyo: 2001); Chihiro Hosoya, Akira Iriye, et al., eds., *Taiheiyō senso* (The Pacific War) (Tokyo 1993); *Taiheiyō senso no shuketsu* (The Close of the Pacific War) (Tokyo: 1997); Yutaka Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensokan: Sengoshi no naka no henyo* (The Japanese Conception of War: The Transformation in Postwar History) (Tokyo: 1995); Daizaburo Yui, *Nichi-Bei: Sensokan no sokoku* (The Friction between the Japanese and American Conception of War) (Tokyo: 1995).
 - 4) On this point, highly informative is Lifka's *The Concept "Totalitarianism" and American Foreign Policy*, esp., pp. 159-211.
 - 5) Roosevelt statement quoted in Travis Beal Jacobs, *America and the Winter War, 1939-1940* (New York: 1981), p. 98; the Chârgé in Iran to the Secretary of State, December 1, 1939, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Hereafter cited as *FRUS*): 1940, III (Washington, D.C.: 1958), 625.
 - 6) Henderson memorandum, July 15, 1940, *ibid.*, I, p. 390; Page memorandum, October 3, 1940, *ibid.*, III, pp. 228-29.
 - 7) Grew memorandum, May 19, 1945, in Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, II (Boston: 1952), pp. 1445-46; Byrnes speech in Lifka, *The Concept "Totalitarianism" and American Foreign Policy*, p. 376; Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: 1951), pp. 72-73, 95-96.
 - 8) *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, D.C.: 1963), pp. 178-79.
 - 9) Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: 1956), pp. 332-33; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States of America: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, p. 10.
 - 10) Eisenhower to Churchill, April 5, 1954, in David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (New York: 1988), p. 214; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956*, p. 479. Gordon Chang stresses that anti-Asian racism formed the pervasive part in the Eisenhower administration's policy toward Asia in general and China in particular. See Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford: 1990), pp. 170-74.
 - 11) Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, Calif.: 1992), p. 48. Rightly sensing an attempt to shirk responsibility for

- having attacked Pearl Harbor in this remark, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson angrily responded: “nothing could show more clearly than this statement the failure of the Japanese to understand the nature of their conduct or the mind of the American people. . . . Pearl Harbor is not a symbol of hate for Japan but a symbol of Japanese perfidy.” Ibid. It should, however, be noted that it had been President Truman who had established the linkage between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima when he justified the use of the atomic bomb against the Japanese city by arguing that “I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. . . . When you have to deal with a beast, you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.” Truman to Samuel McCrea Cavert, August 11, 1945, in Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948* (New York: 1977), pp. 96-97.
- 12) Kishi’s diary in Yoshihisa Hara, *Kishi Nobusuke: Kensei no seijika* (Nobusuke Kishi: A Politician of Power and Influence) (Tokyo: 1995), p. 127. Kishi even noted two years later that in order to prevent “the communization of East Asia” and the Chinese Communists’ military victory, the United States, instead of providing the Nationalist government with “dollar and arms,” should employ its military forces that would include “the Japanese voluntary army.” Ibid., p. 129.
- 13) Osamu Ishii, *Reisen to Nichi-Bei kankei* (The Cold War and the Japanese-American Relations) (Tokyo: 1989), pp. 47-49; NSC 13/2, “Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan,” October 7, 1948, *FRUS: 1948*, VI, 858-62.
- 14) On the Truman administration’s policy toward the Japanese Peace Settlement, see Chihiro Hosoya, *Sanfuranshisuko kowa eno michi* (The Road to the San Francisco Peace Treaty) (Tokyo: 1984).
- 15) Yui, *Nichi-Bei*, pp. 158-66.
- 16) United States Strategic Bombing Survey report, “Summary Report (Pacific War),” July 1, 1946 (Washington, D.C.: 1946) (Microfilm version), pp. 30-32. On Nitze’s experience in Japan, see Paul H. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: A the Center of Decision-A Memoir* (New York: 1989), pp. 40-44; David Callahan, *Dangerous Capabilities: Paul H. Nitze and the Cold War* (New York: 1990), pp. 46-52. An editorial in the *Army and Navy Journal* demonstrated the lasting lesson of Pearl Harbor in September 1945 when it wrote that Pearl Harbor would not have happened, if the American people, “then rotted to pacifism,” had allowed Congress to provide appropriations necessary for adequate defense. Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past?*, p. 37.
- 17) NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, *FRUS: 1950*, I, 237-92.
- 18) NSC 5724, “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age,” November 7, 1957, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, XIX, 639-61. On the Gaither Report and its impact upon containment, see David L. Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War* (Columbus: 1999), esp., pp. 129-81.

- 19) Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite* (New York: 1993), pp. 23, xvi, 67; Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War*, p. 80; *New York Herald Tribune*, January 28, 1960; Michael Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair* (New York: 1986), p. 265.
- 20) Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1997), pp. 4, 143, 189; Rusk interview in Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: 1994), p. 303. Ambassador Dobrynin refutes the news that the Soviet diplomats burned the files. See Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)* (New York: 1995), p. 80. The most comprehensive study of the Cuban Crisis is Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble:" Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: 1997).
- 21) Kennan statement quoted in Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: 1992), p. 253. Kennan again showed in 1977 his nagging uneasiness about a Japan that would set loose from the Japan-US security pact. "Japan's industrial power, . . . is so tremendous a factor in world affairs that it can hardly help constituting a force either for great good or for great bad. So long as we have a close and solid relationship with the Japanese, we can hope to prevent it from becoming the latter. If we lose that relationship, we cannot tell." George F. Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: 1977), p. 108.
- 22) The JCS to Wilson, April 9, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, XII (Part 1), 417; the Bush administration's report on the strategic framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, April 19, 1990, in Chihiro Hosoya, Tadashi Aruga, Osamu Ishii, and Takuya Sasaki, eds., *Nichi-Bei kankei siryoshu, 1945-97* (Collection of Documents on the Japanese-American Relations, 1945-97) (Tokyo: 1999), p. 1176. Even a former Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. admitted that the Asian nations understood the Japan-U.S. security pact as an important "brake" against the revival of Japanese militarism. Takeshi Yasukawa, *Wasureenu Omoide to korekarano Nichi-Bei gaiko* (Unforgettable Memories and Future Japan-U.S. Diplomacy) (Tokyo: 1991), p. 92.
- 23) James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: 1998), pp. 43-44. See also Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York: 1997), pp. 355-56.
- 24) Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: 1992), pp. 140-41. On American race relations and their foreign policy implications in the Cold War period, see Thomas Borstelman, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass.: 2001).
- 25) Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven: 1995), p. 146; C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*,

- Third Revised Edition (New York: 1974), pp. 132, 146-47.
- 26) Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past?*, pp. 51-52, 48, 49.
- 27) Johnson and McNamara in John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: 1982), p. 262.
- 28) Harrison M. Holland, *Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis* (Boulder, Col.: 1992), pp. 101-107. On Japan's postwar security policy, I have also relied on Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzen hoshō* (National Security) (Tokyo: 1997).
- 29) Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990* (New York: 1992), p. 72; NIE 41-58, "Probable Developments in Japan's International Orientation," December 23, 1958, *FRUS: 1958-1960*, XVIII, 114; NIE 41-60, "Probable Developments in Japan," February 9, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 288.
- 30) Tanaka, *Anzen hoshō*, pp. 140-41, 264, 296.
- 31) Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981), pp. 118-20.
- 32) Dongo-Jo Kim, *Kan-Nichi no wakai* (Korea-Japan Reconciliation), translated by Takehiko Hayashi (Tokyo: 1993), p. 317. John Foster Dulles knew and was ready to capitalize on Japanese subtle racism. On January 29, 1951, he stressed to the political representative of the British liaison mission in Tokyo the desirability of inviting Japan to join "an elite Anglo-Saxon club." *FRUS: 1951*, VI (Part 1), 825-26.
- 33) Tadashi Aruga, "Nichi-Bei kankei ni okeru taiheiyo senso" (The Pacific War in the Japanese-American Relations), in Hosoya, Iriye, et al., *Taiheiyo senso*, pp. 547-48.
- 34) William S. Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955* (Madison: 1984), pp. 203-4.
- 35) NSC 30, "United States Policy on Atomic Weapons," September 30, 1948, *FRUS: 1948*, I (Part 2), 624-28.
- 36) John L. Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: 1987), p. 119.
- 37) J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," in Michael J. Hogan, ed., *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1996), pp. 24-25; S. David Broscious, "Longing for International Control, Banking on American Superiority: Harry S. Truman's Approach to Nuclear Weapons," in John Gaddis, et al., eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb* (New York: 1999), pp. 20, 19.
- 38) NSC 162/2, "Basic National Security Policy," October 30, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, II (part 1), 593; Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 312-13; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The Presidency* (New York: 1984), p. 184.
- 39) Dulles to Eisenhower, April 30, 1958, *FRUS: 1958-1960*, III, 605. On Dulles' concern, see also memorandum of conversation with the President, March 19, 1958, John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, Box 6, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Like Eisenhower, Dulles too had demonstrated intense moral reservations about the atomic bombing of Japan in the summer of 1945. See Neal Rosendorf, "John

- Foster Dulles' Nuclear Schizophrenia," in Gaddis, et al., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb*, pp. 64-66.
- 40) On the Nuclear Freeze Movement, consult David Cortright, *Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War* (Boulder, Col.: 1993); John Lofland, *Polite Protesters: The American Peace Movement of the 1980s* (Syracuse: 1993). On Luis Alvarez, see Fumihiko Yoshida, *Shogen: Kaku yokushi no seiki* (Testimony: The Century of Nuclear Deterrence) (Tokyo: 2000), pp. 49-52, 279-84.
- 41) Ronald Reagan, *The American Dream* (New York: 1990), pp. 549-50, 574.
- 42) See, for example, former Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh's statement in William C. Wohlforth ed., *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War* (Baltimore: 1996), pp. 32-33. But see also Ambassador Dobrynin's disagreement in his *In Confidence*, pp. 610-12.
- 43) State Department background paper, "Visit of Prime Minister Sato, January 11-14, 1965," January 7, 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, National Security File: Country File, Japan, Box 253, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas; Dean Rusk memorandum for the President, "Visit of Prime Minister Sato, January 11-14, 1965" undated, *ibid.*, Box 253.
- 44) Memorandum of conversation between Humphrey and Miki, January 13, 1965, *ibid.*, Box 250.
- 45) Tanaka, *Anzen hoshō*, pp. 221-25; Shimoda address at the Japan-America Society of Washington, December 1, 1967, Johnson Papers, National Security File: Country File, Japan, Box 252.
- 46) Department of State Policy on the Future of Japan, June 26, 1964, *ibid.*, Box 250; Masaya Ito, *Ikeda Hayato to sono jidai* (Hayato Ikeda and His Times) (Tokyo: 1985), pp. 234-35; Sato comment to Ambassador Johnson reported in *Kobe Shimbun*, June 10, 2000; *the Asahi Shimbun*, June 17, 2002; Boei cho (The Defense Agency), *Nihon no boei—Boei hakusho* (Japan's Defense: The White Paper on Defense) (Tokyo: 1970), p. 36.
- 47) Kei Wakaizumi, Prime Minister Sato's confidential emissary, confessed in the memoirs that he was instrumental in working out this secret agreement. See Kei Wakaizumi, *Tasaku nakarishiwo shinzemuto hossu* (I Would Like to Believe That There Was No Alternative) (Tokyo: 1994).
- 48) Miyazawa's interview in Yoshida, *Shogen*, pp. 317-18.
- 49) On the Japan-U.S. relationship since the late 1980's, see LaFeber, *The Clash*, pp. 379-95. See also Sherry, *In the Shadow of War*, pp. 446-49.
- 50) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d106:1:./temp/~bdC9Zq:@. . ./d106query.html> (accessed on May 8, 2002); *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 9, 2001; *International Herald Tribune*, May 28, 2002.
- 51) On issues of memory and history in Asia, see Gerrit W. Gong, ed., *Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia* (Washington, D.C.: 1996); *Memory and History in East Asia and Southeast Asia: Issues of Identity in*

The Cold War Diplomacy and Memories of the Pacific War:
A Comparison of the American and Japanese Cases(Takuya Sasaki)

International Relations (Washington, D.C.: 2001).

- 52) As Yukio Matsuyama, a leading journalist for *the Asahi Shimbun*, noted in his memoirs, the Japan-U.S. alliance which is not founded on common sharing of historical memories might be unexpectedly fragile when a dynamic change of international politics occurs. Yukio Matsuyama, *Jiyuu to setsudo* (Freedom and Moderation) (Tokyo: 2001), p. 26.
- 53) Recent two publications that have commemorated the 50th anniversary of the San Francisco Peace Treaty demonstrate the common sharing of the postwar experiences of the two nations. Chihiro Hosoya and A50 Editorial Committee, eds., *Japan and the United States: Fifty Years of Partnership* (Tokyo: 2001); Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler, eds., *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001* (Tokyo: 2001).