Thoreau and Politics

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I.

Late July of 1846, Henry David Thoreau refused to pay his poll tax in protest against the state of Massachusetts' policy on slavery, and was taken to a Concord prison, where he spent a night. Released next morning when friends bailed him out, he promptly joined a huckleberry party going to nearby Fair-Haven Hill. Thoreau was neither a political activist nor an anarchist. Although he refused to pay his poll tax for the year, he did pay the highway tax, in order to be a good neighbor. And he thereafter paid his poll tax regularly every year. As he writes later, he did not come into this world chiefly to make this a good place to live in. He only wished "to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually" (Variorum Civil Disobedience 50). This political attitude seems important not only to approach but also to edit Thoreau's writings.

Thoreau's essay of 1849, "one of the most widely read and reprinted of American literary texts" [1] (Howe 1), has two titles: "Resistance to Civil Government" and "Civil Disobedience." The text of the former title is that of

the essay first published in 1849 in the *Æsthetic Papers*, while the text of the latter is that included in one of the collected writings, *A Yankee in Canada, with Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1866), posthumously published in 1866. Many readers buy and read either of them. Bartholow Crawford's American Writers Series *Thoreau* (New York: Cincinnati [etc.] American Book Company, 1934), Owen Thomas in the Norton Critical Edition (W. W. Norton, 1966), Wendell Glick's *Reform Papers in The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton University Press, 1973), Nancy L. Rosenblum in *Thoreau: Political Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), and others include the 1849 version. William Rossi in the Norton Critical Edition, Second Edition (W. W. Norton, 1992), chooses the text of the 1849 version, on the ground that "Although Thoreau prepared a number of his essays for posthumous publication during the last few months of his life, no evidence exists indicating that 'Resistance to Civil Government' was among them. Despite the fact that the 1866 title has acquired the force of tradition, neither title nor other alterations of the text for the 1866 printing have any authority" (246). In fact, however, 19 years before the Norton Second Edition, the Princeton edition *Reform Papers* (1973) explains that an unsigned editorial in the Boston *Commonwealth* for March 13, 1863, writes of Thoreau's plan to reissue the essay before his death (316). Thoreau had a plan to collect and reissue his essays including "Resistance... ." Then, is it not strange that Rossi does not give us any comments or opinions upon it? Why does Rossi ignore the explanation of the Princeton edition concerning Thoreau's plan to reissue his essays including "Resistance ..."?

On the other hand, the ten-volume Riverside Edition (Houghton, Mifflin, 1888), the twenty-volume Walden Edition (Riverside Press, 1906), Brooks Atkinson in the Modern Library *Walden and Other Writings* (Random House, 1937), Carl Bode in *The Portable Thoreau* (The Viking Press, 1947), Walter Harding in the *Variorum Civil Disobedience* (Twayne Publishers, 1967), H. A. Bedau in *Civil Disobedience in Focus* (Routledge, 1991) and others select the 1866 version.

Where does the dissension of editors come from? As holograph fair-copy forms for the definitive evidence have not yet been discovered, it seems

inevitable that disagreement still continues among editors. Walter Harding, for instance, in his annotated *The Variorum Civil Disobedience*, chooses the 1866 version "on the assumption that it was based on a corrected copy made by Thoreau" (27). On the other hand, Wendell Glick, the editor of the Princeton edition chooses the 1849 version on the ground that "editorial policy of the Center for Editions of American Authors dictates that the *Æsthetic Papers* version provide the copy-text for this edition" (317). How shall we understand the "Editorial policy of the CEAA dictates..."? According to Glick, the aim of the Princeton edition is, following "the editorial principles and procedures established by the Center for Editions of American Authors of the Modern Language Association of America," "to produce texts as close as possible to the author's intention, texts that would have met with his approval" (234).

Then, what should editors do in order to come as close to the author's intention as possible, and what kind of text would meet Thoreau's approval? In fact, the differences between these two versions are not many, and it might seem to some that they are not serious. Hence, as Harding writes in his book, they are "two slightly differing versions. ...Except for numerous (but trivial) differences in capitalization and punctuation — which were probably editorial rather than authorial changes — they vary only in a few sentences" (Civil Disobedience 27). If this is true, it would seem unreasonable that such strong disagreement remains among editors as to which version should be chosen. So long as definitive evidence is lacking, would either version be good enough to approach the mind and thought of Thoreau, that is, his intention? And if either version is good enough, pragmatically speaking, would they be in effect the same, without any substantial interference to approach the author's intention in spite of small differences? Then, would it be possible for us to assert that both are close enough to the author's intention and meet with his approval?

Without definitive evidence, how should we approach the author's intention? Certainly, the differences are not many. There are thirteen differences on the whole, with nine of them coming from misreading or a stylistic taste of an unknown editor, as the editor of the Princeton edition acknowledges, writing still further: "The remaining four substantive variants, however, are not so simply accounted for, ... And in two cases, there are significant additions" (Glick

239-40). Namely, in the 1866 version, the title is changed from "Resistance to Civil Government" to "Civil Disobedience," and twenty words are stricken in the second paragraph. And the remaining two "significant additions" which the Princeton edition points out are: six lines of poetry from George Peele's *The Battle of Alcazar* in the sixth paragraph from the last, and a sentence beginning with "Even the Chinese philosopher ..." in the last paragraph. Why and by whom were these alterations made, if not by Thoreau himself?

The reason the 1849 version is chosen in the Princeton edition is that "editorial prudence presently dictates that it is safer to print the 1849 substantives for which Thoreau probably read proof than to emend on the basis of the negative evidence that it is unlikely that Thoreau's editor(s) would have made these changes without authority" (Glick 240). With definitive evidence lacking, "editorial prudence" would be to decide which is "safer," and which happens more "probably." Hence, on the ground that nowhere in Thoreau's plan to reissue the essay before his death is written "Civil Disobedience," the Princeton edition chooses the 1849 title: "Resistance to Civil Government." As its editor writes, however, a transcribed copy of an unsigned editorial in the Boston *Commonwealth* for March 13, 1863, proves "a list, prepared by (Thoreau) himself shortly before his death," on which the writer of the editorial was planning to collect and publish Thoreau's works (Glick 316). And, on the list appears, "In Æsthetic Papers. Resistance to Civil Government." Thoreau had a plan to reissue the essay. Then, the Princeton edition comes to a judgment:

> If the list is genuine, Thoreau "shortly before his death" had made no plans for altering his title. Whatever the circumstances were, editorial policy of the Center for Editions of American Authors dictates that the *Æsthetic Papers* version provide the copy-text for this edition. But since no marked copy of the first printing that Thoreau might have left has been found, the decision as to whether to emend the copy-text with some or all of the 1866 substantive variants must rest, at present, upon internal evidence (Glick 316-17).

Here again, "editorial policy of the CEAA dictates...," but the decision as to

how to consider those four significant alterations in the 1866 version must rest upon "internal evidence." Then, we would understand that the Princeton edition chooses the 1849 version because of the editorial policy of the CEAA, but not because of the editor's own decision based on his research into external and internal evidence. And what does "internal evidence" mean? Nowhere do we read anything like references to or explanations of internal evidence in the Princeton edition. "As to capitalization, punctuation, and so on," it observes, the 1866 version is "far more consistent," but "they reflect the Ticknor and Fields house style and the desire of an editor or compositor for consistency rather than the practice of Thoreau" (Glick 317). It complains of improper interference of someone like an editor or compositor, and that person, if any, must be Sophia, Thoreau's sister. Is this true? Is this a judgment or a decision based on what the Princeton edition calls "internal evidence"? February 11, 1862, three months before his death, Thoreau sends a letter, written by Sophia's hand, addressed to THE EDITORS OF THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, expecting "that no sentiment or sentence be altered or omitted without my consent" (*Correspondence* 636). If the Princeton edition says that "capitalization, punctuation, and so on," reflect the Ticknor and Fields house style and the desire of an editor or compositor, then, what does it explain about such negligence and disregard of Thoreau's intention? Why does it think the publisher and an editor belied Thoreau? It continues to say, furthermore: "... one cannot argue that the 1866 sentences reflect the kind of revision he (Thoreau) would likely do at the end of his life. As a matter of fact, the revisions are clearly the sort an editor might make in an attempt to 'improve' the syntax" (Glick 318). As to the alteration of "most" to "many" in the 1866 version, ("This may be to judge my neighbors harshly; for I believe that <u>most</u> of them are not aware that they have such an institution as the jail in their village."), the editor writes as follows:

> ... (the alteration) may have been Thoreau's attempt at a more accurate estimate of the sentiment of his neighbors; but it may just as well have been the posthumous attempt of the presumptive editor, Sophia, who probably after her brother's death retained a sharp recollection of Thoreau's jailing and the community response to it. Or,

it may simply have been the 1866 printer's misreading (Glick 318).

The editor thus continues to look carefully for "safer" evidence here and there, and those considerations and surmises — are they what the editor means by "internal evidence," on which the editor writes above that significant alterations must rest? Nothing is yet conclusive from the above variants, as the Princeton edition observes. And regarding "the four substantive variants" mentioned above, it says: "All sound like changes Thoreau *might* have made" (318), and then it proceeds to the case of the deletion of twenty words in the second paragraph in the 1866 version, — the sentence in the 1849 version is: "It (the American government) is a sort of wooden gun to the people themselves; and, if ever they should use it in earnest as a real one against each other, it will surely split." And in the 1866 version, the sentence ends with a period at "themselves." The deletion "could have been made by Thoreau: that is to say, there is nothing in the change that would preclude Thoreau's having made it. But nothing in the sentence itself is so characteristic of Thoreau that it can be argued Thoreau must have made the elision" (319). How circuitous is this way of writing! What is this edition intending to say by that? — Thoreau made, nothing precludes Thoreau's having made, or nothing is characteristic of Thoreau? Thence, the editor's final surmise is: "why could not a literary minded Ticknor and Fields reader have reasoned that wooden guns do not split, and have stricken the second clause? Or why might not Sophia or the publisher have felt that the 1849 reading was unfortunately suggestive of the Civil War?" (319) — all sound like changes Thoreau might have made, and he could have made, but nothing is characteristic of Thoreau, the publisher could have reasoned, or Sophia might have felt, ... and thus, the editor circuitously comes to the decision to choose the 1849 version, on the ground that the changes in the 1866 version might not have been made by the author, but by the publisher or Sophia. The Princeton edition dislikes Sophia as editor. This "negative evidence" makes it choose the 1849 version. For, the editor's decision "has been to print what Thoreau unquestionably wrote once, not what he may have written later" (320). But the aim of the Princeton edition is, as the editor explains above, to follow the editorial principles and procedures of the CEAA, and "to produce

texts as close as possible to the author's intention, texts that would have met with his approval." If all the editor needs is "to print what Thoreau unquestionably wrote once," then, what does he mean by the aim of the Princeton edition "to produce texts as close as possible to the author's intention, texts that would have met with his approval"? Is it not to neglect the author's later plan to revise his text, if ever? As to the addition of a sentence of the Chinese philosopher in the last paragraph of the 1866 version, the editor says:

> That sentence ... is plausibly Thoreau's, since he had used a quotation from Confucius earlier in the essay; but the sentence is rejected as a part of text in this edition on the ground that the plausibility is not enough to justify adopting a sentence which, even though it may be Thoreau's, may not have been intended for insertion here" (320).

These considerations and surmises sound reasonable at first, but the Princeton edition rejects the Confucian sentence on the ground that plausibility is not good enough for justification. That is, the plausibility is always negative in this edition, and therefore, the Confucian sentence is judged not worthwhile considering in editorship. If plausibility is simply rejected, however, what would become of the editor's aim "to produce texts as close as possible to the author's intention, texts that would have met with his approval"? Moreover, it is because "he had used a quotation from Confucius earlier in the essay" that he considers the Confucian sentence plausibly to be Thoreau's. Though he considers it plausibly to be Thoreau's, does he not have any other evidence, external or internal, based on research? Without them, how does he think it possible to come as close as possible to the author's intention? The Princeton edition — isn't it widely interested in, and doesn't it intend to hunt for, some other research in this field in order to approach as close as possible to the author's intention?

It is certainly never easy to make a decision as to these editorial problems Thoreau editors face, many more in regard to Sophia's and her brother's later revisions. With the printing of the new edition of *Walden* in progress, for instance, Thoreau sends a letter to Ticknor & Fields to make one alteration, "to

leave out from the title the words «Or Life in the Woods»," offering simultaneously a new title for the essay he has already sent, "Life without Principle" (*Correspondence* 639). In those days, in early 1862, Thoreau stays all day on his day bed in the parlor, exclusively revising manuscripts for publication, and whenever occasion demands, he dictates letters and revisions to Sophia "in a faint whisper" (Richardson 388). In his "confined illness and prostration of physical strength" (*Correspondence* 648), Thoreau continues to work on "Walking," "Autumnal Tints," "Wild Apples," and "Night and Moonlight," with proof reading.[2] In spite of little evidences as to what and how he has dictated to Sophia, however, Thoreau has a plan to issue, after finishing pressing work, a book of collected essays including his *Æsthetic Papers* article, to which he would like to add a few revisions. One of the revisions is to add six lines from George Peele, *The Battle of Alcazar*, which is he thinks undoubtedly effective to amplify the tone of conformity, responding to such phrases as "conforming to the laws of the land," "a pretext for conformity," and "affect our country" (Civil Disobedience 51-52). In "Walking," he talks of himself "as a true patriot," and repeats here and there that he is neither a bigot, nor a hermit:

> I think I love society as much as most, and am ready enough to fasten myself like a bloodsucker for the time to any full-blooded man that comes in my way. I am naturally no hermit, but might possibly sit out the sturdiest frequenter of the bar-room, if my business called me thither (*Walden* 140).

Judging from these circumstances, no one could refuse the validity of the addition of six lines from Peele's poetry in the 1866 version, and similarly, Thoreau plausibly spoke with Sophia before his death about the change of the title, from "Resistance ..." to "Civil Disobedience." Thoreau has read William Paley, *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* well, in which often appear such phrases as "civil obedience," "civil government," "civil governors," "civil society," "civil obligation," "civil right," "civil subjection," "civil liberty," as well as "public obedience" and "public advantage." Familiar with these expressions, Thoreau must have spoken to Sophia of a new title, "Civil Disobedience."

Would it be possible for Sophia to neglect or belie Thoreau, as we quoted above, expecting "that no sentiment or sentence be altered or omitted without my consent"? There is a copy of *A Yankee in Canada, with Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1866), deposited in the Berg Collection, the New York Public Library, on the cover or title page of which no name of the editor is printed. Opening the cover, we read on the right page a punctilious dedication written in pencil: "W. H. Channing, with the kind regards of S. E. Thoreau ." It must have been given to Channing in token of her gratitude for his useful advice in editorship. There is also inserted a small slip of paper, on which is written in pencil, "Edited by Sophia Thoreau and W. H. Channing," though we do not know who wrote and inserted it. Thoreau and Sophia leave no evidence, no corrected copy, no proof, that the addition of poetry and the new title, "Civil Disobedience," are without fail the decision of the author. Also, there is no evidence that the addition and the new title are not the author's, but still we believe that both the addition and the new title, along with the addition of the Confucian individual as the basis of empire were without doubt bequeathed to Sophia in Thoreau's voice before his death. She drew the picture of the Walden hut for her brother, on the title page of the 1854 edition.

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In 1961, more than a decade before the Princeton edition, Lyman V. Cady published an article titled "*Thoreau's Quotations from the Confucian Books* in Walden," which inquired into Thoreau's source of quotations from and his fascination with Oriental texts. His first quotations, as they are widely known, are a selection of twenty-one maxims entitled the "Sayings of Confucius," which was published in the *Dial*, April 1843. The second is a selection of forty-three items under seven headings from the *Four Books*, published as "Ethical Scriptures" in the *Dial*, October 1843. The source of the former is Joshua Marshman's English translation, *The Works of Confucius: Containing the Original Text, with a Translation...* (Serampore: the Mission Press, 1809), and an anonymous compilation, *the Phenix; a Collection of Old and Rare Fragments* (New York: William

Gowan, 1835), as the editor of the Princeton edition *Early Essays and Miscellanies* writes in his "Textual Notes and Tables" (382-3). And the source of the latter is David Collie, *The Chinese Classical Work, commonly called The Four Books* (Malacca: the Mission Press, 1828). In addition to the *Analects* of Confucius, there are also included *Mencius* and *The Doctrine of the Mean.* These quotations, however, are not always same as those used in *Walden.* Why? Is there any other source than Marshman and Collie? "Interestingly enough," as Cady writes, "the nine quotations from Confucian Books in *Walden* ... coincide only once with the sayings listed in the *Dial*" (Cady 21). Moreover, "none of the nine were based on Collie's translation" (21). Then, where do they come from?

Ascertaining that Confucian quotations in *Walden* do not come from any of the English translations above mentioned, Cady finds some other source and writes: "The answer is to be found, I submit, in a translation directly from the Chinese into the French by G. Pauthier, published in Paris first in 1840, republished in 1841 and in subsequent editions" (Cady 21). It is entitled *Les livres sacrés de l'Orient, le Chou-king ou le livre par excellence: les Sse-chou ou les quatre livres moraux de Confucius et de ses disciples: les lois de Manou, premier legislateur de l'Inde; le Koran de Mahomet / traduits ou revus et publiés par G. Pauthier,* and there is included the French translation of the *Four Books.* Confirming that the source is Thoreau's own translation from Pauthier's book, then, Cady goes on to write, now assuredly:

> The internal evidence for Thoreau's use of Pauthier's translation is quite convincing. A close comparison of the English of the *Walden* quotations with Pauthier's French text reveals that in each passage and in every respect the French source controls the form and wording of the English equivalent. This is very clear in the choice from among possible English synonyms: each time the word immediately mirrors the French word used by Pauthier to render the original Chinese term. An equally telling point is that the proper names are always given in the French system of romanization used by Pauthier. ... (Cady 22).

"Quite convincing" is that the source of Confucian quotations in *Walden* is Pauthier's French text. With the external evidence very scanty, since Thoreau gives no indication of the exact source of any of his quotations, Cady goes on to compare carefully Thoreau's quotations with the French text. Before coming to assert his identification, he takes an example of Thoreau's quotation from *Analects* in *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers:*

> They say that Lieou-hia-hoei and Chao-lien did not sustain to the end their resolutions, and that they dishonored their character. Their language was in harmony with reason and justice; while their acts were in harmony with the sentiments of men (*A Week* 132-33).

> On dit que Lieou-hia-hoei et Chao-lien ne soutinrent pas jusqu'au bout leur réolutions, et qu'ils déshonorèrent leur caractère. Leur language était en harmonie avec la raison et la justice; tandis que leur actes étaient en harmonie avec les sentiments des hommes (*Confucius and Mencius* 231).

Judging from the spelling of proper names and the word order mirroring each other, there is no doubt that Thoreau's quotations come from Pauthier's text. As Cady points out, Thoreau in *A Week*, five pages later than the above quotation, "refers very favorably to a French translator ... without mentioning his name" (Cady 22):

> "Assuredly," says a French translator, speaking of the antiquity and durability of the Chinese and Indian nations, and of the wisdom of their legislators, "there are there some vestiges of the eternal laws which govern the world" (*A Week* 136).
> (Assurément, il y a à quelques vestiges des lois éternelles qui gouvernent le monde. "Introduction" to *Confucius et Mencius* 3.)

Thoreau must have felt an intellectual affinity with the French translator, as will be discussed later. Is that why Thoreau comes to use his own translation of

Pauthier's text, rather than the available English translations? Thus although confirming Thoreau's source of his *Walden* quotations in Pauthier's French text, Cady did not consult Thoreau's own translation manuscripts in the "Commonplace book," deposited in the Berg Collection of the New York Public Library. Toward the end of his article, he points out that we are "struck by the affinity of the two writings (*Walden* and the Chinese Philosophy) and the profound similarity of the points of view," and that there still remains "a rich field for a special comparative study of its own" (Cady 31-32). Though indeed his research is a precious contribution to Thoreau studies, it seems to us, if with more insight and understanding of Confucian philosophy in Thoreau's context, he would not have written that "Thoreau rarely sees these sayings in their proper implications; ... Thoreau reads his own meanings into passages and uses them ingeniously to add exotic reinforcement to his own distinctive and highly individualistic ideas. In short, he for the most part uses Confucian materials in a non-Confucian way" (31). Is it "exotic reinforcement"? Did it mean something to Thoreau? If it is "a non-Confucian way," then, what is the Confucian way like?

It is similarly hard to understand why the Princeton edition, aiming to be "an authoritative edition of Thoreau's writings" (Glick 215), does not consult Thoreau's "Commonplace book" for confirmation. In the "Textual Notes" there is a note to one author's quotation near the middle of "Civil Disobedience," "Confucius said: 'If a state is governed ...'," and writes, "The translation is probably Thoreau's, from *Les Quatre Livres Il Philosophie Morale Et Politique* ... tr. Du Chinois Par M. G. Panthier [sic] (Paris, 1841).... Thoreau's English rendering is not to be found in any of the standard translations" (Glick 325). If the editor in fact had examined Thoreau's "Commonplace book" in the Berg Collection, he would not have written "the translation is probably Thoreau's," nor would he have written "Panthier," or the book "*Les Quatre Livres ...* ." And, if Cady's article had been checked up on, he would not have written "Thoreau's English rendering ... ." For, as we read in "Commonplace book," p. 127, the book Thoreau used for his translation is, as Thoreau himself writes there, *Confucius et Mencius: les quatre livres de philosophie morale et politique de la Chine*, traduits du Chinois par G. Pauthier (Paris: Charpentier, 1841),

which is a republication of the *Four Books* from *Les livres sacrés de l'Orient,...* (Paris: Firman Didot frères, 1840). Referring to it, Thoreau himself writes in his note that "Pauthier has translated the Chou-king in what he calls his 'Livres sacrés de l'Orient' from which in fact the present translation is taken" (Commonplace book 128; Tan 288). In fact, Pauthier's *Confucius et Mencius* is a reproduction of his *Les Sse-chou, ou les quatre livres de philosophie morale et politique*, traduits du Chinois par M. G. Pauthier, pp. 153-304, from *Les livres sacrés de l'Orient*, a book of 760 pages.

Encouraged by and then advancing Cady's research, Hongbo Tan published in 1993 at last Thoreau's translation of ninety-six paragraphs of Confucius from Pauthier's French texts: "Confucius at Walden Pond: Thoreau's Unpublished Confucian Translations."[3] Although there have been many Thoreau (and Emerson) teachers and scholars in each generation, we do not understand why foreign influences and references on American Transcendentalism have been neglected. Scholars such as Kenneth W. Cameron, William Howarth, Joseph J. Moldenhauer, and Robert Settlemeyer have mentioned of the existence of Thoreau's unpublished notebook in their publications, but Tan deplores that:

> ...none of these scholars seems to show an understanding of exactly what Thoreau had translated; nor do they seem to feel the need for further investigation. The Princeton edition of Thoreau's *Translations*, for example, ignores these translated Confucian passages, stating that its editorial principle is to publish Thoreau's "literary translations" only. Thus, ironically, while critics such as Cady go so far as to infer that Thoreau had made his own translations in *Walden*, while a single figure of speech in Thoreau's writings often triggers endless source probing and investigation, these twenty-three pages of Thoreau's actual translation remain ignored in the archive, their content virtually unknown (Tan 26).

Cady in the above-mentioned article suggests "a rich field for a special comparative study of its own," and now again, Tan bemoans and repeats here that "nor do they seem to feel the need for further investigation" (Tan 276).

Recollecting Thoreau (Emerson, Alcott, and Fuller) as "avid readers" and "internationalists-to-a-fault" (Dimock 763-64) immersed in Persian, Indian and Chinese literature, as well as European literature, what should we think of the scholars' narrow-mindedness, indifference and negligence in comparison with those authors? Haven't they been working from astoundingly restricted academism for such drastic and world-wide-open-minded Transcendentalists as Thoreau and Emerson? Wai Chee Dimock in her "Deep Time: American Literature and World History," calls it "academic nationalism," or "parochialism." In terms of Paul Gilroy, *the Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (1993), Dimock rejects a geographical unit as neither the starting point nor the end point of our world, or of our critical analysis, and then continues:

> ... the nation is only one determinant, one among others. These others can sometimes bracket it and override it. The adjective *American*, because it recognizes only national causality, cannot capture figures more complexly formed: figures such as Frederick Douglass, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Richard Wright. They are ill served by a metonymic paradigm. Their writings take on their full significance only when they are seen, not as a part of a national whole, but as an index to what disputes that *wholeness*. Gilroy thus highlights the following: Douglass and his relation to Enlightenment rationality; Du Bois and his relation to German idealism; Wright and his relation to French existentialism. These transatlantic ties, requiring for their analysis something other than a self-contained unit, make it clear that neither a single nation nor a single race yield an adequate frame for literary history. Both the strict Americanist and the strict Africanist come up short (757).

So long as such indifference and negligence continue to work, it will be unable for us to expect academic nationalism and parochialism to be subjugated, and we will as a consequence remain contented with national causality. Dimock calls for a "sea change" in regard to the cultural boundaries of

America. We must transcend the parochialism, the Eurocentricism, and the nation-centered paradigm. This sea change responds to Thoreau's call for the new world of America as "the ground on which Orientals and Occidentals meet," as he writes in one of his later essays (Life 163). Thoreau writes of this theme again in "Walking":

> We go eastward to realize history and study the works of art and literature, retracing the steps of the race; we go westward as into the future, with a spirit of enterprise and adventure. The Atlantic is a Lethean stream, in our passage over which we have had an opportunity to forget the Old World and its institutions. If we do not succeed this time, there is perhaps one more chance for the race left before it arrives on the banks of the Styx; and that is in the Lethe of the Pacific, which is three times as wide (Walking 604).

Neglecting this westward desire in Thoreau, how can we fulfill his intention? What indifference and negligence, what parochialism can be found in scholars concerned with an internationalist-to-a-fault mind like Thoreau (and Emerson)? — Tan continues:

> Anxious to defend Thoreau's originality, or, rather his Occidentality, critics since Mark Van Doren, who asserted in 1916 that "Thoreau took figures and sentences, not ideas from Oriental reading," have tended to minimize Thoreau's debt to the Orient, particularly to the Confucian texts. In his pioneering study of the *Orient in American Transcendentalism*, Christy acknowledges the Confucian canon as one of the three major Oriental resources. But he quickly dismisses it as least significant when compared with the Indian and Persian influences, and declares unhesitantly that it is "fruitless to attempt finding in [Thoreau] a resemblance to the ethics of Confucius." He further asserts that there was "nothing essentially Confucian in Thoreau's temperament," adding "No Confucius would ever have gone to Walden." Few scholars have challenged these conclusions (276).

Few scholars have challenged these nationalist and parochial conclusions two decades after the publication of Thoreau's translation of Confucius. In our time of civilization, with information technologies connecting the world in an instant, it sounds strange for us to hear scholars like Dimock say that American Transcendentalists were "internationalists-to-a-fault." The world has become much smaller in comparison with that of Thoreau's day. Unfortunately, however, intellectual conditions need a call for sea change to burst out of national causality and nation-centered paradigm. This is scarcely time for us to remain there, as Thoreau cried out intensely, and now again, we should listen to him: "Shall the world be confined to one Paris or one Oxford? ... Why should our life be in any respect provincial (*Walden* 109)? Thoreau editors should not disregard these words, however anxious to defend Thoreau's originality and his Occidentality, and however eager to dislike Sophia's interference. Without challenging those nationalist and parochial conclusion, and without sea change in national causality and paradigm, it would be impossible to approach the internationalist-to-a-fault Thoreau and those problems Thoreau editors face, as well as the way he is to be related with the government or the state.

Ⅲ.

Plain, simple, and honest is Thoreau's attitude toward government, state, or politics in "Civil Disobedience." It is his declaration of an individual as "the lord of a realm" (*Walden* 321), as "the basis of the empire" (Civil Disobedience 55). It was written after lecturing on some occasions, as is well known, from his jail experience by his refusal to pay a tax. He refused to pay it when he was asked to do so by the village tax collector. Thoreau was then feeling the impending cause to do so, since his "government ... is the slave's government" and "a sixth of the population of a nation ... are slaves" (35). He felt that the situation was unbearably serious and impending. In other words, as he writes again later in *Walden*, " [he] did not pay a tax, or recognize the authority of, the state which buys and sells men, women, and children, like cattle at the door of its senate-house" (171). Then, to begin with, what is the state or the government for its people? What are civil rights and obligations, and how are the people to

be related with the state or the government? What kind of cases justify "the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government" (Civil Disobedience 34)? Beginning his "Civil Disobedience," Thoreau writes, "Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient" (31). And thence his discourse moves on toward the origin or foundation of what is called civil obedience to government and refers to "Paley, a common authority with many on moral questions," who "resolves all civil obligation into expediency" (35).[4]

According to William Paley, *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, "all civil obligation is resolved into expediency" (427), and he regards "the only ground of the subjects' obligation (as) THE WILL OF GOD COLLECTED FROM EXPEDIENCY" (423). Certain it is, "so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that is, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniency" (424). Thoreau is naturally concerned about the justifiable cases of resistance. Although expediency is the will of God, who will judge or admit it? Thoreau does not always agree with Paley when he says that "*every man for himself*" judges in regard to "every particular case of resistance" (424). The point of difference of the two writers is that Paley thinks and writes in a far less serious situation in comparison with that of Thoreau living in "the *slave's* government," — that is to say, "the magnitude and seriousness of the question" (Civil Disobedience 44) differs. In Thoreau's case, men, women, and children are being sold and bought like cattle at the door of the senate-house. His country is, figuratively, in such condition as the state or the government has now unjustly wrested planks from those drowning people. This is an absolute situation, not to be resolved into expediency. Paley does not contemplate this serious and impending situation, which, as Thoreau says, the rule of expediency would not apply to. The government in an absolute situation must restore their planks to them, "*cost what it may*" (Civil Disobedience 36). Thoreau affirms, therefore, that "he that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose it. This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people" (35). These are pathetic cries: "cost what it may," and "though it cost them their existence as a people," con-

veying the seriousness and urgency of the situation.

In the government as an expedient, what is called a majority is allowed to rule, that is to say, the government is an expedient machine moving through a majority rule. It does not signify, however, that "they are most likely to be in the right," and it is not a majority but conscience that virtually decides right and wrong. Every man has a conscience, inborn and inherent, Thoreau thinks. It should not be, therefore, "ever for a moment, or in the least degree," resigned to legislator, or government. Neither a majority, nor law, but conscience is to be given consideration before anything else. "Unjust laws exist" (Civil Disobedience 39) and "law never made men a whit more just" (33). Hence, law makes many soldiers and privates march over hill and dale to wars "against their wills, ay, against their common sense and conscience" (33). It can be nothing but conscience, Thoreau states, that would make possible "free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense" (33).

Even the process of voting is a kind of expediency, and "voting *for the right* is *doing* nothing for it" (Civil Disobedience 37). Who can imagine, therefore, a wise man to "leave the right to the mercy of chance, [and] wish it to prevail through the power of the majority" (37)? What matters truly is never a majority, nor voting, in which "the character of the voters is not staked" (36). Only that matters which the character of the voters is staked on. What is a majority that supports the government admitting that men, women, and children are sold and bought at the door of the senate-house? They will not vote for the abolition of the slavery until slavery is left. Then, it is clear that a majority is not useful for the right and justice. If it is not, we have to look for such "absolute goodness somewhere," as "will leaven the whole lump" (36). We should seek neither a majority, nor a law, but "absolute goodness." It must be private and individual. "Absolute goodness" exists somewhere and leavens the whole lump, and it alone is able to resist against the unbearable situation of governmental abuse, to quote from Emerson:

> The antidote to this abuse of formal Government, is, the influence of private character, the growth of the Individual; the appearance of the principal to supersede the proxy; the appearance of the wise

> man, of whom the existing government, is, it must be owned, but a shabby imitation (Politics 126).[5]

"The growth of the Individual," can be "a little leaven." Since the antidote will come from nowhere but private wisdom and individual experience, Thoreau responds to Emerson: "eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person" (Civil Disobedience 42). Or, that man can combat injustice "who asserts his own freedom by his vote" (37), or who serves the state with his conscience. Such an individual is "*one* HONEST man," withdrawing from this copartnership in slavery. He "would be the abolition of slavery in America. ...what is once well done is done forever" (41-42). And only his wisdom, his determined voice, and his assured objection, will leaven the whole lump. Years later, Thoreau confirms this: "the faintest assured objection which one healthy man feels will at length prevail over the arguments and customs of mankind" (*Walden* 216). "The faintest assured objection" of "one HONEST man" is urgently needed in his serious situation. Then, this image of one honest man to leaven the whole lump induces Thoreau to quote Confucius saying, "The virtues of a superior man are like the wind; the virtues of a common man are like the grass; the grass, when the wind passes over it, bends" (*Walden* 172). What is needed now is, if not a majority, but a *man*, private and individual. For, he will leaven the whole lump, the whole people, as the wind passes over it.

Then, how is every man, every individual, to be related to the government? What to do with his "right of revolution"? Should he continue to protest until he sees his aims be carried out? No, he should not, Thoreau says, because the state will be seen nowhere if he joins a huckleberry party on a hill a few miles off. His assured objection, however faint, is his revolution, all of his resistance. For, once it is done, it is done forever. The reason is, "[he] came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad" (Civil Disobedience 40). Then, what to do to the government "he cannot without disgrace be associated with" (34) is "to wash his hands of it," and "not to give it practically his support." Every man has some other concerns, some other pursuits and contemplations to engage him (38). Then, at least, he should

not "pursue them sitting upon another man's shoulders" (38), since he is "the lord of a realm" (*Walden* 321). Thoreau calls for annulment of association with a government or a state. It is Thoreau's "doctrine of individual nullification" (Parrington 2: 410) and "individual 'disunion' from the state" (Rosenblum xix). Though disunited from it, Thoreau never declines to pay the highway tax, and he is even desirous of being a good neighbor. He is not an anarchist activist, nor a ruffian.[6] He likes to live in this world as a good neighbor. Rather, a "desperate odd-fellow" is the government, Thoreau retorts (*Walden* 171). Thoreau simply wishes "to refuse to allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually" (Civil Disobedience 50). Thoreau's attitude to the government or the state is completely expressed in these words, splendidly. But these words do not close any form and implication, but rather set free all suggestions, spontaneously going toward Confucius:

> Confucius said: "If a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame; if a state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honors are the subjects of shame" (Civil Disobedience 44). (In the "Commonplace book," it reads: "poverty and misery are a subject of shame," and "riches and honors are then the subjects of shame.")

The way the people are related to the state should be necessarily a moral relation. To be related to the state or the government, it does not mean for the citizen to "resign his conscience to the legislator" (Civil Disobedience 32), to act against their common sense, to give up the free exercise of judgment, or to blunt the moral sense. How shall we live in the state is unavoidably a moral question for every man. Hence there is the reason why Confucian dialogues repeat discussions related to "poverty and misery." It is undoubtedly because Thoreau felt more deeply this important moral question in the French text of Pauthier, rather than in that of Marshman and Collie, that he dared to try his own translation from Pauthier. We will discuss this, comparing Pauthier's text with some other English texts:

Pauthier's French translation is: Quand l'État est gouverné par les principes de la droite raison, recevoir des émoluments; quand l'État n'est pas gouverné par les principes de la droite raison, recevoir également des émoluments: c'est là de la honte. (Pauthier, *Confucius et Mencius*, p. 195)

Marshman's translation is: When a country is in a state of order, men (void of learning) poor and useless, are exposed to shame: in a country without order, such (though) rich and honorable, still expose themselves to shame. (Marshman, *Confucius*, Vol. 1, pp.551-52)

Collie's translation is: ... when a country is governed by reason to have a salary, (a sinecure) and when a country is not governed by right principles, to have a salary, are both shameful things. (Collie, *The Chinese Classical Work*, Vol. II, Hea Lun, Chap. XIV, p. 125)

James Legge's translation is: When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honour are things to be ashamed of. (James Legge, *The Chinese Classics, vol. 1. Confucius*, p. 76)

Reading and comparing these translations, it might be difficult for us to discern why Thoreau did not use any published English translation available at his day, and dared to translate himself from the French text. Before beginning his translation, Thoreau translates some passages from Pauthier's "Introduction" in his "Commonplace book," pp. 127-28. He seems to have been greatly impressed with it. Undoubtedly, it seems, the "Introduction" somehow moved Thoreau.

Pauthier's "Introduction," in comparison with those in other English translators, reveals clearly a deeper and more insightful understanding of the Chinese philosophy. According to Pauthier, it is the greatest and most extraordinary philosophy of human intelligence that has ever been produced in the past centuries. Thoreau translates some passages from this introduction in his

"Commonplace book," p. 127:

> Indeed it is a phenomenon which we can call extraordinary, that of the Chinese nation and the Hindoo nation preserving themselves immoveable, from the remotest origin of human societies, on the so moveable and changing scene of the world! One would say that their first legislators, seizing with their arms of iron these nations in their cradle, had impressed upon them an indelible form, (and) cast them, so to speak, in a mould of brass, so strong has been the impress, so durable has been the form! Assuredly, there are there some vestiges of the eternal laws which govern the world. (Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 3; Tan 288)

The Chinese civilization is the most ancient one on earth, and the *Chou-king* includes the most ancient documents of the history of the Chinese. Therein respires "la haute raison, le sens éminemment morale" (the noble reason, the eminently moral sense. Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 4).[7] This kind of book, Pauthier's Introduction continues, would have never been possible without a great moral culture. It would be impossible to find any other which surpasses it in our age. This kind of great moral culture is doubtlessly very important for the history of humanity as the fruit of an advanced civilization. It is the product that has been developed from a right and reflective nature, as well as a philosophical and historical insight.

Pauthier, then, draws our attention to the thoughts on the Divinity in the Chinese philosophy, the beneficent influence working in the world. What attracts us all without fail is "l'intervention constante du Ciel ou de la Raison suprême dans les relation des princes avec les polulations, ou des gouvernements avec les gouvernés; et cette intervention est toujours en faveur de ces derniers, c'est-à-dire du peuple" (the intervention of the Heaven or the supreme Reason in the relations of the princes with the people, or of governments with the governed; and this intervention is always in favor of the latter, that is to say, the people. Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 5). Isn't it the idea and assertion of Thoreau himself in his "Civil Disobedience," that in the relation of

the government with the governed, the supreme Reason is always in favor of the governed? The rights and the duties of the sovereign and the people, of the government and the governed, have never been expressed in a more elevated way. That is also the principle of the democracy we find in our modern society. Pauthier, therefore, goes on to say: "C'est bien là qu'est constamment mise en pratique cette grande maxime de la démocracie moderne: vox populi, vox Dei, «la voix du peuple est la voix de Dieu.»" (There it is, there is put into practice with consistency this grand maxim of the modern democracy: vox populi, vox Dei, «the voice of people is the voice of God.» *Confucius et Mencius* 5), and then, in order to disclose the concepts of the Chinese philosophy, quotes he thinks typical passages from his own translation:

> «Ce que le Ciel voit et entend n'est que ce que le peuple voit et entend. Ce que le peuple juge digne de récompense et de punition est ce que le Ciel veut punir et récompenser. Il y a une communication intime entre le Ciel et le peuple; que ceux qui gouvernent les peuple soient donc attentifs et réservés. » (*Les livres sacrés* 57-58)
> (What the Heaven sees and hears is nothing but what the people see and hear. What the people judge worth reward and punishment is what the Heaven wishes to punish and reward. There is an intimate communication between the Heaven and the people; those who govern the peoples therefore should be scrupulous and reserved.)

> «Obtiens l'affection du peuple, et tu obtiendras l'empire;
> Perds l'affection du peuple, et tu perdras l'empire.» (*Confucius et Mencius* 62)
> (Gain the affection of the people, and then you will gain the empire ;
> Lose the affection of the people, and then you will lose the empire.)

Stressing "vox populi, vox Dei," — the voice of the people is the voice of the Heaven, — Pauthier writes that the Chinese moralists have never admitted the authority of the government unless Heaven or Reason embraces it. As Thoreau in "Civil Disobedience," seeing the authority of his government as impure,

declares, "to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed" (Civil Disobedience 55). Any authority losing the respect of the people, the affection of the people, should be destroyed immediately and give way to another legitimate authority mainly aiming at the welfare of the people. As we read in Thoreau, "Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect" (32), without which the authority would be impossible. In fact, who could think of democracy without "a true respect for the individual" (55)? This must be the "grande maxime de la démocracie moderne," the great maxim of the modern democracy, which Thoreau reads and responds to in Pauthier.

And then, focusing on Confucius (Khoung-tseu), his *Lûn-yù* ou les *Entretiens philosophiques* (*Analects*) in particular, Pauthier writes that human reason has never been represented with more dignity, and it is truly the expression of a high and virtuous intelligence in an advanced civilization. We will nowhere be able to find more elevated and nobler ideas, very simple and wholly founded on human nature. There we read, as Pauthier quotes, Confucius said, « Ma doctrine est simple et facile à pénétrer ». (My doctrine is simple and easy to understand.) And then, one of his disciples added: « La doctrine de notre maître consiste uniquement à posséder la droiture du cœur et à aimer son prochain comme soi-même » (The doctrine of our master consists solely in having the uprightness of mind and in loving our neighbors like ourselves. *Lûn-yù* ch. iv, §15; *Confucius et Mencius* 130-131). To have the uprightness of mind, and to love neighbors, — this is the Confucian doctrine expressed by this quotation. And then this leads Thoreau to his way of thinking as we read in "Civil Disobedience," for instance: "It is not so important that many should be good as you, as that there be some absolute goodness somewhere." We are familiar with a similar expression concerning a little leaven to be found in I Cor. v. 6. , to which Harding refers in "Notes" of his *Variorum Civil Disobedience* (60). In spite of the similarity, it does not seem that Thoreau in this instance refers to a religious principle based on the Christian Bible. A little leaven that will leaven the whole lump is justice, and the whole lump refers to the people, or the neighbors. What is important is "a little leaven," namely justice, or an individual goodness, which is called "some absolute goodness." As Thoreau asserts, there-

fore, in order to abolish slavery, there must be "absolute goodness," and "if *one* HONEST man, *ceasing to hold slaves*, in this State of Massachusetts, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefore, it would be the abolition of slavery in America" (Civil Disobedience 43-4). The key words are justice, uprightness, and neighbors, and he introduces the image of an independent individual as a little leaven.

Refusing to pay poll-tax, Thoreau has "never declined paying the highway tax, because [he is] . . . desirous of being a good neighbor" (Civil Disobedience 50). His neighbors, however, do not seem aware how to "refuse allegiance to the State ... effectually." They "[march] in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their will, ay, against their common sense and consciences" (33). They have no doubts of their "damnable business," while "they are all peaceably inclined" (33). Peaceably inclined, they obey "unjust laws" (39). With "no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense" (33), they "are commonly esteemed good citizens" (34). Indeed, they can be good citizens only when they lose common sense. Could they be trusted as good neighbors and friends? No, they are "a distinct race from me," Thoreau writes definitely, "by their prejudices and superstitions" (49). So, then, they need to wake up. They need something to wake themselves up with. Thoreau writes in *Walden*, therefore: "I do not propose to write an ode to dejection, but to brag as lustily as chanticleer in the morning, standing on his roost, if only to wake my neighbors up" (84). This passage is put on the title page, and it is the only passage repeatedly used twice in his writings.

His neighbors need Chanticleer to wake them up from the sleep of moral sense, common sense, and conscience, or from prejudices and superstitions. For, to use Thoreau's expression, "moral reform is the effort to throw off sleep. ... To be awake is to be alive" (*Walden* 90). His neighbors have to hear Chanticleer crow on the trees, and Thoreau figuratively and symbolically recommends, "think of it ! It would put nations on the alert. Who would not be early to rise, and rise earlier and earlier every successive day of his life, till he became unspeakably healthy, wealthy, and wise?" (127)

As Thoreau wishes "to brag as lustily as Chanticleer in the morning, standing on his roost, if only to wake my neighbors up," Pauthier understands the

Chinese philosophy as a mission to convey the old wisdom to the posterity. The philosopher tries to learn it, but not to make up new ideas: "j'éclaircis (les anciens ouvrages), mais je n'en compose pas de nouveaux" (I lighten the ancient works, but I do not compose anew. *Lûn-yù*, ch. vii, §1; *Confucius et Mencius* 145). Also, "je ne naquis point doué de la science. Je suis un homme qui a aimé les anciens, et qui a fait tous ses efforts pour acquérir leurs connaissances" (I am never born with learning. I am a man who have loved the ancients and who have made all the efforts in order to acquire their knowledge. *Lûn-yù*, ch. vii, §19; *Confucius et Mencius* 148). As Pauthier shows from these passages, the aim of the Chinese philosophy is:

> "*l'amélioration constante de soi-même et des autres hommes;* de soi-même d'abord, ensuite des autres. L'amélioration ou le perfectionnement de soi-même est d'une nécessité absolue pour arriver à l'amélioration et au perfectionnement des autres (Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 10).
> (the constant amelioration of oneself; of oneself to begin with, and then the others. The amelioration or the perfection of oneself is absolutely necessary in order to arrive at the amelioration or the perfection of the others.)

To seek the wisdom of the ancients, to try to improve thyself incessantly, and then to extend to the others! We read indeed a Confucian quotation of the same kind of thinking in *Walden*, which Thoreau quotes from the *Grand Etude:* "Renew thyself completely each day; do it again, and again, and forever again" (*Walden* 88). Confucius seeks to convey his philosophy and his way of thinking to those who govern the people: how and what to do to be beneficial to the governed and to make them happy. His is a practical philosophy, extending to all the conditions of daily life, all the affairs of social life. It is simultaneously a philosophy for the rights and duties of the government to improve itself and then to extend the virtue to the people, that is to say, "You who govern public affairs, what need have you to employ punishment? Love virtue, and the people will be virtuous" (*Walden* 172). We read repeatedly the same kind of thoughts

in some other places, for instance, "Virtue does not remain as an abandoned orphan; it must of necessity have neighbors" (*Walden* 134).

It is not, however, that there can be found no difference between the democratic concepts of Chinese philosophy and modern society. According to Pauthier, the moral and political laws in the former should be conceived and taught by a few sages and then extended to the people, while those in the latter should be conceived by each of the constituents of the society who are equal in spite of their differences of the ability to distinguish justice from injustice, and those of moral and intellectual education. Since Thoreau in "Civil Disobedience" thinks "it is not so important that many should be as good as you, as that there be some absolute goodness somewhere," he is more sympathetic toward the democratic ideas of the Chinese philosophy rather than toward those of modern democracy. And this is undoubtedly related to Thoreau's insistence on the dignity of an individual or a minority in the democratic society. Hence, he protests to his government, "Why does not [the government] cherish its wise minority?" (Civil Disobedience 39)

Affirming the essential attitude of Confucius to government as justice and right, Pauthier refers us to one passage in the text: "le gouvernement, c'est ce qui est juste et droit. Si vous gouvernez avec justice et droiture, qui oserait ne pas être juste et droit?" (the government, it is what is just and right. If you govern with justice and rectitude, who will not be just and right? *Lûn-yú*, ch. xii, § 17; *Confucius et Mencius* 183). It is the eternal law for the government to make the people happy, and as Pauthier repeatedly says, the aim of Chinese philosophy is the instruction of the duties of governments as the perfection of oneself and the practice of virtue for all men. Here, the Confucian sayings reminds Pauthier of Plato's dialogues, in which Socrates as master supervises the dialogues and discussions with his disciples. It seems that Pauthier tells of Confucius, taking notice of Socrates at the same time, when he explains the characteristics of *Lûn-yú* (*Analects*):

> C'est dans ces *Entretiens philosophique* que se révèle à nous toute la belle âme de Khoung-tseu, sa passion pour la vertu, son ardent amour de l'humanité et du bonheur des homes (Introduction to

> *Confucius et Mencius* 24).
> (It is in this *Philosophical Dialogues (Analects)* that arises in us all the beautiful soul of Confucius, his passion for the virtue, his ardent love of humanity, and of happiness of men.)

Pauthier then proceeds to the *Tchoung-young*, seeing there "*des principes métaphysiques* fondés sur la nature de l'homme et les lois éternelles de monde" (metaphysical principles founded on the nature of men and the eternal law of the world. Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 16). With these characteristics, *Tchoung-young* is ranked as the first metaphysics of the world, though the modern European writers, Hegel and Ritter for instance, are loath to acknowledge the Chinese philosophy. These characteristics also remind Pauthier of the philosophy of Stoics such as Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Aristotle. Pauthier therefore understands the Chinese philosophy as follows:

> Selon le philosophe chinois, le *parfait*, le vrai, dégagé de tout mélange, est la loi du ciel; la *perfection* ou le *perfectionnement*, qui consiste à employer tous ses efforts pour découvrir et suivre la loi céleste, le vrai principe du mandat du ciel, est la loi de l'homme. Par coséquant, il faut que l'homme atteigne la *perfection* pour accomplir sa propre loi (Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 18-19).
> (According to the Chinese philosopher, the *perfection*, the truth, wholly unalloyed, is the law of heaven; the *perfection* or the *perfecting*, which consists in using every effort to discover and follow the celestial law, the true principle of heaven, is the law of the man. In consequence, the man must attain the *perfection* to achieve his own law.)

In the case of Mencius (Meng-tseu), his way of philosophy resembles that of Socrates and Plato, with more vigor and sally. No other Oriental writers would be able to give more charms to the Europeans, and the French in particular. For his sally is nothing but the vivacity of his mind. He deals with irony with perfection, which is "plus dangereuse et plus aiguë que dans celles du sage

Socrate." (more dangerous and sharper than that of Socrates the sage. Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 30). In that sense, Pauthier concludes, Mencius is among a few geniuses who have clarified the human condition, leading humans toward civilization (33). François Jullien's *Fonder la morale* is a very stimulating discussion on Mencius in comparison with Kant, Rousseau, and Nietzsche, and the way it approaches Chinese philosophy is certainly one of the splendid examples in Oriental studies in France, which is quite different from those of Hegel and Ritter in Germany. Thoreau also translates some passages of M. A. Langlois' French text of *Harivansa* in his "Commonplace book," pp. 151-161, using a passage in *Walden*, "An abode without birds is like a meat without seasoning" (85). (See Illustration). Thoreau has appreciated the French understanding of the Oriental literature, but not that of the big names in Germany.

Ⅳ.

It is not that the way Pauthier shows in his "Introduction" in approaching and understanding the Chinese philosophy was shared by readers in Europe and America in the early nineteenth century. Before the Pauthier's translation, there were already available some French translations, as well as English translations, by missionaries. Pauthier, however, felt dissatisfied with them, writing in his note that "la traduction des missionaires n'est qu'une longue paraphrase enthousiaste dans laquelle on reconnait à peine le texte original" (the translation by these missionaries is nothing but a long rapturous paraphrase in which one hardly recognizes the original text. Introduction to *Confucius et Mencius* 33, n). Though Thoreau does not leave any note regarding the use of his own translation in his writings instead of English translations, it seems that he must have felt discontented with them as Pauthier did. Thoreau, on the contrary, seems to have been moved and delighted to read Pauthier's interpretation, one that seemed more sincere and deeper than those of the missionaries. We should be pleased with Thoreau's sympathetic approach to Pauthier for the free and open-minded development of American Transcendentalism. Thoreau will not follow the authority of great names like Hegel and Ritter, as he does not recog-

nize the authority of the state. He will consult only the authority of his own conscience, the free exercise of the judgment or of the moral sense. Judgment is done in the conscience, and in that sense, "every man is the lord of a realm," and it is all dissipation for us to "seek so anxiously to be developed, to subject [ourselves] to many influences to be played on" (*Walden* 328).

Beginning the "Introduction" to his translation, *Les livres sacrés de l'Orient*, Pauthier asks, why do Europeans begin to study foreign matters, far away oriental subjects, unless in order to inspire and enlarge their field of intellectual interests? Things, however, do not always move as we expect, and it is very interesting to read Pauthier admonish the reader not to be misguided by famous names in terms of the Chinese classic literature and civilization. Accordingly, his translation is planned to correct the prejudices and false ideas in regard to the Oriental civilizations. While the study on and interests in them are becoming increasingly necessary for the Europeans, the majority of published books and ideas are unfortunately based on false, inexact, and weak systems, taking no account of the important civilizations that have greatly influenced the general development of humanity. Pauthier, therefore, has inevitably been forced to embark on his own translation. He has been losing patience with superficial and suspicious knowledge and understanding, guided by the great names in particular whose teachings spread with ease among the reading public as authoritative. He gives us two examples, in which German historians are unfair and groundless in their judgments on Confucius and the Chinese philosophy:

> Nous avons des entretiens de Confucius avec ses disciples, dans lesquels est exprimée une morale populaire; cette morale se trouve partout, chez tous les peuples, et meilleure; elle n'a rien que de vulgaire. Confucius est un philosophe pratique; la philosophie speculative ne se rencontre pas dans ses écrits; ses doctrines morales ne sont que bonnes, usuelles, mais on n'y peut rien apprendre de special. L'ouvrage moral de Cicéron, *De Officiis*, nous en apprend plus et mieux que tous les ouvrages de Confucius; et, d'après ses ouvrages originaux, on peut émettre l'opinion qu'il vaudrat mieux

pour la reputation de Confucius qu'ils n'eussent jamais été traduits (Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Erster Band. S. 140-141).

(We have conversations between Confucius and his followers in which there is nothing definite further than a commonplace moral put in the form of good, sound doctrine, which may be found as well expressed and better, in every place and amongst every people. Cicero gives us *De Officiis*, a book of moral teaching more comprehensive and better than all the books of Confucius. He is hence only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom — one with whom there is no speculative philosophy. We may conclude from his original works that for their reputation it would have been better had they never been translated. — Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, trans. by E. S. Haldane, p. 121.)

Quant aux écrits attribués à Confucius, et qui sont pour ses compatriots comme le sources de la sagesse, on peut remarquer que les Chinois réputent quelquefois sagesse tout autre chose que ce que nous regardons comme philosophie; car ses règles de conduite et ces sentences morales répétées jusqu'à satiété, qu'on rencontre dans les écrits de ce sage, ces formes de pratiques extérieures qui s'y trouvent prescrites, et tout cela sans le moindre ensemble, ne mérite de nous qu'un sourire sur le sérieux plein de roideur qui voudrait faire passer ces maximes pour quelque chose d'important (Ritter, *Histoire de la philosophie ancienne*. Traduction Française de M. Tissot, t. I, p. 52).

(As to the writings ascribed to Confucius, which in China are considered as fountains of wisdom, they at least are sufficient to shew that something very different passed current as philosophy with the Chinese than with ourselves: for the trite rules of life and the pithy proverbs which they contain, and the forms of conventional practices which they prescribe, and string together without the least coherence or connexion, are only calculated to awaken a smile at the

> sober earnestness with which their observance is enjoined as matters of the great importance. Heinrich Ritter, *the History of Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 1, trans. by A. J. W. Morrison, p. 58.)

Persistent influences by big names like Hegel do not seem to have disappeared even in our times. Hegel, not only in the above cited work, but also in *The Philosophy of History*, bases his view of world civilization on "reason," that is to say, "the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process" (9). What is called civilization, world history, or universal history, belongs to the realm of reason, and reason shares the same realm with spirit. Spirit displays itself in its most concrete reality. And "the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom," Hegel says, "as the essence of matter is gravity." It is that the essence of reason or spirit is freedom, and we cannot think of reason without freedom. They are inseparable. "Philosophy teaches that all the qualities of Spirit exist only through Freedom; that all are but means for attaining Freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone" (17). Namely, reason is the freedom by which world or civilization develops. Thence, we may say that the essence of world history is spirit or reason, which is the process of its development. And then, we are astounded to read Hegel write:

> The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit — Man *as such* — is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that *one is free*. But on this very account, the freedom of that one is only caprice; ferocity — brutal recklessness of passion, or mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature — more caprice like the former. — That *one* is therefore only a Despot; not *a free man* (*Philosophy of History* 18).

How far this view of Hegel on freedom is from that of Thoreau! He says that he is "more than usually jealous with respect to [his] freedom" (Life 160). It is the American government that "does not keep the country free" (Civil Disobedience 32), and there, "a sixth of the population of a nation which has

undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves" (35). On the other hand, according to Thoreau, there is in China the tradition of individual liberty. If our civilization progresses from monarchy to democracy, with "a true respect for the individual," how good it is to read a philosopher in China who "is wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of empire" (55). The addition of this passage in the 1866 version is indispensable to finish Thoreau's essay, for "a true respect for the individual," and "to regard the individual as the basis of empire," namely, Thoreau's idea or view on "individual" is the core of his "Civil disobedience." Confucian ideas are a finishing touch to it. In that sense, Thoreau and Pauthier stand in quite the opposite position to that of Hegel, so far as the view on freedom is concerned. The difference becomes clear when Hegel explains his views on the State as a communal life: "the actually existing, realized moral life" (*Philosophy of History* 38). The universal, essential Will and that of the individual are one in Hegel. This is what Hegel means by "Morality." A moral life would be impossible unless the individual lives within the unity of the universal will and the individual one.

Developing his views further, Hegel now brings up the case of Sophocles' *Antigone*, in which the heroine says: "The divine commands are not of yesterday, nor of to-day; they have an infinite existence, and no one could say whence they came" (*Philosophy of History* 38-39). Hegel does not admit Antigone's defiance of Creon's edict. Her disobedience of the King's law, the state law, or the civil law, should not be allowed, because the communal law, or the State law, is Reason itself. It is "an infinite existence," an eternal law, and the life and activities of men would not be possible without the state. For Hegel, the state is "the Divine Idea" (39), and it is that law and morality are not separable from the ideal of freedom. They are inseparable, and it is stressed, "Society and State are the very conditions in which Freedom is realized" (41). Europeans have become acquainted with Chinese morality in terms of Christian morality, and the writings of Confucius have been read with praise and attention. To those growing readers, however, Hegel admonishes that in the Confucian writings there is not found "the essential consciousness of the Idea of Freedom. ... Freedom, through which alone the essential determinations of Reason become moral sentiments, is wanting" (71). It is needless to say that Thoreau, who

has read and translated some passages from *Antigone*, does not agree with such classical republicanism as shown there.[8]

Hegel also writes about the unity of the substantial Spirit and the individual in Chinese philosophy. That means the disappearance of the individual into the state, and furthermore, there is "no self-cognizance at all in antithesis to substantial, positive being, ... In China the Universal Will immediately commands what the Individual is to do, and the latter complies and obeys with proportionate renunciation of reflection and personal independence" (*Philosophy of History* 120). Hegel will not recognize the subjectivity there, the moral disposition of the subject, or the individual power in the political totality. What he admits is only "One Being of the State supremely dominant" and the individual "resembles nothing" (120-21). On what foundation is Hegel's thought and judgment based? As we continue to read Hegel, we feel ourselves receding further and further from Thoreau, as well as from Pauthier, in regard to the importance of the individual in understanding Chinese philosophy. As Thoreau quotes from Confucius in the Conclusion of *Walden*, "From an army of three divisions one can take away its general and put it in disorder; from the man the most abject and vulgar one cannot take away his thought" (328). A man, an individual, however abject and vulgar, is stronger than a great army, a powerful state, while keeping his own thought. What Hegel has written on Confucius should be applied to Hegel himself: "a circumlocution, a reflex character, and circuitousness in the thought, which prevents it from rising above mediocrity" (*Philosophy of History* 136). Then, so long as we see Thoreau's and Pauthier's understandings of Confucius, Hegel seems blinded by mediocrity and prejudice, or Eurocentrism, even when compared with the American Transcendentalists. He speaks, not for the world, but only for the provincial corner he inhabits, to use Thoreau's phrase:

> To an American reader, who, by the advantage of his position, can see over that strip of Atlantic coast to Asia and the Pacific, who, as it were, sees the shore slope upward over the Alps to the Himmaleh mountains, the comparatively recent literature of Europe often appears partial and, clannish, and, notwithstanding the limited range

> of his own sympathies and studies, the European writer who presumes that he is speaking for the world, is perceived by him to speak only for the corner of it which he inhabits (*A Week* 142).

Hegel neither approaches nor understands the Chinese ideas of reason; he views them much the same way the Chinese describe the origin of things: "nothing, emptiness, the altogether undetermined, the abstract universal." What the Greeks called the absolute, and the moderns call the highest existence, seems to Hegel to be abolished in the Chinese philosophy, because it expresses Being only by negation. In consequence, he cries at last, "What is there to be found in all this learning?" (*History of Philosophy* 125). But Thoreau, on the other hand, sees in what Hegel has discarded as meaningless and worthless, sees and reads the core of the modern democracy: a true respect for the individual.

V.

Now that we have discussed Thoreau's views on government or the state, we come back again to our worrying question, how is every individual to be related to it? At the beginning of the essay, we read the motto, "that government is best which governs least." What is it like, a government that governs not at all? Is it possible in our society? Whether possible or impossible, Thoreau says, that is the government he wishes to have in the future, in a democratic society to come. Actually, the government is an expedient, and it is usually inexpedient. Every one, therefore, has to live under an inexpedient government. Whether liking or disliking it, no one has any other world but that.

One sort of state Thoreau waits for is a "really free and enlightened State" (Civil Disobedience 55). It is the State one step advanced beyond such a democracy as we know it. It regards the individual as the basis of the empire, as Confucius says. It recognizes and organizes the rights of man. Such a state, however, is not seen yet anywhere. Since the state or government as we see at present is an expedient, and usually inexpedient, nothing would be more dangerous than for us to resign our conscience to it. Nothing would be more

unreasonable than to support it by voting. Instead, we should try deliberately not to be bound and swallowed by it. Isn't it far more important for us to deliberate how "to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually." For, whereas government is an expedient, our life is not. To live in this world is not like a sort of gambling, nor like voting. It is not to leave our whole character to the mercy of chance. For Thoreau, to live is "not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad" (Civil Disobedience 40), with whole character.

Thoreau writes, "the government does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it. It is not many moments that I live under a government, even in this world" (Civil Disobedience 52), because into these moments, he must "cast [his] whole vote, ... [his] whole influence" (42). In later essays, Thoreau still continues to stick to this problem, and writes, "practically, I have never fairly recognized that it (politics) concerns me at all" (Life 177). It is "superficial and inhuman." And again in "Walking," he writes:

> Politics is but a narrow field, and that still narrower highway yonder leads to it. ... I pass from it as from a bean field into the forest, and it is forgotten. In one half-hour I can walk off to some portion of the earth's surface where a man does not stand from one year's end to another, and there, consequently, politics are not, for they are but as the cigar-smoke of a man (Walking 599).

Politics, it is forgotten, when he passes into the forest. It must be a thing to be forgotten, just like cigar-smoke, and then, he can find it nowhere, when for instance he joins a huckleberry party on a hill a few miles off. Disappearance of both politics and the state, we can say, that is the state Thoreau waits for, as he writes: "a State at last ... which even would not think it inconsistent with its repose, if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men" (Civil Disobedience 55). That is what Thoreau implies with his motto, the government "which governs not at all." For a truly good state, Thoreau believes, "would end by making itself redundant" (Howe 23). In other words, it is such a

government as let the governed alone, as they do not need remember, and they are not reminded of (*Journal* 4: 3).[9] So he thinks it necessary, not to be embraced by, but to keep proper distance from it, "to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually." Two miles off the Concord prison, in the huckleberry field, as is written in "Civil Disobedience," the State is nowhere seen.

Here again, Confucius and Chinese philosophy reflect Thoreau's view on and attitude to the state. Thoreau translates some passages from Pauthier's Oriental text in his "Commonplace book," one of which impresses Thoreau much in terms of this theme. There (Lûn-yùs, XI, 25; *Confucius et Mencius* 176-78), the Philosopher is seated along with his disciples, Tseu-lou, Thseng-sie, Yan-yeou, and Kong-si-hoa. The Philosopher asks, what would you do if any one asked you to serve a state. Yeou (Tseu-lou) answers first, with a brisk and respectful air, that, if he is appointed to its administration, "in less than three years, I could accomplish that the people of this kingdom should recover a manly courage, and know their condition." The philosopher smiles at these words. The next, and then the next disciple answers in turn, and lastly, the philosopher asks Tian (Thseng-sie), what he thinks. He draws some rare sounds from his guitar, and respectfully replies that his opinion differs from those of his three fellow disciples. The Philosopher urges him again to express his thoughts, and then he says:

> Spring time being no more, my robe of spring laid aside, but covered with the bonnet of manhood, accompanied by five or six men, and six or seven young people, I should love to go and bathe in the waters of the -Y-, to go and take the fresh air in those woody places where they offer sacrifices to heaven to obtain rain, to modulate some airs, and then return to my abode (Tan 292).

Hearing these words, the Philosopher expresses approval with a sign of satisfaction and says, "I am of (the opinion of) Tian ('s mind)." After the other three disciples depart, Tian remains and asks the Philosopher the reason for his smile at Yeou's words. Then, the Philosopher answers, "one ought to administer a kingdom according to the established law and customs; the words

of Yeou were not modest; this is the reason I smiled."

Thoreau must have been deeply impressed with this passage, and it seems that he has come back to that page repeatedly. In the lower margin space of the page in which this passage is written in pen, Thoreau adds in pencil, "For the most part I too am of the opinion of Tian. I am of Tian's mind." (Commonplace book 139; see Illustrations).

The making of Thoreau's view of politics, Chinese philosophy, and his translation of Pauthier's Oriental texts, are inseparably connected. Confucius's words are used many times in his writings, and it is no doubt that Confucian thoughts on state and moral are deeply rooted in Thoreau's thoughts, along with the idea of the individual as the basis of the empire. In regard to the reissue of the *Æsthetic Papers* essay, also, it is possible from the above examination of internal evidence to conclude that Thoreau dictated to Sophia those revisions and additions before his death. Although holograph revisions or corrected copies have not been found, still it seems, Harding is right to assume that the 1866 version is "based in a corrected copy made by Thoreau." His new title "Civil Disobedience," the deletion, and the additions, along with the Confucian addition, are clearly Thoreau's individual impact on his text. Any version without it seems to be a diluted Thoreau.

As we see in Thoreau (and Emerson), indeed, the development of civilization would be impossible without communication with and mixing with foreign civilizations. Regarding American Transcendentalism, Dimock says that it is "a mutt," and it mixes "the Koran with Sufi mysticism as well as the ethics and politics of Plato and Aristotle." It is "a linguistic and philosophical hybrid," with Arabic, Persian, Greek, Roman, Hindu, Chinese, and English (765). Without the Confucian idea of politics expressed in Tian's answer, Thoreau would not have developed his views on, and attitude towards, the state. As he writes in "Slavery in Massachusetts," "Let each inhabitant of the State dissolve his union with her ..." (104). Disunion with the state is the essential goal of his politics, leading him "to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually." For, as we have seen, the way the people is related to the state, or shall live in it, is unavoidably a moral question or a moral relation for every individual. It follows then, since Thoreau's views are based on those of Confucius, Thoreau was nec-

essarily obliged, and could not forget, to employ Confucius's words to the moral position: the individual is the basis of empire.

(November 2004.)

Notes on Illustrations

The first two pages are Thoreau's manuscript, "Commonplace book," pp. 138-39. Thoreau drafts his translation of Pauthier's French text, "Lûn-yù les Entretiens philosophiques," Chap. XI-25; *Confucius et Mencius*, pp. 176-78. On the bottom space of p. 139, Thoreau adds in pencil, "For the most part I too of the opinion of Tian. am of Tian's mind."

The third and forth pages are "Commonplace book," pp. 152-53. Thoreau translates M. A. Langlois' French text, *Harivansa ou Histoire de la Famille de Hari*. On p. 153, we read, "An abode without birds is like a meat without seasoning," which is used in "Where I Lived, and What I Lived for," *Walden*, 85. — the New York Public Library.

quality of a humble functionary.

And you, Tian, what do you think?

The disciple did nothing but draw some rare sounds from his guitar; but these sounds prolonging themselves, he laid it aside, and, rising, replied respectfully: My opinion is from those of my three fellow disciples. — The Philosopher said: What prevents you from expressing it? Each one here can speak his thought. The disciple said: Spring-time being no more, my robe of spring laid aside, but covered with the bonnet of manhood, accompanied by five or six men, and six or seven young people, I should love to go and bathe in the waters of the Y-, to go and take the fresh air in those woody places where they offer sacrifices to heaven to obtain rain, modulate some airs, and then return to my abode.

The Philosopher applauding these words by a sigh of satisfaction, said: I am of the opinion of Tian.

The three disciples departed, but Thsengsie remained yet some time.

Tseng-ni said: What ought one to think of the words of these three disciples? The Philosopher said: Each one of them has expressed his opinion; that is all. — et voilà tout!
— He added: Master, why did you smile at the words of Yeou?

The Philosopher said: To administer a kingdom according to the established laws and customs; the words of Yeou were not modest; this is the reason I smiled.

But Khieou himself, did not he also show the desire to administer a state? How should we see that in a province of sixty or seventy li, or even of fifty or sixty li in extent? That is not a kingdom.

And Tchi, was it not of the affairs of a kingdom that he meant to speak? Those ceremonies of the temple of ancestors, those public assemblies, are they not the privilege of the grandees of all the orders? And Tchi how could he take part in them in the quality of a humble functionary? Whether could perform the great functions?

"The foetus, once constituted, increases like a cloud; the air introduces itself there and is mingled with the supreme breath."

Brahman,

"As for us, who live in the forest, we have our water for drink and the air for nourishment; our teeth, the only mortar which we use; the rock is our bed, and fasting without ceasing, we consume ourselves beside the ardor of the five fires".

"The father of beings has constructed for each one the causeway which he ought to follow in the world."

Vichnou.

"This god is the world; and the three worlds are himself: he comprehends also the gods, and the gods in heaven are yet he. He is a mien, of which the most profound thought does not perceive the other shore; he alone, Madhava, knows the supreme bound-

ries of the worlds. — This mysterious being 153
whom the gods seek the trace".

"An abode without birds is like a meat without seasoning"

"There are none happy in the world but beings who enjoy freely a vast horizon".

"The earth is the abode of beings engaged in the bonds of action, the heavens are the abode of all which has lightness, the capacity of the mind. Swarga is the habitation of those who have acted well, and amassed treasures of good works, and of persistence."

"It is impossible to estimate the destruction of an embryon, the death of a cow, that even of a woman: but into what world can be admitted an ungrateful relation who has slain a benefit."

"My friend, wise men do not praise themselves, and the Vedas approve only the qualities which another can boast in you".

"One of our first obligations is to have every kind of regard for old men, whom it is

Notes:

1. More than eighty editions have been published by 1977, and "the 1999 issue of American *Books in Print* lists thirteen editions for customers to choose among today." See Howe 1.
2. For Thoreau's revisions and plans to publish some other articles in his last days, see *The Days of Henry Thoreau*, 457-58, and *Henry Thoreau: A Life of the Mind*, 388.
3. This is undoubtedly a splendid contribution to the study of American Transcendentalism. Though more than two decades have passed since then, we have not seen research articles on Thoreau based on Thoreau's own translation. Wai Chee Dimock, on the other hand, warns researchers that American Transcendentalists are internationalists-to-a-fault (763-64).
4. Thoreau's quotation from Paley's chapter on "Duty of Submission to Civil Government" is, to be correct: Book VI. Elements of Political Knowledge. Chap. III. "The Duty of Submission to Civil Government explained."
5. Raymond Adams, "Thoreau's Sources for 'Resistance to Civil Government," discusses the same quotation from Emerson as an important source of Thoreau's view on government. See Adams 642-43.
6. Richard Drinnon argues that Thoreau's thought is philosophical anarchism. Thoreau gives us an image of such a future State as "would not think it inconsistent with its own repose," but we may not characterize it as an example of anarchistic ideas of Thoreau. See Drinnon, 129-33.
7. English translation of the French text is hereafter mine, unless especially noted.
8. Howe argues that Thoreau disagrees with classical republicanism which assumes that man is "essentially a political animal and the good, whole life necessarily a political one." See Howe 20.
9. Thoreau writes in his *Journal*, "Where it is the most natural thing in the world for a government that does not understand you, to let you alone ! Oh — what a government were there my countrymen! It is a government that English one — & most other European ones that cannot afford to be forgotten — as you would naturally forget them — that cannot let you go alone, having learned to walk .... In the States it is only once in a dog's age that a man needs remember his government — but here he is reminded of it every day." See *Journal*, 4: 3. This point is mainly discussed in Herr.

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